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Preface
As a scholar from a developing country, I have always been with a cherish of doing
some research on the current development of public international law and its impact on
the developing countries. The creation of the World Trade Organisation and, particularly,
the accession of China to the WTO provide me an opportunity to study international law
against the setting of this new institution and its dispute settlement mechanism.
The World Trade Organisation is a new institution, compared with the United Nations
and many other international organisations. The same sense applies to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, ifwe compare it with the International Court of Justice and other
international tribunals. Despite its short history, the WTO has performed well from the
perspective of both developed and developing countries. Its unique dispute settlement
mechanism has, so far, functioned well in resolving the trade disputes among the Member
governments. The fact that quite a few countries are still waiting for their membership
vindicates this predication. But these positive features do not mean that the WTO and its
dispute settlement mechanism are far from improvements. On the contrary, the active
participation in this institution and frequent use of its dispute settlement mechanism have
exposed their imperfect aspects to the fore. Based on the general principles of public
international law, the research in this thesis is targeted at studying the institutional
features of the WTO and the early practice of its dispute settlement mechanism from a
developing country Member perspective, then, putting forward some proposals for the
future reform.
The three years away from my family and my home country for a PhD degree is an
arduous experience for me. But I feel lucky to have been offered an ideal studying place
by the school of law, the University of Edinburgh, and the thoughtful supervision by
professor Alan E. Boyle. Professor Boyle is an excellent supervisor. He is always ready to
answer my various questions and able to guide me to overcome the difficulties in the way
ofmy research. Without his help, it is impossible for me to finish the thesis today.
I feel much indebted to my parents, my wife, Jianli Chen, and my son, Yandong Hu.
Whenever I feel sick and depressed, I can get comforts and encouragement from them.
Without their support, I cannot continue my research to the end. My gratitude should also
go to Mr. Adnan Amkhan. He is the first person who introduced me to do the research at
the University of Edinburgh. At last, I wish to take this opportunity to thank all my
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Chapter One Introduction: From the GATT to theWTO
Section One The Significance of the New Institution and Basic Differences Between
the GATT and the WTO
1.1.1. The major achievements of the Uruguay Round negotiations
Until the end of 1994, there was no multilateral or international organisation that was
competent to deal with trade issues between countries.1 For almost fifty years, the
international trading system had functioned without such an organisation: under the aegis
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 7ra</e(GATT),2 rules of the game in
international trade had been developed and reasonably respected. But the GATT was
applied through the Protocol ofProvisional Application practised from 1948,3 it did not
have the legal status of an international organisation.4
Then, all of that changed from 1 January 1995. A new institution, the World Trade
Organisation(WTO) came into being for the purposes of assisting the governments of its
Members to better manage problems of international economic interdependence.5 This
event occurred fifty years after the establishment of the Bretton Woods System which
was targeted at setting up a framework to regulate international economic affairs;6 and
1
: The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was substantially concluded on 15 December
1993. From 12 to 15 April 1994, ministers representing the 124 governments and the European
Communities participating in the Uruguay Round negotiations met at Marrakesh, Morocco, to declare that
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was formally concluded. Ministers also declared
that their signature of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade
Negotiations and their adoption of associated Ministerial Decisions initiated the transition from the GATT
to the WTO. They established a Preparatory Committee to lay the ground for the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement and committed themselves to seek to complete all steps necessary to ratify the WTO
Agreement so that the World Trade Organisation could enter into force by 1 January 1995. The WTO was
established according to the original schedule as the necessary ratification of the WTO Agreement by the
participating governments was acquired by the end of 1994. See Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994.
cf. The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Cambridge
University Press(1999).
2
: Originally contemplated as part of the proposed International Trade Organisation(ITO) Charter{Havana
Charter), the GATT was signed in 1947. Because of the failure of the ITO, the GATT had, de facto,
functioned as an organisation to regulate international trade till the day when the WTO was established.
3
: Since Article XXIX:2 ofGATT 1947 states: "Part II of this Agreement shall be suspended on the day on
which the Havana Charter enters into force", it was widely recognised that the purpose for the application
of this protocol was to avoid the losses of those countries which had made their tariff-reducing
commitments before the International Trade Organisation was established and the Havana Charter began
to bind all its participants.
4
: As Schermers and Blokker define: "An international organisation is born when the treaty containing its
constitution comes into force", an agreement with constitutional characteristics is one of the most important
factors for the recognition of an international organisation. See Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker:
International Institutional Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers(1995), p.1617. GATT 1947 is only an official
document to regulate the governments of the potential (ITO) members for their conducts in international
trade. It contains no provisions to define the legal status of an international organisation and its
relationships with its members and other international organisations.
5
: See Article III(Functions of the WTO) of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 1.
6
: It is named after the place Bretton Woods, New Hampshire of the United States, where an international
conference was held from 1 to 22 July 1944. The participants of the conference discussed issues concerning
how to regulate the international economic affairs, especially the financial affairs, after the World War II.
According to professor John Jackson, there were two main objectives sought at the Bretton Woods
1
almost fifty years after the 1947 establishment of the GATT and the later failure of the
International Trade Organisation(ITO),7 which would have been the institution to
complete the Bretton Woods System in parallel with its sister institutions of the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development(World Bank).
The establishment of the WTO is one of the major achievements of the extended
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations(1986-1994) which was under the
auspices of the GATT. This newly-born institution marks the regulation of international
trade shifting from negotiation-orientation to rule-orientation. Although the World Trade
Organisation, as one scholar observed, "has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue
helmets, no truncheons or tear gas",8 the sense of community encourages its Members to
abide by the rules and the possible retaliation measures which are authorised by the WTO
to a suffering Member seem effective, so far, in frightening those potential recalcitrants
who may breach their commitments. In the context of assistance to its Members, the
WTO has no power over debt reduction, nor can it guarantee development funds or
infrastructure spending to assist development. What it may offer is trade rules which are
designed to maximise the benefits from open markets. Apart from these obvious
advantages, there are also some other outstanding achievements resulted from these
multilateral trade negotiations, which can be summarised in the following aspects.
Firstly, the Uruguay Round negotiations have resulted in some impressive advances
in market access with a reduction in the numbers of products exported to the developed
countries from the developing countries in accordance with quotas(the remaining quotas
Conference and the subsequent conferences that led to the negotiations of the GATT and the International
Trade Organisation(ITO). The first objective, and the more important one at that time, but sometimes
overlooked, was the prevention of another war. The idea was to build institutions, which would avoid the
problems that occurred in the inter-war period and that were blamed for leading to the second world war.
The second objective was the economic betterment of the whole world. This is based on general policies
about economics and the market structure of economics. The basic idea is that increasing the amount of
resources for each individualfor family) is the best way to allow that individual to follow his or her choices,
lifestyle, and goals in life. See John H. Jackson: The WTO "Constitution " and Proposed Reforms: Seven
"Mantras" Revisited, Journal of International Economic Law, No.4, 2001, p.68.
7: There are several factors which account for the failure of the ITO. The most prominent one is that such a
surrender of sovereignty was politically premature shortly after the war. However, it is generally
acknowledged that the fault for failure to adopt the complete liberalisation programme lies with the US,
whose executive branch of government by 1950 had decided to abandon attempts to gain legislative
approval for entry into an actual international "organisation". In this regard, it is worth noting that
international trade is an area of commerce where competition and conflict between the US President and
Congress is particularly intense. In the US, then as now, the Congress was determined that the executive
would not gain too much power in the area of foreign trade relations. Thus from the 1930s onward, the US
Congress granted the President limited authority to enter into trade agreements of a reciprocal, bilateral
nature. Clearly, the implications of this are very different from the prospect of entering into a multilateral
organisation. In light of these limitations on presidential action, there could be no entry into the proposed
ITO without specific congressional authorisation. Since the Havana Charter was not passed in the US
Congress, other countries seemed unwilling to join the ITO without the participation of the United States.
See Sara Dillon: International Trade and Economic Law and the European Union, Hart Publishing(2002),
p.27.
8
: Judith Hippler Bello: The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, The American Journal
of International Law, Vol.90, 1996, p.416.
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will be changed into tariffs),9 as well as substantial tariff-cutting(perhaps the most of all
eight rounds of GATT multilateral trade negotiations).10 Some of the most substantial
tariff-cutting has been accomplished by the developing countries. Overall, developed
countries' tariffs on industrial products have been cut by an average of 40 percent, with
the average tariff reduced from 6.3 percent to 3.8 percent. The average tariff cut on
industrial products achieved by developing countries is estimated to be 20 percent with
the average tariff reduced from 15.3 percent to 12.3 percent.11 As the tariff-cutting is
negotiated on a reciprocal basis, the developing countries, while they are expecting to
increase their exports to the developed countries, will also be required to further open
their own markets for foreign investment and products.
Secondly, not only has the largest number of countries in history made significant
trade liberalisation commitments in goods,12 but the participating countries have agreed
to expand the scope of their activities considered to include trade in services and
protection of trade-related intellectual property rights, to reintegrate textiles and apparel
into the GATT system, to start the process of liberalisation in agriculture.13 All countries
ended up agreeing to accept the entire package of agreements, a major change from prior
9
: For example, prior to the WTO, the volume of textile and clothing exports from the developing countries
to the developed countries is decided according to the quotas distributed by the importing countries under
the Multiple Fibre Arrangement)MFA). However, Article 2(6) of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
requires each WTO Member to "integrate into GATT 1994 products which accounted for not less than 16
per cent of the total volume of the Member's 1990 imports of the products" at the establishment of the
World Trade Organisation. The remaining products, which have not been integrated into GATT 1994 under
paragraph 6, shall be integrated in three stages as not less 17 per cent three years after the establishment of
the WTO, not less 18 per cent seven years after the establishment of the WTO, and all other products ten
years after the establishment of the WTO. See supra note 1.
10
: According to the estimates by some scholars, the value of trade covered by tariff-cutting is around 3700
billion US dollars. See John H. Jackson: The World Trade Organisation Constitution and Jurisprudence,
Royal Institute of International Affairs) 1998), p.21.
11
: The sources come from the GATT Secretariat. See The Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral
Trade Negotiations', Market Access for Goods and Services: Overview of the Results, November 1994, at 8.
According to the GATT Secretariat, the trade liberalisation measures implemented during the Uruguay
Round negotiations will result in an increase of almost one-quarter in the volume of goods traded, and an
annual increase in world income of approximately 510 billion US dollars by 2005. Id.
12: 124 countries and the European Communities participated in the Umguay Round negotiations.
13
: Agricultural products had always been treated differently from manufactured goods in the GATT
system. This sense of difference, known as "agricultural exceptionalism", was taken for granted over many
decades. The fact that food security, rural life and culture were intimately tied to viable national
agricultural structures meant that the key participants in the GATT system were not willing to open up
trade in primary products to the same level of competition as other goods. It is for this reason that the
Agreement on Agriculture made in the Uruguay Round negotiations must be seen as a dramatic first step
towards economic integration in food; as well as the first step towards dismantling the traditional protection
of the rural sector, with all that this implies for the national life in many WTO Members. The preamble of
the Agreement on Agriculture states that WTO Members have decided to "establish a basis for initiating a
process of reform of trade in agriculture" and to "establish a fair and market-oriented trading system";
Members are to ensure that "a reform process should be initiated through the negotiation of commitments
on support and protection and through the establishment of strengthened and more operationally effective
GATT rules and disciplines". See supra note 1. See also Sara Dillon, supra note 7, p.175; Dimitris
Moutsatsos: The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: Issues and Perspective(mc\uded in
Negotiating the Future of Agricultural Policies: Agricultural Trade and the Millennium WTO Round,
edited by Sanoussi Bilal and Pavlos Pezaros, The Hague: Kluwer Law International[2000], pp.29-30);
Randy Green: Part II: Review ofSubstantive Agreements(Part IIC: Agreement on Agriculture: the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture), Law and Policy in International Business, No.31, 2000, p. 819.
3
Rounds.14 Although the WTO agreements have no direct effect upon the national law, the
WTO Members are required to keep their domestic law and regulations in conformity
with the WTO rules. This will bring some fundamental changes to the legal system of
some Members, particularly those with a centralised economy. While the opening of
markets for textile and agricultural products may benefit some of the developing
countries, the inclusion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services(GATS) and
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property RightsfTJUPS) within the
ambit of the WTO will surely have some significant impact on most developing
countries. Furthermore, these expansions started the considerations of this institution
beyond trade issues to trade-related ones, although the linkage is still a little murky.15
Thirdly, the Uruguay Round negotiations aimed at phasing out all the "voluntary
export restraint agreements"(prevalent before the Uruguay Round in industries such as
steel, electronic products and motor vehicles), the so-called grey-area practice whereby
one country agrees to limit its exports to another country to a pre-set level. Compliance of
such arrangements with the GATT has always been doubted, as all the compromises and
benefits negotiated are only bilateral, not multilateral.16 However, these arrangements
have long been tolerated by the GATT due to the economic and social significance of the
sectors concerned. The binding commitments offered by each WTO Member have guided
them back to the track of the most-favoured-nation principle, and this will make the
international trade more predictable and enforceable.
Fourthly, the increasing number of accession signifies that the new institution is
attracting more and more countries to join. Some of the new entrants, like China, are
transforming their economies from centralisation to market-orientation. The impact of the
WTO rules upon their domestic systems is comprehensive and ostensible, touching
almost every aspect of their ordinary life. Developing countries are more fully integrated
into the GATT/WTO system than before,17 with a requirement that all WTO Members
should have their goods and service tariff schedules with some constraint on certain
18
developing country exceptions. This measure can be regarded as one of the most
important Uruguay Round achievements.
Last but not least, the Uruguay Round negotiations, for the first time, established an
overall unified dispute settlement mechanism for all portions of the agreements signed
14
: The previous seven rounds of negotiations are: Geneva(1947); Annecy(1949); Torquay(1950);
Geneva(1956); Dillon) 1960-1961); Kennedy) 1962-1967); Tokyo(1973-1979). Only since the Kennedy
Round negotiations, did the multilateral agreements begin to be discussed. However, different from the
practice of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the adoption of the multilateral agreements in the previous
rounds ofnegotiations was not compulsory, but optional.
13
: As for the linkage issues, see Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, The American Journal of
International Law, No.l 2002, pp. 1-145.
16
: For example, Article XIII: 1 of GATT 1947 requires that "No prohibition or restriction shall be applied
by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the
importation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all third
countries is similarly prohibited or restricted".(Emphasis added). See supra note 1.
17
: For example, although the number of participating countries in the Tokyo Round negotiations is 99,
next to that of the Uruguay Round negotiations, few developing countries accepted the negotiated
multilateral agreements (which were called "codes" at that time).
18
: The references to "less-developed contracting party" and "developed contracting party" in GATT 1947
has been transformed as "developing country Member" and "developed country Member" respectively.
See Explanatory Notes to GATT 1994(A). See supra note 1.
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during the negotiations, together with a legal text entitled Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes{Dispute Settlement Understanding or
DSU) to carry out those procedures. These new procedures include measures to avoid the
"blocking" when the Dispute Settlement Body19 decides to establish a panel, to adopt the
panel or Appellate Body report, which frequently occurred under the previous positive
consensus decision-making mechanism,20 and for the first time, a new "appellate
procedure", which is designed to replace some of the procedures that were vulnerable to
blocking. The significance of this new dispute settlement mechanism can best be
described in the words of late His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco at the closing
ceremony of the Uruguay Round negotiations at Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994:
"By bringing into being the World Trade Organisation today, we are enshrining the rule
of law in international economic and trade relations, thus setting universal rules and
disciplines over the temptations of unilateralism and the law of the jungle."21
Although Article XVI: 1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation^the WTO Agreement) states that "Except as otherwise provided under this
Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the
decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES22 to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT
1947",23 the World Trade Organisation is still fundamentally different from its
predecessor, the GATT. Therefore, it is necessary for us to distinguish the basic
differences between the GATT and the WTO before we move into any further research
concerning this new institution.
1.1.2. Basic differences between the GATT and the WTO
The postwar trade and financial order was mainly designed to enable States to
manage their domestic economies, in a manner consistent with political and social
stability and justice, without the risk of setting off a protectionist race to the bottom.
States obligated themselves not to impose quotas or related import restrictions, of the sort
strongly associated with the race to the bottom of the interwar years. On the other hand,
they were not required to eliminate or reduce their import tariffs. The legal structure of
19
: In contrast to the GATT Council, which was the main body to deal with the disputes, the Dispute
Settlement Body is set up particularly to deal with the disputes under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, although it is with the same staff of the General Council. See Article IV:3 of the WTO
Agreement and Article 2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
20
: The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its
consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the
proposed decision. See footnote 1 of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 1. The positive consensus
requires that there is no formal objection from any party present at the meeting in adopting a decision.
Thus, more often than not, a defeated party will object to the passage of a decision which is unfavourable to
it. The WTO, however, has reversed this practice into the negative consensus which requires that there is
no formal objection from any party present at the meeting in negating a decision. It seems unlikely that a
prevailing party will join the consensus to negate the decision which is favourable to it.
21
: GA TTActivities( 1994-1995), Geneva, p.15.
22 :The GATT is not an international organisation, but an international agreement ratified by the
governments of its participants; the contracting parties were those governments which had accepted GATT
1947. When the reference was made as to the joint action of the contracting parties, they were designated as
the CONTRACTING PARTIES.(Note added). See Articles XXV and XXXII of GATT 1947. See supra
note 1.
23: See supra note 1.
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the GATT was designed to facilitate such concessions and make them binding. Over the
years, the two pillars which supported the GATT legal structure are the most-favoured-
nation(MFN) treatment and the national treatment, which are embedded in Article I and
Article III of GATT 1947. The former is designated to regulate the treatment on the
imports from all foreign countries, while the later is to deal with the relationship between
the imports and similar domestic products. The World Trade Organisation has inherited
the basic principles from the GATT in regulating international trade. However, the
GATT, because of its birth defects, had some limitations in carrying out these principles.
In contrast, the WTO has not only strengthened these principles, but expanded the
dimension of their application beyond the trade in goods.24 Therefore, the differences
between the GATT and the WTO are reflected in both their institutional structures and
regulating targets.
The first and most prominent difference lies in the objectives of the GATT and the
WTO, which are defined in the preambles of GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement. The
general objectives of the GATT were defined with a view to "raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the
production and exchange of goods"(Emphasis added). The WTO, in addition to retaining
the objective of raising the living standards of people as its general target, has diverted its
emphasis from the "full use" of the world's resources to the "optimal use" in accordance
with the objectives of sustainable development,25 with a view to "seeking both to protect
and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
developments".26 This change of attitude reflects the fact that the drafters of the WTO
agreements have realised that the economy cannot develop at the expense of the
preservation of natural resources and environmental protection. Although Article XX(g)
of GATT 1947 has already permitted a GATT contracting party(now WTO Member) to
invoke unilateral measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources"
on condition that "such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
24
: For example, Article II and Article XVII ofGATS; Article 3 and Article 4 of TRIPS. See supra note 1.
25
: As professor Patricia Birnie and professor Alan Boyle have observed, the concept of "sustainable
development" is by no means easy to identify. The use of this concept had already emerged prior to the UN
Conference on Environment and Development which was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, but,
obviously, only after the Rio CONFERENCE, did it begin to be frequently adopted as a policy by
numerous governments, both at national and regional levels. The concept is often examplified and
instantiated but rarely, if ever, defined. The majority opinion in the International Court of Justice asserts, in
the context of the Gabcikovo case, that sustainable development "means" looking afresh at the
environmental impact of the project. But sustainable development clearly includes more than this anodyne
prescription. Philippe Sands identified four elements within the concept of "sustainable development", i.e.
(a)inter-generational equity; (b)sustainable use; (c)intra-generational equity; (d)integration of
environmental protection and development. See Philippe Sands: Principles of International Environmental
Law, Manchester University Press(1995), pp. 199-208. Patricia Birine and Alan Boyle defined the concept
of "sustainable development" from both the substantive and procedural levels. They observed Principles 3-
8 and 16 of the Rio Declaration as containing the substantive elements, while Principles 10 and 17
containing the procedural elements of the concept of "sustainable development". See Patricia Bimie and
Alan Boyle: International Law and the Environment, second edition, Oxford University Press(2002),
pp.84-86.
26: See supra note 1.
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domestic production or consumption" against imports entering into its domestic market,27
the scope of application for the WTO Agreement provisions is much broader.
Furthermore, GATT Article(g) is retroactive in nature, while the provisions of the WTO
Agreement, in their nature, seem to be prospective.28 From the perspective of developing
country Members, these provisions mean a lot to them as they have already found it much
more difficult to keep their economic development in accordance with the "optimal use"
ofnatural resources.
The second difference derives from the different legal status of the GATT and the
WTO. Because of its contractual character, the competence of the GATT is quite limited
in regulating international trade, particularly in dealing with the relationships with other
international organisations. Professor John Jackson once observed that "the GATT
limped along for nearly fifty years with almost no basic 'constitution' designed to
regulate its organisational activities and procedures"29 although, through experimentation,
trial and error, the GATT evolved some fairly elaborate procedures for conducting its
business. In contrast, the WTO has its own legal personality and enjoys the full privileges
and immunities of an international organisation. According to the WTO Agreement, the
privileges and immunities to be accorded by a Member to the WTO, its officials, and the
representatives of its Members shall be "similar to the privileges and immunities
stipulated in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised
Agencies, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 November
1947"(Article VIII:4). Within its own competence, the WTO will cooperate with the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank with a view to achieving greater
coherence in the global economic policy-making(Article 111:5). The WTO may also make
appropriate arrangements with other governmental or non-governmental organisations
concerning the matters related to those of the WTO(Article V).30 In the short span of its
new life, the WTO, as professor John Jackson described, appears to be the "prodigal
27: Id.
28
: Professor Jagdish Bhagwati took a different view as to the binding effect of the preamble of the WTO
Agreement. In a recent article, he stated that "many of us nonlegal intellectuals and experts think that the
preamble is like the overture at the opera: the audience is free to rustle through the libretto and even to
whisper to friends until the real opera begins!". He did not agree that the WTO Agreement should be
interpreted as a nod in favour of shifting GATT Article XX in a more environmentally friendly direction, as
the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case did. See Jagdish Bhagwati: Afterword: The Question of Linkage,
The American Journal of International Law, No.l, 2002, p.133 and note 27. The author cannot agree with
him on these points. Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: "The context for
the purpose of interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including the preamble and
annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty; (b)any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty." See
Basic Documents in International Law, fourth edition, edited by Ian Brownlie, Oxford University
Press(1995). Thus, the binding effect of the preamble in a multilateral treaty like the WTO Agreement, in
the view of the author, should be the same as that of the context.
29: See supra note 10, p. 19.
30
: As for the relationship with those non-governmental organisation, Article 8(2) of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade requires WTO Members to "ensure that their central government bodies rely
on conformity assessment procedures operated by non-governmental bodies only if these latter bodies
comply with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, with the exception of the obligation to notify proposed
conformity assessment procedures". See supra note 1.
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child" of the international trading system,31 already establishing a fairly good relationship
with relevant international organisations.
The third difference is concerned with the mandates of the GATT and the WTO. The
GATT's original mandate was to facilitate the implementation of the General Agreement.
After decades of development, the GATT legal system evolved two fundamental goals or
functions, i.e. (a)to reduce the policy-related uncertainty surrounding the exchange of
goods across national frontiers by providing a set of rules and procedures governing
countries' trade-related policies; (b)to provide a forum for dispute settlement, and for
negotiations both to strengthen and extend the rules and procedures, and to further
liberalise trade-related policies. In the Uruguay Round negotiations, participants gave the
WTO a mandate that expands in some important ways on the GATT's mandate. Article
III of the WTO Agreement spells out the five functions of the WTO, i.e. (a)to administer
the implementation of the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements that together
make up the WTO legal framework; (b)to act as a forum for negotiations among its
Members concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the
covered agreements; (c)to administer the application of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding and arrange the dispute settlement among its Members; (d)to administer
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism to review their national trade policies of its
Members; (e)to co-operate with the IMF and the World Bank with a view to achieving
greater coherence in global economic policy-making. The first of these WTO's functions
is inherited directly from the GATT's original mandate; the second and the third are
derived from the GATT's practice; and the fourth was provisionally added in 1989 and
made permanent under the WTO. The fifth function is a completely new addition.32
The fourth difference reflects different binding effects of the agreements under the
GATT and the WTO legal systems. Before the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Tokyo
Round negotiations(1973-1979) achieved much more than ever in the GATT history.
Seven multilateral trade agreements(which were called "codes" then) were signed.
Namely, they are Government Procurement Code; Customs Valuation Code; Product
Standards Code; Antidumping Code; Subsidies and Countervailing Code; Import
Licensing Code; and Civil Aircraft Code. For the first time, the GATT legal system
touched those non-tariff issues like the technical standards. But the participation in these
codes was optional, i.e. only the contracting parties which had signed the code(s)
followed these recommended practice(s).33 Therefore, the use of these codes was reduced
to a limited scope and often caused trouble in the application between the members and
the non-members of these codes. Under the WTO legal framework, this problem has been
expediently avoided. As Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement states, the multilateral trade
agreements are integral parts of it and "binding on all Members".34 This realises the
single undertaking enshrined at the Punta del Este Declaration which started the Uruguay
Round negotiations, and has great significance in protecting the negotiated rights and
31
: John H. Jackson: Global Economics and International Economic Law, Journal of International
Economic Law, No.l, 1998, p.17.
32 See Konstantinos Adamantopoulos: An Anatomy of the World Trade Organisation, Klumer Law
International! 1997), p.30.
3jl: See GATTActivities(\919), Geneva.
34
: As to the binding effect of those Plurilateral Trade Agreements, Article 11:3 of the WTO Agreement
states that they are "also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them", and "binding
on those Members". See supra note 1.
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ensuring the implementation of obligations by WTO Members. As to the priority while
conflicts of application arise, there are two clauses which are designated to deal with
these problems. Article XVI:3 of the WTO Agreement, which regulates the relationship
between the WTO Agreement and other multilateral trade agreements, states: "In the
event of a conflict between a provision of this Agreement and a provision of any of the
Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to the extent
of the conflict". Similarly, the general interpretative note to Annex 1A of the WTO
Agreement also provides that the provision of that other multilateral trade agreement shall
prevail when a conflict arises between it and GATT 1994.35
Another difference deserving clarification is the conceptual shift from GATT 1947 to
GATT 1994. It is well known that GATT 1947 was originally contemplated to be applied
provisionally for several years until the ITO came into being, and then would have been
put under the umbrella of and conformed to the ITO Charter. Naturally, GATT 1947 has
some intrinsic defects. However, GATT 1994 is just one of the major results achieved in
the Uruguay Round negotiations, which is contained in Annex 1A to the WTO
Agreement. To be more specific, GATT 1994 consists of (a)the provisions in GATT
1947(excluding the Protocol of Provisional Application) as rectified, amended or
modified by the terms of legal instruments which have entered into force before the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, (b)the provisions of the legal instruments set
forth below that have entered into force under GATT 1947 before the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement: (i)protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions;
(ii)protocols of accession; (iii)decisions on waivers granted under Article XXV of GATT
1947 and still in force on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, (iv)other
decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947; (c) six understandings
which include: (i)Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticle II:1(b) of GATT 1994\
(ii)Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticleXVII ofGATT 1994', (iii)Understanding
on Balance-of-Payment Provisions of GATT 1994', (iv)Understanding on the
Interpretation ofArticle XXIV ofGATT 1994; (y)Understanding in Respect ofWaivers of
Obligations under GATT 1994', (yi)Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticle XXVIII
of GATT 1994\ and (d)Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994. Therefore, the contents
contained in GATT 1994 are much more than those in GATT 1947. Meanwhile, with the
transformation from the GATT to the WTO, those GATT contracting parties and the
European Communities which had accepted the "single package" of the Uruguay Round
as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement became WTO Members.36
Around two hundred years ago, the classical political economists, like Adam Smith
and David Ricardo, told us that, with some qualifications or exceptions, a policy of
liberalising restrictions on imports would maximise the wealth of that sovereign.37 Back
to the years of Smith and Ricardo when, with a few exceptions, most countries were in a
similar development level, the theories of absolute and comparative advantages should
sound plausible. But whether these classical theories can be vindicated by the realities of
the present world is quite another story. The World Trade Organisation came into
existence with the applaud that the international trade will be conducted in a freer and
35
: See supra note 1.
36
: See Article XI: 1 of the WTO Agreement and explanatory note (a) to GATT 1994. See supra note 1.
37 See Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse: The Regulation of International Trade, second edition,
Routledge(London and New York, 1999), Chapter One.
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more legalised atmosphere. In the eyes of some people, the WTO may perform like the
Noah's Ark to many developing countries, especially the least-developed countries, in
their severe struggling against the floods of poverty and hunger. But the protests in
Seattle in 1999 and later in somewhere else have reminded us that the free trade
advocated by the WTO has not benefited all the residents in this global community. Thus,
it is time to think about such questions: What is wrong with the classical theory of free
trade? What can the WTO do for the world's poor in the face of globalisation?
Section Two Bringing Developing Countries into the Global Trading: Fortune or
Misfortune?38
1.2.1. Globalisation vs marginalisation: a challenge to the World Trade
Organisation
Globalisation is the latest fashionable term used to describe the all pervasive forces of
a new stage of capitalism in which multinational companies and financial institutions
move their capital around the world in search of the highest returns, and in so doing
create a truly global market and global capital. The term "globalisation" was first coined
in the 1980s, but the concept stretches back decades, even centuries, if we count the
trading empires built by Spain, Portugal, Britain and Holland. Some would say that the
world was as globalised 100 years ago as it is today, with international trade and
migration.39 Globalisation can be briefly characterised as the following: "it has brought
diminishing national borders and the fusing of individual national markets. The fall of
protectionist barriers has stimulated free movement of capital and paved the way for
companies to set up several bases around the world".40 Professor John Jackson
summarised the causes of these new developments as the "incredible advances in
efficiency of communication, extraordinary reduction in transport costs, growing
prevalence of instant tele and cyber transactions, treaty and other norms causing
reduction of governmental barriers to trade, an economic climate more favourable to
principles of market economics, cross-border influences of competition which have
driven increases in production and service efficiencies, and last but not least: the blessing
of relative peace in the world".41
j8
: The term "developing countries" was first launched around 1957-58 by the OECD. Namely, these
countries are in a process of development and are filling the economic gap with industrialised countries.
Since then, this term has been widely used in the official documents of numerous international
organisations including the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation.
j9
: But the 1930s depression put "paid" to that. States drew back into their shell on realising that
international markets could deliver untold misery in the form ofpoverty and unemployment. The resolve of
Western States to build and strengthen international ties in the aftermath of World War II laid the
groundwork for today's globalisation.
40
: See BBC E-cyclopaedia. cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/special_report/1999/02/99/e-cyclopaedia
41
: See John H. Jackson, supra note 31, p. 1. Jackson summarised the manifestations of the globalisation as
"stock market trends that flow quickly around the world; impacts of national government monetary and
fiscal decisions; effects of fraud within certain banking or other financial enterprises; worries about health
and safety of products moving across borders such as foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, machinery, appliances;
effects of governmental mismanagement and sometimes corruption; worries about the power of non¬
government and private enterprises and their capacity in some cases to operate on the global economy
while largely ignoring particular national governmental regulatory protections; and flows of 'cultural'
influences involving various media often moving swiftly with new communication techniques to transmit
10
It was once believed that globalisation would lead the world into a bright new era of
rapid poverty reduction and falling levels of inequality. Economists confidently predicted
a process of income "convergence" with increased flows of trade and investment,
enabling poor countries to catch up with the average income level of those rich countries.
Some believe that the early promise has been delivered. "Global integration", declares the
World Bank, "is already a powerful force for poverty reduction".42 However, that
assessment is difficult to reconcile with the facts. On the evidence of the World Bank's
own figures, the impact of global integration on poverty reduction appears less powerful
than often suggested. Extreme poverty declined only slowly in the 1990s. The proportion
of the world's population living on one US dollar a day fell from 28 per cent in 1987 to
23 per cent in 1998. At the start of the twenty-first century, 1.1 billion people are
struggling to survive on less than one US dollar a day, the same figure as in the mid-
1980s. The proportion and number of people living on less than two US dollars a day, a
more relevant threshold for middle-income countries, show similar trends.43 In other
words, the wealth that flows from liberalised trade is not trickling down to the poorest,
contrary to the claims of the enthusiasts of globalisation.
As countries in this global community tend to be more inter-connected, developing
countries become more exposed to the fluctuations of world markets, as are the
livelihoods of their populations. All countries are affected by mutual interdependence,
but developing countries have the least capacity to protect their citizens from its
associated risks. According to the figures published by a non-governmental organisation
Oxfam, the average income gap, in terms of purchasing power parity(the real purchasing
power taking into account the different values reflected in different currencies), between
poor and rich countries widened in the 1990s from a ratio of 1:5.4 to 1:7.3. From every
one US dollar wealth generated in the global economy, high-income countries receive
about 80 cents, and low-income countries, with the most extreme concentrations of
poverty, and with 40 per cent of the world's population, receive around three cents.44 In
music or drama across borders(with substantial economic implications and other effects, even to cause a
new taste in Paris for Halloween pumpkins!)". Id, pp. 1-2.
42: See World Bank Report, 2001(a).
43
: See World Bank Report, 2001(d). Behind this global picture, there are important regional differences.
The contrasting experiences of East Asia and Latin America, two regions that have been rapidly integrating
into the global economy, show that there is no simple relationship between globalisation and poverty
reduction. The incidence of poverty in East Asia has fallen by 10 per cent, whereas in Latin America it
remains the same as in 1987, and there are now another 15 million people living below the poverty line.
The incidence of poverty in South Asia has fallen, but not fast enough to negate the effects of population
increase, so that another 48 million people are below the poverty line. In Africa, the incidence of poverty
increased in the first half of the 1990s before falling back by the end of the decade to the levels of the mid-
1980s, leaving an additional 73 million people in extreme poverty. Having realised the necessity of
comprehensive efforts in the poverty-reduction process, the heads of many governments in the recently-
concluded UN Johannesburg Summit 2002 pledged to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the
world's people whose income is less than $1 a day and the proportion of people who suffer from
hunger(reaffirmation ofMillennium Development Goals); by 2020, to achieve a significant improvement in
the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, as proposed in the "Cities Without Slums"
initiative(reaffirmation of Millennium Development Goals) and; to establish a world solidarity fund to
eradicate poverty and to promote social and human development in the developing countries, cf.
www.johannesburgsummit.org
44
: Oxfam: Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation, And The Right Against Poverty,
Chapter Three(Leyi behind: poor countries andpoorpeople in the international trading system), p.67.
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the absence of effective redistributive measures, it is very difficult to close income gaps
as wide as those that prevail in the present world economy. In the calculation of the
Oxfam Report, if developing countries are to increase their average incomes by three per
cent a year, and average incomes in high-income countries are to increase by one per cent
a year, it would still take approximately 70 years before absolute incomes in both sets of
countries increase by an equal amount.45
Then in the context of international trade, although export growth in developing
countries was more rapid than that in high-income countries in the 1990s(7 per cent
versus 5.6 per cent), there were wide regional variations. Growth rates for Africa were
less than one half of the high-income countries' average, while Latin America achieved
equivalence. Only East Asia and South Asia exceeded high-income countries' growth
levels, the latter from an exceptionally low base.46 This helps to explain why sub-Sahara
Africa is falling further behind in both relative and absolute terms. The unequal
distribution of export activity reinforces wider income inequalities. Even though
developing countries have been increasing their growth rate of exports, the resulting
income gains have been smaller than those gained by rich countries. This is for the
obvious reason that a small increase in a large initial figure is worth more than a
proportional increase in a small figure.
Thus, as the Oxfam Report concluded, low-income developing countries as a group
increased per capita income from exports by 51 US dollars during the 1990s, while high-
income countries generated an average gain of 1938 US dollars. Even East Asia has
fallen behind in absolute terms, despite having an export growth rate that is double the
high-income countries' average. The per capita value of its exports increased by 234 US
dollars, compared with 1493 US dollars for the USA, even though the exports of the
former were growing at twice the rate of the latter. For sub-Sahara Africa, export
marginalisation has contributed to the region's fast-diminishing share of world income.
Whereas the value of its per capita gained from exports rose by 46 US dollars, a modest
industrial-country exporter like the UK enjoyed an increase of 2701 US dollars.
Meanwhile, the three regions with the worst record on poverty reduction in the 1990s
have seen their share of global exports either stagnate(Latin America), rise very slightly
from a low base(South Asia), or decline(sub-Sahara Africa). At the end of the 1990s,
South Asia and Africa—two regions that account for almost three-quarters of world
poverty and one-third of world population—were generating only two per cent of world
exports 47
It is widely acknowledged that the present world we live in is still full of injustices.
This is a place in which, as the former WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero
described, "far too many people lack proper access to food, water, health care, education,
or justice. The benefits of development are not evenly shared, and marginalisation
45
: Id. In a global economy, it is appropriate to ask what is happening to income distribution across all
countries, treating the world as if there were no borders. Researchers at the World Bank have attempted this
exercise, using surveys covering more than 90 per cent of the world's population for the period 1988-
1993(Milanovic 1998). The results provide a powerful contradiction to some of the more benign
assessments of globalisation: they show that the poorest 10 per cent of the world have only 1.6 per cent of
the income of the richest 10 per cent. The World Bank study also identified widening average income gaps
between countries as the main factor behind widening global inequalities.
46
: See Oxfam Report, Chapter Three, p.69.
47: Id, pp.69-70.
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remains a real threat for too many".48 The despair caused by the escalating number of
jobless people in some countries has already caused serious societal tensions which may
boil into violence and cruelty. The stress and shock brought by the globalisation have
often made some national leaders feel helpless to fulfil their promises for their
constituents in the face of external trade and monetary pressures. The impact and
consequence of the national interdependence became ever more impressive when we
witnessed the financial crisis of 1997-98, which was totally unexpected, but caused
severe economic problems for some countries. Thus, it is not right to deny the existence
of globalisation and the problems associated with it. But it is not right either to contribute
all these problems to the globalisation. The presence of marginalisation has some more
profound internal social reasons. Political instability, high rate of illiteracy, and lack of
initiatives and financial resources for reforming domestic economic structures49 may all
account for the failures of some countries in their integration into this global world.
Economists teach us that trade liberalisation creates more goods or more welfare for
people overall, but they are unable to guarantee that every person will be better off in this
process of liberalisation. There will still be some winners and some losers, particularly if
they are disadvantaged. Who should bear the task to help the poor to catch up with the
rich in this process? The World Trade Organisation seems to fit this role. This choice
comes not only from the vocation of this organisation, but from the expectation ofmany
people around the world. This is also the basis for the present study, through which, the
author wishes to achieve , a deeper insight into the WTO legal system, particularly its
dispute settlement mechanism, then to put forward some useful means by which
developing countries may benefit from this legal system.
1.2.2. Integrating into the global economy: an ambivalent choice
The attitudes among developing countries toward the Uruguay Round negotiations
and the reform of the dispute settlement mechanism are in a way diversified.50 A group of
developing countries, led by India and Brazil, had much stronger objections to the
proposal for a new round of negotiations. They did not want the GATT to be extended to
the new areas because services, intellectual property rights, and foreign investment were
sectors in which developing countries were generally no match for their developed
country counterparts. Accordingly, they challenged the GATT's legal competence to
enter these new areas, arguing that the GATT was an agreement confined to trade in
goods, and also that other international organisations had prior jurisdiction over the new
48
: These words were quoted by Mike Moore, the present WTO Director-General, in his speech: The
WTO: The Challenge Ahead—Address to The New Zealand Institute ofInternational Affairs.
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmmO 1_e.htm
49
: Some developing countries have seized the opportunities created by globalisation. They are not only
increasing the volume of their exports, but also raising the quality of their exports in terms of local value-
added, entry into dynamic sectors of world markets, technological composition, and employment creation.
Many more countries are failing. This group includes not only the majority of primary-commodity
exporters and countries in sub-Sahara Africa, but also countries that are participating in some of the most
dynamic areas of international trade—on the basis of low-quality export activity. While export growth is
creating employment in these countries, it is often based on simple low-cost assembly operations. Links
with the local economy are minimal, and little effort has been made to create the foundations for successful
integration into world markets. One consequence is that export-linked employment is highly vulnerable to
competition from low-wage competitors.
50: See GATTActivities(19&6), Geneva.
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areas subjects. In addition, these developing countries correctly pointed out that the
GATT had not yet been able to deliver the kinds of improved market access promised in
the Tokyo Round negotiations. Without some better assurance of payment on these
promises, these countries did not want to enter another round of negotiations where more
demands would be made on them in exchange for more unkept promises.51
Meanwhile, another group of pro-Uruguay Round developing countries, which
consisted mainly of those newly industrialised countries, was taking shape. As they had a
large volume of trade with the developed countries and possessed a relatively mature
market for those new areas, they took a more moderate attitude.5" They were more ready
for a new round of negotiations including those of the reform to the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism. Under the influence of these countries and, to some extent, the
threats from the developed countries, the India-Brazil-led group eventually gave their
way at the last minute before the initiation of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
It is no surprise that such contrasting viewpoints could arise out of developing
countries. In fact, after decades of development, it is difficult to characterise developing
countries in a concise way as they have already differed so widely both politically and
economically. These countries include China with a population of over 1.2 billion,
India(l billion) and Brazil(120 million), as well as Nauru with a population of a little
more than 10,000, Grenada( 100,000) and Swaziland(600,000). They range from States,
like Bangladesh and the Central Africa Republic, with an extreme backward and
rudimentary economic structure to countries such as Singapore, Korea, Mexico and
Nigeria, where considerable progress towards industrialisation has been achieved and at
least one sector of the economy has advanced along with the lines similar to those
prevailing in the developed countries. By the same token, developing countries comprise
both nations where economies are based on free market and free competition principles,
and nations where centralised economy or transitional economy prevails.
Notwithstanding the huge difference, a few generalisations are still possible, with the
usual caveat that they tend to over-simplify the reality.
First of all, the author should make it clear that the existence and degree of
underdevelopment may be assessed on the basis of a number of factors. All these factors
suffer from various flaws. Nevertheless, the least questionable of all is probably the
criterion of per capita income. It would appear that developed countries have an average
per capita income from 8000 to 15000 US dollars per annum, while the average capita
income of the developing countries is from 70 to 1500 US dollars per annum.53
Upon these statistical analyses, I then turn to the principal economic characteristics of
many developing countries! The following points may be worth noticing: (a)The
dominant economic activity is agriculture(while in developed countries, industrial
production prevails). (b)Often two sectors of economy coexist: one export-oriented,
which is more advanced; and another which is based on subsistence activities. (c)Both
agriculture and manufacture are conducted on a family basis, i.e. primarily in family-
sized, cottage-type units, rather than in industrial productive units. (d)The industrial and
31
: For an example of the debate over both points, see C/M/187(meeting of 30 April-1 May 1985); see also
L/5744(meeting of 23 November 1984).
32: Some countries in this group, like Korea, were unwilling to open their markets for agricultural products
because of the vulnerability in this area.
33
: See M. Bertrand: Refaire L 'Onu: un programme pour la paix, Geneva(1986), p.79.
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agricultural equipment is primitive, or at any rate not very sophisticated. As a
consequence, the labour productivity is low and the output is relatively poor. (e)So-called
concern-unemployed prevails. In other words, "the situation prevails in which the number
of workers employed would be reduced without causing a fall in production, even
without a change in the stock of capital and technique ofproduction used".54 (f)There is a
low level of capital stock. The accumulation of capital necessary for the acquisition of
better industrial equipment and more generally for productive investment does not take
place for two principal reasons: first, the low productivity of labour does not bring about
the excess of production over consumption which allows private saving(in other words,
industrial and agricultural output primarily serves to ensure the subsistence of workers);
second, that part of the national products not earmarked for the subsistence of the labour
force often goes to a small wealthy elite, normally made up of landowners, a few
industrial entrepreneurs, and political leaders.55
These features create what economists have called "the vicious circle of poverty". In
the words of a distinguished scholar: "To increase income per capita, it would be
necessary to increase productivity, which in turn would require a fast rate of
accumulation of capital and therefore a substantial excess of production over subsistence
consumption; but this surplus is very small because income per capita is so low in the
first place. The existence of this vicious circle condemns some developing countries to a
practically stationary situation, which is all the more hopeless because the excess of
output over subsistence consumption is not only small but, in many cases, also destined
for the affluent consumption of the wealthy classes".56
A further complicating factor is the steady increasing in population in many
developing countries. Early in 1964, Prebisch, the then Secretary General of UNCTAD,
warned in a report to the United Nations that economic growth was likely to be largely
absorbed by the growth of population in some countries. He pointed out that "Nearly half
of the capital invested in the developing countries is needed to provide for the increase in
population, thereby limiting the resources available for substantially and steadily raising
the overall level of living. Unless the present tempo of population growth slows down, it
would take eighty years at an annual rate of GDP growth of 5 per cent for some
developing countries to reach the current average per capita income level of Western
Europe, and approximately forty years more for them to reach that of the United States.
For the least developed countries, accounting for one half of the population of all
developing countries, the period required to reach the present Western Europe level
would be of the order of two hundred years".57 Unfortunately, this situation has not
changed much since then.
In view of these problems prevalent in many developing countries, the multilateral
trade agreements signed during the Uruguay Round negotiations contain some provisions
which are designated to accord special or differential treatment to developing countries.
These provisions can be found chiefly in the Preamble, Article IV:7 and Article XI:2 of
54
: C. Napoleoni: Thought of the Twentieth Century, translated and edited by A. Cigno, London(1972),
p.145.
55
: See Antonio Cassese: International Law in a Divided World, Oxford: Clarendon Press(1994), pp.352-
355.
56: Id, p. 147.
57
: R. Prebisch: Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, Report by the Secretary General of
UNCTAD, CE/Conf. 46/3.(1964), p.5.
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the WTO Agreement, Part IV of GATT 1994; the selected provisions of some multilateral
trade agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement;58 and in some ministerial decisions.59
From the perspective of developed countries, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and
GATS are perhaps the most significant, while the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,
for example, figures more prominently in the agenda of developing countries. The
Agreement on Agriculture and Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, on
the other hand, are of significant interest to both developed countries and developing
countries.
The World Trade Organisation recognises the special development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries in the implementation of the obligations attendant
their accession. These special needs arise both at national and international levels. Thus,
where the WTO imposes obligations on its Members, either to take affirmative action or
to abstain from certain conduct, developing countries may be allotted more time to fulfil
their obligations.60 Selected exemptions from obligations also may be available for
developing countries.61 Furthermore, to address the special needs of developing
countries, some of the multilateral trade agreements require developed country Members
to provide assistance to developing country Members.62 In the words of Alice Alexandra
Kiple, these various measures are intended to remove those seemingly insurmountable
obstacles from the paths for developing countries so that they can fully participate in the
WTO activities.63 Through accession, developing countries become bound to act in
accordance with the parameters set forth in the WTO agreements. Consequently, the
activities of developing countries in international trading should become subject to those
widely recognised nonns.
For many developing countries, to participate in the global trading is an ambivalent
choice. On the one hand, nations in the present world are so closely connected that "our
58
: For example, Agreement on Agriculture: Article 12(2), Article 15, Article 16; Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Article 10; Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade-. Article 11, Article 12; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures-. Article 4; Antidumping
Agreement: Article 15; Customs Valuation Agreement: Part III; Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures-. Article 2(2); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures-. Part VIII; Agreement on
Safeguards: Article 9; General Agreement on Trade in Services: Article IV; Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Article 65(2), Article 66, Article 67; Dispute Settlement
Understanding: Article 3(12), Article 4(10), Article 8(10), Article 12(10-11), Article 21(8), Article 24;
Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Paragraphs C and D. See supra note 1.
59
: See Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries and Decision on Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-
Importing Developing Countries. See supra note 1.
60
: For example, Article 65 of the TRIPS permits a developing country to delay the implementation of its
TRIPS obligations in general for four years, and an additional period of five years in the area where the
product patent is not so protectable in its territory on the date of application of the TRIPS. See supra note 1.
61
: For example, Article 15(2) of the Agreement on Agriculture states: "Developing country Members shall
have the flexibility to implement reduction commitments over a period of up to 10 years. Least-developed
country Members shall not be required to undertake reduction commitments". See supra note 1.
62
: For example, Article 11(1) of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade states: "Members shall, if
requested, advise other Members, especially the developing country Members, on the preparation of
technical regulations". See supra note 1.
63
: Alice Alexandra Kipel: Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries(m World Trade
Organisation—The Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Centuiy and U.S. hnplementing
Legislation, edited by Terence P. Stewart), American Bar Association) 1996), p.626.
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independence is best guaranteed by interdependence".64 On the other hand, citizens in
many countries feel locked out, forgotten, angry and hurt in the face of the increasing
pressures. They falsely believe that globalisation is the cause of all these problems. Under
these circumstances, the first and foremost task for the WTO is to strengthen the
confidence of its Members, especially the developing country Members, for their
participation in the global trading. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said recently:
"globalisation should not be made a scapegoat for domestic policy failures...the WTO
must not be distracted from its own vital task: extending the benefits of free trade fully to
the developing world".65 Now it is the time for the WTO to vindicate that.
There are indeed many ways by which the WTO may help the developing countries to
manage international trade rules, and eventually to benefit from them. To solve trade
disputes among WTO Members, particularly those concerning developing country
Members, in a fair and reasonable manner under the new dispute settlement mechanism is
definitely one of the most important benefits of the new organisation.
Section Three Adjudication of International Trade Disputes
1.3.1. Different methods of peaceful dispute settlement
A dispute may be defined as a specific disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law
or policy in which a claim or assertion of one party is met with refusal, counter-claim or
denial by another.66 In the broadest sense, an international dispute can be referred to exist
whenever such a disagreement involves two or more governments, international
institutions, or juridical persons(corporations), private individuals of different countries.
Disputes are an inevitable part of international relations, just as disputes between
individuals are inevitable in domestic relations.
A basic requirement, when a dispute arises, is a commitment from those who are
likely to become involved, that dispute settlement will only be pursued by peaceful
means. On the international plane, Article 2(3) of Charter of the United Nations requires
all UN Members to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered".67 A
General Assembly Resolution of 1970, after quoting Article 33 of the UN Charter,
proclaims: "States shall accordingly seek early and just settlement of their international
disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice".68
These methods are not used with the same frequency and may change their form to some
extent in different situations. With regard to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism,
negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration are the most relevant means despite
the fact that theymay have different forms.
Negotiation is, in practice, employed more frequently than all the other methods put
together. Often, indeed, negotiation is the only means employed, not just because it is
64
: Mike Moore, see supra note 48.
65: Kofi Annan, New York Times, 29 November 1999, at A28.
66
: J. G. Merrills: International Dispute Settlement, Grotius Publications Limited(1991), p.l.
67: See Basic Documents in International Law. See supra note 28.
68
: Id, General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. G. A. Res.
2625(XXV), 24 October 1970. The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote.
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always the first to be tried and is often successful, but also because States tend to believe
its advantages to be so great as to rule out the use of other methods, even in situations
where the chances of a negotiated settlement are slight. On the occasions involving other
methods of dispute settlement, negotiation is still used more commonly as a preliminary
procedure of the whole process. In fact, negotiation is more than a possible means of
settling differences, it is also a technique for preventing them from arising as negotiation
is a process which allows the disputing parties to retain the maximum amount of control
over their dispute. Consequently, negotiation, in most cases of dispute settlement, has
become a process which is not optional, but obligatory.69
When the parties to an international dispute are unable to resolve it by negotiation,
the intervention of a third party is a possible means of breaking the impasse and
producing an acceptable solution. Such intervention can take a number of different forms.
The third party may simply encourage the disputing States to resume negotiations, or do
nothing more than to provide them with an additional channel of communication. When
the third party, working as an active participant, is authorised and expected by the
disputing parties to advance his own proposals and to interpret, as well as to transmit,
each party's proposals to the other, this activity is known as "mediation". Mediation is
often used together with good offices which consist of action taken by a third party to
bring about, or cause to be continued, negotiations, without the third party actively
participating in the discussion of the dispute. In many occasions, the terms of
"mediation" and "good offices" are employed indifferently rather than as labels for
distinct approaches to dispute settlement.70 Mediation may be sought by the disputing
parties or offered voluntarily by outsiders. Once under way, it provides the governments
in dispute with the possibility of a solution, but without any prior commitment to accept
the mediator's suggestions. Therefore, it has the advantage of allowing the disputing
parties to retain control of the dispute, and to subject the dispute to being settled in a face-
saving way.
"Inquiry" as a term of art, is used in two distinct, but related senses. In the broader
sense, it refers to the process that is performed whenever a court or other body
endeavours to resolve a dispute from the issues of fact. In this regard, it resembles the
information-seeking process in the WTO panel examination. Inquiry may become more
relevant when the disputes involve some complicated technical issues. In addition to the
use by a court or other legal bodies, inquiry can also be used as a specific institutional
arrangement which States may select in preference to arbitration or other techniques,
69
: For example, Article XXII: 1 of GATT 1947 requires GATT contracting partiesfnow WTO Members)
"shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation...with
respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement"(Emphasis added). Article 41 of the 1978
Vienna Convention on Succession ofStates in Respect of Treaties provides that "If a dispute regarding the
application or interpretation of the present Convention arises between two or more Parties to the
Convention, they shall, upon the request of any of them, seek to resolve it by a process of consultation and
negotiation"(Emphasis added). See supra note 1. See also R. Lavalle: Dispute Settlement under the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, The American Journal of International Law,
Vol.73, 1979, p.407.
70
: Both the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dispute of 1899 and
1907(Articles 2-8) do not differentiate between them. Article 33(1) of the UN Charter does not specifically
mention good offices either. Sometimes, however, both are mentioned and apparently treated as distinct, as
in the Pact ofBogota 1948(Articles IX-XIV). See also Article 5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
See supra note 1.
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because they may desire to have some disputed issues investigated independently. Thus,
in its institutional sense, inquiry refers to a particular type of international tribunal,
known as the "commission of inquiry" which was introduced by the 1899 Hague
Convention,71
Conciliation has been defined as: "A method for the settlement of international
disputes of any nature according to which a commission is set up by the parties, either on
a permanent basis or an ad hoc basis to deal with a dispute, proceeds to the impartial
examination of the dispute and attempts to define the terms of a settlement susceptible of
being accepted by them or of affording the parties, with a view to its settlement, such aid
as they may have requested".72 The eclectic character of this method is at once apparent.
If a mediation is essentially an extension of negotiation, conciliation puts third party
intervention on a formal legal footing and institutionalises it in a way comparable, but not
identical, to inquiry or arbitration. While the fact-finding exercise that is the essence of
inquiry may or may not be an important element in conciliation, the search for terms
"susceptible of being accepted" by the parties, but not binding on them, provides a sharp
contrast with arbitration and a reminder of the link between conciliation and mediation.73
This feature of conciliation has presented commissions with something of a dilemma. On
the one hand, they wish to make their proposals as persuasive as possible by supporting
them with reasons; on the other hand, they are unwilling to provide the disputing parties
with legal arguments or findings of fact that may be cited in subsequent litigation.
Arbitration seems to contain the elements of both consensus in a diplomatic
settlement and jurisdiction in a legal settlement.74 After having developed over the last
two hundred years, arbitration provides the parties to a dispute with the opportunity to
obtain a decision from an impartial third party of their own choice. This is important
because, if governments are persuaded to refer their disputes to third parties for
settlement, they must have confidence in those people who are to give the decision. As an
arbitration tribunal has the subject matter of the dispute and the criteria for its decision
71
: Hague Convention of 1899, Articles 9-14. Envisaged by the Hague Convention as an institution for the
management of a relatively narrow range of disputes, the international commission of inquiry has carved
out a worthwhile, yet curiously ambivalent record. From its inception over a century ago, inquiry has been
employed in cases in which honour and essential interests were unquestionably involved, for the
determination of legal as well as factual issues, and later by tribunals whose composition and proceedings
more closely resembled courts than commissions of inquiry as originally conceived. The diversion of the
function has led to the decreasing use of inquiry in the recent years, since the disputing parties may resolve
their dispute either by negotiation, mediation, in which the outcome is completely in the hands of the
disputing parties, or by arbitration, court, in which both of the parties are bound by the award or decision.
However, as one of the dispute settlement methods, inquiry is still worth discussing here.
72
: Article 1 of the Regulation on the Procedure of International Conciliation(adopted by the Institute of
International Law in 1961). See Annuaire(1961), 49(ii), pp.385-391.
73 See J. G. Merrills, supra note 66, p.59. All the conciliation commissions have the same functions to
investigate the dispute and to suggest the terms of a possible settlement. However, within this broad
mandate, conciliation commissions have performed a variety of different tasks. What a commission does
and how it goes about its work depend in the first place on the instrument setting it up. But much also
depends on how the parties choose to present the particular case, and how the members of the commission
see their role. As a result, though the practice of conciliation commissions exhibits many common features,
significant differences of approach to the most basic matters are also to be found.
74
: The division between diplomatic means and legal means is only based on the binding effect of the
decisions made. Despite the fact that there may exist more division methods, the dichotomy containing
diplomatic and legal means is nevertheless the one widely accepted and used.
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laid down by the disputing parties, arbitration can be used to produce a solution to a
selected problem and on any agreed basis. Unlike inquiry and conciliation, arbitration
results in a decision which is binding on the disputing parties. Provided that no problems
of interpretation, nullity, etc., arise, an arbitration award should be reasonably expected to
dispose of complex technical issues as most arbitration tribunals are composed of experts
in one field or another who can give an award in no way inferior to a court decision.
Despite these obvious advantages, arbitration still has its own limitations. The most
prominent of all is the enforcement of the arbitration award. Although arbitration
produces a binding award, there is no guarantee that the unsuccessful party will carry out
its obligation to recognise that award. This does not mean that arbitration awards are
widely disregarded. On the contrary, since States often prefer to end a dispute rather than
incur the political costs which would follow refusing to accept an award, arbitration
awards are usually implemented. But if there are practical reasons for not carrying out an
unfavourable award, the lack of procedures for enforcement is certainly a conspicuous
limitation.
Then the judicial settlement comes as the last line of defence, which involves the
reference of disputes to permanent tribunals for legally binding decisions. Since the
judicial settlement developed from arbitration, it is no surprise that there exists a close
similarity between the two. For most of the recent century, the judicial settlement has
been available through a number of courts of either general or special jurisdiction. The
most comprehensive example of them, in the context of international dispute settlement,
is the International Court of Justice, which was founded in 1945 as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations.
Both the advantages and limitations of the judicial settlement are easy to notice. In
addition to the advantage of saving costs,76 the reference of a dispute to a permanent
judicial body with an established composition and procedure also avoids the need to
negotiate about the membership of the tribunal and related matters, the problems which
could arise with arbitration. More importantly, dispute settlement in a judicial body is
assisted by the development of international law and consistent jurisprudence, which may
be expected to contribute more to the legal progress than occasional arbitration. But on
the other hand, States are reluctant to surrender control over their disputes, particularly
where important interests are involved. This partly accounts for the present picture of a
situation in which international litigation is a wholly exceptional act and the vast majority
of disputes are handled by other means.
In terms of the binding effect, negotiation creates a situation in which matters are
entirely in the hands of the disputing parties, then mediation, inquiry and conciliation, in
each of which outside assistance is utilised, but the disputing parties still have the final
say on the disputing issues. Only in the context of arbitration and judicial settlement, the
object is to produce a legally binding decision. As it shows in the above analyses, no sole
75
: The 1958 New York Convention solves the problem of enforcement to a certain extent, which ensure
that the arbitration awards should be as enforceable as court decisions among its signatories, although this
convention is limited in its effects only to civil and commercial arbitration awards.
76
: Except for the expenditures for preparing the documents, hiring counsels and advocates, there is no
charge for the disputing parties in the legal proceedings of ICJ. As for a State which is not a UN Member,
the Court will decide the amount which that State is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court. See
Article 33, Article 35(3) and Article 64 of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice. See supra note
28.
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method provides a perfect settlement for the disputing parties. In practice, a dispute is
usually settled in a mixed way, i.e. involving more than one of the discussed methods.
The newly-bornWTO dispute settlement mechanism reflects such a trend.
1.3.2. TheWTO dispute settlement mechanism: a guarantee of realisation for the
Uruguay Round negotiated results
The World Trade Organisation has realised the goal to have all the multilateral trade
agreements bind its Members. Central and vital to the WTO institutional structure is the
dispute settlement mechanism which was derived from almost half century of experiment
and practice in the GATT, but now is elaborately set forth in the new treaty text of the
Dispute Settlement UnderstandingfDSU). Over the last two decades, people have come to
recognise the crucial role that dispute settlement plays for any treaty system.77 It is
particularly crucial for a treaty system designed to address today's myriad of complex
economic questions of international relations and to facilitate the cooperation among
nations that is essential to the peaceful and welfare-enhancing aspect of those relations.78
Dispute settlement procedures assist in making the negotiated rules effective, adding an
essential measure of predictability and effectiveness to the operation of a rule-oriented
system in the otherwise relatively weak realm of international norms.79 Thus, the GATT
contracting parties resolved at the 1986 launching meeting of the Uruguay Round
negotiations to deal with some of the defects and problems of the then-existing dispute
settlement mechanism. The result of that resolve is the new DSU.
Serving as the backbone of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, the Dispute
Settlement Understanding has altogether 27 articles, 132 paragraphs, 4 appendixes which
include the multilateral trade agreements covered by the DSU, special or additional rules
and procedures contained in the covered agreements, working procedures of the panel
process,80 rules and procedures of the expert review which is required in accordance with
Article 13(2) of the DSU. This is a lengthy and comprehensive agreement on all aspects
of the dispute settlement process. It absorbs, but consolidates, all of the earlier GATT
agreements on dispute settlement process, which were issued in the previous rounds of
negotiations and ministerial meetings, including the 1979 Tokyo Round Understanding
with its Agreed Description ofCustomary Practice, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, the
1984 Agreement on Panel Selection, and the procedural reforms adopted at the 1988
Montreal Midterm Meeting. The DSU borrows large chunks of text from all these earlier
reform documents. It retains most of the gains, but it goes much further.
The key new element in the DSU is the elimination of the veto power by reversing the
decision-making mechanism from the positive consensus to the negative consensus. The
77: Everyone will make such a conclusion ifwe compare the consequences of dispute settlement before and
after the establishment of the World Trade Organisation. In fact, it has become quite common that when a
new international regime emerges, it is usually accompanied by its dispute settlement mechanism, which
combines the general principles of international law and its unique rules as the legal foundation. The recent
development of such examples are the Court of Justice of the European Communities , the European Court
ofHuman Rights, and the tribunals envisaged by the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.
78
: See John Jackson: The Uruguay Round, World Trade Organisation, and the Problem of Regulating
International Economic Behaviour, in Policy Debates(Ottawa, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1995).
79
: See Hugo Paemen and Alexandra Bensch: From the GATT to the WTO—The European Community in
the Uruguay Round, in Policy Debates(Ottawa, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1995).
80
: The working procedures for appellate review were made on 28 February 1997. See WT/AB/WP/3.
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab3_e.htm
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MontrealMidterm Agreement had eliminated that veto power from some early phases of
the panel process by giving automatic answers to certain preliminary questions, such as
terms of reference. But the Montreal Midterm Agreement had equivocated on the veto
power over the creation of a panel, and had clearly preserved the veto power over
Council adoption of a ruling and Council authorisation of retaliation.81 On each of these
three key blocking points, the new Dispute Settlement Understanding clearly removes the
power to veto. In each case, the process moves forward unless the Dispute Settlement
Body(DSB) takes consensus to stop it.
On the first point about the authorisation of the DSB to a panel, Article 6(1) of the
DSU leaves no ambiguity this time, which states: "If the complaining party so requests, a
panel shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting following that at which the
request first appears as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless at that meeting the DSB
decides by consensus not to establish a panel".82 Two conclusive points can be drawn
from the above statement: firstly, the complained party may object to the establishment of
a panel at the first DSB meeting; secondly, it is certain that the panel will be established
at the following DSB meeting since it is unlikely to occur that the complaining party will
keep silent in negating the establishment of the panel.
On the second point of adopting a panel ruling, the DSU sets forth a pattern contrary
to that made in the Montreal Midterm Agreement. In Article 16, the new Understanding
provides for full participation by the disputing parties in the follow-up proceedings. It
permits them, and others, full opportunity to record their review. But then, "Within 60
days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be
adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its
decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report..In other
words, the panel ruling becomes binding on the parties to a dispute at most 60 days after
the circulation of the panel report unless the ruling is overruled by the DSB on the base of
consensus, or is appealed.
The main danger of such automatic binding effect is that the panel may have made a
legal error in its deliberation. To meet this potential problem, the Uruguay Round
negotiators created a second, appellate stage in the dispute settlement process. The DSU
provides for a standing Appellate Body which consists of seven qualified individuals
appointed by the DSB, from whom appellate groups of three are to be chosen by
rotation.84 This arrangement is based on the assumption of equal division of the appellate
work and avoiding the practice of "choosing forum". Although at the moment, the
appellate review is limited to "issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel",85 some of the Appellate Body decisions have
already produced much impact on the disputing parties,86 and certainly, have some
81
: See GATTActivities{ 1989), Geneva.
82
: If the complaining party so requests, a meeting of the DSB shall be convened for this purpose within 15
days of the request, provided that at least 10 days' advance notice of the meeting is given.(Footnote
original) See supra note 1.
83
: Article 16(4) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.(Original footnote omitted) See supra note 1.
84
: See Article 17(1) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
85: See Article 17(6) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
86
: To name a few, such appellate reviews include United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional G«so/we(WT/DS2/AB/R); India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
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potential impact on the future cases. As a general rule, the appealing process shall not
exceed 60 days from the time when the request to appeal is formally notified to the day
the Appellate Body circulates its report. In no case shall the process exceed 90 days.
Thereafter, the Appellate Body's ruling becomes binding unless the DSB decides by
consensus not to adopt it within 30 days following its circulation to the WTO Members.87
Under the same reason as that in the establishment of a panel, we can expect that this
adoption is almost automatic as no wining party will join such a consensus.
Then comes the third point. Once a ruling becomes binding, the DSU sets out to give
the winning party a right to enforce that ruling without being subjected to blockage. The
process first provides for a "reasonable time" for compliance, with the length of the
deadline being submitted to binding arbitration if the disputing parties cannot agree. The
new process also provides for binding adjudication, in 90 days, of any dispute about
whether the lost party's corrective action has satisfied the ruling. Then, if the reasonable
time expires without satisfactory corrective action, the process provides a further 20 days
for the disputing parties to negotiate compensation. If no agreement on compensation is
reached during this period, the winning party is allowed to withdraw its concessions from
the schedule 10 days later.88
Taken as a whole, the Dispute Settlement Understanding has converted the GATT
dispute settlement process into a mandatory one that takes a legal claim from complaint
to retaliation without any need to obtain the defendant's consent of any stage. Compared
with the dispute settlement reforms outlined in the 1988 Montreal Midterm Agreement,
the DSU represents nothing less than a sea change in the attitudes of WTO Members
toward dispute settlement. The Montreal Midterm Agreement rested on a view that
dispute settlement required a strong measure of voluntary cooperation from defendants,
and so consciously left a way out for those defendants willing to pay the price. The DSU,
by contrast, provides a legal ruling in every case, and guarantees a full enforcement
effort, right down to retaliation.
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Dispute Settlement Understanding was
discussed with reference to the traditional GATT dispute settlement process under Article
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Most of the leading negotiators
had anticipated that, at the end of the negotiations, all of the Uruguay Round negotiated
agreements including the new area agreements on services, intellectual property rights
protection, and investment should be linked by a common dispute settlement process
which would allow the enforcement by "cross-retaliation", that is to use trade sanctions to
enforce new area agreements. This anticipation has been reflected in the new
Understanding.89 As to the conflicts of applicability between the rules and procedures of
the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures contained in the multilateral
trade agreements, Article 1(2) of the DSU states: "The rules and procedures of this
Understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on
dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to
this Understanding. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and
Proc/wc(WT/DS50/AB/'R); United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(WT/DS58/AB/R).
87: See Article 17(5), Article 17(14) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
88
: See Article 21(3), Article 21(5), and Article 22(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra
note 1.
89
: See Article 1(1) and Article 22(3) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
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procedures of this Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set
forth in Appendix 2, the special or additional rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall
prevail..."90 Therefore, different from the relationship between the WTO Agreement and
those multilateral trade agreements, the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides a
general structure for the dispute settlement, while the special or additional rules and
procedures contained in the multilateral trade agreements are invoked to deal with
disputes in specific situations. Together with all these provisions, the new mechanism
pushes WTO dispute settlement to move in a more judicial way.
By stipulating new trade rules and establishing new dispute settlement mechanism,
the World Trade Organisation has facilitated the integration of developing countries into
the global economy. But which countries can really benefit from this integration process
and, to what extent, these new rules and procedures are fair to most developing countries?
To answers these questions involves a comprehensive study of the relationship between
the new institution and developing countries. This study also constitutes the leitmotifof
the rest chapters in this thesis.
90
: The special or additional rules and procedures contained in the covered agreements include those in
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures^Article 11 [2]); Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing(Articles 2[14], 2[21], 4[4], 5[2], 5[4], 5[6], 6[9], 6[10], 6[11], 8[1] through 8[12]);
Agreement on Technical Barriers to 7rarfe(Article 14[2] through 14[4], Annex 2); Agreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI ofGATT 1994(Article 17[4] through 17[7]); Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII ofGATT 1994(Article 19[3] through 19[5], Annex II.2[f], 3, 9, 21); Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures^Article 4[2] through 4[12], 6[6], 7[2] through 7[10], 8[5], footnote 35, 24[4],
27[7], Annex V); General Agreement on Trade in Services(Article XXII:3, Article XXIII:3); Annex on
Financial Servzcas(Rule 4); Annex on Air Transport .S'ervzcas(Rule 4); Decision on Certain Dispute
Settlement Procedures for the GA 71S'(Paragraphs 1 through 5). See supra note 1.
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Chapter Two WTO and Developing Countries
Section One The Definition of a Developing Country: A Nominal Dilemma
2.1.1. An evolutionary status of developing countries from the GATT to the WTO
The future of developing countries is one of the most pressing issues of international
economy in our era, and the resolution of this issue will profoundly affect the lives of the
people from both developing countries and developed countries. The intense desire of the
majority of the human race to escape its debilitating poverty and join the developed world
is a determining feature of international politics. Yet in the final decades of the twentieth
century, bitter controversy still exists regarding the causes of and possible solutions to
this problem.1
The causes of this tragic situation for most developing countries are various, both
historically and politically. The predatory exploring of their natural resources by the
powerful countries in history, the mismanagement of domestic affairs by their own
leaders after independence and, the lack of external financial aid and internal
technological innovation are the most substantial ones. Aware of this huge gap between
the developed countries and the developing countries, and its potential effect upon
international politics, some international institutions began to reflect on the way to
narrow this gap, and the GATT is just one of them.
GATT policy towards developing countries owed nothing to the past. There was no
Golden Age that pointed the way. Before the World War II, the organising principle for
rich-poor relationships had been colonialism. Most of the countries in Africa and Asia
were colonies de jure. A goodly portion of those in Central and South America were
colonies de facto. This colonial past was not what the Bretton Woods system was
looking for. The GATT started its function to discipline its contracting parties in
international trade on a most-favoured-nation and non-discrimination basis.4 Despite the
fact that, among the founding States of the GATT, almost half of them could be deemed
as "less-developed countries",5 the first draft of the Charter of the proposed International
1
: See Robert Gilpin: The Political Economy ofInternational Relations, Princeton University Press(1987),
p. 263.
2
: See Robert E. Hudec: Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, Gower Publishing Company
Limited(1987), p.6.
3
: About the history of the Bretton Woods system, see John H. Jackson: The World Trade Organisation,
Constitution and Jurisprudence, Chapter 2(Bretton Woods, the ITO, the GATT and the WTO), Royal
Institute of International Affairs(1998), ppl2-35.
4
: The preamble of GATT 1947 states: "The governments...being desirous of contributing to these
objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce." See The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade
Negotiations, Cambridge University Press(1999).
5
: The founding members are the Commonwealth ofAustralia, the Kingdom of Belgium, the United States
ofBrazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the Republic ofChile, the Republic of China the Republic of Cuba, the
Czechoslovak Republic, the French Republic, India, Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Kingdom ofNorway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria,
the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America. In the GATT history, contracting parties consisted of "developed countries" and "less-
developed countries". These nominations have been changed since the establishment of the WTO.
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Trade Organisation(ITO), which was put forward by the United States, provided for a set
of rules for all the potential members.6 There were no specific provisions on economic
development, nor were there any special rules or exceptions for developing countries.
After the failure of the ITO, the GATT took the role to regulate international trade in
the global community. The power to govern usually brings with it, according to most
twentieth-century political norms, a duty to take care of the disadvantaged members of
the community to be governed. The GATT had no money to give, only rules. Thus, rule
assistance was naturally the core help which most developing countries could seek for in
the GATT history.
The demands for the special and preferential rules during the first years' operation of
the GATT were only limited to some dependent overseas territories of the former colonist
powers. A Working Party was set up, by a decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on
17 January 1955, to examine the proposal of the United Kingdom relating to the special
problems of its dependent overseas territories. The decision to set up the Working Party
originated from a discussion, in a Plenary Session, of a proposal by the United Kingdom
government to introduce an appropriate article into the General Agreement.8 Since it was
considered that the preferential arrangement for the dependent overseas territories
contained in this proposal would constitute in effect an amendment to Article I of the
General Agreement and would therefore require unanimous acceptance by the
Explanatory Note 2(a) to GATT 1994 states: "The reference to 'contracting party' in the provisions of
GATT 1994 shall be deemed to read "Member". The reference to 'less-developed contracting party' and
'developed contracting party' shall be deemed to read 'developing country Member' and 'developed
country Member'. The reference to 'Executive Secretary' shall be deemed to read 'Director-General of the
WTO'". Id.
6: Proposalsfor Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment, Publication No.
2411, Commercial Policy Series No.79(Washington: United States Department of State, 1945).
7
: The United States explained the absence of developing-country provisions in the Proposed Charter by
saying that the special needs of developing countries would be addressed in the Economic Development
Sub-commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and by institutions such as the World
Bank. In other words, special attention may have been needed, but not in the trade-policy rules. See Clair
Wilcox: A Charter for World Trade, New York: Macmillan(1949), p. 141. Clair Wilcox served as chairman
or vice-chairman of the United States delegation to the various GATT-ITO negotiating conferences in
1946-1948. According to professor Hudec, the initial position of the United States rested on the view that
the key to industrial development was capital investment, especially private investment, coupled with an
open international market for exports. The United States was unsympathetic to the infant-industry argument
on conventional economic grounds—infant-industry protection would merely promote the creation of
inefficient local industries, thereby wasting resources. These positions were drawn from, and reinforced by,
a global economic and political policy that had two main objectives: (a)the desire to reduce trade protection
generally, so that the world would not repeat the destabilising economic situation created by the
protectionism of the 1930s, and (b)the desire to eliminate discrimination—partly for the same economic
reasons but also because the United States wanted to eradicate the colonial system. To be sure, this global
policy also served somewhat narrower visions of self-interest. Under the mercantilist perceptions of
national advantage that tended to prevail in these calculations, the over-powering dominance of the United
States' economy during this period made it appear that the United States had the most to gain from an open
world market for exports. Robert E. Hudec, see supra note 2, pp.9-10.
8
: The proposed article reads as "A metropolitan country may take action, or invoke any procedure under
this Agreement, on behalf of the economic interests and development of a dependent territory for whose
external relations it is responsible, and the provisions of the Agreement shall apply for this purpose as if the
dependent territory were within the customs area of the metropolitan country; provided always that any
measures taken by virtue of this paragraph shall operate substantially to the exclusive benefit of the
dependent territories of the metropolitan country concerned." GATT BISD, 3rd Supplement(1955), p.131.
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CONTRACTING PARTIES, the United Kingdom was advised to change its proposal to
a draft waiver, which it accepted.9
The 1960s saw some dramatic changes in the GATT, not only in terms of its size, but
in terms of its contents.10 The first significant step made during this period is the
Declaration on Promotion of the Trade ofLess-Developed Countries which was adopted
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES at their nineteenth session on 7 December 1961.
Recognising that there was need for a rapid and sustained expansion in the export
earnings of the less-developed countries if their development was to proceed at a
satisfactory pace, the CONTRACTING PARTIES demanded that the governments of the
contracting parties should give immediate and special attention to the less-developed
countries on the following issues: (a)quantitative restrictions; (b)tariff reductions;
(c)revenue duties; (d)state-trading; (e)preferential treatment within the customs unions or
free-trade areas; (f)the use of subsidies; and (g)the disposal of commodity surpluses.11
The 1961 Ministerial Declaration set some general principles which demanded the
developed countries to give their special and preferential attention to the less-developed
countries. Shortly after that, the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted an amendment to
the General Agreement, which became Part IV of GATT 1947.12 Part IV, with the
general title Trade and Development, consists of three articles, i.e. Article
XXXVI{Principles and Objectives), Article XXXVU(Commitments), and Article
XXXVIII(Jom? Action). As professor Robert E. Hudec pointed out: "the importance of
9
: Id. The waiver, as agreed by the Working Party, is recommended to the CONTRACTING PARTIES for
acceptance in accordance with the procedures of Article XXV(Joint Action by the Contracting Parties)of
the General Agreement.
10
: According to Karin Kock, the Swedish expert on the GATT affairs, the issue of developing countries
became critical once it became clear that a large number of British and French colonies were soon to
achieve independence. "Cold War" competition for the loyalty of these emerging countries intensified
when the former Soviet Union began to press for the creation of a global trade organisation, within the
United Nations, that would provide an alternative to the Western-dominated GATT. The prospect of a rival
United Nations organisation grew more substantial each year and finally materialised in the form of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD), formally constituted in 1964. See
Karin Kock: International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell(1969),
p.236. By the early 1960s, GATT relations between developed and developing countries had become
almost totally centred on competition with the UNCTAD. The UNCTAD threat considerably augmented
the bargaining power of developing countries. Developed countries believed that a bloc decision not to
participate in the GATT would be seriously damaging to Western political interests; they were therefore
willing to pay a price to avoid it. Certain other factors are commonly cited as reasons for the substantial
increase in the developing-country bargaining power during this period. One is the formation of an
effective "bloc" in the early 1960s, the so-called "Group of 77". Although not all Group of 77 members
participated in GATT affairs, the presence of effective bloc behaviour in the international sphere,
particularly in the United Nations, probably did increase the bargaining power and thus consolidated the
traditional source of developing-country power—the participation issue—in a more effective way. See
Robert E. Hudec, supra note 2, pp.39-40.
11
: See GATT BISD, 10th Supplement! 1962), pp28-32.
12
: The scheduling of the UNCTAD conference in the spring of 1964 precipitated an effort within the
GATT to demonstrate more forcefully its commitment to the interests of developing countries. The first
step was a decision to draft amendments to the legal text of the General Agreement that would consolidate
the various strands of the GATT's emerging policy towards developing countries. Initially, it was
contemplated that the new legal text would be placed in Article XVIII(Governmental Assistance to
Economic Development). The new text grew so long, however, that at the last moment it was repackaged
as a new Part IV of the General Agreement. See GATT BISD, 13th Supplement! 1965), p.2(protocol
introducing PART IV).
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Part IV is not easy to describe. From a technical point of view, Part IV added nothing to
the existing legal relationship between developed and developing countries. Part IV was
merely a slightly more impressive statement of the urgent but non-binding texts that the
Action Programme had been issuing over the proceeding five years, giving them a
permanent form in the text of the General Agreement. The language of Part IV was a bit
more legalistic, giving the illusion of greater commitment. Indeed, the title of the new
Article XXXVII, 'Commitments', actually said so. In fact, however, the text of Part IV
1 1
contained no definable legal obligations."
Despite its non-binding nature, Part IV did lay the rationale and morale for the
developing countries in the GATT to ask for special and preferential treatment, and their
constant demanding eventually resulted in the Generalised Special Preferences(GSP)
schemes which were adopted in the GATT in 1971.14 In the Ministerial Decision of 23
June 1971, the CONTRACTING PARTIES decided that GATT Article I(General Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment) would be waived for a period of ten years to the extent
necessary to permit developed contracting parties to accord preferential tariff treatment to
products originating in developing countries and territories without according such
treatment to like products of other contracting parties.15 The Ministerial Decision of 26
November 1971 permitted developing countries to exchange tariff preferences among
themselves.16 These two ministerial decisions laid the landmark that the GATT's new
relationship with developing countries had been defined.
Shortly after the GSP was established, the United Nations adopted two major
resolutions in 1974, one calling for the establishment of a new international economic
order and the other declaring a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
Developing countries regarded these UN resolutions as their victories in the contending
with developed countries for more political and economic rights. Using these resolutions
as their moral base, they pressed developed countries for more special preferences, which
culminated in a series of legal texts known as the "Framework Agreement".17 The
Framework texts included a decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, called the
Enabling Clause, which was a de facto amendment of the MFN obligation in GATT
Article I. The Enabling Clause gave permanent legal authorisation for: (a)the Generalised
System of Preferences; (b)preferences in trade between developing countries; (c)more
13
: Robert E Hudec, supra note 2, p.56.
14
: The GATT's first step towards the GSP was a waiver permitting Australia to give preferences to
developing countries. See GATT BISD, 14th Supplement 1966), p.23. The first explicit experiment with
preferences on trade between developing countries was a 1968 "decision"(not a waiver) permitting a
preference agreement between India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, open to participation by all
other developing countries. See GATT BISD, 16th Supplement) 1969), p.17.
13
: See GATT BISD, 18th Supplement) 1972), pp.24-26. The terms of the GSP waiver required that
preferences should be made generally available to all developing countries, but the details were not defined.
Consequently, it was up to the government of each developed country to decide what products would be
covered, what the margin of preference would be and what quantitative or other limits would be imposed
on preference benefits. Each developed-country government did something different.
16: See GATT BISD, 18th Supplement(1972), pp.26-28. It should be noted that the legal status of the GSP
programme was permissive and not mandatory. In UNCTAD, governments of developed countries had
agreed in principle to grant preferences, but that agreement was never reduced to a contractual obligation,
either in UNCTAD or in the GATT. The only GATT legal instrument on the GSP was the waiver allowing
governments to introduce preferences if they chose.
17
: See GATT BISD, 26th Supplement) 1980), pp.203-210, reprinted separately as an unnumbered GATT
pamphlet entitled Relating to the Frameworkfor the Conduct ofInternational Trade(\919).
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favourable treatment for developing countries in other GATT rules dealing with non-
tariff trade barriers; and (d)specially favourable treatment for the least-developed
countries.18
Facing the constant demanding from developing countries, developed countries
changed their strategies. On the one hand, they continued to use the GSP policy
selectively, either to bargain for commercial advantage in return or to punish those
developing countries whose behaviour was somewhat found wanting. On the other hand,
they used the Kennedy Round(1962-67) and Tokyo Round(l973-79) negotiations to
codify the international trading rules in some important areas like subsidies and anti¬
dumping.19 Different from the WTO practice of "buying one, buying all", which requires
the participants to accept all WTO agreements(except the plurilateral agreements) for
their memberships, the participation for the GATT contracting parties in these codes was
optional. Professor Hudec criticised, in this respect, that the code approach had very
important implications for the legal relations between developed and developing
countries. It proposed a new legal community, limited to those members who were
willing to subscribe to the rules. If developing countries wished to participate in the new
community, they would have to accept equal obligations. If, on the other hand, they
continued to insist on a one-sided relationship, they would find themselves excluded from
the really serious work and left with only a GATT membership increasingly empty of any
substance.20
From the non-discrimination of GATT 1947 to the permanent status of the GSP,
developing countries seemed to have gained much in legal terms in the GATT after
almost four decades of struggle. However, the irony is that, except some "industrialised"
countries, most developing countries had not been able to use these specialised
preferences efficiently and found the gap with developed countries even bigger when
they were requested to co-operate with developed countries in the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. Under these circumstances, it sounds only natural when
these developing countries raised such a question: "are the world trade rules fair to us?"
2.1.2. Are the world trade rules fair to developing countries?
The issue of developing countries had caught the attention of GATT contracting
parties even before the Uruguay Round negotiations. Early in the 1982 GATT Ministerial
Declaration, the CONTRACTING PARTIES acknowledged that "many countries, and
particularly developing countries, now face critical difficulties created by the
combination of uncertain and limited access to export markets, declining external
demand, a sharp fall in commodity prices and the high cost of borrowing. The import
18
: See Decision of 28 November \919{Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation ofDeveloping Countries), GATT BISD, 26th Supplement! 1980), p.203.
19
: The result of the Kennedy Round negotiations on multilateral trade rules is only the Anti-dumping
Code, while the results of the Tokyo Round negotiations include: Agreement on Interpretation and
Application ofArticles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 7rarfe(known as the
Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties), Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures, Agreement on Government Procurement, Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 7>acfe(known as the Customs Valuation Code),
Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 7rarfe(known as the
revised Anti-Dumping Code). See GATT Activities(1979), Geneva, pp.21-26.
20: See Robert E. Hudec, supra note 2, pp.82-83.
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capacity of developing countries, which is essential to their economic growth and
development, is being impaired and is no longer serving as a dynamic factor sustaining
the exports of the developed world. Acute problems of debt servicing threaten the
stability of the financial system."21 In light of this situation, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES decided to: (a)instruct the Committee on Trade and Development22 to examine
how the developed contracting parties had responded to the requirements of GATT Part
IV; (b)urge GATT contracting parties to implement more effectively Part IV and the
Enabling Clause; (c)urge GATT contracting parties to work towards further improvement
of GSP or MFN treatment for products ofparticular export interest to the least-developed
countries, and the elimination or reduction ofnon-tariffmeasures affecting such products;
(d)strengthen the technical co-operation programme of the GATT; (e)instruct the
Committee on Trade and Development to carry out an examination of the prospects for
increasing trade between developed and developing countries and the possibilities in the
GATT for facilitating this objective.
Pushed by the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, the CONTRACTING PARTIES began to
amend the trade rules made during the Tokyo Round negotiations. The task was so huge
that another round ofmultilateral trade negotiations seemed necessary. In 1986, the Punta
del Este Declaration marked the start of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations.23 The declaration reaffirmed the principle of differential and more
favourable treatment towards developing countries, urged developed countries to further
remove tariff and non-tariff barriers. Meanwhile the declaration demanded GATT
contracting parties to give more attention to the particular situations and problems of the
least-developed countries and to the need to encourage positive measures to facilitate
expansion of their trading opportunities.24
21
: See GATT BISD, 29th Supplement(1981-1982), p.9.
22
: The Trade and Development Committee inherited the unfinished work of the Legal and Institutional
Committee that had drafted Part IV. The Contracting Parties agreed to create a permanent organ which
would have its mandate all the objectives of Part IV. Since then, there was a permanent bureaucracy
attending to developing-country concerns and preparing the agenda called for by their agreed principles.
See GATT BISD, 13th Supplement! 1965), p.76.
23
: At the Special Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES at Punta del Este, Uruguay on 20 September
1986, ministers of the contracting parties decided to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.
A trade negotiations committee was established thereafter, to carry out the negotiations.
24
: There are four paragraphs concerning developing and least-developed countries in the "objectives" of
the Punta del Este Declaration. Paragraph (iv) states: "The CONTRACTING PARTIES agree that the
principle of differential and more favourable treatment embodied in Part IV and other relevant provisions
of the General Agreement and in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 28 November 1979 on
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation ofDeveloping Countries
applies to the negotiations. In the implementation of standstill and rollback, particular care should be given
to avoiding disruptive effects on the trade of less-developed contracting parties." Paragraph (v) states: "The
developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to
reduce or remove tariff and other barriers to the trade of developing countries, i.e. the developed countries
do not expect the developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are
inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting parties
shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions
that are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade needs." Paragraph (vi) states: "Less-
developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to make contributions or negotiated concessions or
take other mutually agreed action under the provisions and procedures of the General Agreement would
improve with the progressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade situation and
they would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework of rights and obligations under
30
Different from the "codes" made during the Tokyo Round negotiations, the
multilateral trade agreements made during the Uruguay Round negotiations are
implemented as a "single package", which means that the precondition to be a WTO
Member is to "buy in" all the results of the negotiations with only limited exceptions.
Here, one fact deserving our notice is that a large number of former colonies became
GATT contracting parties without experiencing the accession negotiations,25 they did not
have the opportunities, neither were they required, to familiarise themselves with the
GATT rules. During the Tokyo Round negotiations, except some "industrialised"
developing countries, most developing countries kept themselves away from the
codifying process, devoting their efforts to asking for more special and preferential
treatment.26 In the Uruguay Round negotiations, developing countries, half-exhorted and
half-threatened by the developed countries, agreed to integrate themselves into the global
community. But even then, few of them could predict what impact of these trade rules
would have upon them. When the WTO rules began to bind all its Members, developing
countries came to realise that they already had no choice but to accept.
It is important, in this context, to assess how the WTO agreements have been
implemented in sectors of international trade covered by the WTO where developing
countries have a significant stake. During the 1996 and 1998 Ministerial Conferences of
the WTO,27 several developing countries called for such an assessment to be made, so
that the benefits expected to flow from the Uruguay Round negotiations to developing
countries could be properly evaluated, to see whether the attempt to enable these
countries to effectively participate in, and benefit from the WTO system had succeeded.28
The WTO itself had noted in 1996 that "some Members have expressed dissatisfaction
the General Agreement." Paragraph (vii) states: "Special attention shall be given to the particular situation
and problems of the least-developed countries and to the need to encourage positive measures to facilitate
expansion of their trade opportunities. Expeditious implementation of the relevant provisions of the 1982
Ministerial Declaration concerning the least-developed countries shall also be given appropriate attention."
See GATT Activities! 1986), Geneva, pp.17-18.
25
: Article XXVI, paragraph 5(c) of GATT 1947 states: "If any of the customary territories, in respect of
which a contracting party has accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires full autonomy in the conduct
of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement, such territory
shall, upon sponsorship through a declaration by the responsible contracting party establishing the above-
mentioned fact, be deemed to be a contracting party." See supra note 4.
26
: A major objective of the developing countries in the Tokyo Round was to seek improved and
predictable conditions of access for their increasingly diversified range of exports, an improved legal
framework for the future conduct of international trade taking into account their development, financial and
trade needs, and special and differential treatment where this was feasible and appropriate, including
special treatment for the least-developed countries. They were also concerned to ensure that any
liberalisation achieved would be placed on a secure footing. See GATT Activities(1979), Geneva, p. 13.
27: Article IV: 1 of the WTO Agreement states: "There shall be a Ministerial Conference composed of all the
Members, which shall meet at least once every two years. The Ministerial Conference shall carry out the
functions of the WTO and take actions necessary to this effect. The Ministerial Conference shall have the
authority to take decision on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, if so requested by
a Member, in accordance with the specific requirements for decision-making in this Agreement and in the
relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement." See supra note 4. Although the Minister Conference is the highest-
level authority, it is not a permanent body. In most cases, its functions are carried out by the General
Council.
28
: See WTO Focus Newsletter, No.13, 1996, p.20; No.26, 1998, pp.3-6.
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with certain aspects of the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreemnts".29 It was
pointed out that trade was "an instrument of development, to raise standards of living,
expand production, keeping in view, particularly, the needs of developing countries and
least-developed countries".30 However, despite calls for such an assessment to be made
prior to the launching of any further round of trade liberalisation negotiations, the WTO
was prevented by developed countries form doing so in a coherent manner.
The impact of the WTO rules upon developing countries are uneven in different trade
sectors. A panoramic assessment of these impacts seems difficult, if not impossible, in
light of the multitude of the WTO rules and the comparatively short period of
implementation. A more important factor accounting for this difficulty is the huge
difference among developing countries themselves in terms of their development level. In
order to be more specific and convincing, the discussion of this part is only limited to
those areas of greater interest to the developing countries, such as textiles and clothing,
agriculture, trade-related intellectual property rights, and trade in services.
The textile and clothing industry has always occupied a sensitive position in national
economies. It was, after all, the bedrock of the industrial revolution in many developed
countries like Britain and Japan. While extremely labour-intensive, textile and clothing
production is not particularly capital-intensive, and is often regarded as the first stepping
stone out of an agrarian society. In recent times, when many developing countries
attempted to produce textiles and clothing products for the same over-supplied world
market, they found that this particular sector had already been kept outside the purview of
the GATT system. Liberalising this trade sector had been the demand of many
developing countries in the GATT for almost four decades. The outcome of the
negotiations on this subject during the Uruguay Round is the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing(ATC), which provides a 10-year transition period (1995-2004) for phasing out
the quantitative restrictions(quotas) imposed arbitrarily under the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement(MFA) by the United States, the European Union, Canada and Norway on
imports of textiles and clothing products into their markets.33 Although the phase-out
29
: Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Document(WT/MIN/1996/DEC), dated 18 December 1996,
para.10, p.3.
30
: Ramakrishma Hegde: WTO Issues and India's Concerns(Speech at the Second Ministerial Conference
of the WTO in Geneva, 18-20 May 1998), India and WTO, Vol.1, 1999, No.2, p.3.
31
: See Asoke Mukerji: Developing Countries and the WTO—Issues of Implementation, Journal of World
Trade, Vol.34, 2000, No.6, p.39.
32
: Voluntary export restraints in this sector had been introduced at the end of the Second World War by
the United States and the United Kingdom. In 1959, the United States introduced the concept of "market
disruption" into the GATT examination of trade in textiles and clothing sector, in an attempt to provide a
conceptual justification for import restrictions of these products. In 1961, the United States proposed a
conference among cotton textiles producers, which led to the conclusion of a Short-Term Cotton
Arrangement(STA), effectively marking the beginning of a long period during which textiles and clothing
trade would be treated as a "special case" for the GATT. The STA was followed in 1962 by the Long-Term
Arrangement(LTA), which was replaced in 1974 by the Multi-fibre Arrangement(MFA), which was in
force until 31 December 1994. Throughout this entire period, international trade in cotton products, later
extending to wool and man-made fibres, and in 1986 to practically every fibre in existence, was kept out of
the GATT's purview, and trade was restricted arbitrarily by import restrictions in the form of quotas which
were negotiated and implemented on a bilateral basis. The consequence of this bilateral action was that the
cornerstone of trade liberalisation , the MFN treatment, was completely ignored. Id, pp.41-42.
33
: Article 1(1) of the ATC states: "This Agreement sets out provisions to be applied by Members during a
transition period for the integration of the textiles and clothing sector into GATT 1994." Article 2(6) of the
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mechanism gives developing countries some assurance that this particular sector will be
completely integrated into GATT 1994 from 1 January 2005, it is still disappointing to
observe that developed countries, in the initial stages, opened their markets only to the
products which were not commercially significant.34 As regards those products which
have already been integrated into GATT 1994, developing countries will still possibly
meet the barriers raised by developed countries by invoking Article XIX of GATT
1994(with the title Emergency Action on Imports ofParticular Products), Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and Agreement on Safeguards despite the fact that the use of these measures
may become more politically costly. Therefore, the disadvantageous status of developing
countries in the textiles and clothing sector has not been changed fundamentally merely
because of the implementation of the ATC.
The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in the Agreement on Agriculture(AOA),
which is to be implemented over a six-year period beginning from 1995(extended to a 10-
year period for developing countries).35 In the AOA, five broad areas were negotiated
into the text of the agreement to address the concerns of developing countries. These
negotiated areas are market access, food security(with specific reference to net food
importing countries), domestic support commitment, export subsidy commitment,
ATC states: "On the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, each Member shall integrate into
GATT 1994 products which accounted for not less than 16 per cent of the total volume of the Member's
1990 imports of the products in the Annex, in terms of HS lines or categories." Article 2(8) states: "The
remaining products... shall be integrated ...in three stages, as follows: (a)on the first day of the 37th month
that the WTO Agreement is in effect, products which accounted for not less than 17 per cent of the total
volume of the Member's 1990 imports of the products in the Annex; (b)on the first day of the 85th month
that the WTO Agreement is in effect, products which accounted for not less than 18 per cent of the total
volume of the Member's 1990 imports of the products in the Annex; (c)on the first day of the 121st month
that the WTO Agreement is in effect, the textiles and clothing sector shall stand integrated into GATT 1994,
all restrictions under this Agreement having been eliminated." See supra note 4.
34
: The WTO review of the implementation of the ATC, which was conducted in 1997-98, expressed the
concern of some developing countries on this issue: "...products selected for integration were concentrated
in less valued-added products such as tops, yarns and fabrics, with only small shares of make-up textile
products and clothing; furthermore, the shares of integrated products were substantially lower in terms of
value of trade than in volume of trade while more of the integrated trade was being accounted for by
imports from developed countries than from developing countries. ..with over 96 percent of restricted trade
remaining to be integrated even after seven years of implementation, there would be no benefits for
developing countries." See Major Review of the Implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
in the First Stage ofthe Integration Process, WTO Document G/C/W/105, dated 4 February 1998, para.10,
p.3. This concern was shared by the WTO's collective membership, which stated: "...the integration
programme of the major importing Members during the first stage, and as announced for the second stage,
included only a small number of products which had actually been under quota restrictions, therefore,
leaving a large number of products for which quota restrictions would need to be eliminated during the
remainder of the transition period." Id, para.13, p.4.
35
: Although the original GATT 1947 applied to the agriculture sector, it had significant loopholes. For
example, it allowed countries to subsidise exports and use import quotas. The use of export subsidies, in
particular, caused serious distortions of international trade. A major impediment to liberalising agriculture
trade was the exemptions built into the GATT by the United States, allowing it to take measures to stabilise
farm incomes, enhance export sales and shield US farmers from foreign competition. In 1955, the United
States obtained a waiver from the GATT obligations for its farm programmes. This was compounded by
the newly formed European Economic Community's Common Agriculture Policy(CAP), which was built
on a foundation of guaranteed prices defended from import competition by a system of variable levies, as
well as by a provision for export restitution to dispose of the inevitable bumper crops that guaranteed prices
would stimulate. See Asoke Mukerji, supra note 31, p.45.
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notification requirements and technical assistance. As in the sector of textiles and
clothing, the implementation of these commitments has not been satisfactory.36
According to Article 20 of the AOA,37 the WTO started the negotiations to review the
implementation of the AOA on 27 March 2001. Altogether 125 WTO Members(counting
the EU as 16) out of a total of 140 submitted 44 negotiating proposals and three technical
submissions in the first phase of the negotiations.38 This reflected the general concerns of
the WTO Members, especially the developing country Members, to the ineffectuality of
the AOA, and their expectations to reform the present agreement. On 26 April 2001, the
WTO Secretariat circulated a detailed study on the post-Uruguay Round market access
conditions in three areas: industrial tariffs, agriculture and service,39 which
acknowledged: "As required by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, all
agricultural tariffs are bound, but in many cases these bindings are at very high rates and
offer limited market access opportunities", while "the products of greatest export interest
to the least-developed countries—many agricultural products together with clothing and
other labour-intensive manufactures—are among the most heavily protected in the
markets of their current and potential trading partners". At the outset of the new round of
agriculture negotiations, the impenetrability of the language of the initial agreement, and
the lack of substantial reforms of agricultural policies in some developed country
Members are serious disadvantages. Without political consensus on such issues as the
most desirable size of farming units, the role of food security and environment protection,
the influence of multinational agribusiness, and the principal intended outcomes of any
further reform, the next agreement on agriculture is likely to remain as obscure in its
general aims and effects as the first one.
In the years leading up to the Uruguay Round negotiations, the developed countries,
those capable of making huge investment in industrial innovations, had constantly urged
the newly industrialised countries to cease their practice ofmass copying of products that
had cost dearly to develop. The reluctance of those countries to continue providing
market access to the newly industrialised countries in the event of a continued failure to
honour intellectual property rights is understandable. The traditional, uni-focus
intellectual property conventions could not possibly persuade the countries of the
developing world to alter their domestic regimes, since these conventions had no broader
economic leverage over the offending parties.40 Along with the new dispute settlement
36
: For example, although the preamble to the AOA specifies that "developed country Members would take
fully into account the particular needs and conditions of developing country Members by providing for a
greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of particular interest to
these Members", the fact remains that the post-Uruguay Round base tariffs of a number of sensitive
commodities in many developed countries are higher than the actual tariff equivalents of all border
measures which existed in 1986-1988. Id, pp.46-47.
: Which states: "Members agree that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated one year
before the end of the implementation period..." See supra note 4.
38: See WTO Focus Newsletter, 2001, No.52, p.2.
39
: See WTO Special Studies(6): Market Access: Unfinished Business—Post-Uruguay Round Inventory
and Issues, pp.3-4. cf. http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/maccessl_e.pdf
40
: Administered by the World Intellectual Property Organisation(WIPO) under the auspices of the United
Nations, the principal intellectual property conventions are the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works(\91 \)\ the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property(\967);
and the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organ isations(Rome Convention^ 1961).
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mechanism, and the "buying in, buying all" acceptance requirement for prospective WTO
Members, for the first time, there is a chance that even the most recalcitrant intellectual
property violators could be made to provide legal protection for non-national rights
holders. But from the point of view of the developing world, paying the full cost of
industrial innovation to wealthy corporations is unthinkable, if only because under the
existing situation, copied products could be delivered on a mass scale to populations
generally unable to pay the price of intellectual property rights. The standards of
protection, set out during the Uruguay Round negotiations, "are at a level comparable to
those in the major industrial countries today".41 The benefits guaranteed by the
transitional provisions of the TRIPS Agreement42 for developing countries have already
been offset by the high standards ofprotection which have become the WTO norm. Many
developing countries, by distancing themselves from the debate in the WTO on these
standards of protection, have unwittingly endorsed this approach. This will have major
repercussions for them after the end of the transition period, when their intellectual
property rights protection regimes will be required to meet the same criteria as those of
developed countries which already have a mature market and a complete intellectual
property rights protection regime. The consequence of this over-emphasis on the
protection of intellectual property rights has diverted peoples' attention away from the
spirit of both the preamble and substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which
deal with the issues of relevance to the developing countries.43 During the first five years
of operation of the WTO, attempts by developing countries to seek access to technology
on realistic terms have been substantively obstructed by the stance of developed
countries,44 creating a new form ofprotectionism to the international economic order.45
41
: Adrian Otten and Hannu Wager: Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, Vanderbilt
Journal of Transitional Law, Vol.29, 1996, p.396.
42
: According to Article 65(Transitional Arrangements), except developing countries, all other WTO
Member are obliged to apply the TRIPS Agreement one year after the creation of the WTO(beginning from
1 January 1996). Developing countries and those with a transitional economy are entitled to delay for a
further period of four years the date of application(beginning from 1 January 2000). A developing country
which previously did not provide product patent protection in any field of technology may be given an
additional transition period of five years to provide protection in this field(beginning from 1 January 2005).
See supra note 4.
43
: For example, not much attention has been paid to the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement which states
that the WTO should "ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade". Id.
44
: For example, proposals to examine the compulsory licensing provision(Article 31) and the term of
protection(Article 33) of the TRIPS Agreement to ensure the transfer of environmentally-sound products
and technologies to developing countries were rejected by developed countries in the CTE. See Report of
the Committee on Trade and Environment 1996, WTO Document WT/CTE/W/40, 7 November 1996,
paras.137-138, pp.31-32.
45
: Two examples can be used to illustrate the favour to the developed countries and the disfavour to the
developing and least-developed countries in the TRIPS Agreement. One is Article 23. This article is used to
regulate the protection for geographical indications for wines and spirits, of which the developed countries
have much advantage, while there are no similar provisions to protect those manufactures of relevance to
the developing countries. The other example is that although Article 65(Transitional Arrangements)
provides a five-year transition period for developing countries to apply the TRIPS Agreement,
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, however, are excluded from this transition period
according to Article 69(8). This has already brought much impact on the development ofmany developing
countries. This is also the main reason for the dispute raised by the United States against India's patent
protection regime for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products. See India—Patent Protection for
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The integration of services into the international trade sphere is another negative
impact upon the economy of most developing countries. The General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) regulates the supply of a service: (a)from the territory of one
Member into the territory of any other Member; (b)in the territory of one Member to the
service consumer of any other Member; (c)by a service supplier of one Member, through
commercial presence in the territory of any other Member; (d)by a service supplier of one
Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other
Member.46 The GATS is remarkable for the fact that it marks the first step in making it
difficult(perhaps impossible) for the WTO Members to refuse rights of participation in
their domestic economies, in almost any capacity, to non-nationals. Along with the
GATS, those separate protocols on such heavily regulated sub-sectors as financial
services, telecoms and transport indicate that for the first time in economic history, not
only the nationality of goods, but also the nationality of economic structures, may be
about to crumble. Although the GATS guaranteed a "progressive liberalisation" of
markets to the developing countries, the backwardness of basic facilities and low level of
education have made it difficult for most developing countries to compete with the
developed countries in most service areas in a feasible future. Even in those labour-
intensive areas like construction and tourism, in which some developing countries do
have competitive advantages, the reality is that those developing countries still cannot
earn as much as expected either because of the barriers raised by developed countries
under the grounds of licensing or certification of the service suppliers, or because of the
low efficiency of those developing countries.47
In the light of the huge gap existing between developed and developing countries, it is
necessary to make the rule-based international economic system more responsive to the
challenges facing developing countries, especially with regard to the operation of their
economic and legal infrastructures which have to meet the twin demands of economic
liberalisation and socio-economic development. Although the special and preferential
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report of the Appellate Body(distributed on 19
December 1997), WT/DS50/AB/R.
46: Article 1:2 of the GATS. See supra note 4. The GATS almost covers all modes of internationally traded
services which include business services(e.g. professional services, computer and related services, research
and development services, real estate services, rental/leasing services without operators, advertising and
other miscellaneous services); communication services(e.g. courier services, postal services,
telecommunication services, audio-visual services); construction and related engineering services,
distribution services; educational services; environmental services; financial services(e.g. insurance
services, banking and other financial services); health and related social services; tourism and travel-related
services; recreational, cultural and sporting services(e.g. entertainment services, news agency services,
libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities, sporting and other recreational services); and
transport services(e.g. maritime transport services, internal waterways services, air transport services, space
transport services, rail transport services, road transport services, pipeline transport services, and services
auxiliary to all modes of transport). See Asoke Mukerji, supra note 31, p.58.
47
: World Tourism Organisation statistics indicate that arrivals by air account for more than 90% of total
arrivals in a significant majority of developing countries. Since many of these countries are far distant from
the rich markets which provide their consumers, their export revenues are diminished by the high air-fares
caused by low air traffic density and by protectionist aviation policies, which, according to the World
Travel and Tourism Council, severely constrain the development of tourism. Protectionism in the air
transport sector, at the expense of hotels and other tourist activities whose net revenues are likely to be far
greater than those of national airlines, may be a very expensive strategy. See WTO Special Studies(6),
supra note 39, pp.131-132.
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treatment for the developing countries embedded in the WTO rules has received wide
recognition from WTO Members, the rationale behind these rules has rarely been studied
in detail. A careful study of this issue will help us to understand the current world trade
rules in a more co-ordinated way.
2.1.3. The rationale for the special and preferential rules
International trade exerts a critical influence on the economic development of any
country, be it a developed country, a transitional economy country, a developing country,
or a least-developed country. Yet, the role of international trade in economic
development is far from settled and uncontroversial. While international trade is widely
viewed as an "engine of growth", developing countries disagree profoundly over the role
of international trade in the process of their economic development. The focal point of
the debate is whether developing countries, as their economy is lagged far behind those
of developed countries, should be bound by the same trade mles as those applicable to the
developed countries or should be treated differently during their integration into the
world economy. This was also a major issue of the Uruguay Round ofmultilateral trade
negotiations. The justifications for those special and differential rules resulting from the
Uruguay Round negotiations are numerous. From an economic perspective, any universal
legal system must address the particular concerns of developing countries. The actual
relative economic positions of developed and developing countries must be
acknowledged and somehow reconciled.
The traditional neo-classical theory of international trade regards trade as a means of
promoting(both productive and allocative) efficiency, equity, stability and growth on a
world-wide scale. An interdependent world economy based on free trade, specialisation,
and an international division of labour facilitates domestic development. Flows of goods,
capital, and technology within and across national borders should work to the economic
benefits of all countries, exploiting their comparative advantages.48 While free trade may
be theoretically attractive, the assumptions upon which this theory is based do not
necessarily apply to the contemporary realties of the global economy and the majority of
developing countries. In the real world, there exist imperfect competition, unequal trade,
and differential human resource and technological growth. Accordingly, the question
becomes one ofwhether international trade is to be a force of equality or inequality.
In contrast to the traditional view of international trade, some modern scholars argue
that a liberal capitalist world economy tends to preserve or actually increase inequalities
between developed and developing countries.49 Whereas trade was indeed an engine of
growth in the nineteenth century, it cannot continue to perform this role properly today
because of the combined effects of free trade and the economic, sociological, and
demographic conditions which are prevalent among many developing countries. These
conditions include the combination of overpopulation and subsistence agriculture, rising
expectations causing a low propensity to save, excessive dependence on unstable
48
: Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, argued that the case for gains from the specialisation in
domestic economic activities applied equally to specialisation in international trade: "What is prudence in
the conduct of every private family can scarcely be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can
supply us with a commodity cheaper than we can make, better buy it from them with some part of the
produce of our industry." Adam Smith: The Wealth ofNations, New York: Modem Library Edition, 1937,
p.424. Smith's theory marks the advent of neo-classical theory of international trade.
49
: See Ian Roxborough: Theories ofUnderdevelopment, London: Macmillan(1979), chapter three.
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commodity exports, and the consequential impact of long-time feudal elite leadership.50
These misfortunes trap those developing countries in a self-perpetuating state of
underdevelopment equilibrium from which they cannot escape without outside
assistance.51
Although the globalists argue that flows of trade, investment, and technology diffuse
economic development and reduce international inequalities, the real situation seems
going in an opposite way in many developing countries. International market
imperfections increase inequalities among developed and developing countries as the
developed countries tend to benefit disproportionately from international trade.52 While it
may be true that the "developing countries" of the nineteenth century did enjoy the so-
called advantages of backwardness that enabled them to learn from the experience of the
more advanced economies, many of the twenty-first-century developing countries are,
however, said to face almost insurmountable obstacles before they develop their national
economy: the widening technological gap, their long experiences of marginalisation in
the world economy, the lack of social discipline, conservative social structures, inherited
population problems, low education level, harassment of indebtedness, and harsh climatic
and geographic conditions. These developing countries are thus trapped in a vicious cycle
of poverty from which escape is nearly impossible, and free trade may only make their
situations become worse. As Ragnar Nurkse put it: "a country is poor because it is poor"
whereas "growth breeds growth".53
In order to expose the causes of these social injustices, some scholars point out that
the world economy is composed of a core or centre of highly developed countries and a
large underdeveloped periphery.54 Technical progress that leads to increasing
productivity and economic development is the driving force in this system, but technical
advance has different consequences for the economic centre and the economic periphery
due to their different economic structures and the international division of labour
inherited from the past.55 The heart of their argument is that the nature of technical
30
: The history of the twentieth-century China can mirror these social upheavals of a developing country.
The 1911 bourgeois revolution ended the feudal elite leadership in China. After that, China was involved in
the long-time civil war and the World War II. After 1949 when the Communist Party overthrew the
Kuomintang government, China did not concentrate its efforts on the economic development until 1978
when the Open Door Policy was enacted.
31
: See Gunnar Myrdal: Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, New York: Harper and
Row(1971).
32
: According to Alice Alexandra Kipel, apart from those East Asian new industrialised countries, which
account for more than two-thirds of the manufactured exports from developing countries, most developing
countries export primary products as their main source of foreign revenues, which places them at a
disadvantage relative to developed countries. See Alice Alexandra Kipel: Special and Differential
Treatment for Developing Countries(m The World Trade Organisation—The Multilateral Trade
Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation, edited by Terence P. Stewart),
American Bar Association! 1996), p.618.
33
: Ragnar Nurkse: Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, New York: Blackwell
(1953), p.4.
54
: See Raul Prebisch: Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, American Economic Review,
No.49(May), 1959, pp.251-273.
55
: Some scholars consider that even though the former European colonies have achieved political
independence, they either have not developed or have at least remained economically subordinate to the
more advanced countries. Rather than progressing into higher stages of economic development, some of
these countries have in fact increased their reliance on advanced economies for food, capital, and modern
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advance, cyclical price movements, and differences in demand for manufactured goods
and primary products cause a secular deterioration for developing countries as they can
only rely on their exportation of primary products for the importation of manufactured
goods from developed countries. In the economic centre, technical progress is said to
arise from the spontaneous operations of the economy and to diffuse throughout the
whole economy so that employment displaced by increasing efficiency can be absorbed
by investment in other expanding industrial sectors. Without large-scale of
unemployment and with the pressures of powerful trade unions, there is an increase in
real wages. Moreover, monopolistic corporations can maintain the price level despite the
increasing of productivity and the decreasing cost of production. In the non-industrial
periphery, however, technical progress is introduced from the outside and is restricted
primarily to the production of commodities and raw materials that are exported to the
economic centre. Inflexible social structures and immobile factors of production make
adaptation to price changes impossible. Increased productivity in the primary sector, a
shortage of capital due to a low rate savings, and an elite consumption pattern imitative of
advanced countries all combine to increase the level of national unemployment. With
surplus labour in primary occupations and the absence of strong trade unions, the real
wage in the periphery economy then declines, transferring the fruits of technical advance
in the periphery economy to the economic centre via depressed prices for commodity
exports.56
Based on this analysis, we can find that the terms of trade between developed
countries(the core economy) and most developing countries(the periphery economy) tend
to deteriorate constantly to the advantage of the former and to the disadvantage of the
latter. As a consequence of this imbalance of the global economic structures, developing
countries are unable to reverse this tragic situation, if they do not change the pattern of
exportation. They will export ever more primary commodities in order to import the
manufactured goods they need. Under these circumstances, even though the developing
countries might gain absolutely from international trade, they would lose in relative
terms.57 As Arthur Lewis has cogently argued, the fact that the terms of trade for many
developing countries are unfavourable is that they are unable to develop their agriculture.
The combination of rapid population growth(which creates an unlimited supply of
labour) and low productivity in food grains causes export prices and real wages in many
technology. See Simon Kuznets: Toward a Theory ofEconomic Growth, New York: W. W. Norton(1968),
p.2, note 2.
56: See Robert Gilpin, supra note 1, pp.275-276.
57
: According to Kipel, due to the low income elasticity of demand for primary products, the export
performance of developing countries is poor compared with the export performance of developed countries.
Income elasticity of demand can be defined as the relation of the quantity demanded of a commodity to the
changes in consumer income. It is expressed by the ratio of change in quantity demanded over the changes
in consumer income. Relative income inelasticity of demand entails that the percentage increase in quantity
demanded increases less than the percentage increase in national income. In the case of primary products,
the world demand curve shows that the income elasticity of demand is in general relatively low. By
contrast, in the case of manufactured goods, the income elasticity of demand is relatively high. Thus, as
income rises in the developed countries, their demand for primary products from the developing countries
rises less than proportionatelyfless than 1 to 1), but their demand for manufactured goods, the production of
which is dominated by the developed countries, rises more than proportionately (greater than 1 to 1). See
Alice Alexandra Kipel, supra note 52, pp.618-619.
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developing countries to lag behind those of developed countries.58 Although it is true that
there are some developed countries, like Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and even the
United States, which are also major exporters of agricultural products, the point here is
that many developing countries, unlike the early modem Europe, are unable to improve
their industrial productivity based on a prior rapid development of agriculture.5 Low
efficiency in agricultural sector and lack of innovations in industrial sector will place
many developing countries in an even weaker position in the current integration ofworld
economy.
The question of whether developing countries are better off to be integrated into or
isolated from the global world cannot be answered in the abstract. In either scenario,
international trading rules(and adherence thereto or exemptions therefrom) have a
substantive economic impact. Furthermore, neither policy can realistically be pursued
without acknowledging and somehow remedying the disparities between developed and
developing countries. Indeed, special and differential treatment for developing countries
can be utilised to promote exports and/or stimulate domestic production ofmanufactured
goods.
The rationale of the special and preferential treatment accorded to developing
countries is based on the recognition that "there is a wide gap between standards of living
in less-developed countries and in other countries".60 While we focus our attention on
narrowing the gap of living standards between developed and developing countries, we
cannot neglect another important fact that the gap of living standards among developing
countries themselves is widening. Being aware of this, some developing countries may
ask: "are these special and preferential rules universal or differential?"
2.1.4. Special and preferential rules: universal or differential?
The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade
Negotiations^hereinafter as Final Act) contains many provisions which accord special and
differential treatment to developing and least-developed country Members.61 These
provisions are found chiefly in the WTO Agreement^Preamble, Article XI), in Part IV of
GATT 1947(which has been incorporated into GATT 1994), in selected provisions of the
multilateral agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement,62 in the ministerial Decision on
38
: See Arthur Lewis: The Evolution of the International Economic Order, Princeton University
Press(1978).
19
: The current movement of urbanisation in China indicates that the Chinese government has realised that
the next stage of modernisation should include the sector of agriculture. Among the 1.3 billion of the
population, about four-fifths live in rural areas. The autarkic mode of agricultural production has restricted
the further development of the Chinese economy. After entering the WTO, China will face further pressure
of low-price but high-quality agricultural products from abroad. A prior development of agriculture will
accumulate more capital and provide surplus labour for a higher level ofmodernisation.
60: Article XXXVI:l(c) of GATT 1994. See supra note 4.
61
: Paragraph 1 of the Final Act states: "Having met in order to conclude the Umguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, representatives of the governments and of the European Communities,
members of the Trade Negotiations Committee, agree that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation(referred to in this Final Act as the "WTO Agreement"), the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, as annexed hereto, embody the
results of their negotiations and form an integral part of this Final Act."(Emphasis original). See supra note
4.
62
: For example, Agreernent on Tgn'cw/tare(Preamble, Articles 15, 16); Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures{Preamble, Article 10); Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
40
Measures in Favour of Least-developed Countries, and in the ministerial Decision on
Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-
developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries. The WTO Members recognise
the special development, financial and trade needs of developing and least-developed
countries in the implementation of the obligations attendant their accessions to the WTO.
These special needs arise on both a national and international level. Thus, where the WTO
Agreement and its annexed agreements impose obligations on the Member governments,
either to take affirmative action or abstain from a certain conduct, developing and least-
developed country Members may be given more time to fulfil their obligations. Selected
exemptions from obligations may also be available to developing and least-developed
country Members. Furthermore, to address the special needs of developing countries,
particularly the least-developed countries, some of the WTO agreements require
developed country Members to provide for developing country Members the necessary
technical assistance.
In situations where these terms are defined, a country's international status as
"developed", "developing", or "least-developed" is determined primarily with reference
to its Gross National Income(GNI) per capita. M. Bertrand used GNI per capita 8000 US
dollars per annum as the dividing line for developing and developed countries.63
However, while the WTO Agreement, its annexed agreements and the related documents
make reference to "developing country Members", nowhere do they generally define the
term "developing country", nor do they specify any numerical criteria. Hence, in the case
of accession to the WTO(as it was in the GATT), designation of a country as
"developing" occurs somewhat on an ad hoc basis, mostly through self-selection.64 In the
light of this situation, developing countries in the WTO can possibly be referred either to
countries like Singapore, Korea, or to countries like South Africa, Kenya. In contrast, as
for the term "least-developed", the WTO Agreement provides a benchmark—the
Agreement refers to "least-developed" countries as those recognised as such by the
United Nations.65
(Preamble, Article 6[6]); Agreement on Technical Barriers to 7rarfe(Preamble, Article 12); Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures(Preamble, Article 4); Anti-Dumping Agreement(Article 15);
Agreement on Customs Valuation^Article 20); Agreement on Preshipment Inspection(Vreamble);
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures^Article 1 [2]); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Meajwrej(Articles 27, 29); Agreement on Safeguards(Article 9); General Agreement on Trade in
SemcesfPreamble, Article IV); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
/?z'g/zrt(Preamble, Article 66); Dispute Settlement Understanding (Article 24), etc. See supra note 4.
63: See M. Bertrand: Refaire L'Onu: un programmepour la paix, Geneva(1986), p.79.
64
: There are no WTO definitions of "developed" and "developing" countries. A Member country may
decide itself as a "developing country" by self-selection. However, this does not automatically provide
rights under preference schemes such as Generalised System of Preferences(GSP). In addition, other
Members can challenge this selection, and this has sometimes happened in specific areas such as
intellectual property. This challenge can then lead to negotiations to clarify the position. For countries
which negotiated to join the WTO after 1995, their status depends on the terms agreed in the accession
negotiations, cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dlwho_e.htm
65
: Article XI of the WTO Agreement states: "The least-developed countries recognised as such by the
United Nations will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent
with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional
capabilities." See supra note 4. There are currently 48 least-developed countries on the UN list, 30 of which
to date have become WTO Members. These countries are: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Bumndi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea,
41
According to Alice Alexandra Kipel, the vagueness regarding what constitutes a
developing country can be attributed to two factors: (a)lack of consensus as to a definitive
standard, and (b)disagreement over the goals sought to be achieved through special
treatment for developing countries.66 The lack of consensus on the definition by over 100
countries, which are at various levels of social and economic development and, therefore,
have differing perspectives on this issue, is understandable and merits no further
analysis.67 The interplay between a flexible definition and the purposes to be served by
special treatment for developing countries is more complex. Indeed, the purposes and the
concerns addressed are different depending on whether the point of view is that of a
developed country or a developing country.
Kipel in her article seems to favour a vague definition for developing countries: "a
subjective definition likely inures to the benefit of both developed countries and
developing countries. If a country is willing to describe itself as developing country and
articulates a need for special assistance, there presumably is reason to provide special
treatment to enable that country to assume the obligations of the Final Act, thereby
helping to ensure that this developing country offers market access and is not a disruptive
presence in the international trade arena. Moreover, without a bright-line test, putative
developing countries can proffer a variety of justifications in support of their need for
special treatment. A rigid definition of the term 'developing country', on the other hand,
would preclude such a creative approach, thus preventing countries from obtaining the
special treatment and assistance which they believe necessary. As such, a country might
effectively be blocked from meaningful participation in the world trading system which
the Final Act seeks to regulate".68
There might be some reasoning in Kipel's argument, especially for a young
international institution like the WTO. Since the WTO Members have resolved to
"develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade
liberalisation efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations",69 a practical way to fulfil this purpose is to attract the WTO Members in a
flexible manner. However, the differences among developing countries themselves, in
reality, are so huge that a set of vague standards for their definition could only make the
special treatment become impracticable and contradictory. According to the statistics
distributed by the World Bank, the world average level of Gross National Income(GNI)
per capita in 1999 is 5,020 US dollars, with the average level of high-income countries at
26,440 US dollars, middle-income(including upper-middle-income and lower-middle-
income) countries at 1,240 US dollars, and low-income countries only at 420 US dollars.
These data profiles also reflect a similar contrast in the areas of technology,
infrastructure, trade and finance.70 In the World Bank documents, those low-income and
Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Vanuatu,
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dlwho_e.htm
66: Alice Alexandra Kipel, see supra note 52, p.624.
67
: See GATT Analytical Index: Guide to GATTLaw and Practice, GATT BISD 13th Supplement(1965),
pp.75-76(describing the lack of consensus as to how to identify developing countries).
68
: Alice Alexandra Kipel, see supra note 52, p.625.
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middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing economies, but it is
not intended to imply that all economies in this group are experiencing similar
development or that other economies have reached a preferred or final stage of
development. The reference used within the World Bank is just for the sake of
convenience. The WTO has no similar criteria to classify its Members. Consequently,
some of the WTO Members which label themselves as developing countries are grouped
either as high-income countries or upper-middle-income countries by the World Bank.71
Under such a circumstance, if the WTO does wish, as the WTO Agreement proclaims, to
raise the living standard of developing countries by means of international trade under the
auspices of those special treatment provisions, the definition of developing countries
should be clearly-cut, otherwise the treatment accorded to developing countries is not
special but universal.
Furthermore, just as Kipel herself acknowledged, a subjective definition can lead to
friction between those countries seeking preferential treatment and the developed
countries with whom they have substantial trading relations. For example, much debate
and publicity surrounded the application of China for its WTO membership. Among the
issues of contention between China and the United States was the question of whether
China should enter the WTO as a developing country(the result desired by China) or as a
developed country, thereby assuming the full obligations of a WTO Member(the result
sought by the United States). China, after two decades of economic reform, has achieved
significant progress in its economic development. But with a huge number of population,
the gross national income per capita in China is still low compared with that of those
developed country Members and some other developing country Members in the WTO.72
The basic facilities, particularly those in the inland China, are quite backward. The
education level of the population is still relatively low. Under these circumstances, it is
understandable that China insisted on its developing country status in the WTO. From
1986, first for the resumption of the contracting party status of the GATT, then for the
entry of the WTO,73 China negotiated with all the GATT contracting parties/WTO
71
: According to the World Bank, 64 countries are grouped as low-income economies(all the 29 least-
developed WTO Member countries, except Djibouti and Vanuatu which are grouped as lower-middle-
income economies, are included in this group), among which are India and Kenya, 55 countries are grouped
as lower-middle-income economies, among which are China and Morocco, 38 countries are grouped as
upper-middle-income economies, among which are Korea and Saudi Arabia, 49 countries are grouped as
high-income economies, among which are Kuwait and Qatar. Ironically, all the above-mentioned countries,
including India, Kenya, Djibouti, Vanuatu, China, Morocco, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, are




: In 2002, the gross national income per capita in China is just a little over 1000 US dollars. See Chinese
Economic News of 2002, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/31/179 See also US-China GATT Accession
Talks Described as Making Progress, 11 International Trade Report, No.23, 1994, p.899.
73
: China is one of the 23 original signatories of GATT 1947. After China's revolution in 1949, the
government in Taiwan announced that China would leave the GATT system. Although the government in
Beijing never recognised this withdrawal decision, nearly after 40 years later, in 1986, China notified the
GATT of its wish to resume its contracting party status in the GATT. Since the negotiations could not be
completed before 1995, the year of the establishment of the WTO, China entered the negotiations applying
for the WTO membership.
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Members which had significant trade relations with China. It is only a bit more than a
year ago that the final obstacle in the way ofChina's entry into the WTO was removed.74
Here, one more question which merits noting is that the status of a developing
country should not be stationary. Some countries, when they entered the GATT/WTO,
were only at the initial stage of their industrialisation process and did need the external
help for their fledgling industries. Nevertheless, after these years of development, they
are still labelled as "developing countries" even if they have achieved much success and
become quite "developed". In order to maximise the benefits of the special and
preferential treatment, and to help those developing countries which still lag far behind
others, the WTO needs to specify the criteria for a country which wishes to be accorded
the special and preferential treatment. At the moment, there are two options available.
One is, similar to the practice of the World Bank, to set a statistical standard to regroup
the developing country Members and accord different special and preferential treatment
to different groups in conformity with their respective development levels. The other
option is, similar to the practice of some developed countries in implementing their
overseas aid programmes, to adopt a "graduation" system.75 The countries which have
met a certain set criteria will automatically "graduate" from the list of the beneficiary.
The special and preferential provisions are designed to help developing country
Members to reduce the risks when they are integrated into the global economy. However,
they are not free lunch. While the developing country Members enjoy the special and
preferential treatment, they are also required to open their domestic markets to other
Members. Furthermore, the special and preferential treatment in most of the WTO
agreements is not indefinite.76 After the terms of special and preferential treatment expire,
developing country Members will be required to keep their domestic law and regulations
in conformity with the WTO rules and, this will bring about fundamental changes to
these countries in the context of their legal systems and social lives. Therefore, it is high
time for many developing country Members to consider whether they will evolutionise or
revolutionise their own trade policies.
74
: On 17 September 2001, the World Trade Organisation successfully concluded negotiations on China's
terms ofmembership of the WTO, paving the way for the text of agreement to be adopted formally at the
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November.
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e
75
: The concept of graduation has entered into the legislation of some developed countries providing
special or differential treatment to developing countries. Built into the U.S. Generalised Special Preferences
(GSP) Programme, for instance, is a graduation principle. In fact, the United States has graduated
governments such as Korea, Singapore from the GSP programme. While formerly designated as GSP
beneficiary developing countries, by virtue of their graduation, these countries are now ineligible for the
special treatment provided under the U.S. GSP programme. See James V. Feinerman: Taiwan and the
GATT, Business Law Review, No.39, 1992, pp.47-48 and note 29.
76
: For example, developing countries are only accorded five years of delay to implement the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. In the Agreement on Subsidies and Counten>ailing
Measures, developing countries are permitted to provide subsidies upon export performances for eight
years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 4.
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Section Two Developing Countries and Trade Policy
2.2.1. Implementation and adaptation: an evolution or a revolution?
At the moment, there is an increasing debate about the issue of globalisation.
Although the merits and demerits of globalisation are outside the sphere of my study
here, the impact of this trend on WTO Members is another issue which deserves our
attention when we study the relationships of developing countries and their trade policies.
Before the World Trade Organisation was created, developing countries had already been
participating in the GATT activities, but they were only involved in those issues
concerning their interests. The participation of those multilateral trade agreements
concluded during the Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round negotiations was optional, and
relatively few developing countries accepted these agreements.77 Thus, in the GATT
history, there were few international trade rules which bound developing countries and
the reform of their domestic trade policies was almost out of the question.
Then, the newly-established WTO legal system changed all this overnight. Article
11:2 of the WTO Agreement states clearly that "The agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3(hereinafter referred to as 'Multilateral Trade
Agreements') are integral parts of this Agreement, binding all Members."78 This make-up
of uniform trade rules means that all WTO Members, no matter whether they are the
original ones or new entrants, and no matter whether they are developed countries or
developing countries(with a few years of delay to implement the WTO rules), need to
keep their national trade policies in conformity with the WTO rules. Perhaps this means
almost nothing to many developed country Members since they have already established
a mature market and a relatively complete legal system, but this means a lot to most
developing country Members because they either have a centralised economy base or
lack a complete legal system(including a powerful legislature and an impartial judiciary).
Entering the WTO has brought about in these countries many social changes including
the legal reform.
Take the example of China which is the largest developing country, entering the
WTO looks like a double-edged sword for this country. Both the advantages and
disadvantages are easy to observe. Although, before China became a full Member of the
WTO, it had already opened its door to the outside for more than two decades, this
opening policy had been guided by the China's domestic laws and regulations, and had
been limited only to certain areas.79 All the foreign trade and investment were subject to
Chinese laws and regulations. Now the WTO membership has changed all these
practices. While China enjoys the benefits of the multilateral trade system, it also needs
to undertake a series of important commitments to further open its domestic market and
liberalise its regime in order to better integrate into the world economy, and to offer a
77: The Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds are the sixth and seventh rounds ofmultilateral trade negotiations. All
the previous five rounds of negotiations were only limited to the tariff reductions and did not touch the
issue ofmultilateral trade system. See supra note 3.
78
: See supra note 4.
79
: At the initial stage, China mainly used the duty and tax reductions or exemptions to attract foreign
investment, and used government subsidies to encourage exports. The Open Door policy was first
implemented in the coastal areas, then sprouting into the inner lands. Foreign investment was only limited
in the sectors like manufacturing, tourism. The sectors, like agriculture and services, were still insulated
from foreign penetration.
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more predictable environment for trade and foreign investment in accordance with the
WTO rules. In contrast to the practices of twenty years ago, the current opening policy is
systematic and universal.
According to the terms of China's accession to the WTO, which were concluded on
17 September 2001, China will provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO
Members. All foreign individuals and enterprises, including those not investing or
registered in China, will be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
the enterprises in China with respect to the right to trade. China will eliminate dual
pricing practices as well as differences in treatment accorded to goods produced for sale
in China in comparison to those produced for export. The WTO Agreement will be
implemented by China in an effective and uniform manner by revising the existing
domestic laws and enacting new legislation full in compliance with the WTO rules.
Within three years of accession, all enterprises in China, no matter whether they are
Chinese-based or foreign-based or jointly-funded, will have the right to import and export
all sorts of goods with only limited exceptions. China will not maintain or introduce any
export subsidies on agricultural products. Meanwhile, the conclusion of the negotiations
on 17 September 2001 for market access on goods represents a commitment undertaken
by China to gradually eliminate trade barriers and expand market access to goods from
foreign countries. China has bound all tariffs for imported goods. After implementing all
the commitments made, China's average bound tariff level will decrease to 15% for
agricultural products. The range is from 0 to 65%, with the highest rates applied to
cereals. China has agreed to limit its subsidies for agricultural production to 8.5% of the
value of farm output. For industrial goods, the average bound tariff level will go down to
8.9% with a range from 0 to 47%, with the highest rates applied to photographic film,
automobiles and related products. Some tariffs will be eliminated and others reduced
mostly by 2004 but in no case later than 2010.80
While China may still reserve the right of exclusive State trading for certain products
such as cereals, tobacco, fuels and minerals and maintain some restrictions on foreign
investment in the areas like transportation and distribution of goods within its domestic
market after it acceded to the WTO, many of the restrictions which foreign investors and
traders currently meet in China will be eliminated or considerably eased after a three-year
phase-out period. In other areas, like the protection of intellectual property rights, China
has implemented the TRIPS Agreement in full from the date of accession. On the other
hand, prohibitions, quantitative restrictions or other measures maintained against imports
from China in a manner inconsistent with the WTO rules would be phased out or
otherwise dealt with in accordance with mutually agreed terms and timetables specified
in an annex to the Protocol ofAccession.81
In contrast to the limits on foreign investment in certain designated areas under the
Open Door Policy, entering the WTO has made it clear that China has been prepared to
fully integrate into the global economy. This requires that China should open almost all
areas for foreign investment. For example, services, including telecoms, banking and
insurance, were highly protected areas before China entered the WTO. But this has been
changed a lot because of the GATS obligations. Take the example of telecoms first, upon





enterprises without quantitative restrictions, and provide services in several cities.
Foreign investment in the joint venture shall be no more than 25%. Within one year of
accession, the areas will be expanded to include services in other cities and foreign
investment shall be no more than 35%. Within three years of accession, foreign
investment shall be no more than 49%. Within five years of accession, there will be no
geographic restrictions. As for banking service, upon China's accession, foreign financial
institutions will be permitted to provide services in China without client restrictions for
foreign currency business. For local currency business, within two years of accession,
foreign financial institutions will be permitted to provide services to Chinese enterprises.
Within five years of accession, foreign financial institutions will be permitted to provide
services to all Chinese clients. As regards insurance, foreign non-life insurers will be
permitted to establish either as a branch or as a joint venture with 51% foreign ownership.
Within two years of China's accession, foreign non-life insurers will be permitted to
establish as a wholly-owned subsidiary. Upon accession, foreign life insurers will be
permitted 50% ownership in a joint venture with the partner of their choice. For large
scale commercial risk reinsurance, international maritime, aviation and transport
insurance and reinsurance, upon accession, joint ventures with foreign equity share of no
more than 50% will be permitted; within three years of China's accession, foreign equity
share shall be increased to 51%; within five years of China's accession, wholly foreign-
owned subsidiaries will be permitted.82
In order to fulfil the foregoing commitments, China is experiencing a series of
fundamental changes, bringing the impact on not only its legal system, but almost every
aspect of its social life. The imminent task for the Chinese government is to amend or
revise the existing laws and regulations which are inconsistent with the WTO
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agreements, and to enact new laws which are necessary in forming a secure and
predictable regime for foreign investors. This is a huge work which needs the joint efforts
of the legislative bodies and governments at both national and local levels.84 Among the
recently finished work are the revised Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures Law; Chinese-
Foreign Co-operative Ventures Law; Solely Foreign-Funded Ventures Law; Patent Law;
Intellectual Property Rights Law and a few others. Meanwhile the government officials,
82: cf. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm
83
: According to the Chinese administration law, laws and regulations are referred to both national laws,
regulations and local laws, regulations. The national laws are made by the national legislative body, which
is the People's Congress. The national regulations are enacted by the State Council. The local laws are
referred to those made by the legislative bodies of the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities
directly under the Central Government and some big cities. The local regulations are referred to those
enacted by the local governments at all levels. In the event of a conflict between a law and a regulation, the
law shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.
84
: At the moment, there are more than three hundred national laws and regulations which need to be
amended or revised. As regards the local laws and regulations, there is no precise figure of how many of
which need to be amended or revised. The Chinese State Council has been examining and clearing up
current administrative decrees, and is to enact a number of other rules including those against dumping and
subsidy practices. Meanwhile, the Chinese legislative body is busy in reviewing those existing laws which
are incompatible with the WTO agreements and enacting new laws such as anti-monopoly law, to complete
its legal system. It is expected that it will take about ten years for the Chinese legislative body to finish the
revision and amending of all these existent laws and regulations.
cf. http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/docs/2001_04_30/3110.html
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judges85 and lawyers86 are busy in acquainting themselves with so many revised or
amended domestic laws, regulations and the WTO rules.
On the other hand, more and more ordinary Chinese have felt the approaching of the
WTO. Many people are worrying about losing their jobs because of the more severe
competition brought by those multi-national corporations. The most heavily hit industries
include telecoms, automobiles, banking, securities, insurance and agriculture. In fact,
the impact could be felt even before China entered the WTO. In April 2000, China
accepted the first shipments of US pork and beef to start implementing the deals
negotiated with the United States. China's foodstuff producers and processors will be
among the major losers since tariff cuts and free imports will place China's domestic
meat, fruits and soybeans in the same line to compete with the higher quality imports.
Cheaper meat will threaten Chinese livestock industry. High quality imported fruits will
make it more difficult for local farmers to sell their products if they do not increase the
varieties and improve the quality. Within a feasible future, many small and medium-size
enterprises will be merged or closed because of their low efficiency or the adjustment of
economic structures. High rate of unemployment will bring China many social problems.
Meanwhile the gap between the rich and the poor in China is widening. The Chinese
government should put high priority on the solutions of these problems.
While the fruits of globalisation still await to come for many developing countries,
the social changes brought by the globalisation have already occurred. These changes, to
some countries, mean an evolution, while to others, they are no less than a revolution. As
the accession to the WTO may change not only the legal system of a country, but also the
base of a society—its economic structures. This will risk the stability of this country.
John F. Kennedy once said that if a free society could not help the many who were poor,
it could not save the few who were rich. Inequality, growing inequality, is a scourge of
oo
our times. It is a problem both among and within countries. People now are appalled
and dismayed when they see the few living in splendour and the many in squalor, with
half the world dieting and the other half starving. This is not only about a widening gap,
with everyone better off than before. Some are absolutely worse off than they were two
83
: According to Chinadaily, Beijing will recruit more judges who are specialised in intellectual property
rights to handle an increase in intellectual property cases after China entered the WTO.
cf. http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/docs/2001_04_30/3014.html
86
: An official from the Chinese Ministry of Justice recently urged legal services to prepare for China's
entry into the WTO. This official said that judicial administrative departments and government legal
advisers should be prepared to aid national and local policy making, and lawyers should make themselves
familiar with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
cf. http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/docs/2001_04_30/3082.html
87
: China plans to cut import tariffs to 60-80 percent in the next two years and to 90 percent by 2006. The
domestic auto industry is seen as one of the hardest hit, with a shake-out looming ahead. Cheaper imports
could also hurt foreign auto joint ventures with better product quality. Security is a new industry which
emerged in China only about ten years ago. At the moment, fledging domestic brokerages are seeking
partnerships with foreign security companies to increase their capital strength and acquire the management,
cf. http://wwwl.chinadaily.com.cn./news/2001_09-16/33547.html As for the impact upon telecoms,
banking, and insurance, see supra note 82.
88: According to the World Bank, per capita incomes in the richest 30 percent of countries rose from a little
over $10,000 in 1970 to $20,000 in the mid-1990s. In the middle and lower two-thirds of countries, income
did little more than stagnate at far lower levels. See Mike Moore, the Director-General of the WTO,
Challenges for the Global Trading System in the New Millennium—a speech delivered to the US Council
on Foreign Relations on 28 September 1999.
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or three decades ago. Now the WTO has taken the responsibility to help those developing
and least-developed country Members to get rid of their poverty, but examples like
Singapore, Korea, or even China have demonstrated that the momentum for development
normally comes from inside, not from outside. It is true that integrating into the global
economy has speeded up the development of some developing countries, but this does not
mean that the fruits of globalisation have automatically come to them without their
experiencing any throes from an old system evolving into a new one. Developing
countries need to be aware that it is essential to adapt themselves as soon as possible to
the new world trade environment, otherwise, entering the WTO is not to bring fortunes,
but to call evils for them. Of course, if the developed countries and the international
institutions, particularly the WTO, could provide some technical assistance in this
adaptation, the developing countries would reduce the risks which, otherwise, might have
occurred, and consequently, minimise the social instabilities during the integration into
the world economy.
2.2.2. Legal reform and technical assistance
One of the contributions of the WTO to international law is the accomplishment of a
set of uniform trade rules in global terms. According to Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law ofTreaties'. "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith"(Pacta sunt servanda).89 This general
principle is reflected in Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement. Entering the WTO means
accepting a set of uniform international trade rules. Indeed, the implications of these new
trade rules are discernible within each WTO Member. Nevertheless, the impact in many
developing country Members is more obvious than in others. As professor Mary E.
Footer cogently pointed out: "many developing country Members were 'sponsored' into
the GATT by the former colonial powers with which they maintained preferential trading
relations.90 Consequently, they did not go through a full working party examination
process that the acceding WTO Members currently face.91 This resulted in many of them,
especially sub-Saharan African countries, becoming GATT contracting parties, without
knowing anything of substance about the GATT legal system. Furthermore, since many
89
: See Basic Documents in International Law, fourth edition, edited by Ian Brownlie, Oxford University
Press(1995).
90
: Article XXVI:5(c) of GATT 1947 states: "If any of the customs territories, in respect of which a
contracting party has accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement, such territory shall,
upon sponsorship through a declaration by the responsible contracting party establishing the above-
mentioned fact, be deemed to be a contracting party." Thus, all that a developing country had to do was to
certify that it had "full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other
matters provided for in this Agreement". This process is no longer open to acceding WTO Members(Note
added). See supra note 4.
91
: Article XII:2 of the WTO Agreement states: "Decision on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial
Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-
thirds majority of the Members of the WTO." See supra note 4. That means any applying country or
separate customs territory must negotiate with at least two-thirds of WTO Members on the terms of
accession before it becomes a full member of the WTO. This may take an intolerable long time. The 15-
year negotiations for China's accession into the WTO is just one of these examples(Note added).
49
of these countries kept themselves away from the Uruguay Round negotiations, neither
are they familiar with the WTO rules."92
When the WTO rules became to bind on all Members, these developing countries had
not fully been prepared to be integrated into the global economy in the context of both
their legal culture and economic structure. This time, however, they had no choice, but to
accept. Other Members like China are those traditionally plan-oriented countries. The
governments of these countries wish to take the opportunity of accession to the WTO to
promote the transition of their economy. But it still awaits to assess as to what extent
these countries have achieved this ambition.
Implementation ofWTO rules is no easy task for most developing countries and those
in transitional economy, given the quantity, scope and breadth of such rules.93 Various
factors may account for this difficulty. Long-time marginalisation in the world economy
and unfamiliarity with the international trade rules, vulnerable economic basis and lack of
expertise, mismanagement by the domestic leaders and lack of innovation for reform, all
these factors may affect the efficient implementation of WTO rules in these countries.
Furthermore, the lack of participation of many developing countries in the Uruguay
Round negotiations makes them perceive that these trade rules are just imposed from the
outside. This is, unfortunately, like a vicious circle that the more developing country
Members are unfamiliar with the global trade rules, the more they are resentful to these
rules and, consequently, unwilling to integrate into the global community. Professor Julio
Faundez attempted to explain this unwillingness in her article Legal Reform in
Developing and Transition Countries: Making Haste Slowly94 by linking the social
reasons of these countries: "In countries where institutional and political systems are
weak, legal reform, indeed any major reform, is difficult and at times almost impossible
to achieve. In such countries, it is difficult to distinguish the process of lawmaking from
the process of institution building. Some publications on this topic point out that in order
to strengthen the institutional framework, the rule of law must be observed. In many
respects, this statement begs the question as it presents us with the classic chicken and
egg dilemma. How can the rule of law be secured in countries where the institutional
framework is weak; and how can the institutional framework be strengthened, if the
legality and the rule of law are constantly flouted? This dilemma, though frustrating in
practice, should not lead us into despair. It should, however, serve as a reminder that in
countries where the institutional framework is weak, lawmaking and institution building
are processes that cannot always be easily distinguished. Hence the importance of
ensuring that managers of legal reform projects do not take the institutional framework
for granted."(Original note omitted).
92
: Mary E. Footer: The WTO, Developing Countries and Technical Assistance for Trade Law Reform{in
Governance, Development and Globalisation edited by Julio Faundez, Mary E. Footer and Joseph J.
Norton), Blackstone Press Limited(2000), p.354.
93
: Moon Soo Chung in his contribution on Implementation of the Results of the Uruguay Round
Agreements: Korea notes that normally international treaties are self-executing but, "given the scope and
magnitude" of the legislative action needed for implementation of the WTO agreements, for the first time
in the constitutional history of Korea, a special implementing law was passed by the Assembly, id, pp.365-
397, at p.374. Almost exactly the same considerations prevailed in Costa Rica, another "self-executing"
country, although political considerations prevailed too. This source of this note is from Mary E. Footer,
The WTO, Developing Countries and Technical Assistancefor Trade Law Reform, id, note 34.
94
: Which is included in Governance, Development and Globalisation, see supra note 92, p.36.
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Julio Faundez' remarks indicate that an overall legal reform is necessary for some
developing countries during their integration into the global economy, no matter whether
the momentum comes from the inside or outside. Flowever, the practical situations
demonstrate that legal reform cannot be completed overnight, and technical assistance
from the outside is necessary, especially during the initial stage. In terms of technical
assistance, the most prominent part, of course, should include those coming from the
WTO. The current technical assistance programmes under the auspices of the World
Trade Organisation are guided by the fundamental objectives of assisting recipient
countries in their understanding and implementation of agreed international trade rules,
achieving their fuller participation in the multilateral trading system and ensuring a
lasting, structural impact, to enable them to derive the full advantages from the new
trading environment.95 Technical assistance is administered by the WTO Secretariat and
reviewed by the Member governments, in accordance with operational directives and
implementation modalities established by the Committee on Trade and Development.
The technical assistance is principally provided to government officials of beneficiary
countries who have specific responsibilities with regard to the implementation of the
WTO agreements. Officials can be trained and prepared for tasks ahead, both in Geneva
or on a national, regional or sub-regional basis. The main types of assistance, at the
moment, include seminars, workshops, technical missions, briefing sessions and technical
co-operation in electronic form.96
It seems still too early to assess the impact of these types of technical assistance, but
the delaying of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations has already sent us some
discouraging information that many developing country Members are not as enthusiastic
about globalisation as they are expected. The resentment or uneasiness generated by the
legal reform in some developing country Members may, to a certain extent, account for
this inactivity. The implementation of the WTO rules in some countries is criticised as an
instrument designed to impose alien legal regulatory schemes upon them, which, in their
view, is to undermine their indigenous legal culture.97 This criticism comes from all sides
95: Some of the main objectives and principles of the WTO technical assistance programmes are to assist in
the process of integration of beneficiaries into the multilateral trading system and contribute to the
expansion of their trade; strengthen and enhance institutional and human capacities in the public sector for
an appropriate participation in the multilateral trading system/which may include representatives of the
private sector); be demand-driven and adapted to recipient needs, in particular with respect to the most
appropriate modes of delivery, cf. http://www.wro.org/english/thewto_e/teccop_e/ctdl4_e.htm
96
: Seminars are organised at a national, regional or sub-regional level. Some seminars are specialised—
focusing on a narrowly defined subject, e.g. anti-dumping, customs valuation, subsidies and countervailing
measures, while others cover broader aspects of the multilateral trading system, e.g. the functioning of the
WTO and Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Workshops are generally focused on a particular area of trade
policy. They cover in addition to theoretical explanations, case studies and simulation exercises. Technical
missions are designed to assist countries in drafting and preparing legislation and regulations, and in
meeting notification requirements as well as to facilitate the understanding of specific trade policy issues of
particular interest to them. Briefing sessions are generally held for Geneva-based delegations and visiting
officials to up-date them on recent developments in the work programme carried out by the World Trade
Organisation. Technical co-operation in electronic form refers to computer-based interactive tools
developed to facilitate the dissemination of information on the multilateral trading system,
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/teccop_e/tctl_e.htm
97: For an interesting proposal on how comparative lawyers can avoid undermining local legal cultures, see
Nora V. Demleitner: Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, Arizona State
Law Journal, No.31, 1999, p.737.
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of the political spectrum. Some focus on the economic components of the current process
of legal reform, while others focus on its political components. Thus, while some depict
the measures that have led to the liberalisation and deregulation of national economies as
evidence of a new form of international domination, others see the current stress on
human rights as confirmation that imperialism is alive and well.98 Whether or not this
reaction to the globalisation is correct is not the sphere ofmy study here. What is relevant
for us is to bear this fact in our minds that honest and competent officials as well as
responsible citizens in the recipient countries of these technical assistance programmes
genuinely believe that externally funded projects either are part of an alien political
agenda or pose a serious threat to their legal culture and national identity.
Then we come across such a dilemma. On the one hand, the scope of the World Trade
Organisation is expanding quickly, with more than 140 full members and dozens of
countries and separate customs territories still waiting for their membership.99 On the
other hand, however, there is an increasing dissatisfaction with the WTO rules among the
WTO Members, especially the developing and least-developed country Members. This
situation may become more complicated after those influential countries, like China and
Russia, enter the WTO. The focus of the dissatisfaction is not on the institution itself, but
on the applicability and suitability of its rules. The World Trade Organisation has
acknowledged the difficulties of developing country Members in implementing the
results of the Uruguay Round negotiations, and taken the responsibility to help them in
their integration into the world economy. However, the definition of "developing
country" itself is so ambiguous that most countries and separate customs territories
selected themselves as "developing countries" when they entered the WTO. Under this
circumstance, it is not surprising that the special rules and preferential treatment designed
to promote the trading capacity of developing country Members could not be so specific
and effective in the practical implementations as they are expected. In order to focus the
limited sources on those countries in real need,100 the WTO needs to adjust its technical
assistance programmes and the policies towards developing country Members. At the
moment, to regroup the developing country Members and to reset the criteria for
according special and preferential treatment are among the practicable ways.
2.2.3. Contradictions of the definition and the rationale of regrouping
We have heard a lot about helping developing and least-developed countries to raise
their living standard and to fully integrate into the world economy, but few of us have
made any substantive research upon the issue of how we can help them in an effective
98: Julio Faundez, see supra note 94, p.37.
99
: cf. http://www.wto.org/englishythewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
100: The WTO's yearly budget for technical assistance is only half a million US dollars. At the moment, the
technical assistance programmes are financed mainly through extra-budgetary voluntary contributions from
WTO Members. For example, in 1998 alone, over 80 percent of the WTO technical assistance programmes
were made possible through extra-budgetary contributions. Considering the permanent character and the
growing financial requirements of WTO technical assistance programmes, a number of WTO Members
have decided, as an interim solution, to finance these activities through the establishment of a Global Trust
Fund(GTF). The objectives of the GTF are oriented to support and complement the WTO regular budget, to
enhance technical assistance with the view to enabling the Secretariat to deliver technical assistance in a
flexible, timely and pertinent manner. At the same time, it is intended to minimise the administrative costs
and procedures derived from having a multiplicity of trust funds on a national basis,
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/teccop_e/tctl_ehtm
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way. It has been around eight years since the World Trade Organisation came into
existence. The real situation is that we are still living in a world which is unsatisfactory—
even unacceptable—in many respects. In the words of the former Director-General of the
WTO, Renato Ruggiero, "It is a world where...over a quarter of the developing world's
people still live in poverty. About a fifth—1.3 billion—live on incomes of less than $1 a
day. And over fifty percent of the global population has less than five percent of global
income. These statistics reinforce what our eyes and ears already tell us—that though we
are part of an ever more integrated global economy, the distance between the rich and the
poor is still intolerably great."101 This is a tragedy of our times. After we reflect upon
why the gap between the rich and the poor is widening instead of narrowing, we may
raise such questions: is there anything wrong with the WTO special and preferential
rules? how can we help the developing countries in a more effective way?
The World Trade Organisation has chosen to ensure that developing country
Members, especially the least-developed country Members among them, secure a share in
the growth of international trade as one of its objectives.102 Most of the multilateral trade
agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement contain provisions which accord the special
and preferential treatment to the developing and least-developed country Members in
their implementations of these agreements.103 However, after these years' operation, the
WTO is still confronted with such a dilemma: on the one hand, the WTO is raising more
funds for its technical assistance programmes which are designated to help the
developing country Members to benefit these new international trade rules; while, on the
other hand, many developing country Members are increasingly dissatisfied with the
WTO development policy. Here, the crux is, in the view of the author, that the definition
of "developing country" has been blurred by the self-selection mechanism of the
WTO.104 At the moment, each country or separate customs territory can select whether it
will be taken as a "developing country" or "developed country" when it enters the WTO.
This over-flexible method of defining the status of a WTO Member may bring about the
following disadvantages. Firstly, the special and preferential rules contained in the WTO
agreements, which are designed to help developing and least-developed countries to fully
integrate into the global economy and to raise the living standard in these countries,
cannot be made in a specific way. There are altogether 144 WTO Members by the end of
2001, eighty percent of them have selected themselves either as developing countries or
as economies in transition.105 With the possibility of so many countries applying these
special and preferential rules, the real benefits of these rules should be debatable.
Secondly, as there is no clear criteria to define a "developing country",106 it is
understandable why the negotiations upon the accessions of some countries to the WTO
have taken such a long time. The issue of China's accession is just one of such examples.
Thirdly, the divergent views among the WTO Members upon the criteria of definition
101
: Renato Ruggiero: An Enabling Environment for Development: the Contribution of the Multilateral
Trading System, the address to ECOSOC in Geneva, 2 July 1997.
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprrl_e/ecosoc_e.htm
102: See the preamble of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 4.
103
: See supra note 62.
104
: See supra note 64.
105
: See China and the World Trading System, the speech delivered by Renato Ruggiero, the former WTO
Director-General, at Beijing University, China, cf. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/chinal_e.htm
106
: The definition of a "least-developed country" is clear in the WTO. See supra note 65.
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may challenge the validity of these special and preferential rules and, eventually,
undermine the stability of the current international trade order.
In order to make the defining process become more precise and predictable, to reduce
the conflicts which arise out of the different views to this definition, and more
importantly, to help those countries in real need to benefit from the WTO special and
preferential rules, the World Trade Organisation needs to clarify the criteria for countries
which wish to apply these special and preferential rules. The factors for consideration
should include the economic level, development potential, population and a few others.
Before I put forward any further suggestions upon this issue, I use a table to depict a real
picture of all WTO Members and the observers(countries and separate customs territories
waiting for theirWTO membership) in terms of the size of their economy.
Table 1: Size of economy ofWTO Members and observers
Population Gross national Gross national Gross domestic




growth(%)million $ billion rank $ rank
1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1998-99 1998-99
Albania 3 3.1 135 930 138 7.2 6.1
Algeria* 30 46.5 52 1,550 117 3.3 1.8
Andorra*
Angola 12 3.3 130 270 185 2.7 -0.2
Antigua and
Barbuda
Argentina 37 276.1 17 7,550 58 1 -3-2 -4.4
Armenia* 4 1.9 150 490 157 3.3 2.9
Australia 19 397.3 15 20,950 27
im n * -
4.4 3.2
Austria 8 205.7 21 25,430 14 2.1 1.9




•••'-/ li ... ... . . . §|
Bangladesh 128 47.1 50 370 170 4.9 3.2
Barbados ... ... ... ... ... ... ~ ♦ » »
Belarus* 10 26.3 61 2,620 94 3.4 4.4
Belgium 10 252.1 24,650 18 2.5 2.3
Belize —
Benin >6 2.3 141 380 169 c r\5.0 2.1
Bhutan* ... ... ... ...
Bolivia 8 8.1 94 990 134 0.6 -1.7
Bosnia and
Herzegovina* 4 4.7 114 1,210 127 12.8 9.5
"
: The source comes from the World Bank. cf.
http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi20001/worldview.htm The data for some Members and observers are
not available.
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Botswana 2 5.1 109 3,240 87 4.5 2.8
Brazil 168 730.4 8 4,350 73 0.8 -0.5
Brunei
Darussalam
Bulgaria 8 11.6 81 1,410 121 2.4 3.0
Burkina Faso 11 2.6 138 240 193 5.8 3.2
Burundi 7 0.8 174 120 205 -1.0 -2.9
Cambodia* 12 3.0 136 260 187 4.5 2.2
Cameroon 15 8.8 88 600 150 4.4 1.6
Canada 30 614.0 9 10.140 30 4.6 3.8
Cape Verde* ... ... ... ... ... ...
Central Africa
Republic 4 1.0 168 290 181 3.4 1.7
Chad 7 ' 1.6 155 210 197 -0.7 -3.4
Chile 15 69.6 43 4,630 70 1.1 -2.4
China 1,254 979.9 7 780 142 7.1 6.1
Colombia 42 90.0 37 2,170 100 -4.3 -6.0
Congo
Republic
3 1.6 154 550 152 -3.0 -5.6
Costa Rica 4 12.8 79 3,570 80 8.0 6.1
Cote d'lvoire 16 10.4 84 670 147 2.8 0.1















Republic 8 16.1 74 1,920 105 8.3 6.4
Ecuador 12 16.8 72 1,360 123 -7.3 -9.0
Egypt 63 86.5 39 1,380 122 6.0 4.1
El Salvador 6 11.8 80 1,920 105 3.4 1.4
Estonia 1 4.9 112 3,400 83 -1.1 -0.6





Finland 5 127.8 29 24,730 17 4.0 3.8





: : :■ V i J;
... ...
Gabon i 4.0 118 3,300 85 -6.2 -8.4
The Gambia i 0.4 190 330 175 6.4 3.4
Georgia 5 3.4 128 620 149 3.3 3.1
Germany 82 2,103.8 3 25,620 13 1.5 1.4
Ghana 19 7.5 97 400 166 4.4 2.1
Greece 11 127.6 30 12,110 46 3.4 3.1
Grenada ... ... ...
Guatemala 11 18.6 68 1,680 112 3.6 0.9
Guinea 7 3.6 126 490 157 3.3 1.0
Guinea Bissau 1 0.2 200 160 202 7.8 5.7
Guyana ... ... : .. . ..... .
Haiti QO 3.6 125 460 161 2.2 0.2
Holy See
(Vatican)*
Honduras 6 4.8 113 760 143 -1.9 -4.5
Hong Kong,
China 7 165.1 24 24,570 19 2.9 1.8
Hungary 10 46.8 51 4,640 69 4.5 5.0
Iceland
India 998 441.8 11 440 163 6.5 4.6
Indonesia 207 125.0 31 600 150 0.3 -1.3
Ireland 4 80.6 40 21,470 24 9.8 8.7
Israel 6 99.6 35 16,310 36 2.2 -0.2
Italy 58 1,162.9 6 20,170 29 1.4 1.3
Jamaica 3 6.3 101 2,430 95 -0.4 -1.2
Japan 127 4,054.5 2 32,030 7 0 2 0 1U'
Jordan 5 7.7 96 1,630 115 3.1 0.0
Kazakhstan* Bl H 18.7 67 1,250 1261
^
1.7 2.7
Kenya 29 10.7 83 360 172 1.3 -o.8
Korea,
Republic of 47 397.9 13 8,490 54 10.7 9.7
Kuwait 2
The Kyrgyz
Republic 5 1.5 158 300 180 3.7 2.2
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Lao PDR* 5 1.5 157 290 181 7.4 2.8
Latvia 2 5 9 106 2,430 95 0.1 0.8
Lebanon* 4 15.8 75 3,700 78 , , ,
•
Lesotho 2 1 ->1.2 165 550 152 2.5 0.2
Liechtenstein ••• ... ... ... ... ...
Lithuania 9.8
-
85 2,640 92 -4.2 -4.1
Luxembourg ...... ... ... ... ...
Macao, China ... ... ... ; : ' - ; '* ; - , , ,
Madagascar 15 3.7 123 250 190 4.7 1.5
Malawi 11 2-0 149 180 201 4.0 1.5
Malaysia 23 76.9 42 3,390 84 5.8 3.3
Maldives ... ... ... ... ... illllfSlilf
Mali 11 2.6 139 240 193 5.5 3.0
Malta ■MMHHN • » . ... ... ... ...
Mauritania 3 1.0 169 390 167 4.1 1.3
Mauritius 1 4.2 117 3,540 SI 3.4 2.1
Mexico 97 428.9 12 4,440 72 3.5 2.1
Moldova 4 1.5 156 410 164 -4.4 -4.0
Mongolia 2 0.9 172 390 167 3.0 2.1
Morocco 28 33.7 55 1,190 129 -0.7 -2.3
Mozambique 17 3.8 122 220 195 7.3 5.2
Myanmar 45 11 ... . . .
Namibia 2 3.2 132 1,890 107 3.1 0.7
Nepal* 23 5.2 108 220 195 3.9 1.6
Netherlands 16 397.4 14 25,140 16 3.6 2.9
New Zealand 4 53.3 47 13,990 43 4.4 3.9
Nicaragua 5 2.0 147 410 164 7.0 4.3
Niger 10 2.0 148 190 200 -0.6 -3.9
Nigeria 124 31.6 57 260 187 1.0 -1.5
Norway 4 149.3 26 33,470 5
'
0.9 0.2
Oman* 2 ... .. . ■. ... ... . . . ' ...
Pakistan 135 62.9 44 470 160 4.0 1.5
Panama 3 8.7 89 3,080 89 3.0 1.2
PapuaNew
' :
Guinea 5 3.8 121 810 140 3.2 0.9
Paraguay 5 8.4; 91 1,560 116 -0.8 -3.4
Peru 25 53,7 46 2,130 101 1.4 -0.3
Philippines 74 78.0 41 1,050 133 3.2 1.2
Poland 39 157.4 25 4,070 74 4.1 4.1
Portugal 10 110.2 34 11,030 49 3.0 2.8
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Qatar ... ... ... ... • • • • * . • • ♦ ' :: v
Romania 22 33.0 56 1,470 120 -3.2 -3.0
Russian . 5 psiim
Federation* 146 329.0 16 2,250 99 3.2 3.6




And Nevis ... ■ » ■ • 6V . . » ... ... ...
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent





Saudi Arabia* 20 139.4 27 6,900 60 0.4 -2.1
Senegal 9 4.7 115 500 156 5.1 2.3
Seychelles* ... ... ... ... ...
Sierra Leone 5 0.7 180 130 204 -8.1 -9.9
Singapore 4 95.4 36 24,150 22 5.4 4.6
Slovak 5 20.3 63 3,770 77 1.9 1.8
Republic
Slovenia 2 19.9 65 10,000 50 4.9 4.7
Solomon
Islands
South Africa 42 133.6 28 3,170 88 1.2 -0.5
Spain 39 583.1 10 14,800 39 3.7 3.6
Sri Lanka 19 15.6 76 820 139 4.3 3.2
Sudan* 29 9.4 86 330 175 5.2 2.9
Suriname ... ... ... ...... ... . .. ... ...
Swaziland . .. . . . . . . . . .
Sweden 9 236.9 20 26,750 12 3.8 3.7
Switzerland 7 273.9 18 38,380 3 1.5 1.1
Chinese Taipei ... ... ... ... ... ... . . »'
Tanzania 33 8.5 90 260 187 4.7 2.2
Thailand 60 121.1 32 2,010 103 4.2 3.4
Togo 5 1.4 160 310 179 2.1 -0.3
Tonga* * * • ... ... ... ...
Trinidad and
Tobago 1 6.1 104 4,750 68 6.8 6.1
Tunisia 9 19.8 66 2,090 102 6.2 4.9
Turkey 64 186.5 22 2,900 90 -5.1 -6.6
Uganda 21 6.8 98 320 178 7.4 4.5






60 1,403.8 5 23,590 23 2.1 1.7
United States | 278 8,879.5 1 3.6 -.4
Uruguay 3 20.6 62 6,220 64 -3.2 -3.9
Uzbekistan* 24 17.6 70 720 146 4.4 2.6













Zambia ...10 3.2 131 330 175 2.4 0.2
Zimbabwe 12 6.3 102 530 154 0.1 -1.7
Note: Countries with the asterisks are the observers of the WTO
The World Bank used the Gross National Income(GNI) per capita as the criterion to
classify its members(183) and all other economies with populations more than 30,00(207
in total).108 The countries and other economies with their GNI per capita at $755 or less
are classified as the low-income group; those with their GNI per capita at $756-$2,995
are the lower-middle-income group; those with their GNI per capita at $2,996-$9,265
are the upper-middle-income group; and those with their GNI per capita at $9,266 or
more are the high-income group. According to this classification, among the present
144(excluding Chinese Taipei as there are no data available for it) WTO Members as of
this writing, forty-three are in the low-income group; thirty-five are in the lower-middle-
income group; twenty-nine are in the upper-middle-income group; and thirty-six are in
the high-income group. This is a more specific and practicable classifying method,
compared with that of the WTO.
From the above table, we can find that all those WTO least-developed country
Members with two exceptions,109 together with some other WTO Members, are in the
low-income group. The GNI per capita in these countries is only around two US dollars
or even less a day. Furthermore, twenty-seven among the low-income WTO Members are
classified by the World Bank as severely-indebted countries, twelve are classified as
moderately-indebted countries, only three of them belong to less-indebted countries.110 In
108: cf. http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/classl.htm
109: The two exceptions are Djibouti and Maldives, which are grouped by the World Bank as lower-middle-
income countries, but no specific data are available to show the Gross National Income and the Gross
National Income per capita of these two countries as of this writing.
'10
: According to the World Bank, "severely-indebted" means either of the two key ratios is above critical
levels: present value of debt service to GNI(80 percent) and present value of debt service to exports(220
percent); "moderately-indebted" means either of the two key ratios exceeds 60 percent of, but does not
reach, the critical levels. For economies that do not report detailed debt statistics to the World Bank Debtor
Reporting System(DRS), present-value-circulation is not possible. Instead, the following methodology is
used to classify the non-DRS economies. "Severely-indebted" means three of four key ratios(averaged over
1997-99) are above critical levels: debt to GNI(50 percent); debt to exports(275 percent); debt service to
exports(30 percent); and interest to exports(20 percent). "Moderately-indebted" means three of the key
ratios exceed 60 percent of, but do not reach, the critical levels. All other classified low- and middle-
income economies are listed as less-indebted, cf. http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/classl.htm
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the global terms, the total population of the low-income countries amounts to 40 percent
of the world population, but their GNI totally is only 3 percent of the world totality. The
average GNI per capita of these low-income countries is $420, compared with $26,440 of
high-income countries, and $1,980 ofmiddle-income (including lower-middle and upper-
middle) countries.111 Upon this research, the author of this thesis may put forward such
suggestions that the WTO special and preferential rules currently applicable to these
least-developed country Members should be extended to all those Members grouped as
low-income countries. Since the gross national products and exports of these countries
are so insignificant that other countries should eliminate all the duties and other trade
barriers for the imports from these countries. The WTO should also focus its technical
assistance programmes mainly on these low-income Members. Meanwhile, there should
be a "graduation" system, which is designated that any country, when it reaches a certain
level, e.g. GNI per capita at $756 or more, will "graduate" automatically from the low-
income group.
The situation of the middle-income countries, however, is not so easy to define. The
economic level of those countries contrasts so much that the GNI per capita starts from
$756 to $9,265. Even the difference between the lower-middle-income countries and the
upper-middle-income countries is so obvious that it is impracticable to accord same
special and preferential treatment to the countries from these two different groups. Most
of these listed in the upper-middle-income group are the newly-industrialised countries
like Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, which have diverted their economies of
agriculture-orientation to manufacture-orientation and raised the living standard
significantly in the recent decades. In contrast, those countries listed in the lower-middle-
income group, either encumbered with heavy population as in the case of India, and
foreign debt as in the case of most sub-Sahara countries, or impeded by the
mismanagement of their leaders, can only acquire a subsistent level in their economic
development. At the moment, all these countries, from both the lower-middle-income and
upper-middle-income groups, announce themselves as developing countries in the WTO.
Some other countries like Singapore, Kuwait, Qatar, which have already been classified
by the World Bank as high-income countries, still have the status of developing country
Members. Under such a broad perspective, it is no surprise that about sixty percent of the
WTO Members are treated as developing countries. If we apply the WTO special and
preferential rules to all of these countries, together with other twenty-nine(about twenty-
one percent) least-developed countries, it will become clear that the WTO mechanism to
accord special and preferential treatment is neither reasonable nor workable. One
practicable way is that the application of the special and preferential rules should be
limited in scope, for example, only to those low-income and lower-middle-income
countries(about fifty-three percent of the WTO Members), most of which are still
devoted to agrarian production, therefore, need more help to readjust their economic
structures. The other way available is that the multilateral agreements like the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures may set separate criteria for developing




: Article 27(2) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures stipulates that WTO
Members designated as the least-developed countries and those with GNI per capita below $1,000 are not
subject to the prohibition of export subsidies. Other developing country Members get eight years of delay,
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The rationale behind the practice of regrouping developing countries is to apply the
WTO special and preferential rules in a more efficient way. The increasing
marginalisation of some poor countries is a big challenge to all of us in the 21st century.
Without them, the globalisation can never be in a full sense. The WTO has set its
objective to help developing and least-developed country Members within its ambit, but
whether or not these countries did benefit from the current international trade rules is
quite another issue which deserves our careful study. To redefine and regroup developing
country Members within the WTO is just one of the inspirations based on this study.
After we have gained a better understanding of the present situations of the WTO
developing and least-developed country Members, it is time for me to deepen my
research about the links between the WTO and developing country Members from the
institutional and jurisdictional perspectives.
from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, to fully implement this agreement. See supra note
4.
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Chapter Three WTO and the Institutional Issues
Section One Legal Analysis of the WTO Institutional Characteristics
3.1.1. The functional approach towards the classifications of international
organisations
Professor Henry G. Schermers and professor Niels M. Blokker, in their influential
book International Institutional Law} have given us a clear introduction to the origin of
the term "international organisation": "While the term 'international organisation' was
probably used for the first time in the 19th century,2 it is only since the Second World
War that the terms 'intergovernmental organisation' and '(public) international
organisation' have received wide acceptance for the phenomenon discussed in this
study."3 This term, sometimes, is used with another term "international institution"
interchangeably. But according to Schermers and Blokker, international institution is also
used as a synonym for the organs of an international organisation, or even for
international law in general.4
International organisations differ widely in a number of respects. Some have only a
few members(for example, the Benelux, NAFTA, or the Economic Community of the
Great Lakes Countries, having Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire as its members), whereas
others include nearly all existing States(for instance the United Nations). Some
international organisations have very limited powers(e.g. to function only as a forum for
consultations—the International Tin Study Group or the International Whaling
Commission), while others can take a majority of decisions which will bind the member
States and even individuals within the jurisdiction of the member States(the typical
example is the European Union). Each organisation has its own constitution and makes
its own rules. There is little coordination of the activities of international organisations.
Thus, international organisations vary greatly.
There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes an international
organisation.5 Different scholars may give their different definitions, although they are
'
: Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker: International Institutional Law, third revised edition,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers(1995), p.20.
2
: By the Scottish jurist James Lorimer. See P. B. Potter: Origin of the term international organisation,
The American Journal of International Law, No. 39, 1945, pp.803-806.(Footnote original)
3
: "Public international organisation" is used, inter alia, in: ICJ Statute, Article 34; ILO Constitution,
Article 12. "Intergovernmental organisation" is used, inter alia, in: OAS Constitution, Article 130. The ILC
has preferred the term "intergovernmental organisation" and has decided, on a number of occasions, not to
elaborate a precise definition (see in particular: Yearbook of the ILC, 1985, Vol. II, Part One, pp.105-107).
The ILC approach has been followed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(\969), the Vienna
Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organisations of a
Universal Character(\915), and in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organisations or between International Organisations^ 1986), which in their provisions on
the use of the terms stipulate: " 'international organisation' means an intergovernmental organisation". The
purpose of this stipulation is indicated in Paragraph 14 of the ILC commentary to Article 2 of the draft
articles on the law of treaties(subsequently the 1969 Vienna Convention): "...in order to make it clear that
the rales ofnon-governmental organisations are excluded"(see Yearbook of the ILC 1966, Vol. II, p. 190).
4
: See supra note 1, p.21.
5
: See M. Virally: Definition and Classification: a Legal Approach, International Social Science, No.29,
1977, pp.58-72, at 59. The fact that there is no such definition also explains why the International Law
Commission, in dealing with the topic "Relations between States and international organisations", decided
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more or less analogous to each other.6 Schermers and Blokker defined international
organisations as "forms of cooperation founded on an international agreement creating at
least one organ with a will of its own, established under international law".7 This is, so
far, the most complete definition. However, many scholars including Schermers and
Blokker limit their definitions to public international organisations^.e., governmental
organisations), and exclude non-governmental organisations. Although general
agreement seems to exist regarding most of the defining elements of public international
organisations,8 the current trend is that non-governmental international organisations are
developing even faster than governmental international organisations.9 Thus, as the
Yearbook of International Organisations observed, "a clear and unambiguous
theoretically acceptable definition of international non-governmental organisations
remains to be formulated".10
The notion "non-governmental" generally refers to the function of these
organisations: they are not endowed with governmental tasks. However, some of the non¬
governmental organisations, like the Amnesty International, the International Chamber of
Commerce, are quite influential. Non-governmental organisations are not created by
treaty; nor are they established under international law. For example, the International
Committee of the Red Cross was established not under international law, but under Swiss
law. Apart from these characteristics, non-governmental organisations share little in
respect of any sense.
Then, what criterion could be used to classify international organisations, including
both governmental and non-governmental organisations? A number of scholars have
suggested and applied different criteria for such a classification.11 The most fundamental
criterion and, moreover, the criterion which seems to be the most persuasive in the study
of the institutional characteristics of an international organisation, seems to be that
suggested by Virally. "...it is an organisation's function that constitutes its true raison
to adopt a pragmatic approach in this respect, and did not try to elaborate a precise definition of
international organisation/see Yearbook of the ILC 1985, Vol. II, p. 105).
6
: See, e.g., Bastid: Droit des Gensflectures-1956-7), p.329; Reuter: Institutions Internationales^ 1975),
p.234; Fitzmaurice: Report on the Law of Treaties, Yearbook of the ILC, 1956, Vol. II, p.108; C. F.
Amerasinghe: Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organisations, Cambridge University
Press(1996), p.8.
7: See supra note 1, p.23.
8
: According to Schermers and Blokker, there are three constituting elements for a public international
organisation. The first element is an agreement between the governments of member States, which
excludes the agreements between branches of government or between particular public authorities. The
second element is the requirement that the organisation should have at least one organ with a will of its
own. This organ should be formed by delegates of two or more States and should not be dependent on any
particular State. The third element is that the organisation should be established under international law.
International agreements are normally concluded under international law. It can therefore be assumed that
this requirement is fulfilled whenever there is an international agreement. Only when an international
agreement clearly indicates that the organisation is not established under international law, will it not be
considered as an international organisation. See supra note 1, pp.23-31.
9
: The 1994/95 edition of the Yearbook of International Organisations classifies 263 organisations as
public international organisations, whereas the Union of International Associations has recognised 4928
international non-governmental organisations. See Yearbook of International Organisations, 1994/95, Vol.
I, p. 1624.
10: Yearbook of International Organisations, 1992/93, Vol. I, p.1650.
11
: For example see El-Erian: First Report, Yearbook of the ILC, 1963, Vol. II, pp.167-169.
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d'etre. And it is in order that it may perform this function that its member States have
established it and take part in its operation, bearing the costs and accepting the constraints
that inevitably derive from it. Moreover, the organisation's structure is directly
determined by this function or purpose. The structure is designed to enable the
organisation to fulfil the purpose assigned to it as efficiently as possible having regard to
the conditions and limitations that the founding States have deemed it necessary to
impose, so that it may be achieved in accordance with their interests, as defined by them.
In other words, the organisation's structure is itself subordinate to the requirements of its
function. Experience also shows that in many cases modifications occur in the structure
as and when these requirements change, and in accordance with them".12
Derived from Virally's functional approach, Schermers and Blokker classified
international organisations into three groups: (a)universal versus closed organisations;
(b)intergovernmental versus supranational organisations; (c)special versus general
organisations.13
Whether the membership is open to all applying countries or limited only to some of
them is the division line for the first of the above three groups. The 1975 Vienna
Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International
Organisations of a Universal Character describes international organisations of a
universal character as "the United Nations, its specialised agencies, the International
Atomic Energy Agency and any similar organisations whose membership and
responsibilities are on a world-wide scale". Thus, to be covered by this description, an
organisation does not have to be truly universal in membership and responsibilities. In
fact, no existing international organisation could fulfil such a condition. Upon the
universality, a rapporteur of the International Law Commission once stated: "A universal
organisation is one which includes in its membership all the States of the world. This is
not the case of any past or present international organisation yet. Thus, it may be more
accurate to use the terms 'universalist' suggested by Schwarzenberger or 'of potentially
universal character' used in the treatise of Oppenheim. The French term 'avocation
universelle' conveys the same meaning as these two terms, which is that while the
organisation is not completely universal, it tends towards that direction. This was
partially the case of the League ofNations and is, in a much broader sense, the case of the
United Nations, especially after 1955, and the specialised agencies".14 This is a proper
description for the universal character of public international organisations. In contrast to
universal organisations, there are organisations which aim at membership from a closed
group of States. No members are admitted from outside the group. We denominate these
organisations as "closed" organisations, to emphasise the closed circle from which the
membership is drawn. Schermers and Blokker divided these closed organisations into
12
: See supra note 5, p.66. In Virally's view, the function of international organisations, as a criterion for
classification, can be considered principally from three points of view: "The first question concerns the
extent of the cooperation that it is the organisation's mission to bring about: is it open to the international
community as a whole, or reserved for certain of its members only? Second, what is the range covered by
this cooperation? Can it extend to all the sectors in which a need for it may be felt, or is it confined to a
clearly delimited field of action? Lastly, what are the means used to effect such cooperation, and what type
of relations does it institute between the organisation and its members(and between the members
themselves in their relations with one another)?" Id, pp.66-67.
13
: See supra note 1, pp.35-44.
14
: See supra note 11, p. 167.
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three categories: regional organisations, organisations of States with a common
background(e.g. language or political system), and closed special organisations.15
Regional organisations are the most common kind of closed international organisations.
The typical examples are the Association of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN), the
European Union(EU), Organisation of African Unity(OAU) and the like. The member
countries in these organisations are located in a particular area, and these organisations
usually deal with a wide range of affairs. Organisations of States which share a common
background, for example, are those like the Commonwealth(the former British
Commonwealth of Nations)16 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development(OECD). The member countries in these organisations either have a similar
level of economic development, or share a common political, cultural background.
Closed special organisations are normally established to perform some specific functions.
The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC), one of such examples,
consists of countries "with a substantial net export of crude petroleum".17 This criterion,
as mentioned above, excludes many countries from the possibility of membership in this
organisation.
Whether the international organisation has the superior power over the national
government of its members is the division line between the intergovernmental and
supranational organisations. The term "supranational organisation" is, more often than
not, used descriptively rather than prescriptively since, so far, no clear legal meaning
about it has been acquired. Even in the cases of the UN Security Council and the EC
IS
Council ofMinisters which may make decisions that bind their member States, there are
still many areas which are within the domain of exclusive domestic regulation. Hence,
the term "supranational" is used only in a relative sense as no absolute supranational
organisation ever exists. The World Trade Organisation, which has been regarded as to
exert much influence upon the national governments of its Members, also stipulates that
only the amendments to the provisions of the multilateral trade agreements which would
not alter the rights and obligations of the WTO Members shall take effect for all
Members upon acceptance by two-thirds of the Members. Amendments to Articles IX
and X of the WTO Agreement, Articles I and II of GATT 1994, Article 11:1 of GATS and
Article 4 of the Agreement on TRIPS, which will substantially alter the rights and
obligations of the WTO Members, shall take effect only upon acceptance by all
13
: See supra note 1, p.37.
16
: Different views have been defended on whether the Commonwealth is an international organisation.
Writers taking the more formal position support the view that it is not an organisation. In their view, the
Commonwealth is an informal grouping of States with some common historical and cultural ties, primarily
used for consultation among the members. It has no written constitution and, moreover, a memorandum
agreed at the 1965 meeting of the Prime Ministers of Commonwealth countries explicitly states that "the
Commonwealth is not a formal organisation", and that it does not "require its members to seek to reach
collective decisions or take united action". Others take the view that a written constitution is not a
necessary requirement and that the agreement to establish an organisation may also be expressed in other
ways, such as, in the case of the Commonwealth, the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles(Singapore,
1971). See J. G. Starke: Introduction to International Law, tenth edition(1989), pp.116-118; and W. Dale:
Is the Commonwealth an International Organisation? International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
Vol.31, 1982, pp.451-473; Yearbook of International Organisation, 1994/95, Vol.1, p.278.
17: See Article 7 of the Statute of the OPEC.
18
: In the case of the EC Council of Ministers, its final decisions may be vetoed by the European
Parliament on an absolute majority basis. See the Treaty ofEuropean Union, Article 189(b).
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Members. Therefore, the distinction between supranational and intergovernmental
organisations has never received wide acceptance. This conceptual vagueness has led
some authors to reject the notion "supranational organisation".
The difference between the special and general organisations lies on the scope of their
responsibilities. Most organisations are established to perform a specific function. For
instance, the Universal Postal Union was founded for the development of postal
communications and, for improving health, the World Health Organisation. Such special
organisations are often called functional or technical organisations.20 Their main
characteristics are the limited scope and technical nature of their tasks. Different from
those special organisations, some organisations may discuss any subject matter they see
fit, or not excluded in their constitutions. Such organisations are called general or
political organisation. The most important general organisations are the United Nations,
which is concerned with the universal issues,21 and a number of other organisations
which deal with various regional issues. The latter examples are the Organisation of
American States(OAS) and the Organisation ofAfrican Unity(OAU).
International organisations may be classified in a number of ways, depending on the
purpose for which the classification is being made. Besides the functional classification,
others have been made such as that between temporary and permanent organisations or
that between judicial and non-judicial organisations,22 but these are not particularly
helpful for the present study. Meanwhile, what we should bear in mind is that all the
international organisations may not be in the absolute sense as they are classified. In
terms of the classification provided by Schermers and Blokker, for example, we may find
that some organisations are universal and general, like the United Nations, while others
are universal but special, like the Universal Postal Union and the World Health
Organisation. Some organisations are closed but general, like the European Union and the
Association of South East Asian Nations, while others are closed and special, like the
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Each organisation may have more
than one of the features, and the classification, therefore, cannot be exhaustive.
Despite the fears and concerns of some governments that international organisations
are increasing too fast and that they are becoming a burden on their exchequers, the
present situation is that international organisations are still proliferating at a considerable
rate. Generally, it is unusual for a new problem in international relations to be considered
without at the same time some sort of international organisation being developed to deal
with it. For instance, concerns with the free trade among the north American countries led
to the creation of the North American Free Trade Association(NAFTA), the fast
economic development in those Pacific rim countries catalysed the establishment of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC). More recently since the 1990s, the problems
arising out of the international trade sphere, which are growing increasingly complex,
have resulted in the expansion of scope regulated by the World Trade
19 :See A. J. P. Tammes: What is "supranational"?, NJB(1953), p.477; P. Hay: Federalism and
supranational organisations^ 1966); M. S. Korowicz: Organisations internationales et souverainte des etats
membres, 1961, pp.283-286.
20
: See supra note 1, p.43.
21
: See. Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, cf. Basic Documents in International Law, fourth
edition, edited by Ian Brownlie, Oxford University Press(1995).
22
: See C. F. Amerasinghe: Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organisations, Cambridge
University Press(1996), p.9.
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Organisation(WTO). The aim of the WTO is to "provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the
agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this(WTO)
Agreement".23 This has determined the special character of the WTO, i.e. this
organisation will concentrate its efforts on those trade and trade-related issues. As for the
participants, Article XII of the WTO Agreement provides that "any State or separate
customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial
relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral
Trade Agreements"24 may enter the WTO. In view of all these features, the WTO can be
deemed as a universal but special intergovernmental organisation.25
After we have classified the international organisations from a functional approach,
some perplexing issues, concerning both the public international law in general and
institutional law, are jumping into our eyes. What are the criteria for the membership in a
governmental organisation? and in what extent is the international governance shared by
a governmental organisation? These issues involve not only the legal status of the present
international organisations, but also the trend of future governmental cooperation.
3.1.2. The issues ofmembership and standing of representation in an international
organisation —a case study of the World Trade Organisation
In a broad sense, the meaning of "membership" contains three aspects: admission,
suspension, termination or expulsion. But because of the limitation of space, and also the
fact that the latter two aspects are more procedural than substantial, the study of
membership in this thesis is only limited to the criteria of admission in an international
organisation.
As a general rule, matters concerning membership depend primarily on the provisions
of the constitution of an international organisation and on the practice of each
organisation. Whether there are any minimum criteria for membership, under what
conditions the membership may be suspended, and what are the legal consequences after
a participant is terminated of its membership or expelled, it is not easy to identify some
general principles which are relevant to the interpretations of all these constituent issues.
On the other hand, however, there are still some consistent practices across many
international organisations in the implementation of their constitutions, which could be
usefully studied.
In some international organisations, such as the United Nations and its specialised
agencies, membership is "universal" in the sense that (a)the organisation is open or has
"universal vocation" and, (b)theoretically, all sovereign States are qualified to become
either members or observers of them. In others such as the regional or specialised
organisations, either political or technical, membership is limited in various ways.
Generally, no matter whether membership is "universal" or limited, the original
signatories who have formulated the constitution become full members of an organisation
automatically without the need for admission, upon their signature and ratification of the
23
: See Article 11:1 of the WTO Agreement. See The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Cambridge University Press(1999).
24
: Id, Article XII: 1 of the WTO Agreement.
25: After China and Chinese Taipei were approved of their accessions to the WTO on 10 November and 11
November 2001 respectively, and became full Members 30 days after that, the number of WTO Members
has reached 144. cf. http://www.wto.org./english/news-e/pres01-e/pr253-e.htm
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constitution. But thereafter, States eligible for membership must be admitted by the
decision of one or more organs of the organisation, even in those "universal"
organisations.26 As for those specialised agencies of the United Nations, UN membership
gives the applying State a right to membership in these organisations. This is because the
United Nations decides not only the legal status of these organisations, but also the
conditions of admissions to these organisations. For example, Article 11(1) of the
UNESCO constitution provides that "Membership of the United Nations Organisation
shall carry with it the right to membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organisation".27 In the case of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development(World Bank), membership of the International Monetary Fund(IMF) is a
condition precedent to membership, while to become a member of the International
Development Association(IDA) or the International Finance Corporation(IFC), a State
must be a member of the World Bank.28 Nevertheless, the phenomenon that the
membership in one organisation is a precondition to the membership in another one is not
so common that it could become a rule. In most cases, the criteria for the membership in
one organisation have no relevance to those of another organisation.
At the present sphere of international law, particularly in the context of international
institutional law, the World Trade Organisation, which was established in 1995, has
attracted more and more attention not only because of the influence it is exerting upon the
global trade, but because of its unique institutional characteristics and the potential
impact upon the development of international institutional law. In terms of its function
and regulated dimension, the WTO is a technical but "universal"(open) organisation. This
implies that the WTO is different from those regional organisations like the European
Union and the NAFTA whose membership is limited only to particular regions, or even
some other international organisations like the OECD, the membership of which is
limited only to those developed and newly industrialised countries. The WTO is a global
organisation. The influence emanating from this organisation has reached to both
developed and developing countries. In terms of its scope, the WTO can be regarded as
the "United Nations of Economics". More significantly, the number of WTO Members is
still on the increase despite the limited function of this institution. The present 144 WTO
Members consist of two categories. The majority of them(about 120 of them) were
transformed from the GATT contracting parties to the WTO original Members in 1995
after they accepted and ratified the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation^hereinafter as the WTO Agreement)}9 Those which acceded to the WTO
26 :There are some organisations which make membership available to all States by adherence. For
example, see Codding: The Universal Postal Union{ 1964), p.80(the UPU between 1848 and 1947); and
Koers: Visserij Organisatiesfm Studies over international Economisch Recht, edited by Van Themaat),
1977, Vol. I, p.25. The suggestion has been made that, where no provision is made in the constitution for
admission of new members, this may be done by amendments of the constitution, and that constitution may
have to be amended in order to accommodate certain new members in organs. See also Higgins: The
Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations(\963), p. 14; and
Broms: The UnitedNations(1990), p.68.
27: See also Article 6 of the IMO constitution.
28
: See Article II(l)(b) of the IBRD Articles ofAgreement; Article 11(1) of the IFC Articles of Agreement;
and Article 11(1) of the IDA Articles ofAgreement.
29
: Article XI: 1 of the WTO Agreement states: "The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of
entry into force of this Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and Commitments are annexed to
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thereafter invoked Article XII of the WTO Agreement, which states: "(1 )Any State or
separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external
commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed
between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto. (2)Decisions on accession shall be taken
by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement
on the terms of accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO.
(3)Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of
that Agreement"(Emphasis added).30 Article XII indicates that WTO Members include
not only sovereign States, but those defined by the World Trade Organisation as
"separate customs territories" which have the autonomy in their commercial affairs. At
the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference which was held in Doha, Qatar in November
2001, the applications of both China and Taiwan were approved, and they became the
143rd and 144th WTO Members 30 days thereafter.31 Therefore, within the World Trade
Organisation, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao have all acquired their full
memberships.32
Traditional views hold that States are the major actors in international relations. As
professor Joost Pauwelyn pointed out: "The creators of international law are at the same
time the main subjects of international law, namely States".33 Therefore, the early
international organisations limited the participation only to those sovereign States.
However, modern international law develops so fast that there have emerged more and
more international organisations(both governmental and non-governmental), in which not
only the sovereign States, but other entities may participate. Disagreements tend to arise
when debates are focused on what the minimum conditions are for membership in an
international organisation in the absence of, or leaving out the account of, specific
provisions governing the matter. This has already occurred in history. In an advisory
opinion in 1930, the Permanent Court of International Justice addressed itself to that
question.34 The specific issue before the Court was whether the Free City ofDanzig could
become a Member of the International Labour Organisation. The Constitution of the
Organisation as then in force(Part XIII of the Treaty ofVersailles) contained no provision
on this subject; indeed there was doubt whether entities which were not Members of the
League of Nations could become Members of the Organisation.35 The problem raised by
the Free City of Danzig was that its foreign relations were, in accordance with Article
104 of the Treaty of Versailles, conducted by Poland; the Court found that this meant, in
practice, that the Polish Government could not impose its policy on the Free City against
GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific Commitments are annexed to GATS shall become
original Members of the WTO". See supra note 23.
30
: Id, Article XII of the WTO Agreement.
31
: Id, Article XIV: 1 of the WTO Agreement states: "...An acceptance following the entry into force of this
Agreement shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of such acceptance".
32
: The titles for the memberships of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao in the WTO are "Chinese Taipei",
"Hong Kong, China" and "Macao, China" respectively.
33
: Joost Pauwelyn: The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go? The
American Journal of International Law, Vol.95, 2001, p.535.
34
: Free City ofDanzig and International Labour Organisation, P. C. I. J. Series B, No.l8(1980), p.l.
35
: The Court left that issue aside.
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its will, but that the Free City could not call upon Poland to take steps regarding its
foreign relations which were opposed to Poland's own policy. The Court considered that,
in these circumstances, the Free City was not able to undertake such acts as ratifying
international labour conventions or filing complaints against other Members. On the
ground that there was no constitutional provision "which absolves a Member of the I.L.O.
from complying with the obligations of membership or excuses it from participating in
the normal activities of the Organisation if it cannot first obtain the consent of some other
Members of the Organisation", the Court held that Danzig was not able to become a
Member unless there were an agreement under which Poland undertook not to object to
any action by Danzig as a Member of the I.L.O.
Despite the fact that the above advisory opinion was delivered by the PCIJ many
years ago, it is still relevant to the interpretations of contemporary international
institutional law, particularly in view of the unique institutional structure of the WTO.
The symbiosis of sovereign States and other entities in the WTO is reminding us of the
statement made by professor Donald McRae: "International trade law rests on the starting
assumption that economic welfare of individuals is enhanced by promoting economic
specialisation and exchange. It is individual-based and views national boundaries as an
impediment to the promotion of that specialisation and exchange that enhances economic
welfare. International law, by contrast, has rested on the basis of the sovereignty and of
the sovereign equality of territorially based States surrounded by national boundaries.
The corollary of that conception is that States must co-operate to promote the welfare of
their inhabitants. The assumptions of the onefinternational trade law) are individual and
welfare-based; the assumptions of the other(international law) are State and security-
based".36
The fact that the WTO has both sovereign States and separate customs territories as
its Members can be traced back to the GATT history. When the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade(GATT) was signed m 1947, there were only 23 signatories. Many
countries, before they won their full independence, were the colonies of some western
powers. They became GATT contracting parties by means of the sponsorship of their
metropolitan countries under Article XXXIII of GATT 1947.38 Among this group of
GATT contracting parties are Hong Kong and Macao. According to The Joint
Declaration ofthe Government of the People's Republic ofChina and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Question of Hong
Kowg(hereinafter as the Sino-British Joint Declaration), which was signed on 19
December 1984, after the Chinese government resumes the exercise of sovereignty over
Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997, "The Hong Kong Special Administrative
36
: Donald M. McRae: The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of International
Law, Recueil des Cours, Vol.260, 1996, p.215.
37: See the Preamble ofGATT 1947. See supra note 23. In the book The Creation ofStates in International
Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press(1979), p.l, James Crawford made an estimate that shortly before the World
War II, there were only about seventy-five States on the earth.
38
: Which states: "A government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on behalf of a
separate customary territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations
and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement, may accede to this Agreement, on its own behalf
or on behalf of that territory, on terms to be agreed between such government and the CONTRACTING
PARTIES. Decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-
thirds majority". See supra note 23.
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Region will retain the status of a free port and a separate customs territory"(Point
Three[6]). "Using the name of 'Hong Kong, China', the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural
relations and conclude relevant agreements with States, regions and relevant international
organisations (Point Three[10]).39 These principles are reaffirmed in similar words in
Article 116 of The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic ofChina{hereinafter as The Basic Law ofHong Kong).40
Then in 1987, the Chinese government and the Portuguese government signed The
Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question ofMacao(hereinafter as the
Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration). Point Two(8) of the Sino-Portuguese Joint
Declaration stipulates that after the Chinese government resumes the exercise of
sovereignty over Macao with effect from 20 December 1999, "The Macao Special
Administrative Region will remain a free port and a separate customs territory in order to
develop its economic activities..." "Using the name 'Macao, China', the Macao Special
Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural
relations and in this context conclude agreements with States, regions and relevant
international organisations"(Point Two[7]).41 Similar words can also be found in Article
112 of The Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic ofChina{hereinafter as The Basic Law ofMacao).42
The issue of Taiwan is different from those of Hong Kong and Macao. The Chinese
government, under the control of the Nationalist Party, signed the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade in 1947, and became one of the original contracting parties of the
GATT.43 When the Communists won the control over the mainland of China in 1949, the
Nationalist Party retreated to the island of Taiwan and withdrew from the GATT in 1951
under Article XXXI of GATT 1947.44 Although this withdrawal was always debated by
the Chinese government as it claimed that the government in Taiwan could not act on
behalf of China, the Chinese government began its negotiations with the GATT for the
resumption of its GATT contracting party status in 1986. The negotiations did not
succeed, and in 1995 when the World Trade Organisation was created as the successor to
the GATT, China's efforts to be one of the WTO founding Members was rebuffed.
Thereafter, China continued the negotiations for its WTO membership. According to the
terms agreed upon between the Chinese government and the World Trade Organisation,
Taiwan, after China's application for WTO membership is approved, may accede to the
WTO as a separate customs territory, using the title "Chinese Taipei", enjoying the full







43: One evidential fact is that China, under the title "The Republic ofChina", is one of the 23 signatories of
GATT 1947. See the Preamble ofGATT 1947. See supra note 23.
44
: Which states: "Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article XVIII, of Article XXIII
or paragraph 2 of Article XXX, any contracting party may withdraw from this Agreement...The
withdrawal shall take effect upon the expiration of six months from the day on which written notice of
withdrawal is received by the Secretary General of the United Nations". See supra note 23.
45: See the WTO news briefing WTO successfully concludes negotiations on entry of the Separate Customs
Territory ofTaiwan, Penghu, Kinmen andMatsu. cf. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01
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11 November 2001, both China and Taiwan were approved for their accession to the
WTO at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference.
Representation of a member State in an international organisation concerns the
question ofwhich government is to be recognised as being entitled to represent that State.
Issues of representation are to be distinguished from admission to membership.
Representation presupposes admission that has already taken place. The question of
representation arises, for example, when there is a change of government in a member
State by revolution or as a result of a coup d'etat,46 In the viewpoint of Amerasinghe,
when there is a simple change of government, the issue, though technically posed, does
not create problems, as there is no competition for representation.
From an objective standpoint, if a State is to be properly represented in an
international organisation, and be subject to the obligations and pressures that the
organisation can impose on that State, membership should be limited to the government
which is in effective control of the State. This was also the view taken in 1950 by the
then UN Secretary General Lie: "It is submitted that the proper principle can be derived
by analogy from Article 4 of the (UN)Charter. This Article requires that an applicant for
membership must be able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership. The
obligations ofmembership can be carried out only by governments which in fact possess
the power to do so. Where a revolutionary government presents itself as representing a
State, in rivalry to an existing government, the question at issue should be which of the
two governments in fact is in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of
the State in fulfilment of the obligations ofmembership. In essence, this means an inquiry
as to whether the new government exercises effective authority within the territory of the
State and is habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population".47
According to professor White, the Secretary General was putting forward an opinion
as regards the question of which government was representing China at the UN.48 The
Nationalist Party representative present since the formation of the UN was not removed
46: See supra note 22, p.126. For example, the UN never accept the right of the Taliban regime to represent
Afghanistan. Sometimes a refusal of representation can be difficult to distinguish from a refhsal of
membership: the UN membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was taken away
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 22 September 1992 under UN General Assembly resolution
47/1. But the reasoning proposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Application for Revision of the
Judgement of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary
Objections(Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), that it was not then a party to the Statute of the Court
and that it was not bound by the Genocide Convention, was not accepted by the Court. The Court observes
that "the difficulties which arose regarding the FRY's status between the adoption of that resolution and its
admission to the United Nations on 1 November 2000 resulted from the fact that, although the FRY's claim
to continue the international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia was not 'generally accepted'..., the
precise consequences of this situation were determined on a case-by-case basis(for example, non-
participation in the work of the Generally Assembly and ECOSOC and in the meetings of States parties to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, etc.)". The Court further states that resolution
55/12 of 1 November 2000(by which the General Assembly decided to admit the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to membership in the United Nations) cannot have changed retroactively the sui generis
position which the FRY found itself in vis-a-vis the United Nations over the period 1992 to 2000, or its
position in relation to the Statute of the Court and the Genocide Convention. See International Court of
Justice, Press Release 2003/8.
47
: See UN Documents, S/1466(1950).
48: See N. D. White: The Law ofInternational Organisations, Manchester University Press(1996), p.67.
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from the seat at the UN, including the permanent seat on the Security Council, until 1971
under the rules of procedures governing credentials. Simply put, the West countries
dominated the UN to the extent that it could oppose any attempt to reject the credentials
of the Nationalist Party government, which had taken refuge in Taiwan, in favour of the
Communist government which had been in effective control of the whole of mainland
China. Eventually, the growth in the membership of the UN enabled the General
Assembly to adopt a resolution which resolved to "restore all its rights to the People's
Republic of China.. .and expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the
place which they unlawfully occupy".49 The Secretary General reported to the Security
Council that he was satisfied under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure,50 and the Council
welcomed the Communist Chinese on 21 November 1971, following a change of tack by
the United States from a policy of confrontation with China to one of rapprochement.
The Republic of China(Taiwan) is no longer a Member of the United Nations even
though Article 23 of the UN Charter, which sets out the composition of the Security
Council, still refers to "the Republic of China" and not "the People's Republic of China".
The UN resolution can be seen as a prototype for other intergovernmental
organisations in their dealing with the issue of representation concerning China and
Taiwan. With the fact that there are more and more States which agree to recognise that
there is only one China, and Taiwan is a part of it,51 there should not have had any
ambiguity on such questions: who should be qualified to represent China, and whether
Taiwan could be a separate State. Unfortunately, there is always some discordance while
in dealing with these issues.52 In actuality, keeping in line with the principle that there is
but one China, and Taiwan is a part of China does not exclude the possibility for Taiwan
49
: See General Assembly Resolutions. 2758, 26 UN GAOR Supplement, No.29, 1971. The resolution was
adopted by a two-thirds majority instead of a simple majority normally required for issues of
representation. See also supra note 1, p. 179.
30
: Which provides that "the credentials of the representatives on the Security Council .. .shall be examined
by the Secretary General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval".
51
: For example, Point 12 of the Joint Communique of the People's Republic of China and the United
States ofAmerica, which was signed on 28 February 1972 and started the normalisation of Sino-American
relationship, states: "The U. S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United
States Government does not challenge that position..." Then in another important document Joint
Communique of the People's Republic of China and the United States ofAmerica on the Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations, which was signed on 1 January 1979, Point 2 states: "The United States of America
recognises the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial
relations with the people of Taiwan"(Emphasis added). Point 7 states: "The Government of the United
States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of
China".
cf. http://www.stimson.org/cbm/CFIINA/3cmmnqs/2-28-72.htm
and http ://www. stimson.org/cbm/CHINA/1 -1-79 .htm
52
: For example, in 1993, representatives of seven Central American countries requested the UN General
Assembly to examine the situation of Taiwan and its participation in the UN. See UN Document, A/48/191;
see also UN Document, A/49/144. Of course, the Beijing government considered this to be "a serious
infringement upon China's sovereignty and gross interference in China's internal affairs , and is "firmly
opposed to any attempt to create 'two Chinas', or 'one China, one Taiwan', or 'one country, two seats both
in and outside the United Nations by any country, international organisation or individual under whatever
pretext and in whatever form". See UN Document, A/49/274, p.l.
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to participate in some of the international organisations. The questions, then, are: what
are they? and upon what conditions?
In order to reduce the disagreement and avoid the confrontations on the criteria of
membership and representation in an international organisation, it is necessary to draw
some general principles upon these issues. For the sake of convenience, while in dividing
international organisations into three categories, the author uses the practice of traffic
lights in the context of the particular situation concerning China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Macao, which, hopefully, will shed some light on similar issues. The first group of
international organisations, which is defined as the "red light area", includes the United
Nations and its specialised agencies,53 other political intergovernmental
organisations("universal" or regional). These international organisations, under the
guidance of the UN Charter and the constitutions of those individual organisations,54
usually consist of sovereign States and have a wide dimension in dealing with
international affairs. Undoubtedly, as integrated parts of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Macao cannot be members of these international organisations. As regards to those
international organisations in which Taiwan had gained its membership before 1971
when the UN membership of Taiwan was replaced by mainland China, they may follow
the practice of the United Nations to transfer the entitlement of representation on behalf
ofChina to the Beijing government.
The second group, which includes the bulk of those technical international
organisations, may be defined as the "yellow light area". In principle, parts of a State
cannot be independent parties to a treaty which embodies the constitution of an
international organisation. Then, in the present world, there are quite a few countries
which have some parts of their territories enjoying more autonomous rights than other
parts out of the historical, ethnical or even political reasons. If these territories are
blocked from any communications with the outside world under the pretext of
sovereignty, it is neither reasonable nor possible. Therefore, it is necessary to set some
conditions to fit the situation in which separate territories like Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Macao could possess their memberships in some international organisations. As a general
principle, only where there are clear provisions in the constitution of an international
organisation such as GATT Article XXXIII and WTO Agreement Article XII: 1, can non-
State territories become members of this international organisation. As Schermers and
Blokker pointed out: "independent membership for non-autonomous territories is
valuable for territories which are independent with regard to certain specific public
functions, but which are not responsible for the conduct of their general international
relations. It is the independence ofthe function which is relevant, not the independence of
33
: The UN specialised agencies include International Labour Organisation(ILO); Food and Agricultural
Organisation(FAO); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation(UNESCO); World
Health Organisation(WHO); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development(IBRD or World
Bank); International Monetary Fund(IMF); International Civil Aviation Organisation(ICAO); International
Maritime Organisation(IMO); International Telecommunication Union(ITU); Universal Postal
Union(UPU); World Meteorological Organisation!WMO); World Intellectual Property
Organisation(WIPO); International Fund for Agricultural Development(IFAD); United Nations
International Development Organisation(UNIDO). See the principal organs of the United Nations,
cf. http://www.un.org./aboutun/chart.html
54
: Except for the above-mentioned Articles 3, 4 of the UN Charter, see also Article 4 of the constitution of
the Organisation of American States(OAS); Article IV of the constitution of the Organisation of African
Unity(OAU).
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territory (Emphasis added).55 The World Trade Organisation has set itself as an example
to distinguish its Members as "States" and "separate customs territories". This clear
conceptual division will help to avoid the confusions on those subtle issues like statehood
and representation in the affairs regulated by the WTO.
One interesting example which deserves noticing, in the context of WTO
membership, is the legal status of the European Communities. In terms of its external
trade relations, the European Communities works as a single trade unit under the unified
EC commercial policy, representing all the current 15 EU members. The legal status of
the European Communities in the WTO is not the same as that of a sovereign State,
neither is it similar to that of a separate customs territory. To a certain extent, the
European Communities looks like a "supranational" organisation, having competence
over the member governments in many respects. Nevertheless, the EC has not taken away
the sovereignty of its member States. Therefore, despite the fact that all the EC members
speak with one voice in the WTO, the European Communities has votes equal to the
number of its members. The EC example in the WTO indicates a new trend of relations
between two international organisations, i.e., the membership of one international
organisation in another international organisation.
The third group, which is defined as the "green light area", is referred to those non¬
governmental international organisations. All States and non-State territories may
participate in these organisations. In the view of the author, non-governmental
international organisations can be divided into constitutional non-governmental
international organisations and non-governmental international organisations de facto.
One example for the former group is the International Olympic Committee(IOC). Article
19(1) of the IOC Charter states: "The IOC is an international non-governmental, non¬
profit organisation, of unlimited duration, in the form of an association with the status of
a legal person, recognised by the Swiss Federal Council".56 In fact, there are already
members from China, Taiwan and Hong Kong who are serving in the IOC Committee,
• • S7
and the Beijing government has never raised any objection to it. The latter group
includes the majority of non-governmental international organisations. These
organisations are regulated either by public international law like the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies(known until 1991 as the League
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), or on a voluntary base like Amnesty
International. The most significant features of non-governmental international
organisations are their neutrality and independence. Membership of these organisations
does not involve such subtle issues like sovereignty or statehood. Therefore,
memberships of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao in these organisations will not meet any
challenge.
The study of the criteria for membership and representation in an international
organisation can be used to regulate the relationship between the organisation and its
members. However, this is only the internal relationship of this organisation. The
relationship between two or more international organisations is the external one, which is
as equally important as the internal one. As a matter of fact, they are just like the two
sides of the same coin. Therefore, after we have acquired a better understanding as to the
55
: See supra note 1, p.53.
56: cf. http://www.olympic.Org/ioc/e/facts/charter/charter_ioc_e.html
57: Among the present IOC members, two from China, one from Taiwan, and one from Hong Kong, id.
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composition of the WTO, it is only natural for us to extend our study to the relevance of
this organisation in the global terms.
Section Two The Global Governance and New Agenda of theWTO
3.2.1. The governance of theWTO in the global terms
Global governance has been defined by one international body as "a continuing
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co¬
operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to
enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements.. .There is no single model or form
of global governance, nor is there a single structure or set of structures. It is a broad,
dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making".58 In the context of
international organisations, global governance is nothing new. According to professor
Patricia Birnie and professor Alan Boyle, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the series
of international conferences that followed it were the precursors of the political co¬
operation in global terms. The creation of international bodies for functional,
administrative purposes began with those innovative 19th century public unions,
including the Universal Postal Union, the International Telegraphic Union, and the
International Railway Union. The first major law-making conferences, the Hague Peace
Conferences of 1898 and 1907, represented another major development in the
institutionalisation of international co-operation. These nineteenth-century developments
in international relations have contributed to and are reflected in modem
intergovernmental organisations—their political role deriving from the Congress
approach, their regulatory role from the Hague Conferences, and their constitutional
powers synthesised from experience with the public unions. All three strands were
embodied first in the League of Nations and then further elaborated in the UN Charter,
which established the United Nations in 1945.59
Parallel to the political pillar supported by the United Nations in the post-war
international relations is the economic pillar which was supported by the GATT together
with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund(IMF) under the Bretton
Woods System. But the GATT is different from the World Bank and the IMF. Its legal
status decided the GATT not as an international organisation, but as a trade agreement.
Until the establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1995, there had not existed an
international organisation with its own legal personality, the mission of which is to
regulate global trade affairs.
The Uruguay Round of negotiations represented a process "through which conflicting
or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken". The
multilateral agreements are the results of the eight years' bargaining, negotiations and
compromises. Therefore, the first and foremost element of the WTO's global governance
is to ensure the implementation of these multilateral agreements by its Member
governments. The legal foundation for this governance derives from two articles of the
58
: See Commission on Global Governance: Our Global Neighbourhood, Oxford University Press(1995),
pp.2-4. For a succinct account of "governance" literature in international relations, see Toope, in Byers(ed):
The Role ofLaw in International Politics, Oxford University Press(2000), pp.94-99.
59
: See Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle: International Environmental Law, second edition, Oxford
University Press(2002), Chapter Two.
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WTO Agreement. Article 11:2 provides that "The agreements and associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3...are integral parts of this Agreement,
binding on all Members . Article XVI:4 further states: "Each Member shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the Annexed Agreements".60 Meanwhile, the WTO has set up a trade policy
review mechanism, the purpose ofwhich is to improve the adherence by all Members to
WTO rules and to enable the regular collective appreciation and evaluation of the full
range of individual Members' trade policies and practices and their impact on the
functioning of the multilateral trade system. With the forthcoming of a new round of
multilateral negotiations, this process will continue to coordinate different views among
WTO Members, amend the existing rules and make new rules. Hence, within the WTO
legal framework, the relationship between the organisation and its Members is well
defined. In other words, its governance is tangible and unquestionable.
In contrast, the role of the World Trade Organisation in regard to non-Members is
clearly limited. Neither the WTO Agreement nor the multilateral trade agreements contain
any specific provisions which touch this issue. As a general mle, Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties(Pacta sunt servanda) should be applicable in this
respect, i.e. WTO agreements are, in principle, merely binding upon its Members. Only
those WTO provisions which are simultaneously general international law could have
universal impact.61
According to professor Birnie and professor Boyle in their book International
Environmental Law, the term "governance", when applied to those "universal"
organisations like the UN and the WTO, implies "rather less than a global government, a
task for which no international organisation is equipped, but more than the power to
determine policy or initiate the process of international law-making."62 Essentially, the
WTO's global governance derives from its competence over law-making on trade affairs
and settlement of disputes among the Members; from its negotiating forum and policy
review mechanism. It is these functions and its global character which make the WTO
relevant in the management of international economic relations. In the view ofBirnie and
Boyle, global governance, at the very least, should capture the idea of a community of
States with responsibility for addressing some common problems through a variety of
political processes which are inclusive in character, and which to some degree "embody a
limited sense of a collective interest, distinct in specific cases from the particular interests
of individual States".63 Upon these criteria, the formation of the WTO legal framework is
only part of this process of global governance. To realise the unification of international
trade rules is just one side of the issue, while to accommodate the different interests of
Members is another side of the issue which the WTO has to address. What matters for the
WTO in the next round ofmultilateral negotiations is not the scope, but the efficiency of
its governance.
The scope of the WTO's governance is also connected with the objectives of this
organisation, which have been defined in a broad sense in the Preamble of the WTO
Agreement with a view to "raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
60: See supra note 23.
61
: See Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, Article 26, Article 34, Article 38. See supra note 21.
62: See supra note 59.
63: Id. See also supra note 58, pp.2-6.
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large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding
the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development".64 Following these general objectives of "raising the living
standards" and "enhancing the sustainable development" among its Member countries,
the WTO has embraced some new issues like environment protection under its
regulations apart from trade which was the sole regulated area of its predecessor, the
GATT, and the trend is that the process of expansion will continue.65
However, even in its most effectively regulated areas, the WTO's governance is still
not exclusive, in view of the relationship between the WTO and other international
organisations, either "universal" or regional, in regulating international trade affairs.66
Take the example of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, Article 111:5 of the
WTO Agreement only provides that "With a view to achieving greater coherence in
global economic policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the
International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and its affiliated agencies." No words could be found, either explicitly
expressed or implicitly implied, on its exclusive governance with regards to global trade
and trade-related affairs. In fact, apart from the World Trade Organisation, there is at
least one other "universal" body concerned with international trade, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law(UNCITRAL).67 UNCITRAL was established by
the UN General Assembly in 1966 according to Resolution 2205 [XXI] of 17 December
1966. The General Assembly recognised that disparities in national laws governing
international trade created obstacles to the flow of trade, and it regarded the Commission
as the vehicle by which the United Nations could play a more active role in reducing or
64: See supra note 23.
65
: For example, there were a lot of talks upon the integration of labour standards into the WTO regulated
dimension at the fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. The advocates for
including labour standards on the WTO's agenda of future work maintain that rights including the freedom
to bargain collectively, freedom of association, elimination of discrimination in the workplace and the
elimination ofworkplace abuse(including forced labour and certain types of child labour) are matters which
should be considered in the WTO. On the other side, developing countries have another view. Member
governments from the developing world believe that attempts to introduce this issue into the WTO
represent a thinly veiled form of protectionism which is designed to undermine the comparative advantage
of lower-wage developing countries. Officials from these countries say that workplace conditions will
improve through economic growth and development, which would be hindered should rich countries apply
trade sanctions to their exports for reasons relating to labour standards. Application of such sanctions, they
say, would perpetuate poverty and delay development efforts including those aimed at improving
conditions in the workplace, cf. http://www-chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minOUe/br
66
: For example, Article V of the WTO Agreement states: "The General Council shall make appropriate
arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental organisations that have
responsibilities related to those of the WTO". "The General Council may make appropriate arrangements
for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organisations concerned with matters related to
those of the WTO". See supra note 23.
67
: The Commission is composed of thirty-six member States elected by the General Assembly.
Membership is structured so as to be representative of the world's various geographic regions and its
principal economic and legal systems. Members of the Commission are elected for terms of six years, the
terms of half the members expiring every three years.
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removing these obstacles. The General Assembly gave the Commission the general
mandate to further the progressive harmonisation and unification of the law of
international trade. The Commission has since become to be the core legal body of the
United Nations system in this aspect of international trade law. The areas in which the
Commission has worked or is working and the major results of that work are as the
followings: (a)international sale of goods and related transactions;70 (b)international
transport of goods;71 (c)international commercial arbitration and conciliation;72 (d)public
procurement and infrastructure development;73 (e)construction contracts;74
(^international payments;75 (g)electronic commerce;76 (h)cross-border insolvency,77 and
other relevant work. Some of the legal texts made by the UNCITRAL such as the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods have been widely
accepted in the practice of international trade. However, unlike the WTO agreements, the
adoption of the UNCITRAL legal texts is not compulsory, but optional.
The global governance of the WTO is further limited with the increasing emergence
of those customs unions78 and free-trade areas79 which are established by those regional
organisations or regional trade agreements. The legal source for these customs unions and
68: cf. http://www.uncitral.org/english/commiss/genmfol.htm
69: Id, the source is from the UNCITRAL website.
70: Which includes: (a)Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale ofGoodsQAew York,
1974); (b)United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goor/.s(Vienna, 1980);
(c)UNCITRAL Legal Guide on International Countertrade Transactions.
71
: Which includes: {a)United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978(the "Hamburg
Rules"); (b)United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in
International Trade.
72
: Which includes: (a)UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules', (b)Recommendations to assist arbitral tribunals and
other interested bodies with regard to arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules(l9%2);
(c)UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules(l9&0): (d)UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration^ 1985); (e)UNCITRAL Notes on Organising Arbitral Proceedings(\996); (f^Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards(New York, 1958).
73
: Which includes: ('d)UNClTRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and
Services) 1994); (b)UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects{2001).
74
: Which includes UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for the Construction
ofIndustrial Works.
15
: Which includes: (a)United Nations Convention on International Bills ofExchange and International
Promissoiy Notes(New York, 1988); (b)UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers(\9Wl);
(c)UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers(\99T)\ (d)United Nations Convention on
Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters ofCredit(New York, 1995).
76
: Which includes: (a)Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer Records(19$>5); (b)UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce.
77: Which includes UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.
78
: Article XXIV:8 of GATT 1994 defines "customs union" as "the substitution of a single customs
territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i)duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce(except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at
least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and (ii)subject to
the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied
by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union". See supra note 23.
79
: Article XXIV: 8 of GATT 1994 defines a "free-trade area" as "a group of two or more customs
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce(except, where necessary, those
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between
the constituent territories in products originating in such territories". See supra note 23.
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free-trade areas under the WTO system is Article XXIV of GATT 1994{Territorial
Application—Frontier Traffic—Customs Unions and Free-trade Area)?0 Article XXIV:5
ofGATT 1994 states: "the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union
or a free-trade area; Provided that: (a)with respect to customs union, or an interim
agreement leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of
commerce imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of
trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the
whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and
regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of
such union or the adoption of such interim agreement as the case may be; (b)with respect
to free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a free-trade area,
the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent
territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of such
interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not
parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding
duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior
to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case may be".81
The current trend is that regional cooperation is developing faster than the
cooperation in the global terms. Some regional organisations or regional trade agreements
have substantially reduced the duties imposed upon the trade across the borders of their
member countries or contracting parties. For example, the Single European Act(SEA),
which was signed in 1986, required that the European Communities adopt more than 300
measures to remove physical, technical, and fiscal barriers in order to establish a single
market, where the economies of the member countries would be completely integrated. In
addition to this, the EC member countries agreed to adopt common policies and standards
on matters ranging from taxes and employment to health and environment. Each member
country also resolved to bring its economic and monetary policies in line with those of its
neighbours.82 The fact that a unified currency(euro) has been put in use since 1 January
2002 in most member countries marks a further integration of the European Union.83
Another influential free-trade area is the one among Canada, the United States and
Mexico based on the North American Free Trade AgreementNAFTA) which became
effective on 1 January 1994. The NAFTA was built upon a 1989 trade agreement
80
: As the first paragraph of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 states: "The provisions of this Agreement shall
apply to the metropolitan customs territories of the contracting parties and to any other customs territories
in respect ofwhich this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article
XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application..." See supra note 23. The rationale for
those free trade areas or customs unions as the exceptions under the GATT system is based on the fact that,
traditionally, some countries impose less duties or no duties upon the trade across the borders of these
countries, or between the metropolitan country and its colonies. The Lome Convention between the
European Union and some African, Caribbean and Pacific(ACP) countries is evolved from the latter
situation.
81
: See supra note 23.
82: See the research view about the European Union contributed by Derek W. Urwin.
cf. http://encarta.msn.com/find/findinpage.asp?&pg=8&ti=761579567&sc=0&pt=T
83
: The three member countries still outside the euro system are the United Kingdom, Denmark and
Sweden.
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between the United States and Canada that eliminated or reduced many tariffs between
the two countries. The NAFTA called for immediately eliminating duties on half of all
U.S. goods shipped to Mexico and gradually phasing out other tariffs over a period of
about 14 years. Restrictions are to be removed from many categories, including motor
vehicles and automotive parts, computers, textiles, and agricultural products. The treaty
also protected intellectual property rights and outlined the removal of restrictions on
investment among these three countries. Mandates for minimum wages, working
conditions, and environmental protection were added later as a result of supplemental
agreement signed in 1993.84
Recently, a new regional co-operation is taking shape, which may have the potential
impact upon the global trade structures and legal system. This is the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation(APEC). APEC was established in 1989 in response to the
growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies. Begun as an informal dialogue
group, APEC has since become the primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade
and practical economic cooperation. Its goal is to advance Asia-Pacific economic
dynamism and sense of community. In 1999, APEC's twenty-one member economies
had a combined Gross Domestic Product of over US$ 18 trillions85 and 43.85 percent of
global trade.86 According to the Bogor Declaration which was made in 1994, the APEC
economies will complete the achievement of free trade and investment no later than the
year 2020. The pace of implementation will take into account differing levels of
economic development among APEC economies, with the industrialised economies
achieving this goal no later than the year 2010 and developing economies no later than
the year 2020.87
The expansion and extent of regional cooperation have made it necessary to analyse
whether the system of WTO rights and obligations as it relates to regional trade
agreements needs to be further clarified. At the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, no
common understanding could be reached among its Members on whether regional trade
agreements would enhance or obstruct the development of the multilateral trading
system, or in other words, whether they would function as "building blocks" or
"stumbling blocks" in the integration ofworld economy.88 In the view of the author, the
84
: Talks have already begun to expand the NAFTA to include all Latin American countries with the
exception of Cuba. These talks include plans to create a free-trade zone throughout the Americas in the 21st
century. However, to include more countries in the NAFTA is expected to be difficult. Some countries are
far from being able to agree to and implement the stringent economic requirements of a free-trade accord,
cf. http://encarta.msn.com/index/conciseindex/6F/06F06000.htm?z=T&pg=2&br=l
85
: See The APEC Regional Trade and Investment 2000, Market Information and Analysis Unit,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, November 2000.
86
: See United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Statistics Division, July 2000.
87




: One view is that regional trade agreements, by moving generally at a faster pace than the multilateral
trading system, represent a way of strengthening it. The positive effect of regional trade agreements on the
integration of developing countries in the world economy is also emphasised . Other Members consider
that, in today's circumstances, a redefinition of the relationship between regional trade agreements and the
multilateral trading system is required, to achieve a better synergy between the two. It is argued that a
further re-interpretation of rules drafted 50 years ago would not suffice to take into account the
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question whether the positive impact is more than the negative one, or vice versa, to the
multilateral trading system, or even to the global governance role of the WTO as regards
the proliferation of regional trade agreements, cannot be answered easily without a
careful analysis of the relationship between the two. Therefore, the following research
will be focused on the rationale of the regional cooperations and their impact upon the
global trading system.
3,2.2. Globalisation vs regionalisation: another challenge to theWorld Trade
Organisation
The objectives to establish the World Trade Organisation, as stated in the Preamble to
the WTO Agreement, are to raise the standards of living, promote full employment,
expand the production of and trade in goods and services, increase real income and
effective demands, advocate the optimal use of world's resources in a sustainable way,
and ensure that developing countries, especially the least-developed among them, secure
a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development. The means whereby these objectives are to be achieved is
through the provision of a secure and predictable international trading environment for
the business community and a continuing process of trade liberalisation based on the
principle of non-discrimination.89 Thus, preferential regional trading agreements, by
definition, are clear violations of the fundamental non-discrimination principle.
Ironically, the number of regional trading agreements, however, has increased greatly in
recent years. To date, over 200 regional trading agreements have been notified to the
GATT/WTO.90 Out of these agreements, 121 notified under GATT Article XXIV, 19
under the Enabling Clause and 12 under GATS Article V are still in force today. The
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements has currently under examination more than
100 agreements.91
fundamental changes observed in the nature and scope—both geographical and in coverage—of regional
trade agreements and their increasingly overlapping membership.
cf. http://www-chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e
89
: For example, Article I of GATT 1994, Article II of the GATS, Article 4 of the TRIPS. See supra note
23.
90
: Article XXIV:7(a) of GATT 1994 provides that "any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs
union or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall
promptly notify the CONTRCTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such information
regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to
contracting parties as they may deem appropriate". During the GATT years, the examination of regional
trading agreements was conducted in individual working parties. In order to ensure the consistency in their
examination, the General Council of the WTO established in February 1996 a single Committee, the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, to oversee all regional trading agreements. In addition to
examining individual regional agreements, another important duty of the Committee is to consider the
systemic implication of the regional trading agreements for the multilateral trading system and the
relationship between them. The Committee is also mandated to develop procedures to facilitate and
improve the examination process and to ensure that the reporting on the operation of the regional trading
agreements is adequately carried out by the parties to the agreements.
91
: During the Uruguay Round negotiations, Article XXIV of GATT 1947 was clarified to some extent and
updated by an Understanding of Interpretation. Preferential trade arrangements on goods between
developing country Members are regulated by an "Enabling Clause" dating from 1979. For trade in
services, the conclusion of regional trading agreements is governed by GATS Article V(Economic
Integration).
82
Early in the 1950s, shortly after the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was
signed, some economists adopted a rather sceptical attitude towards the benefits of
regional trading. Jacob Viner, in 1950, coined the distinction between trade
creation(additional trade created through establishing a customs union) and trade
diversion(trade being diverted from an efficient producer outside the union to a less
efficient producer in a Member country). This theory of customs union found that the
overall welfare benefit to Member countries depended on the degree of trade creation as
opposed to trade diversion. As regional integration increased the efficiency of an external
tariff, the competitive position of a customs union would improve at the expense of the
rest of the world. Therefore, the overall impact of regional integration is at best
ambivalent.92 With the development of free trade areas since 1960s, Viner's scepticism
about the likely welfare benefits of customs unions gradually gave way to a popular
opinion among economists that regional trade blocs generally created rather than diverted
trade.
Among the proponents of regional trading agreements are some prominent figures
who include Gary Sampson, the former Development Division Director of the World
Trade Organisation. In his article Regional Trading Arrangements and the Multilateral
Trading System, Sampson states: "With the successful conclusion of the (Uruguay)
Round, it is fair to speculate that the growth in regionalism—operating in accordance
with GATT obligations—has at least the potential to strengthen the rules-based
multilateral trading system. The surge of regionalism parallels and complements a rapid
expansion in GATT's membership as evidenced by the fact that 28 countries are now in
the process of accession to GATT...In short, provided that regionalism remains open—
and the rules and procedures of the GATT offer the only generally available means of
ensuring that it does—there is no reason why regional trade agreements and multilateral
system should not continue to be mutually supportive."93
In the view of the author, what Sampson cherishes sounds plausible in theory, but
unattainable in practice. When Article XXIV of GATT 1947 was drafted as the
exemptions to the general principle of non-discrimination among GATT contracting
parties, it was deemed that there should be some strict rules adhered to it. For example,
Article XXIV:7(a) requires that "Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs
union or free trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union
or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available
to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to
make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem
appropriate."94 But this provision is neither clear nor operable. Different views may arise
with respect to the point in time at which notification of a regional trade agreement
should occur: whether at the conclusion of negotiations, when the agreement is signed,
when it is ratified or when it enters into force. In most cases, an international agreement
may enter into force only after it is signed by the governments of its participants, ratified
by their legislative bodies, or even approved by a referendum. If the notification process
occurs prior to entry into force, then the examination body of the WTO will review the
92
: Jacob Viner: The Customs Union Issue, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace(1950).
93: Sampson's article is contained in the book Regional Trade Blocs, Multilateralism and the GATT, edited
by Till Geiger and Dennis Kennedy, PINTER(1996), pp.17-18.
94
: See supra note 23.
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agreements which might be rejected eventually by one or more of the participants
involved. Alternatively, if agreements are examined only after a protracted and perhaps
difficult process of domestic legislative approval, the prospect of amending an agreement
to reflect the concerns of the WTO Members will present its own difficulties.
Apart from those apparent procedural problems like the one mentioned above, there
are also some more complicated issues which merit our concern. Regional trading
agreements are often regarded by some scholars as the quicker way to liberalise
international trade as the trade tariffs are lowered further among the participants of these
agreements.95 But the other fact which has been ignored by them is that the trade tariffs
of these regional blocs are raised relatively for those non-participants. In the words of
Jacob Viner, two opposite forces would result from the creation of a customs union: a
trade-creating force generated by the elimination of protection of domestic producers
against their counterparts in other countries in the union; and a trade-diverting force
resulting from the preferential access granted to partner countries in the union vis-a-vis
more efficient third country producers.96 Therefore, regional trading agreements are de
facto like a double-edged sword: they embody both free trade and protection since they
are inherently preferential and discriminatory.
The situation for the free trade area is no better than that of the customs unions,
particularly in the context of those free trade areas with preconditions for their
membership. Taking the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) for example,
professor Jagdish Bhagwati, in his article The Agenda of the WTO, told us that the
passage of the NAFTA was subject to Mexico's acceptance of the supplemental
• 07 . .
agreements on environment and labour standards. This is just a wrong way to go: free
trade requires no preconditions, why should the regional trading agreements as in the case
of the NAFTA? If it is correct to impose such prior conditions for some participants to
join a free trade area, then we would have to revise all our textbooks of international
economics which tell us that, no matter what other countries' own policies, we shall
generally profit from freeing trade in a non-discriminatory fashion. Therefore, the
demands imposed on Mexico could have been successfully resisted, as they were in the
GATT(and now as they are in the WTO). However, in view of the overall interests, the
Mexican administration had to accept these prior conditions as this was a superpower
bargaining in a one-on-one format with a vastly inferior power. In turn, this has
strengthened the environmental and labour lobbies into arguing that because the NAFTA
did it, so must the WTO. In short, the NAFTA has made the negotiations in the WTO
more complex, not less.
In the view of Bhagwati, regional trading agreements have become a process by
which a hegemonic power seeks to(and often manages to) satisfy its multiple non-trade
demands on other weaker trading nations better than through multilateral trading
agreements, and this strategy works so much better than trying to impose these
extraneous, indeed harmful, conditions through multilateral trade negotiations where all
these weak nations are united together and have more bargaining power.98 The
93
: See Stephen Woolcock: Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading Systemfcontained in the
book Regional Trade Blocs, Multilateralism and the GATT), see supra note 93, pp. 115-130.
96
: See supra note 92.
97: Professor Bhagwati's article is contained in the book Challenges to the New World Trade Organisation,
edited by Pitou van Dijick and Gerrit Faber, Kluwer Law International 1996), p.54.
98: Id, pp.54-55.
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proliferation of regional trading agreements despite the success of the WTO must be
traced at least partly to an awareness of this reality. Therefore, the author can draw such
conclusions: if the foregoing analysis has an element of truth in it, regional trading
agreements can be regarded as to exert a more negative impact rather than a positive one
upon the global trade liberalisation process by facilitating the extraneous demands which
aim, not to reduce trade barriers, but to increase them(as in the case when market access
is sought to be denied to the developing countries by some developed countries on the
grounds such as the prevention of "eco-dumping" and "social-dumping").
Patricia Clavin, in the article The Triumph ofRegionalism over Globalism: Patterns
of Trade in the Interwar Period, gives us another perspective to realise the potential
threat of regional trade blocs to the world economy. During the Great Depression, the
world's leading capitalist countries—the United States, Britain and France—failed to
cooperate in efforts to combat the Depression because their analyses of the causes of the
Depression, coupled with the priority of national politics, left little common ground
between each other. Although viable internationalist oriented initiatives to save the world
economy were proposed, there was a lack of political will to make them work. Instead,
countries like National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, governed by regimes who
argued that conflicts in the political economy could be eliminated, came to pose the
gravest threat to capitalist liberal democracy. In the build up to the Second World War,
the failure of cooperation among the sterling and franc regions, and the troubled history
of trade negotiations left the capitalist economies more vulnerable than axis opponents in
preparations on the road to war." Although the present fragmentation of regional trade
blocs are not as threatening to the world economic structure as they were in the 1930s, no
one can assure us that similar tragedies will not reoccur. Thus, in the preparations of the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, many prominent scholars and others
advocated to make GATT obligations relating to regional trading agreements stricter and
more precise. According to an eminent study group appointed by the then Director-
General of the GATT, many existing regional integration arrangements "fall far short of
the (GATT) requirements. The exceptions and ambiguities which have thus been
permitted have seriously weakened the trade rules, and made it very difficult to resolve
disputes(to which GATT obligations are relevant). They have set a dangerous precedent
99: Clavin's article is contained in the book Regional Trade Blocs, Multilateralism and the GATT, see supra
note 93, p.33. In the view of Patricia Clavin, the Peace Treatise of Versailles concluded in 1919 helped to
underline the divisions between European powers which encouraged States to protect national interests
through the adoption and promotion of regional ties. Despite the fact that the nineteenth-century "age of
imperialism" appeared to have passed, the peace settlement worked to extend the territorial boundaries of
the British and French empires, and while the White Dominions(Canada, New Zealand and Australia)
secured self-government, the popularity of notions of imperial economic interdependence among right-
wing political groups continued. Although the diminution of Germany's status as a great power, coupled
with the "cuts in its national flesh", served to limit German influence and custom in eastern Europe during
the early 1920s, by 1930s German economic penetration of eastern European had returned in an aggressive
form. In fact, it was not only particular members of German society who looked on with envious eyes at the
continued imperial ties enjoyed by Britain and France. The apparent economic and strategic benefits
enjoyed by the "have" imperial powers encouraged the drive for similar advantages by those have not
powers as diverse as Japan, the promoter of co-prosperity across South East Asia, and Italy where there was
a drive to conquer the Mediterranean. Even the United States, aloof from these imperial pretensions, and
disdainful of others' resort to Empire in the 1930s, was, nevertheless, motivated to strengthen its ties within
its own economic backdoor in the Americas, both to the North and to the South. See supra note 93, pp.39-
40.
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for further special deals, fragmentation of the trading system, and damage to the trade
interests of non-participants...GATT rules on customs unions and free trade areas should
be examined, redefined so as to avoid ambiguity, and more strictly applied".
Despite the long-standing recognition of the shortcomings of GATT obligations and
procedures relating to regional trading agreements, the outcome of the Uruguay Round
negotiations in improving matters in this area was modest at best. The need for a revision
of rules and procedures was well appreciated. The GATT negotiating group in the
Uruguay Round which dealt with the updating and improving of the relevant GATT
articles addressed the need but without making changes to the original obligations and
procedures. Thus, the results of the Uruguay Round negotiations contain an
Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticle XXIVof the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 which does not at all amend the original article itself. Nor does it resolve
the principal problems that have arisen in the application of this article. At the very best,
it usefully clarifies a number of points which have given rise to difficulties in the past.101
A further development in the Uruguay Round negotiations is the creation of the General
Agreement on Trade in Service. The GATS includes an article on "Economic
Integration"(Article V), which establishes rules that broadly parallel those provided in
GATT 1994 for trade in goods, and which serve much the same purpose.
Issues raised by the debaters on regionalisation are pluri-dimensional and inter¬
linked. Some are primarily legal.102 Others are more institutional in nature and highlight
possible discrepancies between the rules of regional trading agreements and WTO rules
concerning the regulated areas. The legal issues may be resolved by strengthening the
WTO rules, while the institutional issues should be clarified by means of redefining the
WTO agenda.
3.2.3. The new agenda of the World Trade Organisation
It is now manifest that the World Trade Organisation should have a new agenda since
many implementation periods contained in the multilateral trade agreements either have
expired or need to be modified.103 Meanwhile, the WTO itself also needs to consider
100
: See F. Leutwiler: Trade Policies for a Better Future, GATT, Geneva(1985), p.41.
101
: For example, the Understanding provides guidelines for calculating the incidence of tariffs and other
measures before and after the formation of a customs union (not the free trade areas), as well as for making
compensatory adjustments in response to changes in tariff rates that result from the introduction of a
common external tariff. The rules on interim agreements make it clear that such agreements "should exceed
ten years only in exceptional cases". See supra note 23.
102
: For example, Article XXIV of GATT 1994 requires that "substantially all the trade" between the
constituent members should be covered by the regional trading agreements, and the same condition is laid
by GATS Article V which requires a "substantial sectoral coverage" in services. But there is no agreement
among WTO Members on the meaning of these wordings, and in fact, many agreements omit from their
coverage large and sensitive areas such as agriculture and textiles. This has enhanced the difficulties
encountered by WTO Members in assessing the consistency of regional trading agreements with the WTO
rules. See Briefing Notes on Regional Trade Agreements at Doha WTO Ministerial Conference 2001.
cf. http://www-chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minst_e/min01_e/br
103
: For example, Article 1(f) of the Agreement on Agriculture provides: " 'implementation period' means
the six-year period commencing in the year 1995, except that, for the purpose of Article 13, it means the
nine-year period commencing in 1995". Article 31 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures states: "The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8 and Article 9
shall apply for a period of five years, beginning with the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
Not later than 180 days before the end of this period, the Committee shall review the operation of those
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whether any new issues may be included within its ambit after these years' success of
regulation on global trade in goods, services and trade-related intellectual property rights.
On 8 February 2001, when the WTO General Council agreed to accept the offer from the
government of Qatar to host the fourth Ministerial Conference, the General Council
Chairman and the Director-General received from the Council a mandate to work with
WTO Members on formulating organisational and issue-related aspects of the preparation
for the conference. Various proposals, coming from both developed and developing
country Members, reached the General Council before the conference, which was held
from 9 to 13 November 2001.104
Among the proposals submitted for discussion during this conference, some are
relevant to the concerns of the developed country Members, such as environment
protection and labour standards; while others are ofmore significance to the developing
country Members, like trade facilitation issues, removal of trade barriers on textiles and
clothing. Although most of these proposals concentrate on amending those existent
multilateral trade agreements which are annexed to the WTO Agreement, there are some
issues which were once debated during the Uruguay Round negotiations and still came
out inconclusively this time. The two most prominent among these intensely-debated
issues are environment protection and labour standards.
Issues of labour were present in the abortive Charter for an International Trade
Organisation(ITO) back in the late 1940's. While exports from developing countries were
insignificant, these issues did not attract so much attention during the early GATT years
as they do now. In contrast, the issue of environment protection is almost a new one.
When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was made in 1947, the drafters only
agreed that a contracting party might invoke trade-distorting measures in order to
conserve the exhaustible natural resources provided that these measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption(Article
XX(g)). Neither from the letter, nor from the spirit of GATT 1947, could we trace the
implication of environment protection as it has in the present sense. Only until 1970s and
1980s when both the real wages of the unskilled workers in the United States and
employment rate in many European countries declined, did people in these countries
begin to turn their attention to the trade-offs with those comparatively poor developing
countries. Consequently, the expedient ways for the GATT developed contracting
partiesfnow WTO developed country Members) to invoke are to bring to centre stage the
demands which have spread in their countries for inclusion of environment and labour
standards in the WTO, requiring that either they should be moved up in the developing
country Members or else the developed country Members should be allowed to
countervail the "implied subsidy" represented by those lower standards.105
Several factors contribute to the emergence of these demands. But a principal one
among them surely is the desire to raise, in one way or another, the costs ofproduction of
provisions, with a view to determining whether to extend their application, either as presently drafted or in
a modified form, for a further period." See supra note 23.
104
: See Members' Proposals and Related Statements.
cf. http://www-chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minO l_e/mi
105
: Proposals for such legislation have already been introduced in the US Congress, as in Congressman
Gephardt's so-called "green" and "blue" bill which would authorise the administration to impose "eco-
dumping" duties against lower environment(that is green) standards abroad and social-dumping duties
against lower labour(that is blue-collar workers') standards abroad.
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your rivals abroad, and what is much easier to do than to say that they are deriving unfair
trade advantage by having lower environment and labour standards is to bring this issue
to the international institution and, to make rules applicable to all its members. In fact, it
is surely easier to get a sympathetic ear from the politicians if the appeal to them for
assistance is in the shape of protection or otherwise is couched not simply in the terms of
an appeal of the intricate issue that one cannot otherwise cope with and wants relief, but
in the contention instead that one's distress is the result of one's rival's perfidious, unfair
ways.
Why, then, should one object to the differences in different countries' environment
protection standards with regard to their same industries? Ifwe exclude those transborder
environmental issues, like global warming, ozone layer depletion and acid rain(which
raise problems about the WTO of a different, and more compelling, nature), the issue will
become much clear that most environmental problems result from polluting production
processes, certain kinds of consumption, and the disposal of waste products. If the
argument raised by some environmentalists is logical that trade as such is the root cause
of environmental degradation, then the conclusion should be that countries like Ethiopia
and Sudan are the cleanest countries as they have the least trade with others. Therefore,
we should accept such a fact that each country may have its own priority on the national
environment policy. Rich Americans and Europeans wish to expand the sphere of their
environmental issues to the conservation of natural resources and the protection of
animals, while poor developing countries prefer to save their people from starvation and
accelerate the amelioration of their horrific living conditions. Perhaps, it could be argued
that the horrific lives in some developing countries are due in part to lack of
environmental regulation. But easier said than done, most of those developing countries
are currently short of financial resources to feed their people, let alone to protect their
environment.
Two cases, which were resolved recently under the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, reflect such a diversity among WTO Members in their understanding on the
issues concerning environment protection. In the case United States—Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Ga5o/z>ie(hereinafter as Gasoline), one of the arguments
between the United States and Brazil, Venezuela is whether a policy(implemented by the
United States) to reduce the depletion of clean air is a policy to conserve an exhaustible
natural resource within the meaning ofArticle XX(g) ofGATT 1994. This is also one of
the debated points in the appeal(the Panel Report was appealed by the United States) after
the Panel gave a definite answer on this issue.106 In another case United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products^hereinafter as Shrimp), a similar
argument was raised in the appeal process by India, Pakistan and Thailand(appellees),
which contended that a "reasonable interpretation" of the term "exhaustible" is that the
term refers to "finite resources such as minerals, rather than biological or renewable
resources". In their view, such finite resources were exhaustible "because there was a
limited supply which could and would be depleted unit for unit as the resources were
consumed". They further argued: if "all" natural resources were considered to be
exhaustible, the term "exhaustible" would become superfluous. Conclusively, they
insisted that sea turtles could only be considered under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994
106
: United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS2/AB/R(distributed on 29 April 1996), pp. 19-21.
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which is related to the protection of human, animal or plant life and health, since Article
XX(g) was meant for "nonliving exhaustible natural resources".107 The Appellate Body,
however, did not accept the arguments of the appellees in both cases and decided that the
clean air and sea turtles are exhaustible" natural resources. Ifwe compare these two
cases with the Tuna-Dolphin case which was raised under the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism, we will notice that the WTO Appellate Body has inclined to the broad
interpretation of the exceptions contained in Article XX of GATT 1994, under which a
WTO Member may invoke unilateral and trade-distorting actions. Therefore, the
implications of the Appellate Body decisions are far beyond these two cases. In the view
of the author, many developing country Members need to readjust their national policy
priorities thereafter.
Since the World Trade Organisation embraced "sustainable development" as one of
its objectives, it has been widely accepted that international trade might have an impact
upon environment protection, and vice versa. Being aware of this, we can expect that
there will be more disputes, like the Gasoline and Shrimp, which are brought to the WTO
for settlement. But the WTO is an international organisation based on the multilateral
trade agreements. To solve those complicated environment issues seems to fit neither its
objectives nor its competence. Thus, the pivotal point here is how to delimit the scope of
environmental issues which might be dealt with under the WTO jurisdiction. At the
Marrakesh Conference which was held to establish the World Trade Organisation on 14
April 1994, ministers of the GATT contracting parties(WTO Members after 1 January
1995) decided to set up a Committee on Trade and Environment(CTE). The mandate of
the CTE was first made in the Decision on Trade and Environment, which, in a general
way, addresses the relationship between the international trade rules and those
environment protection measures which may affect the flow of international trade. A
further clarification of the WTO role with respect to the regulation of environment issues
was provided during the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, which includes: (a)WTO
competence for policy coordination in this area is limited to trade and those trade-related
aspects of environmental policies which may result in significant trade effects for its
Members. In other words, it is not intended that the WTO should become an
environmental agency. Nor should it get involved in reviewing national environmental
priorities, setting environment standards or developing global policies on the
environment. (b)To increase WTO Members' national coordination as well as
multilateral cooperation in order to address their environmental concerns. (c)To secure
the market-access opportunities for developing country Members to help them work
towards sustainable development.109
107
: United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS58/AB/R(distributed on 12 October 1998), p.47.
108
: The panel in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute concluded: "The US could not embargo imports of tuna
products from Mexico simply because Mexican regulations on the way tuna was produced did not satisfy
US regulations.(But the US could apply its regulations on the quality or content of the tuna imported).
"GATT rules did not allow one country to take trade action for the purpose of attempting to enforce its own
domestic laws in another country—even to protect animal health or exhaustible natural resources.
Eventually, the panel report was not adopted but circulated on 3 September 1991. See BISD 39th/155. The
US and Mexican governments resolved their dispute on a bilateral agreement.
109: See The Trade and Environment Committee, andDoha Preparations.
cf. http://www-chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/br
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The demands for the inclusion of labour standards, and of making them into
prerequisites for market access by a social clause in the WTO, have both parallels and
contrasts to those upon the environmental issues.
The contrast is that labour standards have nothing equivalent to transborder
environmental externalities. Labour standards are more closely connected with the local
economic and social development. In this regard, the demands to countervail "social
dumping" for lower labour standards parallel the demands to countervail "eco-dumping"
for lower environment standards have the same rationale and, hence, must be rejected for
the same reasons. But a different aspect to the whole question results from the fact that
labour standards, unlike most environment standards, are seen in moral terms. Thus, for
example, central to the thinking of people in some developed countries on the question of
the social clause is the notion that competitive advantage can sometimes be morally
"illegitimate". In particular, it is argued that if labour standards elsewhere are different
and unacceptable morally, then the resulting competition is morally "illegitimate" and
"unfair".
At the current international level, when this argument is made about a practice such
as slavery(defmed strictly as the practice of owning and transacting in human beings, as
for centuries before the Abolitionists triumphed), there will be nearly universal agreement
that if slavery produces competitive advantage, that advantage is illegitimate and ought to
be rejected. Since slavery has been forbidden as a norm ofjus cogens, many international
conventions contain express statements to ban such practice. Article 4 of the Universal
Declaration ofHuman Rights has clearly declared that "No one shall be held in slavery or
servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms".110 Thus, we
have here a "value"-related argument for suspending one country's trading rights or
access to another country's markets, in a sense similar to(but far more compelling than)
the Shrimp case when the United States sought to prohibit certain shrimp and shrimp
products because they are caught and processed in a way different from that accepted by
the United States. The insertion of a social clause for labour standards into the WTO
agreements can thus be seen as a way of legitimating an exception to the perfectly-
sensible WTO rule that prohibits the suspension of a Member's trading rights concerning
a product simply on the ground that, for reasons ofmorality asserted by another Member,
the process by which that product is produced is considered immoral and therefore
illegitimate. The real problem here with this argument, however, is that universally-
condemned practices such as slavery are rare indeed. In most cases, the labour standards
are connected with the local economic development levels. According to professor
Jagdish Bhagwati, even in the most developed country, the United States, it is not
difficult to see that some manufacturers are using the cheap labour of those female
immigrants to produce sweaters in unacceptable working conditions.111 The question
whether a substantive consensus on anything except well-meaning and broad principles
without consequences for trade access in case of non-compliance can be obtained is
therefore highly dubious.
Indeed, the reality is that a diversity of labour practices and standards is widespread
in practice, which mirrors a diversity of cultural values, economic conditions and
analytical beliefs, and theories concerning the economic(and therefore moral)
110
: See supra note 21.
111
: See supra note 97, p.40.
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consequences of labour standards. The notion that labour standards can be universalised,
like human rights such as liberty and habeas corpus, simply by calling them "labour
rights ignores the fact that this easy equation between culture-specific labour standards
and universal human rights will have a difficult time surviving deeper scrutiny. If we
look at the economic structures ofmost developing countries, we may notice that there is
amuch bigger portion of the population in these countries, who are devoted to agriculture
than that to industry. To raise the wages of the industry population and improve their
working condition would slow down the capital accumulation process necessary for basic
constructions which might have absorbed more landless people eventually into gainful
employment. Consequently, this would leave the majority of the population in these
countries in an even poorer condition. Hence, we may conclude that the idea of inserting
the social clause into the WTO agreements is rooted generally in an ill-considered
rejection of the general legitimacy of diversity of labour standards and practices across
countries. The alleged claim for the universality of labour standards(except for a rarely
few cases such as slavery) is generally unpersuasive.
In fact, if a WTO Member finds that the trade advantages of another Member is
derived from the "immoral" or "unfair" competition, the former can invoke Article IX:3
of the WTO Agreement to ask for a waiver to suspend the application to the latter of
concessions or other obligations under the WTO agreements.112 Therefore, the fears that
the "social-dumping" might come from the poor countries to the rich ones are groundless,
and the initiatives to insert the labour standards into the WTO agreements are
unnecessary. At the first WTO Ministerial Conference which was held in Singapore in
December 1996, the WTO Members, in theMinisterialDeclaration, proclaimed that "We
renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognised core labour
standards. The International Labour Organisation(ILO) is the competent body to set and
deal with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them. We
believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further
trade liberalisation contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of
labour standards forprotectionistpurposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of
countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into
question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO secretariats will continue their
existing collaboration"(Emphasis added).113 This statement was reaffirmed in the
Ministerial Declaration of the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference. Meanwhile, when in
formulating those universal labour standards, the ILO needs to take into account Article
19(3) of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, which states: "In
framing any Convention or Recommendation of general application the Conference shall
have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect
development of industrial organisations, or other special circumstances make the
112
: Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement states: "In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference
may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agreement or any of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, provided that any such decision shall be taken by three fourths of the Members unless
otherwise provided for in this paragraph. (a)A request for a waiver concerning this Agreement shall be
submitted to the Ministerial Conference for consideration pursuant to the practice of decision-making by
consensus. The Ministerial Conference shall establish a time period, which shall not exceed 90 days, to
consider the request. If consensus is not reached during the time period, any decision to grant a waiver shall




industrial conditions substantially different and shall suggest the modifications, if any,
which it considers may be required to meet the case of such countries".114
The WTO's attempt is commendable, but it is too covetous, for it cannot account for
individual nations' social and economic policies. Environment and labour standards
should not be set by an organisation whose primary objective is promoting international
free-market trade. These tasks should be left to those multilateral environment
agreements and other international organisations that are ideologically aligned with and
sympathetic to environment and labour issues. Just as one scholar observed: "Every
global issue should have its own solution. Environmental and social problems need
environmental and social answers—and seeking solutions through trade rules is not a
substitute".113 In the view of the author, there is no urgent need, at the moment, to expand
the agenda of the World Trade Organisation so that more efforts may be made on the
implementation of those existing multilateral trade agreements and on the expansion of
assistance to the developing country Members, particularly those least-developed country
Members. Meanwhile, with the increasing of more complicated disputes, it is high time
for us to review the applicability and workability of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. At the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations, ministers of GATT
contracting parties(which became WTO Members after 1 January 1995) decided to
complete a full review of dispute settlement rules and procedures under the World Trade
Organisation within four years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and to
take a decision on the occasion of its first meeting after the completion of the review,
whether to continue, modify or terminate such dispute settlement rules and procedures.116
Because of the debacle of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, the review of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding was not completed in accordance with the original
timetable. Again, the review did not achieve significant results at the recent Doha
Ministerial Conference. However, these setbacks should not affect the scholarly study on
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and WTO law in general against the perspective
ofpublic international law.
114
: See supra note 21.
115
: KimVan der Borght: The Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections
on the Current Debate, Am. U. Int'l. L. R., No.14, 1999, p.1227.
116
: See Decision on the Application and Review ofthe Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement ofDisputes. See supra note 23.
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Chapter Four The Inter-Relationship ofWTO Law and Public
International Law
Section One International Law in a MulticulturalWorld1
4.1.1. A retrospective and prospective view of international law
Law can only exist in a society, and there can be no society without a system of law
to regulate its members with one another. If then we speak of the "law of nations", the
precedent ofmodern international law, we are assuming that a "society" of nations exists,
and the assumption that the whole of the civilised world constitutes in any real sense a
single society or community is one which we are not justified in making without
examination. In any case, the character of the law of nations is necessarily determined by
that of the society within which it operates, and neither can be understood well without
the other.2
Modern international law has its origin in the Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Although communities of States regulated by law had previously existed in
Europe and elsewhere before then,3 they are far from the way in modern sense. The law
which was originally created to govern the diplomatic, commercial, military and other
relations of the society of Christian States forming the Europe of that time provides the
basis for the present law. Although the writers4 who recorded(and, to a large extent,
invented) this early "Law of Nations"5 may have regarded it as having universal
application, it was for many generations really no more than the Public Law of Europe.
International law was first extended beyond Europe at the end of the eighteenth and at the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries to the States that succeeded the rebel European
colonies of North and South Americas respectively. By the mid-nineteenth century,
Turkey had been accepted as the first non-Christian subject of international law.6 After
the Opium Wars,7 increasing European penetration into China and other Asian countries
had led to the "admission", though scarcely on terms of equality,8 of other such subjects.
1
: The author of this thesis was inspired by the naming of the 1984 Hague Academy Workshop, The Future
of International Law in a Multicultural World, when the title was chosen for this section. For the sake of
succinctness, the author of this thesis is using the term "international law" in this thesis when referring to
"public international law", unless a clear distinction from other terms is necessary.
2: See Brierly: The Law ofNations, sixth edition, 1963, pp. 41-42.
3: Ancient Greece and India can be deemed representatives in that sense, but only in a rudimentary way.
4
: Most scholars consider Hugo Grotius(1583-1645), a Dutch diplomat, scholar, and jurist, to be the "father
of the law of nations." Grotius, however, was not the first person to theorise about international law. In the
later half of the sixteenth century, several other scholars had laid a foundation for Grotius and those who
followed. To learn the details on the bases of modern international law, see John W. Williams: Guide to
International Legal Research, The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, Vol.
20, 1986, pp.1-34.
5
: The term "international law" would appear to have been coined later by Jeremy Bentham(1748-1832),
an English philosopher, legal and social reformer, and founder ofutilitarianism.
6
: See D. J .Harris: Cases and Materials on International Law, fifth edition, Sweet and Maxwell(London,
1998), p. 16.
7: Wars occurred between Great Britain and China during the middle of the 19th century, which forced the
opening of China to western trade. See James R. Fox: Dictionary of International and Comparative Law,
Oceana Publications Inc.(1992), p.320
8
: A system of capitulation, which in some cases lasted well into the twentieth century, was commonly
applied by which European nationals present in the territory of the capitulating State were subject not to the
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It was the advent in 1920 of the League of Nations, membership of which was open to
"any" State,9 that , as much as any other single event, marked the beginning of the
present situation in which international law applies automatically to all sovereign States
whatever their location or character. Since that time, the community of States has
increased dramatically in number to close to 200.10
The past century witnessed many changes in the scope and content of international
law. The changes in the balance of interests and values in the world community resulting
from the emergence of Communist States and then from the waves of independence since
1945 of colonial and similar territories have had a tremendous effect in shaping or
reshaping some international law rules. The collapse of the Soviet bloc marked the end of
the Cold War and the emergence of US hegemony in international affairs.11 The demise
of Oppenheim's doctrine that "States solely and exclusively are the subjects of
International Law"12 is also evident. The growth of public international organisations in
particular bears witness to this. If other claimants still have very limited personality, it is
nonetheless the case that inter-State treaties are increasingly concerned with the "trans¬
national" affairs, to use Jessup's terminology,13 of private individuals and companies. Of
great importance is the increase in the subject-matter of international law to cover what
Friedmann has called "the international law of co-operation".14 The development of the
international law of human rights and international environmental law are notable
examples of this more positive, community-minded kind of law.15 Science too has had
considerable impact. It has added two new territory areas—outer space and the deep sea-
local law or courts, but were subject instead to their national law administered in the territory of the
capitulating State by their national consular courts.
9
: Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Covenant of the League ofNations provides that all fully self-governing
States, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission
is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere
intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by
the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.
10
: As of this writing, the total number of the U. N. membership is 191, plus a few observers,
cf. http://www.un.org./Overview/growth.htm
11
: See Wilhelm G. Grewe: The Epochs of International Law, Walter de Gruyter Gmblt and Co. KG, D-
10785 Berlin, 2000, pp.701-706.
12
: Oppenheim's International Law(edited by Jennings and Watts), ninth edition, Longman
Company! 1992), Vol. I, p.13. "States are the principal subjects of international law." Lassa Francis
Lawrence Oppenheim (1858-1919), Professor, Freiburg-in-Breisgau, 1885-92, Basle, 1892-95, LSE, 1895-
1908, Cambridge, 1908-1919.
13
: See Jessup, Transnational Law(\956), pp. 15-16. Philip Jessup(1897-?), US national, Professor,
Columbia University, 1925-61, Judge of the ICJ, 1961-70.
14: Wolfgang G. Friedmann( 1907-1972), lawyer and judge in Germany, 1933-4, law teacher, UK, Australia
and Canada, 1934-55, Professor, Columbia University, 1955-72.
15
: The references to human rights in the Charter of the United Nations (Preamble, Articles 1, 55, 56, 62,
68 and 76) have provided the basis for elaboration on the content of standards and of the machinery for
implementing protection of human rights. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights(adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948, U. N. Doc. A/811), International
Covenants on Human Rights{adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December
1966), The European Convention of Human Rights{signcd in Rome on 4 November 1950). See Basic
Documents in International Law, fourth edition, edited by Ian Brownlie, Oxford University Press(1995).
See also Rio Declaration on Environment and Development(adopted on 14 June 1992, U. N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.l, 1992); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation
(Preamble, signed on 15 April 1994).
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bed—for which international law rules are required,16 and it has produced nuclear
weapons, which have revised thinking about some existing rules and caused the
introduction of new ones. The fast development of the information technology is catching
the concern of the public about the security of the electronic commerce. Recent efforts
have been focused on the law-making against the crimes on the internet.17
The explosion of new States, the gap-widening between the developed and
developing countries(especially the least-developed countries) have made it more
difficult to make new international law rules. It has long been established that law of
universal applicability can be made only by universal agreement or acquiescence; the
likelihood of general agreement decreases, of course, as the number of nations which
must agree increases. The multilateral convention has become the principal form of
general law-making, but experience suggests that universality(or general acceptance)will
be hard to come by. General agreements may be possible only to codify accepted basic
principles and practices, or perhaps to adopt some general, imprecise, and ambiguous
standards to which time and experience may give some agreed contents. On the other
hand, regional law and law for other smaller groupings have become increasingly
common, which have already brought much debate on the relations between the regional
law and the global law.19
With the end of the Cold War, international relations have been characterised by
divisions that are pragmatic rather than ideological, economic rather than political.
Cooperation, not confrontation, is the mainstream in the modern world. This will pave the
way for future law-making, albeit discordance may still exist. This divergence of views
has already been exposed in the different attitudes of the developed and developing
countries toward international law.
4.1.2. Fundamental differences in the attitudes toward international law
When we talk of the difficulty to obtain a general acceptance for an international
agreement, one factor which cannot be ignored is the difference in attitudes toward
16
: See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities ofStates in the Exploration and Use ofOuter Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies)adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
25 January 1967, U. N. Doc. A/Res/2222, XXI); Convention on the Law of the Seafadopted at the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on 30 April 1982). See Basic Documents in International Law,
id.
17
: See Convention on the Physical Protection ofNuclear Material, Legal Series, No. 12, International
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1982; Treaty on the Non-proliferation ofNuclear Weapons)signed on 1
July 1968); Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control)^dited by Bennett Boskey and Mason Willrich,
Dunellen Publishing Company Inc.(1970); Michael J. Matheson: The Opinions of the International Court
ofJustice on the Threat of the Use ofNuclear Weapons, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.
91, 1997, pp.417-435. See also Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde: Law and the Internet—a framework
for electronic commerce, Hart Publishing(2000); Penelope Lawrence: Law of the Internet—A Practical
Guide, London: Sweet & Maxwell(2000); Ian J. Lloyd: Information Technology Law, Butterworths(1993).
18
: The extended Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations exemplifies the difficulties to obtain
the general acceptance for an international agreement. Another example is the Plurilateral Trade
Agreements in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, which only apply to those WTO Members which have
signed.
19: As for the relationships between the global law and the regional law, see Jonathan I. Chamey: Universal
International Law, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, 1993, pp.529-551. See also
Regional Co-operation, Organisations and (included in Encyclopaedia of International Law),
Elsevier Science Publishers B. V., 1983.
95
international law. This difference is occurring not only between the developed and
developing countries, but even between the developed countries themselves. Some of
these differences derive from their legal histories, while others are merely caused by their
different constitutional mandates.
First of all, we may turn our look at the attitude of the European countries toward
international law. International law in Europe appears to be more pertinent than it does in
many other parts of the world.20 This is partly a result ofmany centuries' development of
international law in Europe, with many small countries which must interact with each
other under a framework of international law rules. Now we have the European Union
with an extraordinary powerful and growing framework of rules operating on the
European continent.21 The European Union, at least at its outset, could be described as an
"international" organisation, although some would say that it is now evolving towards a
rather large federal State.22 As it does so, it could well be that thinking in Europe towards
international law(at the point when EU law is assumed no longer to be part of
international law) could change. In addition, many lawyers in continental European
countries are trained in civil law tradition, which, in a broad brush, is characterised by
hierarchical thinking about legal propositions.23 They are more likely to regard
international law as superior to their national law.
20
: This viewpoint can be supported at least by one book National Constitutions and International
Economic Law edited by Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, (Kluwer, 1993). In this book, many
authors, particularly those from European countries, express their wishes to remove the international trade
barriers by constitutional means.
21
: The rising tide of Community powers is slowly eroding the residual powers of the Member States.
Community powers, at first, were usually concurrent with Member State powers, but over time, they have
developed into exclusive powers. Beyond the dynamic coexistence of the Community and Member State
powers, there is an increasingly important principle which governs Member States' conducts. It is the
principle of co-operation stated in Article 10(ex Article 5) of the EC Treaty. Article 10(1) of the EC Treaty
provides: "Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of
the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks." Furthermore, pursuant to
Article 10(2) the Member States shall "abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of
the objectives of this Treaty."
22
: John Pinder in his article A Federal Community in an Ungoverned frWc/(included in Federal Solutions
to European Issues edited by Bernard Burrows et al, The Federal Trust for Education and Research Ltd,
1978, p.220) states: "The welfare of people will best be served by a powerful Community government
which can defend its economy against external shocks that are inevitable in an ungoverned world, while at
the same time encouraging any feasible progress towards international government. This implies a federal
government for the Community, because other forms of association will be too weak for the heavy tasks of
external as well as domestic economic management."
23: For example, in the view ofKelsen, international law determines, through the principle of effectiveness,
the reason and sphere of validity of the national legal orders. Kelsen further states: "The international law
that forms a part of this national law determines, through its principle of effectiveness, the reason for the
validity of all national legal order—of those which are not the starting point of the construction and of the
one which is and which therefore includes international law as a part. It fulfils this function in the latter
case, as a part of the national legal order in a wider sense, only with respect to the national legal order in a
narrower sense. Therefore the relationship of the two parts of this national legal order in the wider sense is
not to be regarded a relationship of coordination, but as one of sub- and superordination. That part of the
national legal order which is the international law is at a higher level than the part that is the national legal
order in the narrower sense. Figuratively speaking we may say: the State which recognises international
law thereby submits to international law." Hans Kelsen: Pure Theoty of Z,«vt'(translated by Max Knight),
University ofCalifornia Press(1970), p.340.
96
By contrast, the Americans have more faith in their constitution and the stability of
their political system than in their government. It is also true that Americans do not share
similar faith when they come to international law and international institutions. To some
extent, international law is viewed as peripheral, and even dangerous, with a potential for
interfering with some of the finer aspects of the US constitutional legal system.24
International institutions are often viewed as unformed, uninformed, relatively unstable
and changing, and subject to the various whims of diplomatic processes. The frequent
veto exercised by the Congress on the Executive bills demonstrates the limited
competence of the US government in the administration of international affairs.25
Then, let us have a look at the attitudes of developing countries toward international
law.26 Developing countries are in many respects very diverse: they differ in their cultural
and ideological backgrounds, in their economic or social development levels, in their
political alignment, in their respective systems of public order, and so on.27 What unites
their attitudes towards international law is their basic strategies adopted by developing
countries in the modern international relations. To them, international law is relevant to
the extent that it protects them from undue interference by powerful States and is
instrumental in bringing about social changes, with more equitable conditions stimulating
economic development.
A major feature of developing countries' attitudes toward international law is their
insistence on the need to elaborate general principles as opposed to detailed and precise
legal rules. What accounts for this marked preference for general principles? One
possible reason is the "dislike of legal technicalities",28 expressed chiefly by some Asian
and African countries. This dislike is partly due to their cultural traditions. To some
extent, perhaps, it is also motivated(or was motivated until recently) by the relative lack
24
: See John H. Jackson: National Constitutions, Transnational Economic Policy and International
Economic Law: Some Summary Reflections. See supra note 20, p.573.
25
: The veto by the US Congress on the Executive bill to establish the International Trade
Organisation(ITO) is but one of such examples. For details of the failure of ITO, see John H. Jackson: The
World Trading System, Chapter Two, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press(1989).
26
: According to Antonio Cassese in his book International Law in a Divided JTorW(Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986, p. 116), the term "developing countries" was first launched in 1957-58 by the OECD.
27
: See P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson: The Law and Economic Development in the Third World, Praeger
Publishers, 1992.
28
: At this point it seems apposite to quote the words of a leading Egyptian international lawyer, G. Abi-
Saab who, in commenting on the attitudes of Third World countriesfas for the definitions of Third World,
see supra note 25, p. 115-116) to the development of international humanitarian law, made a few general
remarks which are also applicable to the position assumed by those States towards the whole of
international law: "...in dealing especially with the Western countries, anything which could be formulated
in the very precise terms of an operational rule was considered nonsense byfdeveloping countries), while
Third World representatives in general attached great weight to general principles which sometimes could
not be refined into operational rules. If we look at the same thing from a different point of view, I would
say that in most cases the attitude of the ThirdWorld was defined by the total effect of a proposed solution.
This is a really special legal outlook: what is law? Is law a principle or a value directive of behaviour, or is
it a mere mechanism?... I think that the Western powers put too much emphasis on mechanistic elements
while for Third World countries if by going through all the notions and respecting all the procedural rules
you end up with an unjust solution, this would be bad law. And if you have a general directive, even if you
cannot reduce it to very precise procedural rules, it still is good law, though it may be imperfect in terms of
application." See The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict(edited by Antonio Cassese, Naples,
1980), pp.249-50. See also J. Syatanw: Some Newly Established States and the Development of
International Law, Leiden, 1960, p.23.
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of skilled lawyers capable of debating with those sophisticated experts from developed
countries on points of law.29 For fear ofbeing outwitted by the experts of those developed
countries, developing countries often tend to play down legal sophistication.
Anyone who is familiar with the development of modern international law can
discern some specific reasons behind those attitudes of developing countries. Firstly,
there is the fact that principles, being general and sweeping in character, are more
acceptable to the developed countries than detailed rules in areas where they oppose new
developments demanded by developing countries.30 Meanwhile, when the developed
countries wish to introduce new rules to regulate international affairs, developing
countries can give their consent on some general principles as a compromise.31 Another
advantage of general principles is that, being loose and flexible, they are more likely to
be interpreted and applied in such a way as to allow for future developments and
demands. By contrast, detailed rules crystallise and even ossify the circumstances for
which they are enacted. In consequence they are often not capable of being adjusted to
fresh situations. Connected with the second advantage, a third merit is that general
principles leave greater latitude than hard and fast rules. Consequently, the developing
countries feel that, by upholding these general principles, they commit themselves in a
32
way permitting greater leeway should unforeseen circumstances arise.
Since most developing countries lag far behind Western countries in the facilitation of
international law, it will not come as a surprise that developing countries are the segment
of the world community which presses most assertively and consistently for legal
change.33 More clearly than others, developing countries have made the choice between
the goals(respect for international law and upholding ofjustice) set out by the UN Charter
29
: Professor Mary E. Footer in her article The WTO, Developing Countries and Technical Assistance for
Trade Law Reform(included in Governance, Development and Globalisation edited by Julio Faundez et al,
Blackstone Press Ltd, 2000, pp.253-272)explains the dilemma that the developing countries are facing
while they are adapting the WTO law, and puts forward some suggestive ways to developing countries for
their trade law reform.
30 Prior to the first conference of UNCTAD in 1964, there was a growing dissatisfaction felt by the
developing countries with the rules governing international trade. The GATT rales, which came into effect
in 1948, allowed protectionism in agriculture requested by the developed countries. On the other hand, it
did not seem beneficial to the developing countries when the reduction of industrial tariffs was
concentrated on those products in which developed, not developing countries, had comparative advantage.
As a first attempt, the UNCTAD I in its Final Act set out new general principles of international law, one of
its first enunciations being the need for preferential and non-reciprocal economic relationships. Thus
general principle eight provided: "New preferential concessions, both tariff and non-tariff, should be made
to developing countries as a whole and such preferences should not be extended to developed countries.
Developing countries need not extend to developed countries preferential treatment in operation amongst
them." See Kamal Hossain: Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order, Frances
Pinter(Publishers) Ltd. , 1980.
31
: One can recall that the original negotiation proposals during the Uruguay Round negotiations included
those of environment and labour standards, which were strongly opposed by the developing countries. In
the end, the developed and developing countries agreed, as a compromise, to establish a Committee on
Trade and Environment as a means for further co-operation on this particular issue.
32: See supra note 25, pp. 118-119.
33
: Under the pressure from developing countries, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development(UNCTAD) convened in Geneva in 1964, New Delhi in 1968, Santiago in 1972, Nairobi in
1976, Manila in 1979, to identify different areas of international economic relations where changes were
perceived to be needed if the objectives of development and other legitimate interests of the developing
countries were to be realised. See Kamal Hossain, supra note 29, pp.4-5.
98
for the achievement of better international conditions.34 They chose justice as their
fundamental objective in the confrontations with the developed world. It, therefore,
seems only natural that they consistently seek to change international law by making it
less unjust. They have already achieved much. They have brought about fairly
satisfactory changes in the rules governing such important areas as treaty-making, the law
of the sea, the humanitarian law controlling armed conflicts, the law of State
succession. Nevertheless, they still have a long way to go if they wish to insert more
equitable conditions into the international economic arena and to acquire greater political
power in international affairs.
4.1.3. International law, international economic law, and WTO law
There have already been a lot of literature which is used to define the term
"international law".36 A generally acceptable definition is: "international law may be
defined as the rules which determine the conduct of the general body of civilised States in
their mutual dealings".37 In international law, as in other sciences, a good definition is
one of the last results to be reached. Until the nature and scope of any study are clearly
seen, its boundaries cannot be determined with perfect accuracy. A definition, in order to
be satisfactory, ought to give with precision the marks whereby the thing to be defined is
distinguished from all other things; and unless it does so it is either incomplete or
misleading. We may expect that different definitions of a science will be given, not only
in its infancy, before its nature and limits are clearly understood, but even in its maturity,
if those who cultivate it differ as to their methods and as to the extent of the subject-
matter with which they deal. International law is in this latter predicament. It has been
studied for ages; but although its expounders are gradually approaching the adoption of a
consistent body of doctrine, they have not been able to come to an agreement upon such
questions as the exact character of the processes to be followed in their reasoning, or the
relation of their science to Ethics and Jurisprudence. Accordingly, each writer's
definition is coloured, to a certain extent, by his or her own view; and the definition in
this thesis is no exception to this general rule.
Two important factors, together with others, determine that the definition of
international law is changeable.
The first factor is the increasing participants in the domain regulated by international
law. About sixty years ago, when the United Nations was founded, there were only fifty-
one member countries. With the lapse of a bit more than half a century, the number has
34
: Charter of the United Nations, Article 1, paragraph 1, provides that the purpose of the UN is to
"maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might
lead to a breach of the peace".(Emphasis added) See Basic Documents in International Law, supra note 15.
35: See supra note 25, p.122.
36
: For example: "International law provides a system of rules governing the conduct of inter-State
relations." D. W. Greig: International Law, Salem, New Hampshire: Butterworths(1970), p.l; "It is the
essence ofpublic international law that it operates across State boundaries and, broadly speaking, the same
rules and principles are accepted as binding by all States and operate to govern their relations inter se." L.
G. Green: International Law: A Canadian Perspective, second edition, The Carswell Company Ltd.( 1988),
p.U
37: T. J. Lawrence: The Principles ofInternational Law, Macmilian and Co. Ltd.(1923), p. 1.
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more than tripled. The UN Member countries range from the most developed to the least
developed in terms of their economic strength, from the largest to the smallest in terms of
size and population. Meanwhile, the proliferation of other international organisations is
leading international law towards a more diversified and specialised direction, which
38
corresponds to the fast development of science and technology.
The second factor which affects the development of international law is the subjects
which international law are dealing with. The time when any one scholar could give a
definitive overview of the whole area of public international law has passed. Nowadays,
scholars and practitioners tend to choose to specialise in the subjects such as commercial
contracts; prevention of money laundering or war crimes; human rights, and others.
Accordingly, international law is subdivided into international economic law;
international criminal law, the law of human rights, etc. This gives us a new approach to
understanding modern international law.
Recently, one of these aforesaid subdivisions of international law, the international
economic law, is increasingly catching the attention from both scholars and
practitioners,39 not only because of the expanding scope which comes under the
regulation of international economic law, but also because of the ever-increasing
influence which it is exerting upon our daily lives. Although there still exists some
disagreement as to the boundaries of international economic law,40 a more restrained
definition would embrace those areas such as trade in goods, investment, trade in services
when they are involved in transactions that cross national borders, and those subjects that
involve an establishment on a national territory of economic activity of persons or firms
originating from outside that territory.41
Since both international law and international economic law are dealing with affairs
which cross national boundaries concerning at least two States, then, what is the
significance to divide them? Two conclusive points can be drawn for this question.
Firstly, as a general rule, international law regulates a wide range of affairs which include
almost every field concerning different States. However, the current international
relations are developing in a more complex and specialised way, it seems necessary that
some technical treaties are made to regulate those specific affairs. Secondly, whereas
traditional international law is mainly limited in regulating the public affairs between
States, international economic law extends the categories of subjects of international law
as to include individuals,42 and which takes into account the possibility of other sources
38
: See Manfred Lachs: Thoughts on Science, Technology and World Law, The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 86, 1992, pp.673-699.
39
: Unfortunately, this phrase is not well defined. Various scholars and practitioners have differing ideas
about the meaning of this term. Some would have it cast a very wide net, and embrace almost any aspect of
international law that relates to any sort of economic matter. Considered this broadly, almost all
international law could be called international economic law, because almost every aspect of international
relations touches in one way or another on economics. Indeed, it can be argued from the latter observation
that there cannot be any separate subject dominated as "international economic law".
40
: Upon the sources of international economic law, see Timothy Hillier: Principles ofPublic International
Law, Cavendish Publishing Ltd(1999), p.307. See also Hazel Fox: The Definition and Sources of
International Economic Lflvtjincluded in International Economic Law and Developing States, edited by
Hazel Fox), the British Institute of International and Comparative Law(1992), pp.3-24.
41
: See John H. Jackson: The World Trading System, supra note 24, p.21.
42
: See Louis Henkin et al\ International Law(Chapter 5, Section 6: Individuals in International Law),
West Publishing CO(1993), pp.374-394.
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of international law than those enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court ofJustice, at least, the possibility of reinterpreting these sources.44
By thus stretching the notion of international law in order to accommodate the facts
of the present-day international economic life, we are confronted with such an unwieldy
mass ofmaterials from which we are obliged to make a choice. Many current inter-State
economic relations are handled within the framework of the law of one particular
international organisation, and the World Trade Organisation is such a representative,
which has its own framework of law and dispute settlement mechanism.
Broadly speaking, WTO law is part of international economic law, which particularly
regulates the transactions concerning trade in goods, trade in services(including finance,
tourism, telecommunication), investment, and trade-related intellectual property rights
among WTO Members. In addition, it also touches the issues of Members' trade policy
and environment protection, albeit at a preliminary level. To be more specific, WTO law
is referred to the "single package" results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations(1986-1994). These results are embodied in a "document" of some 26,000
pages. Most of these pages are detailed schedules of tariff reduction, concessions in
service trade and other sectors. Even the basic texts alone approximate to 500 pages.45
The leading portion of these documents is the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organisation (hereinafter as the WTO Agreement), which is regarded by
some scholars as the "Charter" or "Constitution" of the new organisation.46 It is feasible
that the scope of WTO law will be expanding with the domain regulated by this
organisation extending to the new areas. Hence, before we start any discussion on the
relationship between WTO law and international law, it is necessary for us to enumerate
the sources ofWTO law.
Section Two The Sources ofWTO Law
4.2.1. General agreements
The WTO Agreement is a "particular" international convention within the meaning of
Article 38(l)(a) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and so are those
annexed multilateral trade agreements and legal instruments. 7 Altogether, they are often
43: Modern discussion of the sources of international law usually begins with a reference to Article 38(1) of
the Statute ofthe International Court ofJustice, which provides: "The Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a)international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting States;
(b)international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c)the general principles of law
recognised by civilised nations; (d)subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law". See Basic Documents in International Law, supra note 15.
44
: See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern: International Economic Law, second revised edition, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers(1992), p.2.
45
: See the legal texts of the World Trade Organisation: The Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral
Trade Negotiations, Cambridge University Press(1999).
46
: See John H. Jackson: The World Trade Organisation, Constitution and Jurisprudence, The Royal
Institute of International Affairs(1998), pp.36-48.
47
: To be specific, Annex 1A is Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; Annex IB is General
Agreement on Trade in Services; Annex 1C is Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights. Annex 2 is Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
D«yHites(heremafter as Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU). Annex 3 is Trade Policy Review
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referred to as the "WTO agreements" or "covered agreements." Disputes concerning the
substantive rights and obligations of the WTO Members48 are governed by the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Zh.sy>«/es(hereinafter as the Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU). In the words of
Article 38(l)(a) of the ICJ Statute, the WTO agreements including the DSU are
"establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting States" that are parties to the
WTO dispute settlement procedures.
The fundamental source of WTO law is therefore the texts of the relevant covered
agreements themselves. All legal analyses should begin from here. The WTO Appellate
Body, which is established according to Article 17 of the DSU,49 once stated clearly upon
this issue: . .the words actually used in the Article provide the basis for an interpretation
that must give meaning and effect to all its terms. The proper interpretation of the Article
is, first of all, a textual interpretation."50
While there is no explicit equivalent to Article 38(l)(a) of the ICJ Statute in the
Dispute Settlement Understanding or any other of the covered agreements, Article 7(1) of
DSU performs a somewhat similar function. It specifies that the terms of reference for
WTO panels shall be "to examine, in light of the relevant provisions in(name of the
covered agreements] cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB51
by (name of party) in document...and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those
agreement(s)". Then, working as a safety valve, Article 17(6) of the DSU confines that an
appeal "shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel".
The most relevant part of all the covered agreements in a WTO dispute settlement
procedure is Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement. Annex 1A, which is entitled Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods, includes General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
7997(hereinafter as GATT 1994), six Understandings,52 Marrakesh Protocol to the
Mechanism. Annex 4 is Plurilateral Trade Agreements(which are binding only on WTO Members which
have accepted them). Besides, there are dozens of Ministerial Decisions and Declarations which are also
binding onWTO Members. See supra note 45.
48
: The term "country Members" under the WTO law should be understood to cover both the sovereign
States and those separate customs territories. See Article XXVI(5) of GATT 1994 and Article XII: 1 of the
WTO Agreement. Besides, the European Community is acting on behalf of its member States within the
WTO. See also Article IX: 1 and Article XI: 1 of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 45.
49
: Article 17 states: "A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB(Dispute Settlement
Body). The Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons,
three of whom shall serve on any one case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation.
Such rotation shall be determined in the working procedures of the Appellate Body." Article 17(2) states:
"The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year term, and each person may
be re-appointed once..." See supra note 45.
30
: Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body(distributed on 4 October 1996),
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p. 18.
31
: The "DSB" is referred to the Dispute Settlement Body which is established according to Article 2 of the
DSU. The DSB is, de facto, the General Council of the WTO with a different chapeau. The DSB has "the
authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of
implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorise suspension of concessions and other
obligations under covered agreements." See supra note 45.
32
: To be specific, they are Understanding on the Interpretation of Article 11.1(b) of GATT 1994;
Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticle XVII ofGATT 1994; Understanding on Balance-of-Payment
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General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade 1994, and twelve multilateral agreements.53
GATT 1994 has incorporated GATT 1947 after it had been "rectified, amended or
modified by the terms of legal instruments which have entered into force before the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement"54 Besides this, GATT 1994 also includes the
legal instruments that have entered into force under GATT 1947 before the date of entry
into force of the WTO Agreement55 and the aforementioned Understandings and
Protocol. Therefore, Annex 1A constitutes the backbone of the legal framework within
the WTO. Most of the multilateral agreements in Annex 1A are the revisions of the
previous ones, either from GATT 1947 or the Tokyo Round codes. They not only serve
to regulate international trade in goods, but also provide necessary supplementation on
the interpretation of the provisions of the two new agreements General Agreement on
Trade in Services{GA.TSfb and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights{TRIPS),57 which are in Annex IB and Annex 1C respectively. As the
major achievements of the Uruguay Round negotiations, these two new agreements have
extended WTO law into two important areas: services and intellectual property. Under
the mandate of Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement, the multilateral agreements in
Annexes 1,2,3, are binding on all WTO Members.58
The "covered agreements", however, are only "first of all" resorted to in the WTO
dispute settlement procedures. They do not exhaust the recourse to other relevant sources.
To the contrary, all the other subparagraphs ofArticle 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, apart from
paragraph (a), are relevant in our seeking the potential sources of WTO law, among
which, the reports of prior GATT/WTO panels and the Appellate Body are
extraordinarily important.
Provisions of GATT 1994; Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994;
Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under GATT 1994; Understanding on the
Interpi-etation ofArticle XXVIII ofGATT 1994. See supra note 45.
53
: To be specific, these multilateral agreements include Agreement on Agriculture; Agreement on the
Application ofSanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; Agreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI ofGATT 1994; Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VII of GATT 1994;
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; Agreement on Rules of Origin; Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; Agreement on Safeguards. See supra
note 45.
54: See GATT 1994, paragraph 1(a).(Emphasis added). See supra note 45.
55
: Which include protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions, protocols of accession,
decisions on waivers granted under Article XXV of GATT 1947 and still in force on the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement, other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947. See
GATT 1994, paragraph 1(b). See supra note 45.
56: Article 1:2 defines that the GATS applies to the supply of a service(a) from the territory of one Member
into the territory of any other Member; (b)in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any
other Member; (c)by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any
other Member; (d)by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member
in the territory of any other Member. See supra note 45.
57: Article 1(2) of TRIPS specifies that "intellectual property" of this Agreement is referred to (l)copyright
and related rights; (2)trademarks; (3)geographical indications; (4)industrial designs; (5)patents; (6)layout-
designs(topographies) of integrated circuits; (7)protection ofundisclosed information. See supra note 45.
58: Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement states: "The agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annexes 1,2,3,...are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members. Article 11:3 supplements
that "...The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligations or rights for Members that have
not accepted them." See supra note 45.
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4.2.2. Reports of prior panels and the Appellate Body
Other than the texts of the WTO agreements, no source of law is as important in the
WTO dispute settlement as the prior adopted reports which include the adopted reports of
GATT panels as well as WTO panels, and now, of course, include the adopted reports of
the WTO Appellate Body.
"Judicial decisions" are among the "subsidiary" means for the determination of
international law rules. This mandate is specified in Article 38(l)(d) of the ICJ Statute.
Read together with Article 59,59 Article 38(l)(d) has produced a system of precedent
under which the International Court of Justice essentially refers to and considers its prior
decisions, but is not legally required to follow them.60 The attitude of the ICJ toward its
previous decisions is appropriately described by Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen who
once observed: "though having the power to depart from them, (the Court) will not
lightly exercise that power."61 The WTO dispute settlement mechanism effectively
duplicates this system.
The WTO Agreement specifies that the World Trade Organisation shall be guided by
the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947.62
In the Implementation of this provision in the context of trade in goods, GATT 1994
further specifies that this General Agreement should include "other decisions of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947" as an addition to all other GATT
documents.63
The question whether adopted GATT panel reports represent "decisions" of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 arose in the dispute Japan—Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages. The Panel in its final report concluded that "...panel reports
adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body constitute subsequent practice in a specific case by virtue of the decision to adopt
them. Article l(b)(iv) ofGATT 1994 provides institutional recognition that adopted panel
reports constitute subsequent practice. Such reports are an integral part of GATT 1994,
since they constitute 'other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT
1947'".64
The Appellate Body, however, did not agree with the Panel on this point. "Although
GATT 1947 panel reports were adopted by the decisions of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, a decision to adopt a panel report did not under GATT 1947 constitute
agreement by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on the legal reasoning in that panel report.
The generally-accepted view under GATT 1947 was that the conclusions and
recommendations in an adopted panel report bound the parties to the dispute in that
particular case, but subsequent panels did not feel legally bound by the details and
reasoning of a previous panel report." The Appellate Body further stated: "We do not
59: Which states: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect
of that particular case." See. Basic Documents in International Law, supra note 15.
60
: See David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis: The WTO Legal System: Sources ofLaw, The American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 92, 1998, p.400.
61
: Mohamed Shahabuddeen: Precedent in the World Court 3, 1996.
62
: WTO Agreement, Article XVI: 1. See supra note 45.
63: Paragraph l(b)(iv) of GATT 1994. See supra note 45.
64
: Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel(distributed on 11 July 1996), WT/DS8/R,
WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, para.6.10.
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believe that the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in deciding to adopt a panel report, intended
that their decision would constitute a definitive interpretation of the relevant provisions of
GATT 1947. Nor do we believe that this is contemplated under GATT 1994. There is
specific cause for this conclusion in the WTO Agreement. Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement provides: 'The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the
exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements . Article IX:2 provides further that such decisions 'shall be taken by a
three-fourths majority of the Members'. The fact that such an 'exclusive authority' in
interpreting the treaty has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is
reason enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by implication or by
inadvertence elsewhere."65 The Appellate Body is correct in this deliberation because that
is the only way to ensure the necessary deference to the exclusive authority of the
Ministerial Conference and General Council to interpret WTO agreements. If a decision
made by GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES to adopt a panel report is covered by
paragraph l(b)(iv) of the introduction to GATT 1994, then, all the adopted panel reports
would become, de facto, stare decisis. Although Article 59 of the ICJ Statute has no
direct effect on the WTO Members, the panel and the Appellate Body, in practice, have
followed the doctrine that adopted reports have no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.
From a historical viewpoint, the decisions to adopt panel reports under Article XXIII
ofGATT 194766 were different from the joint actions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
under Article XXV of GATT 1947. Under Article XXIII and GATT practice, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES used "positive consensus" to adopt a panel report, implying
that there was no contracting party present at the meeting against adopting the report;
while Article XXV:4 provides that "Except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement,
decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be taken by a majority of the votes
cast".67 Today, the decisions made by the Dispute Settlement Body to adopt the panel or
Appellate Body report continue to differ in nature from the interpretations of GATT 1994
and other multilateral trade agreements under the WTO Agreement by the WTO
Ministerial Conference or the General Council. This will become much clear after we
read Article 3(9) of the DSU, which states: "The provisions of this Understanding are
without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of
provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement
or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement."68
Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement and paragraph 1 (b)(iv) of GATT 1994 have
brought the GATT legal history and experience into the new realm of the WTO in a
manner which ensures continuity and consistency in the transition from the GATT legal
system to the WTO legal system. This affirms the importance to the WTO Members of
the experience acquired by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947, and
acknowledges the continuing relevance of that experience to the new trading system
65
: See supra note 50, pp. 13-14.(Original notes omitted).
66
: Under the title Nullification and Impairment, Article XXIII is the base for dispute settlement within the
GATT legal system. The Dispute Settlement Understanding, which is the elaboration ofArticle XXIII, now
regulates, together with Article XXIII, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
67
: Under the title Joint Action by the Contracting Parties, Article XXV is designed to facilitate the
operation and further the objectives of GATT 1947. See supra note 45.
68: See supra note 45.
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served by the WTO. Having taken this into account, the Appellate Body in the dispute
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages concluded: "Adopted panel reports are an
important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by subsequent panels.
They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. However, they are not binding,
except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that
dispute."69
The role of unadopted panel reports is somewhat less important than that of the
adopted ones, but they remain relevant. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel in the
dispute Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages on the point that unadopted reports "have
no legal status in either the GATT or the WTO system since they have not been endorsed
through decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT or WTO Members."70
However, the Appellate Body also agreed with the Panel that "a panel could nevertheless
find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it considered to be
relevant."71 This conclusion is similar to the statement made by Shabtai Rosenne:
"Precedents may be followed or discarded, but not disregarded".72
All the above discussions are limited to the GATT panel reports. However, the same
reasoning would, mutatis mutandis, apply to those adopted WTO panel reports.73
Although we still need wait to see it as, in practice, there is a lack of such experience in
the WTO jurisdictional history. Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement has ensured that
the WTO dispute settlement system will not depart too much from that of its predecessor
on this point. Since the disputing parties may still appeal if they are not satisfied with the
panel report under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it is more likely that the
future disputing parties may seek support from the Appellate Body reports.
Like panel reports, Appellate Body reports bind only the parties to the particular
dispute, and do not create binding precedents. Unlike panel reports, the Appellate Body
reports, under Article 17(14) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,74 will be almost
automatically adopted. The real question, therefore, is the extent to which the future
panels and the Appellate Body itself will treat adopted Appellate Body reports as
authoritative.
The answer to this question must await more experience. However, it is reasonable to
predict that, absent unusual circumstances, panels will follow the decisions of the
Appellate Body in much the same way that a lower court follows the decisions of a
69: See supra note 50, p.l4.(Original note omitted).
70
: Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel, see supra note 64, para.6.10; Report of the
Appellate Body, see supra note 50, p. 15.
71
: Id, Report of the Panel, para.6.10; Report of the Appellate Body, p.15.
72
: Shabtai Rosenne: The Law and Practice of the International Court, second revised edition, 1985,
quoted in Mohamed Shahabuddeen, supra note 61, p. 131.
7j
: The WTO panel reports will cover not only those disputes concerning GATT 1994, but also those
concerning the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights.
74
: Which states: "An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by
the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report
within 30 days following its circulation to Members..." See supra note 45. It is unlikely to occur that a
winning party will join the consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report.
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higher court. This is a mandatory practice in some legal systems. In others it occurs as a
practical matter.
The members of the Appellate Body, by contrast, working on a "collegial" basis, have
already paid much deference to the decisions made by their colleagues. In the dispute
United States Import Prohibition ofCertain Shrimp and Shrimp Products)\\Qre\xya.fer as
Shrimp), while in enunciating the application of "customary rules of interpretation of
public international law" as required by Article 3(2) of the DSU, the Appellate Body
stated: As we have emphasised numerous times,76 these rules call for an examination of
the ordinary meaning of the words of a treaty, read in their context, and in the light of the
object and purpose of the treaty involved."77 When in discussing the appropriate method
for applying Article XX of GATT 1994,78 the Appellate Body even quoted part of a
previous Appellate Body report.79 Again in the Shrimp case, after having reversed the
Panel's legal conclusion that the United States measure at issue "is not within the scope
ofmeasures permitted under the chapeau ofArticle XX,"80 the Appellate Body illustrated
several previous Appellate Body reports to support its duty and responsibility to complete
the legal analysis in this case in order to determine whether the American measure
qualifies for justification under Article XX.81
Established according to Article 17(1) of the DSU,82 the WTO Appellate Body is a
standing juridical body, which is different from the composition of a panel.83 While only
73
: See Rene David: French Law. Its Structure, Sources, and Methodology, (translated by Michael
Kindred, 1972), p. 186.
76
: See the Appellate Body Reports in the following disputes: United States—Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gayo/i/ze(adopted on 20 May 1996), WT/DS2/AB/R, p.17; Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages)adopted on 1 November 1996), WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, pp.10-12;
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products)adopted on 16 January
1998), WT/DS50/AB/R, paras.45-46; Argentina—Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,
Apparel and Other Items)adopted on 13 February 1998), WT/DS56/AB/R, para.47; and European
Communities—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment)adopted on 22 June 1998),
WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, para.85.(Original note 82).
77
: United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate
Body(distributed on 12 October 1998), WT/DS58/AB/R, para.l 14.
78
: Under the title General Exceptions, Article XX of GATT 1994 allows WTO Members to deviate from
their obligations under some circumstances listed in that article. See supra note 45.
79
: Quoted from United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, which stated: "In
order that the justifying protection ofArticle XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue must not only
come under one or another of the particular exceptions—paragraphs(a) to (j)—listed under Article XX; it
must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clause of Article XX. The analysis is, in other
words, two-tiered: first, provisionaljustification by reason ofcharacterisation ofthe measure underXX(g);
second, further appraisal of the same measure under the introductoiy clause of Article AX. "(Emphasis
added). Supra note 77, para.l 18.
80
: United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Panel Report, para.7.62.
For Report of the Appellate Body, see supra note 77.
81
: The Appellate Body referred to the prior Appellate Body reports in: European Communities—Measures
Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products)adopted on 23 July 1998), WT/DS69/AB/R,
para.156; Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals)adopted on 30 July 1997), WT/DS31/AB/R,
pp.23-24; United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline)adopted on 20 May
1996), WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 19.
82
: Which states: "A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall
hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three ofwhom shall serve on any one
case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in the
working procedures of the Appellate Body." See supra note 45.
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three of the seven Members sit on any one of the "divisions"84 to hear a particular appeal,
and that division retains full authority to decide the case, views on the issues are shared
with the other Appellate Body Members before a decision is reached.85 Consequently,
Members of the Appellate Body, while in confronting prior decisions, are far more likely
to be confronting their own decisions, or those of their close colleagues, than are WTO
panelists. This relationship seems likely to lead to a stronger attachment to the reasoning
and results of those decisions. "Once standing judicial bodies have come into existence,"
Judge Shahabuddeen once observed, "they provide an additional mechanism for the
further development of the law".86 Thus, although the Appellate Body reports are not
legally binding except to the parties in the dispute, they seem unlikely to be discarded,
not to say to be disregarded, by future panels, especially future Appellate Body divisions.
The nature of the panel examination and the Appellate Body review is, de facto, a
process to interpret the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited
by the parties to the dispute. Upon these interpretations, the panel or the Appellate Body
will make its recommendations or give its rulings to the disputing parties. Therefore, the
rules which the panels and the Appellate Body adopt in their interpretation become
crucial to the result of the dispute settlement.
4.2.3. Customary rules of interpreting international law
The legal reasoning to adopt customary rules for interpreting international law lies in
Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which specifies that one of the
objectives of the WTO dispute settlement system is to "clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law." In practice, Article 3(2) of the DSU has guided WTO panels and the
Appellate Body to invoke Articles 3land 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,87 which have been held to codify customary international law on this subject.
83
: Panels are chosen ad hoc from a roster of individuals whose names have been put forward by WTO
Members. They are generally present or former members of non-party Geneva delegations to the WTO, or
academics—law professors and economists. Those sitting on a particular panel have probably never served
together before, and are likely never to serve together again, although a number of persons have served on
several panels. As for the composition of panels, see Article 8 of DSU. See supra note 45.
84: Which means a particular group of three Members who are selected to serve on any one appeal in
accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the DSU and paragraph 2 of Rule 6 of the Appellate Body
Working Procedures for Appellate Review, cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/ab3-e.htm
85
: Paragraph 1 of Rule 4 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review{as amended on 28 February
1997) states: "To ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, and to draw on the individual and
collective expertise of the Member, the Members shall convene on a regular basis to discuss matters of
policy, practice and procedure." Paragraph 3 of Rule 4 further states: "In accordance with the objectives set
out in paragraph 1, the division responsible for deciding each appeal shall exchange views with the other
Members before the division finalises the appellate report for circulation to the WTO Members..." WTO
Doc. WT/AB/WP/3. cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/ab3-e.htm
86
: Shahabuddeen, supra note 61, p.45.
87
: Article 31(under the title General rule of interpretation) states: "(1)A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose. (2)The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a)any agreement relating to the treaty
which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b)any instrument
which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. (3)There shall be taken into account, together with the
context: (a)any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
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These customary rules of interpretation are, so far, the only portions of customary
international law to have found their way meaningfully into the WTO dispute settlement.
In the wor<is of the Appellate Body, these rules are the "most authoritative and
succinct."88
While keeping in mind the basic principle of interpretation that the words of a treaty
like GATT 1994 are to be given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light
of the treaty's object and purpose, the Appellate Body in the dispute United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gu.s"o/i«e(hereinafter as Gasoline)
observed that the Panel Report failed to take adequate account of the words actually used
by Article XX of GATT 1994 in several paragraphs.89 After enumerating the different
terms contained in Article XX in respect of the various categories of governmental acts,
laws or regulations which WTO Members may carry out or promulgate in pursuit of
differing legitimate State policies or interests outside the realm of liberalisation, the
Appellate Body concluded: "It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO
Members intended to require, in respect of each and every category, the same kind or
degree of connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal and the State
interest or policy sought to be promoted or realised."91
One of the arguments in this appeal is whether or not the American baseline
establishment rules constitute a "measure" "relating to" the conservation of clean air
within the meaning of Article XX(g) of GATT 1994.92 Following the spirit of Article 31
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Appellate Body further concluded
that "Article XX(g) and its phrase, 'relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources,' need to be read in context and in such a manner as to give effect to the
purposes and objects of the General Agreement. The context of Article XX(g) includes
the provisions of the rest of the General Agreement, including in particular Articles I, III
and XI (of GATT 1994); conversely, the context of Articles I and III and XI includes
application of its provisions; (b)any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding to interpretation; (c)any relevant rules of international law applicable
in the relations between the parties. (4)A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended." Article 32(under the title Supplementary means of interpretation) states: "Recourse
may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a)leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure; or (b)leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." See Basic
Documents in International Law, supra note 15.
88
: United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body
(adopted on 20 May 1996), WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 16.
89: Id, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R, paras.6.20-6.41.
90
: For example: "necessary"—in paragraphs(a), (b) and (d); "relating to"—in paragraphs(c), (e) and (g);
"for the protection of'—in paragraph(f); "in pursuance of'—in paragraph(h); "involving"—in
paragraph(i); "essential"—in paragraph(j). GATT 1994, Article XX(General Exceptions). See supra note
45.
91
: See supra note 88, p. 17.
92
: Article XX states: "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party ofmeasures: .. .(g)relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption..." See supra note 45.
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Article XX(of GATT 1994). Accordingly, the phrase 'relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources' may not be read so expansively as seriously to subvert the
purpose and object of Article 111:4 (of GATT 1994). Nor may Article 111:4 be given so
broad a reach as effectively to emasculate Article XX(g)(ofGATT 1994) and the policies
and interests it embodies".93
The Appellate Body is correct in adopting the rules of interpretation. Under the WTO
jurisprudence, the relationship between the affirmative commitments set out by the WTO
Members in, e.g., Articles I, III, XI of GATT 1994 and the policies and interests
embodied in the "General Exceptions" listed in Article XX, can be given meaning within
the framework of GATT 1994 and its object and purpose by a treaty interpreter only on a
case-by-case basis, by careful scrutiny of the factual and legal content in a given dispute,
without disregarding the words actually used by the WTO Members themselves to
express their intent and purpose. Only in this way, can the contents of GATT 1994 meet
the complicated reality of international economic situations.
The purpose to interpret WTO agreements in accordance with the international law
rules on treaty interpretation is to clarify the existing WTO law and to fill the gap of law
lacuna. But the interpretation is not necessarily limited to those international law rules.
As professor Joost Pauwelyn pointed out, many other rules of general international law
not explicitly confirmed in the WTO agreements should also be applicable with respect to
the WTO agreements; that is, as long as they do not contract out of these rules.94 His
approach is confirmed in a latter WTO panel report. The Panel's deliberation is expressed
as the followings: "We take note that Article 3(2) of the DSU requires that we seek
within the context of a particular dispute to clarify the existing provisions of the WTO
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international
law. However, the relationship of the WTO agreements to customary international law is
broader than this. Customary international law applies generally to the economic
relations between the WTO Members. Such international law applies to the extent that the
WTO treaty agreements do not 'contract out' from it. To put it another way, to the extent
there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO agreement that
implies differently, we are of the view that the customary rules of international law apply
to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty formation under the WTO".95 Following
this reasoning, the Panel correctly rejected the argument that the reference in DSU Article
3(2) only to rules of treaty interpretation of customary international law means that all
other international law is excluded.
Nevertheless, customary rules are not WTO law. They are only a means used to
clarify stipulations of WTO law which are "ambiguous" or "obscure". The WTO, like its
93
: Article 111:4 of GATT 1994 is the core provision of the national treatment, which provides that "The
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product". See supra note 45. See also supra note 88,
pp.17-18.
94
: See Joost Pauwelyn: The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go? The
American Journal of International Law, Vol.95, 2001, p.543.
95
: Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, Panel Report(not appealed, adopted on 19 June
2000), WT/DS163/R, para.7.96.(Footnote omitted)(Emphasis added).
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predecessor the GATT, is based on agreements, not on customary rules, and questions of
the use of customary rules are therefore likely to be rare. Even GATT's first and the most
basic provision, the most-favoured-nation clause(MFN), was not a codification of
customary international law; nor did it establish a customary rule.96 On the contrary,
GATT's MFN obligation extended only to the contracting parties, and GATT contracting
parties frequently denied their MEN obligation to other non-contracting-parties.97 This
remains true for the WTO agreements. Other potentially relevant are those general
principles of law abstracted from domestic legal systems of all civilised nations. As
professor Ian Brownlie pointed out: "What has happened is that international tribunals
have employed elements of legal reasoning and private law analogies in order to make
the law of nations a viable system for application in a judicial process...An international
tribunal chooses, edits, and adapts elements from better developed systems: the result is a
new element of international law the content of which is influenced historically and
logically by domestic law".98 Following this vein, the WTO panels and Appellate Body
will treat general principles of law as part ofWTO law in their deliberations.
4.2.4. General principles of law
Before starting the discussion on this issue, the author of this thesis admits that it is
not an easy task to define and enumerate general principles of law. Article 2 of the
Charter of the United Nations provides seven paragraphs which can be deemed as the
basic principles of international relations between States. However, the dimension of
Article 38(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute is much broader than that of Article 2 of the UN
Charter as the "general principles of law recognised by civilised nations" may apply to
more than affairs between States. Furthermore, different writers may well have their
different understandings as to the delimitation of a general principle of law. The purpose
of the discussion on this issue here is only to raise such a proposition that as a general
matter, in addition to the "covered agreements" and customary rules for interpretation of
these agreements, those general principles of law may also be relevant in a WTO dispute
settlement. This is because in WTO law as in any system of law, a situation may arise
where the panel or the Appellate Body is considering a dispute before it realises that there
is no law covering exactly that point, neither a customary rule nor a judicial precedent. In
such instances, the panelist or Appellate Body member may proceed to deduce a rule that
will be relevant by analogy from the general principles that guide the legal system. A
relevant example of this kind is Article 31 of Commission's Provisional Rules for Claims
Procedure, which provides that the Commissioners of the UN Compensation
Commission "will apply Security Council resolution 687(1991) and other relevant
Security Council resolutions, the criteria established by the Governing Council for
particular categories of claims, and any pertinent decisions of the Governing Council. In
96
: See supra note 60, p.407. See also Schwarzenberger: Equality and Discrimination in International
Economic Law, Yearbook ofWorld Affairs, Vol.25(1971), p.163.
97
: Before China entered the WTO in 2001, the United States often connected its MFN treatment with the
human rights condition of China, and consequently made it become a subtle political issue between these
two countries. See Russell H. Stem: A Most Favoured Nation or a Most Feared Nation The PRC s Latest
Anti-Crime Campaign and a Possible U.S. Response, The George Washington Journal of International Law
and Economics, Vol.31, No.1(1997), pp.119-140.
98
: Ian Brownlie: Principles of Public International Law, fifth edition, Oxford University Press(1998),
p.l6(Original note omitted).
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addition, where necessary, Commissioners shall apply other relevant rules of
international law."99 Such a situation is perhaps more likely to arise in WTO law because
of the relative underdevelopment of this system in relation to the needs with which it is
faced.
In the WTO dispute settlement practice, the Appellate Body has already used a
number of customary rules and general principles of law to interpret the "covered
agreements". In relation to the general principle of "good faith", the Appellate Body in
the Shrimp case stated that "The chapeau of Article XX(of GATT 1994) is, in fact, but
one expression of the principle of good faith. This principle, at once a general principle of
law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise of rights by States.
One application of this general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of
abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a State's rights and enjoins that whenever
the assertion of a right 'impinges on the field covered by a treaty obligation, it must be
exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably.'100 An abusive exercise by a Member of its
own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other Members and, as
well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting. Having said this, our
task here is to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking additional interpretative
guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles ofinternational /aw".101
In the dispute European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
ProJwcA(hereinafter as Hormones), the European Communities argued that the
"precautionary principle" was a general principle of law that should be used to interpret
the provisions of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. The Appellate Body declined to reach any conclusion on this point, and stated:
"The status of the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the subject
of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges. The precautionary
principle is regarded by some as having crystallised into a general principle of customary
international environmental law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a
principle ofgeneral or customary international law appears less than clear. We consider,
however, that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this
appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract, question. We note that the Panel
itself did not make any definitive finding with regard to the status of the precautionary
principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at least outside the
field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation".102 The
attitude of the Appellate Body reflects such a fact that a general principle of law needs a
long-time practice and universal acceptance of the international community of States. In
view of its superior status to any international treaty, it is understandable that the
Appellate Body appears to be prudent in adopting a general principle of law.
99
: Governing Council Decision 10, UN Doc. S/AC. 26/1992/10.
100
: B. Cheng: General Principles ofLaw as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Stevens and
Son, Ltd.(1953), Chapter 4.(Original note 156).
101
: See supra note 77, para. 158.(Original note omitted)(Emphasis added).
102
: European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products(Hormones), Report of the
Appellate Body(distributed on 16 January 1998), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, para, 123. In original
note 93, the Appellate Body referred to the deliberations of the ICJ in the case Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project in which the ICJ refused to accept the precautionary principle as one of the general principles of
law. See I.C.J. Judgement, 25 September 1997, paras.111-114, 140.
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Recently, there is a development of a new principle, "sustainable development",103
which is also contained in the first paragraph of the WTO Agreement Preamble as one of
the World Trade Organisation s objectives.104 Sustainable development cannot be
interpreted in isolation from the existing international treaties on the subject-matter. It
concerns the areas of human rights, State responsibility, environmental law, economic
and industrial law, equity, territorial Sovereignty, etc. The corollary of this concept
derives from the conflicts of the right to development and the protection of environment.
As there is not yet a definitive agreement on the meaning of the term "sustainable
development", the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case referred to this principle and
concluded that "it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the
agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement",105 In his Article Sustainable Development
and Unsustainable Arguments, professor Vaughan Lowe told us that "the process of
developing a precise and coherent concept of sustainable development has a way to go
before it is well suited to application by tribunals as a component of judicial reasoning.
Yet even now it is possible to discern some threads common to the majority of the
formulations of the concept. These threads seem to be more of a procedural than of a
substantive character".106 Lowe's view vindicates, in another way, that, although it has
been constantly referred in the reports of WTO panels and Appellate Body, sustainable
development, as a general principle of international law, is still in the process of
development.
The emergence ofnew principles of law explains, in one way, that international law is
not "static", but "evolutionary". In this evolutionary process, international law needs not
only to keep pace with the development of international affairs, but to absorb some useful
elements from the academic study as well.
4.2.5. Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
Article 38(l)(d) of the ICJ Statute provides that the judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations(subject to the
provisions of Article 59 of the ICJ Statute) may work as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law. As the legal status of judicial decisions of other tribunals
103
: This concept has been generally accepted as integrating economic and social development and
environmental protection. In the recent World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002(Johannesburg),
this concept has been reinforced by world leaders. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
adopted on 14 June 1992, U. N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.l, 1992; and UNReport of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development(Johannesburg), U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 199/20. See also G. Handl: Sustainable
Development: General Rules versus Specific Obligations(included in Sustainable Development and
International Law, edited by W. Lang, 1995), p.35; World Commission on Environment and Development,
Our Common Future, Oxford University Press(1987), p.43.
104
: The paragraph reads as: "(The Parties to this Agreement,) Recognising that their relations in the field
of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring
full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the
world's resources in accordance with the objectives ofsustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development. (Emphasis added). See supra
note 45.
105
: See supra note 77, para. 153.
106
: See International Law and Sustainable Development, edited by Alan Boyle and David Freestone,
Oxford University Press(2001), p.26.
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will be given a full elaboration in the next section, the discussion in this part is mainly
focused on the teachings and writings ofpublicists.
Sporadic references can be found in panel reports to the teachings and writings of
highly qualified publicists in the GATT dispute settlement proceedings,107 but this sort of
references is rare. The reason for this rarity is mainly due to the GATT's diplomatic
heritage. Not only were diplomats less likely than lawyers to be aware of or to be
influenced by the writings of legal scholars; GATT diplomats for many years were even
averse to turning the conciliation-based dispute settlement mechanism into a legal
proceeding.108 The views of publicists, however qualified, impressed few "old GATT
hands."109
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism has changed a lot on this issue.110 Authors
of the WTO dispute settlement reports, particularly Members of the Appellate Body,
seem to be far more willing than GATT panelists to refer to the teachings and writings of
those highly qualified publicists in justifying their positions. In the Shrimp case, the
Appellate Body, before deciding whether the phrase "exhaustible natural resources" as
defined in Article XX(g) ofGATT 1994 covers both the living and non-living resources,
cited extensively the views of publicists in order to keep in line with the principle of
effectiveness in treaty interpretation.111 In the dispute Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, the Appellate Body used the views of publicists to support its standing that
"object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the
meaning of its provisions". In other words, "the treaty's 'object and purpose' is to be
referred to in determining the meaning of the 'terms of treaty' and not as an independent
basis for interpretation".112
107
: For example, United States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages(adopted on 19 June
1992), GATT BISD, 39th Supplementary(1993), at paras.206, 285(the Panel cited the works of Professor
John H. Jackson and Professor Robert E. Hudec).
108
: This period of history is recounted in two volumes written by Robert E. Hudec: The GATT Legal
System and World Trade Diplomacy, second edition, Salem, New Hampshire: Butterworths(1990);
Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System, Salem, New
Hampshire: Butterworths(1993).
109
: This sceptical attitude toward law is apparent from the very title of a book written by GATT's second
Director-General, Olivier Long: Law and Its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System, Graham
& Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff(1987).
110
: See Michael K. Young: Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats.
The International Lawyer, Vol.29, No.2, 1995, pp.389-409.
111
: For example, Oppenheim's International Law, ninth edition, edited by Jennings and Watts, Longman
Company, Vol. I, pp.1280-1281; M. S. McDougal, H. D. Lasswell and J. Miller: The Interpretation of
International Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure, New
Haven/Martinus Nijhoff(1994), p.184; I. Sinclair: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, second
edition, Manchester University Press(1984), p.l 18; D. Carreau: Droit International, edited by A. Pedone,
1994, para.369; P.Daillier and A. Pellet: Droit International Public, fifth edition, L. G. D. J.(1994),
para. 172; L. A. Podesta Costa and J. M. Ruda: Derecho Internacional Publico, Tipografica Editora
Argentina(1985), pp. 109-110 and M. Diez de Velasco: Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Publico,
eleventh edition, Tecnos(1997), p.169. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, see supra note 77, para. 131 and note 116.
112
: The Appellate Body referred to the following publicists and their writings: D. J. Harris: Cases and
Materials on International Law, fourth edition, Sweet and Maxwell: London(1991), p.770; Jimenez de
Arechaga: International Law in the Past Third ofa Century, Recueil des Cours, Vol.159, 1978-1, p.l at 44;
I. Sinclair, id, p.130. Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, see supra note 50, p.12 and note 20.
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This development convincingly reflects a recognition of the increasing importance of
law to the international trading system, which is made clear by the very establishment of
the WTO Appellate Body. The Appellate Body, although confined to considering issues
of law and legal interpretations of panel reports, necessarily brings a legal perspective to
the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Panels, advised by lawyers(as was not the case
for the first few decades of the GATT history), will increasingly deal with complex issues
of law, such as standing, adequacy of notice and admissibility of evidence.113 All these
will surely contribute to the development ofWTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Although a WTO panel has jurisdiction only over claims concerning the breach of
those "covered agreements", it should be recalled that some WTO agreements have
explicitly confirmed and incorporated a few other pre-existing non-WTO agreements.
These non-WTO agreements have thereby become another source of WTO law which
can be judicially enforced by a panel.
4.2.6. Other international agreements
The texts of several WTO agreements have explicitly referred to other international
agreements, which may therefore serve as direct sources of law in the WTO dispute
settlement proceedings. The specific references are included in Articlel(3) of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property i?i'g7?te(TRIPS);114 Article
3(4) of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures;115
Annex 3 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade:116 Article 2(4) of the
117
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; and Annex I(k) of the Agreement on Subsidiary
and CountervailingMeasures',118
One question which may arise is whether the rights and obligations brought into the
WTO law framework by these other agreements are only those that were in effect at the
time the WTO agreements became effective, or whether the WTO rights and obligations
113: See supra note 60, p.408.
114
: Which states: "Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the nationals of
other Members. In respect of the relevant intellectual property right, the nationals of other Members shall
be understood as those natural or legal persons that would meet the criteria for eligibility for protection
provided for in the Paris Convention( 1967), the Berne Convention( 1971), the Rome Convention and the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, were all Members of the WTO members
of those Conventions. .."(Original notes omitted)(Emphasis added). See supra note 45.
115
: Which states: "Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the relevant
international organisations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular the Codex Alimentarius Commission,
the International Office of Epizootics, and the international and regional organisations operating within the
framework of the International Plant Protection Convention, to promote within these organisations the
development and periodic review of standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures."(Emphasis added). See supra note 45.
116
: Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, which is
administered by ISO/IEC Information Centre in Geneva.
117
: Which states: "User Members shall ensure that quantity and quality inspections are performed in
accordance with the standards defined by the seller and buyer in the purchase agreement and that, in the
absence of such standards, relevant international standards apply.(Original note omitted). See supra note
45.
118
: Which provides, somewhat indirectly, that the grant by governments of export credits in conformity
with the provisions of the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) shall not be considered an export
subsidy. See supra note 45. See also "OECD Arrangement," OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(92)95(1992).
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will change as these agreements change. This, perhaps, is a lacuna in the WTO law.
Footnote 2 to the TRIPS states that references to the intellectual property conventions are
meant to the specific versions of those conventions.119 Presumably, therefore, any rights
and obligations negotiated later by WTO Members in those other international
agreements, before going through the WTO amendment proceedings, will not affect the
current rights and obligations ofWTO Members and thus should not become the sources
ofWTO law.
To summarise the previous discussion: the World Trade Organisation is the product
of an international agreement. The WTO Agreement and its annexed agreements
constitute the basic source of WTO law. The reports of panels and the Appellate Body,
however, are of increasing importance to the source of WTO law. Most WTO disputes
will be resolved primarily, if not solely, with references to the "covered agreements" and
to prior reports and, in this sense, the WTO legal system may be thought of as largely
self-contained. However, it is not entirely self-contained. On the contrary, it is an
important part of the larger system of public international law, as reflected not only by
the general body of its own agreements that are binding on all WTO Members, but also
by its increasing recourse to the other traditional sources of public international law:
customary rules of interpretation of international law, general principles of law, the
teachings of publicists, and other international agreements, particularly those
incorporated by reference into the WTO agreements. Therefore, the sources of WTO law
will change with the development ofpublic international law.
Section Three The Role ofWTO Law in the Development of International Law
4,3,1. WTO law is not a closed system
With one possible exception, no academic author(or any WTO decision or document)
disputes that WTO law is part of the wider corpus of public international law.120 Like
international criminal law or human rights law, WTO law is just a branch of public
international law. In the Gasoline case, the Appellate Body noted that "the general rule of
interpretation" set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of
119
: Footnote 2 states: "In this Agreement, 'Paris Convention' refers to the Paris Convention for the
Protection ofIndustrial Property: 'Paris Convention! 1967)' refers to the Stockholm Act of this Convention
of 14 July 1967. 'Berne Convention' refers to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literaiy and
Artistic Works: 'Berne Convention! 1971)' refers to the Paris Act of this Convention of24 July 1971. 'Rome
Convention' refers to the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, adopted at Rome on 26 October 1961. 'Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits(IPIC Treaty) refers to the Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect ofIntegrated Circuits, adopted at Washington on 26 May 1989... "(Emphasis added).
See supra note 45.
120
: See generally John H. Jackson: The World Trading System, The MIT Press(1989); Donald M. McRae:
The WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier? Journal of International Economic
Law, No.3, 2000; Donald M. McRae: The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of
International Law, Recueil des Cours, Vol.260, 1996; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: Dispute Settlement in
International Economic Law—Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute in Non-Economic Areas,
Journal of International Economic Law, No.2, 1999. For earlier sources confirming that the GATT was no
more than a specialised branch of public international law, see Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern: International
Economic Law, 1989; George Schwarzenberger: The Principles and Standards of International Economic
Law, Recueil des Cours, Vol.87, 1955. The possible exception is Judith Hippler Bello: The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.90, 1996.
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Treaties has been relied upon by all contesting parties and third parties in the WTO
dispute settlement procedures, although not always in relation to the same issue. That
general rule of interpretation has attained the status of a rule of customary or general
international law . As such, it forms part of the "customary rules of interpretation of
public international law" which the Appellate Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of
the DSU, to apply in seeking to clarify the provisions of the WTO agreements.121
Furthermore, in doing so, the Appellate Body acknowledged that the WTO is not a
hermetically closed regime,122 impermeable to the other rules of international law. In
other words, the Appellate Body has "connected" the GATT/WTO sub-system of law to
the rest of international legal order and imposed on panels and WTO Members the
obligation to interpret the WTO agreements as any other international treaty, thereby
putting an end to what Kuyper has termed "GATT Panels' ignorance"123 of the basic rules
of treaty interpretation.
A number of factors support the conclusion that WTO law is not a closed system.
Firstly, the dimension regulated by WTO law has been expanded, compared with that
regulated by GATT 1947. The existence of environmental, health, social, security and
other exceptions to WTO obligations links WTO law with other systems of law and
policy. The fact that these exceptions such as Article XX of GATT 1994 fail to provide
WTO Members, panels and the Appellate Body adequate criteria forjudging those subtle
issues does not permit them to avoid their responsibility to adjudicate upon these
issues.124 As recognised by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case: "Pending any specific
recommendations by the CTE(Committee on Trade and Environment) to WTO Members
on the issues raised in its terms of reference, and in the absence up to now of any agreed
amendments or modifications to the substantive provisions of GATT 1994 and the WTO
Agreement generally, we must fulfil our responsibility in this specific case, which is to
interpret the existing language of the chapeau of Article XX by examining its ordinary
meaning, in light of its context and object and purpose in order to determine whether the
United States measure at issue qualifies for justification under Article XX."125 (Emphasis
added). Obliged to adjudicate disputes arising from WTO Members, even when involving
the interpretation of the most obscure provisions of the WTO agreements, and to do so in
an "objective manner",126 panels and the Appellate Body have no alternative other than to
121
: See supra note 88, p.l7.(Original note omitted).
122
: The original words in the Appellate Body Report are "the General Agreement is not to be read in
clinical isolation from public international law". Id, p. 17.
123: P. J. Kuyper: The Law ofthe GATTAs a Special Field ofInternational Law, N.Y.I.L.(1994), p.227.
124
: See J. Bourgeois: WTO Dispute Settlement in the Field ofAnti-Dumping Law, Journal of International
Economic Law, 1998, No.l, p.259. As noted by Jacques Bourgeois, a distinction here must be made
between concepts that were left vague by WTO negotiators and those that were left unregulated. Only the
latter would permit a panel or the Appellate Body to refuse jurisdiction on the basis of a non-liquet(i.e.
issue not accessible to legal adjudication due to the absence of law on the matter or for other reasons such
as political impediment). The existence of Article XX, and exceptions elsewhere in the WTO agreements,
implies that panels and the Appellate Body are charged with a duty to balance international trade and
national interests, even in the presence of significant uncertainty about how the relevant WTO provisions
apply. Id, p.271.
125
: See supra note 77, para. 155.
126: Article 11 of the DSU requires that "a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before
it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with
the relevant covered agreements..." See supra note 45.
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look for information that will lead them to the reasonable and objective meaning of the
terms of the treaty that they must ultimately interpret, apply and enforce. The scarcity of
information within the WTO agreements, such as when dealing with environment issues,
necessarily obliges the honest and objective interpreter to take into account any relevant
information, even outside the WTO agreements themselves.
Secondly, as noted already, Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
requires that the WTO agreements should be interpreted with the customary rules of
interpretation, and as the Appellate Body stated in the Gasoline case that these
agreements must not be interpreted "in clinical isolation from public international law",
the reference to the massive body of rules existing in public international law cannot be
denied. In the dispute European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas^hereinafter as Bananas), the Panel stated that the Lome
Waiver127 should be interpreted so as to waive not only compliance with the obligations
of Article 1:1, but also compliance with the obligations of Article XIII of GATT 1994.
The Appellate Body, despite the fact that it recognised the Lome Waiver as part of
GATT/WTO law, considered that the Panel's conclusion was difficult to reconcile with
the limited GATT practice in the interpretation of waivers,128 the strict disciplines to
which waivers are subjected under the WTO Agreement,129 the history of the negotiations
of this particular waiver130 and the limited GATT practice relating to granting waivers
from the obligations of Article XIII of GATT 1994,131 then, concluded that "the Panel
erred in finding that 'the Lome Waiver waives the inconsistency with Article XIII: 1 to
the extent necessary to permit the EC to allocate shares of its bananas tariff quota to
127
: The relevant paragraph of the Lome Waiver reads as the following: "Subject to the terms and
conditions set out hereunder, the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement shall be
waived, until 29 February 2000, to the extent necessary to permit the European Communities to provide
preferential treaty for products originated in ACP(African, Caribbean and Pacific) States as required by the
relevant provisions of the Fourth Lome Convention". See The Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome,
Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 9 December 1994, L/7604, 19 December 1994.
128
: There is little previous GATT practice on the interpretation of waivers. In the Panel report of the
dispute United States—Sugar Waiver, the Panel stated: "The Panel took into account in its examination that
waivers are granted according to Article XXV:5(of GATT 1947) in 'exceptional circumstances', that they
waive obligations under the basic rules of the General Agreement and that their terms and conditions
consequently have to be interpreted narrowly". Adopted on 7 November 1990. BISD 37S/228, para.5.9.
129
: Although the WTO Agreement does not provide any specific rules on the interpretation of waivers,
Article IX of the WTO Agreement and the Understanding in Respect ofWaivers of Obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, which provide requirements for granting and renewing
waivers, stress the exceptional nature of waivers and subject waivers to strict disciplines. Thus, waivers
should be interpreted with great care. See supra note 45.
lj0
: With regard to the history of the negotiations of the Lome Waiver, we note that the GATT
CONTRACTING PARTIES limited the scope of the waiver by replacing "preferential treatment foreseen
by the Lome Convention" with "preferential treatment required by the Lome Convention". This change
clearly suggests that the CONTRACTING PARTIES wanted to restrict the scope of the Lome
Waiver.(Emphasis added).
131
: From 1948 to 1994, the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES granted only one waiver from Article XIII
of GATT 1947. This is Waiver Granted in Connection with the European Coal and Steel Community.
Decision of 10 November 1952, BISD IS/17, para.3. In view of the truly exceptional nature of waivers
from the non-discrimination obligations under Article XIII, it is all the more difficult to accept the
proposition that a waiver which does not explicitly refer to Article XIII would nevertheless waive the
obligations of that Article. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES had intended to waive the obligations of the
European Communities under Article XIII in the Lome Waiver, they would have said so explicitly.
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specific traditional ACP banana supplying countries in an amount not exceeding their
pre-1991 best-ever exports to the EC 132
Thirdly, it can be argued that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, in terms of the WTO dispute settlement, requires any interpreting body, such as
panels and the Appellate Body, to use or to take into account outside legal materials when
interpreting those WTO obligations. In the Hormones case, the European Communities
considered that the Panel, in seeking information from experts individually rather than
from an expert group, violated Article 11(2) of the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures(SPS Agreement)133 and Article 13(2) of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding,134 The Appellate Body did not accept this claim of the
European Communities and stated that "in disputes involving scientific or technical
issues, neither Article 11(2) of the SPS Agreement nor Article 13 of the DSU prevents
panels from consulting individual experts. Rather, both the SPS Agreement and the DSU
leave to the sound discretion of a panel the determination ofwhether the establishment of
an expert review group is necessary or appropriate."135 It should be noted that some of the
WTO agreements are very technical, therefore, recourse may be had to supplementary
means of interpretation when the provisions of these agreements "leave the meaning
ambiguous or obscure".
Fourthly, the WTO Agreement Preamble commits WTO Members to the "optimal use
of the world's resources in accordance with the objectives of sustainable development".
The objective of sustainable development can only be understood in light of
contemporary law and policy that defines and supports this goal. In this context, it may
be worth noting the Marrakesh Decision on Trade and Environment136 in which the
WTO Members has taken note of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
137 138
Development, Agenda 21, and "its follow-up in GATT, as reflected in the statement
of the Chairman of the Council of Representatives to the CONTRACTING PARTIES at
lj2
: European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, Report of the
Appellate Body(distributed on 9 September 1997), WT/DS27/AB/R, para.188.
133
: Which states: "In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical issue, a panel should
seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute. To this end, the
panel may, when it deems it appropriate, establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult the
relevant international organisation, at the request of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative."
(Emphasis added). See supra note 45.
134
: Which states: "Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to
obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific
or other technical matter raised by a party to the dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing
from expert review group.. ."(Emphasis added). See supra note 45.
135: See supra note 100, para. 147.
136: See supra note 45.
137: Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states: "The right to development
must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations." Principle 4 states: "In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.
UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.l, 13 June 1992, 31 International Legal Materials 874.
138
: Agenda 21 is replete with references to the shared view that economic development and the
preservation and protection of natural resources should be mutually supportive. Adopted by the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.l,
1992.
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their 48th Session in 1992..."139 Although all these international declarations and policy
statements contained in the Marrakesh Decision are not legally binding, they have
provided a widely-accepted parameter for the concept of sustainable development.
Finally, if interpreted and developed in isolation from the rest of international law,
WTO law would risk "conflicts" with other international law rules, contrary to the
general international law presumption against conflicts and for effective interpretation of
treaties. More importantly, ifWTO law cannot update itselfwith the social development,
it will obstruct international trade, and eventually, fall into being disregarded and
discarded by the WTO Members. In the Hormones case, before deciding whether the
SPS(sanitary and phytosanitary) measures maintained by the European Communities are
based on a risk assessment required by Article 5(1) of the SPS Agreement,140 the
Appellate Body needed, first of all, to consider what factors were included in carrying out
a risk assessment. The Panel intended to exclude all the matters "not susceptible of
quantitative analysis by the empirical or experimental laboratory methods commonly
associated with the physical sciences".141 The Appellate Body, however, disagreed and
stated: "There is nothing to indicate that the listing of factors that may be taken into
account in a risk assessment ofArticle 5(2)(of the SPS Agreement)142 was intended to be
a closed list."143 This approach sounds persuasive, as the risk that is to be evaluated in a
risk assessment under Article 5(1) of the SPS Agreement is not only the risk ascertainable
in a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also the risk in
human societies as they actually exist. In other words, all the actual and potential factors
leading to adverse effects on human health should be considered if we need to make a
risk assessment.
To state that WTO law is part of international law is one thing. Nevertheless, it is
quite another thing to admit that there is nothing special in WTO law. In many respects,
WTO law is lex specialis as opposed to the general rules of international law. But
contracting out of some rules of general international law does not necessarily mean that
one has contracted out of all of them, nor a fortiori that WTO law is created completely
outside the system of international law. Thus, with the development of general
international law, WTO law itself also needs development.
4.3.2. WTO law needs development
Compared with its predecessor the GATT, the World Trade Organisation, through the
successful settlement of the Gasoline dispute and the Shrimp dispute, has taken a giant
step forward on the subtle issue trade and environment. Under the GATT's jurisdiction, a
139: Preamble of the Decision on Trade and Environment. See supra note 45.
140
: Article 5(1) of the SPS Agreement provides: "Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary
measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, ofthe risks to human, animal or
plant life or death, taking into account risks assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organisations."(Emphasis added). See supra note 45.
141
: US Panel Report, WT/DS26/R/USA, para.8.107; Canada Panel Report, WT/DS48/R/CAN, para.8.110.
142
: Which states: "In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific
evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods;
prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and
environmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment."(Note added). See supra note 45.
143
: See supra note 102, para. 187.
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number of cases, including Salmon-Herring,144 Thai Cigarettes145 and Tuna-Dolphin,146
were referred to GATT Article XX exceptions. However, the GATT panels generally
adopted fairly conservative interpretations of the Article XX exceptions. They were
reluctant to use external sources of law, including other treaties and general principles of
international law, to assist in the interpretation ofGATT provisions.
The creation of the World Trade Organisation has brought with it a change in our
approach to the trade and environment matters. A number of factors may be invoked to
account for this change. Firstly, the drafters of the WTO agreements have replaced the
reference of full use of the world's resources" in the GATT Preamble with a new
undertaking of "optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development" in the WTO Agreement Preamble. Secondly, the Uruguay
Round negotiators decided to expand the dimension of the multilateral trade system to
such new areas like intellectual property rights and services, and to add new disciplines
over national laws in a number of areas including health and technical regulations. This,
in turn, has increased the need for a careful balance to be struck between WTO
disciplines and other national laws and policies. Thirdly, the Uruguay Round negotiations
occurred alongside the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development(UNCED), which reflected a growing international concern over the
increasing and unsustainable impacts of human society on the Earth's ecosystems and the
144
: Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon(adopted on 22 March
1988), GATT BISD 35th Supplement 1989), p.98(hereinafter as "Salmon-Herring"). In Salmon-Herring,
the Panel upheld the United States' claim that Canada's ban on unprocessed herring and salmon exports
violated the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in Article XI: 1 of GATT 1947 and rejected Canada's
argument that, as part of a fisheries management programme, its export ban was permissible under GATT
Article XX(General Exceptions).
145
: Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and International Taxes on C7grzre#es(adopted on 7
November 1990), GATT BISD, 37th Supplement 1991), pp.200-228(hereinafter as "Thai Cigarettes"). In
Thai Cigarettes, the Panel upheld a challenge by the United States to Thailand's restrictions on the import
of cigarettes under Article XI: 1 of GATT 1947. It also determined that Thailand's excise, business and
municipal taxes on cigarettes were inconsistent with the national treatment obligations under Article III: 1
and Article 111:2 and that the trade restrictions could not be justified under Article XX(b) of GATT 1947 as
a measure "necessary to protect human ...life or health". The Panel noted that the requirement of
"necessity" would only be met if "there was no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement,
or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health
policy objectives". Id, at para.75. The Panel went on to note that "A non-discriminatory regulation
implemented on a national basis in accordance with Article III:4(of GATT 1947) requiring complete
disclosure of ingredients, coupled with a ban on unhealthy substances, would be an alternative consistent
with the General Agreement. The Panel considered that Thailand could reasonably be expected to take such
measures to address the quality-related policy objective it now pursues through an import ban on all
cigarettes whatever their ingredients." Id, atpara.77.
146
: United States—Restrictions on Imports of 7h^/(distributed on 3 September 1991, but not adopted),
BISD 39S/155(hereinafter as "Tuna I"); United States—Restrictions on Imports of 7i///a(distributed on 10
June 1994, but not adopted), DS29/R(hereinafter as "Tuna II"). The unadopted panel decisions in Tuna I
and Tuna II addressed the vexed process and production method(PPM) issue when the panels examined the
United States' ban on tuna imports caught by methods that endangered dolphins. In Tuna I, the Panel
determined that because the GATT is concerned with trade in products, any regulatory distinction not
reflected in the physical characteristics ofproducts(for example, a distinction based on the manner in which
tuna was caught) was incompatible with Article III ofGATT 1947. It stated: Article III:4(of GATT 1947)
calls for a comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as a product with that of domestic tuna as a
product. Regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the taking of tuna could not possibly
affect tuna as a product..." Tuna I, at para.5.15. Tuna II, at para.5.27.
121
growing inequality in the patterns of development. Finally, the Appellate Body, after
receiving the comprehensive acceptance from the WTO Members for its initial work, has
acquired enormous power in clarifying WTO law and, eventually, in developing WTO
law.
In the appellate review of the Gasoline dispute, the Appellate Body upheld the
Panel's decision that the US measures, i.e. the baseline establishment rules, ultimately
failed to qualify for the protective application of GATT Article XX, but used a different
legal reasoning. Whereas the Panel found that the US measures were not justified under
GATT Article XX(b),147 (d)148 or (g),149 the Appellate Body allowed the measure under
Article XX(g) and went on to examine the consistency of the measure with the Article
XX chapeau.150 According to some scholars,151 this is the first thorough examination of
the Article XX chapeau in the 50-year GATT/WTO dispute settlement history. The
Appellate Body concluded that the US measure did not satisfy the chapeau requirements,
in that it was applied in a discriminatory and abusive manner, and constituted a disguised
restriction on trade.152 By examining the chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate Body
noted the need to balance the market-access commitments embodied in the substantive
GATT provisions against the right of WTO Members to invoke the Article XX
exceptions.
After the Gasoline case, the next WTO trade dispute concerning GATT Article XX is
the Shrimp case. This dispute arose from a challenge by some developing countries to a
US import ban on shrimp products from countries without certain national policies to
protect endangered sea turtles from drowning in shrimp trawling nets. On this occasion,
the Appellate Body considered that the US measure was based on a policy covered by
GATT Article XX(g), but then determined that the law was inconsistent with the
language of the Article XX chapeau on the basis that it was applied in a manner that led
147: "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health".
148
: "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade
marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices".
149
: "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption".
150: The chapeau functions de facto as the precondition for the following exceptions, which states: "Subject
to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same condition prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party ofmeasures..." See supra note 45.
131
: For example, Gabrielle Marceau: A Call for Coherence in International Law, Journal of World Trade,
Vol. 33, No.5, 1999, p.96.
132
: The Appellate Body gives its legal reasoning for examining the chapeau of Article XX as the
following: "The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or its specific
contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied. It is, accordingly, important to
underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory clause of Article XX is generally the prevention
of 'abuse of the exceptions' of(what was later to become) Article (XX). This insight drawn from the
drafting history of Article XX is a valuable one. The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the
exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as to
frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive mles of the General
Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within
-the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties of the party
claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties concerned." See supra note 88, p.22.
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to an arbitrary and unjustifiable trade discrimination.153 The legal reasoning of the
Appellate Body to support this conclusion marks the most complete discussion of GATT
Article XX so far, and therefore deserves careful consideration. Moreover, it made
extensive reference to other sources of international law when interpreting GATT
1994,154 thereby reinforcing its conclusion in the Gasoline case that the WTO Agreement
must not be interpreted in clinical isolation from public international law.
From the trade and environment perspective, regardless of whether the Appellate
Body's approaches in the aforementioned cases are welcomed by the WTO Members, it
is now open to the membership to define which measures are permitted as valid
environmental actions, and which actions should be prohibited as disguised protectionism
pursuant to GATT Article XX. The Appellate Body in the Shrimp dispute noted that the
standards of the chapeau projected both procedural and substantive requirements.155
However, as a practical matter, the Appellate Body has provided national governments of
WTO Members with little guidance about what is required before a measure is invoked
under GATT Article XX. What kinds of production and process methods(PPMs) are
permitted under GATT Article XX? To what extent, for example, must the WTO
Members engage in multilateral discussions, provide financial and technical assistance or
exhaust other options before implementing trade sanctions? What kinds of special efforts
must be made to the rights of developing countries? What other disciplines should be
placed on unilateral action to ensure that powerful countries do not use it as a way of
transferring the cost of environmental protection to the weaker members of the
international community ofnations?156
It has become clear that WTO law will continue to develop with enrolling more new
Members and covering more affairs. WTO law, like general international law, does not
reflect a once-and-for-all expression of consent. As one scholar noted: "It would be
absurd and inconsistent with the genuine will of States to 'freeze' such rules into the
mould of the time to, say, April 15, 1994".157 Therefore, to keep WTO law workable, we
153: The Appellate Body stated in its report: "It may be quite acceptable for a government, in adopting and
implementing a domestic policy, to adopt a single standard applicable to all its citizens throughout that
country. However, it is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to use an
economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory
programme, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member's territory, without taking
into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of those other Members. See
supra note 77, para. 164.
154
: The Appellate Body examined the use of the term "natural resources" in a number of international
conventions, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 6ea(Done at Montego Bay,
10 December 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122; 21 International Legal Materials 1261, original footnote
110), the Convention on Biological Diversity^Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, UNEP/Bio.Div/N7-
INC5/4; 31 International Legal Materials 818, original footnote 111), the Resolution on Assistance to
Developing Countries adopted in conjunction with the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species ofWildAnimals(Done at Bonn, 29 August 1979, 19 International Legal Materialssl 1, p.15, original
footnote 113), and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna(Done at Washington, 3 March 1973, 993 U. N. T. S. 243, 12 International Legal Materials 1085
original footnote 117). See supra note 77, paras. 130-132.
155: See supra note 77, para. 160.
156
: See supra note 149, p. 105.
157
: Joost Pauwelyn, see supra note 94, p.546.(Original note omitted). As the author explained m original
note 32, the term "State", in the context ofWTO agreements, should include separate customs territories.
See also Article XII: 1 of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 45.
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may borrow the Appellate Body's concept of a "line of equilibrium"158 as it reinforces the
need for a careful balance to be struck between WTO obligations and the right ofWTO
Members to pursue their own policies. However, defining the "line of equilibrium" is no
easy task. The challenge for future WTO law will be to establish this balance in a way
that promotes multilateral co-operation, predictability and the rule of law, and that
ensures the coherence of international trade and national policies.
To refer to other international agreements in the situations where WTO agreements
are not clear or even silent is just one way to develop WTO law; while to refer to the
decisions of other international tribunals is another meaningful way in which the WTO
dispute settlement bodies may deduce some relevant conclusions, although these
decisions have no legally binding effect on WTO dispute settlement. This practice is also
in line with the situations set forth in Article 38(l)(d) of the ICJ Statute.
4.3.3. The relevance of the decisions made by other international tribunals
Before discussing the relevance of the decisions made by other international tribunals
to the WTO dispute settlement, we first need to clarify one important issue, i.e., the
relationship of WTO law with those other legal sources including the decisions of other
international tribunals. Since the WTO covered agreements have established rules which
are expressly recognised by the contesting parties, it is only natural when a dispute arises
to apply the rights and obligations from these agreements binding on both parties to the
dispute.159 However, this rule of priority does not exclude the considerations of other
legal sources. In practice, the ICJ judges tend to make an extensive reference to other
sources of law in their decisions. The situation in the WTO is different from that of the
ICJ. There are no clear provisions in WTO law like Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.
Therefore, it is generally perceived that there are no legal obligations for the WTO
panelists and Appellate Body members to apply legal sources outside WTO law. The
"covered agreements" have laid the core foundations for the WTO dispute settlement
system. All the interpretations of law should begin from here. It is only through the
decisions of panels and the Appellate Body that decisions of other tribunals and
publicists' teachings are taken into account "as subsidiary means for the determination of
158
: In the Shrimp case, the Appellate Body noted that "The task of interpreting and applying the
chapeaufof GATT Article XX) is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of
equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the
other Members under varying substantive provisionsfe.g. Article XI) of GATT 1994, so that neither of the
competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The location of the line of
equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the
shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ."(Emphasis as original).
See supra note 77, para. 159.
139: Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement states thatWTO covered agreements are "binding on all Members".
Article 7(1) of the DSU provides that the terms of reference of a WTO panel(unless the parties to the
dispute agree otherwise) is "to examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered
agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in
document...and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving
the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s)." Article 17(6) of the DSU limits an appeal in the
appellate review to the "issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the
panel." See supra note 45. Therefore, the main task of the WTO dispute settlement bodies is to clarify the
rights and obligations of the parties to a dispute through the provisions of the covered agreements.
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rules of law . Therefore, the proper interpretation of the WTO agreements for a panel
or the Appellate Body is, "first ofall, a textual interpretation".161
Despite the fact that the covered agreements" have constituted the basic framework
of WTO law, it is still possible that there might be some lacunae in the resolutions of
some specific disputes, or some particular aspects of a dispute. Furthermore, it should be
recalled that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism does not contain a remanding
system, nor does it permit the disputed party to raise its counter-complaint in the same
dispute settlement proceeding. 63 In other words, a WTO panel or the Appellate Body has
to make its recommendations and rulings on any dispute if it is raised. Under these
circumstances, recourse to the sources outside the WTO agreements has to be possible.
As the previous section has expounded the other outside sources, the evaluation in this
part is focused on the decisions made by other international tribunals. There are no clear
references in the WTO agreements as to which international tribunals might be
considered of their decisions. The practice of the WTO panels and the Appellate Body,
however, has shown that the decisions made by the International Court of Justice(ICJ)
and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice(PCIJ), are of most
frequent references.
In the first appellate review of the WTO dispute settlement history, the Gasoline
appeal, the Appellate Body adopted the "general mle of interpretation" of the Vienna
Convention on the Law ofTreaties, which has been reinforced by the ICJ in several of its
decisions,164 and stated that "interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms
of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility."165 In the dispute
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body, following the mandate
applied in its appellate review of the Gasoline case, repeated that the interpretation of
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "must be based above all
upon the text of the treaty".166 The provisions of the treaty are "to be given their ordinary
160
: Article 38(l)(d) of the ICJ Statute. See Basic Documents in International Law, supra note 15.
161
: Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, see supra note 50, p. 18.
(Emphasis added).
162
: See David Palmeter: The WTO Appellate Body Needs Remand Authority, Journal of World Trade,
Vol.32, No.l, 1998.
163
: Article 3(10) of the DSU partly states: "It is also understood that complaints and counter-complaints in
regard to distinct matters should not be linked". See supra note 45.
164
: The ICJ decisions which the Appellate Body referred to include: Corfu Channel Case(1949), I.C.J.
Reports, p.24; Territory Dispute Cnse(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad)(1994), I.C.J. Reports, p.23. See
supra note 88, p.22, original note 45. In original note 34, the Appellate Body referred to two relevant
decisions made by other tribunals: Golder v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR,
Series A(1995); Restrictions to the Death Penalty Cases(l9M), Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
International Law Reports, No.70, p.449. See supra note 88, p. 17.
165
: See supra note 88, p.22. This rule has been followed by the Appellate Body in its later rulings
including the one in the dispute Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, see supra note 50, p.10.
166
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, see supra note 50, p. 12, original
note 18. Besides Territory Dispute Case(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad)(1994), Judgement, I.C.J.
Reports, p.6 at 20, the Appellate Body also referred to the dispute Maritime Delimitation and Territory
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgement, (1995) I.C.J. Reports,
p.6 at 18.
164
: The Appellate Body here referred to the dispute Competence of the General Assembly for the
Admission of a State to the United Nations(Second Admission Case)( 1950), I.C.J. Reports, p.4 at 8, in
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meaning in their context".167 The object and purpose of the treaty are also "to be taken
into account in determining the meaning of its provisions".168 In the words of the
Appellate Body, "A fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general
rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness".169
In the Bananas case, the European Communities argued that the Panel infringed
Article 3(2) of the DSU170 by finding that the United States had a right to advance its
claims under GATT 1994. The European Communities asserted that, "as a general
principle, in any system of law, including international law, a claimant must normally
have a legal right or interest in the claim it is pursuing".170 Furthermore, the European
Communities used the ICJ and PCIJ judgements to support its argument that the concept
of actio popularis "is not known to international law as it stands at present".172 The
Appellate Body did not agree on this point, and stated: "We do not read any of those
judgements as establishing a general rule that in all international litigation, a complaining
party must have a 'legal interest' in order to bring a case. Nor do these judgements deny
the need to consider the question of standing under the dispute settlement provisions of
any multilateral treaty, by referring to the terms of that treaty." In the view of the
Appellate Body, the United States "has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a
case against another Member under the DSU."173 Since the United States is a producer of
bananas, the potential export interest by the United States cannot be excluded. The
internal market of the United States for bananas could be affected by the EC banana
regime, in particular, by the effects of that regime on world suppliers and world prices of
which the International Court of Justice stated: "The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty
of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give
effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning and in the context in which they occur".(Quotation
original).
167 See supra note 50, p. 12, original note 19.
168
: That is to say, the treaty's "object and purpose" is to be referred to in determining the meaning of the
"terms of the treaty" and not as an independent basis for interpretation. Here, the Appellate Body referred
to Competence of the ILO to Regulate the Personal Work of the Employer{\926), P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 13,
p.6 at 18; International Status ofSouth West Africa (T962), I.C.J. Reports, p.128 at 336. See supra note 50,
p. 12, original note 20.
169: Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, see supra note 50, p.12. See also
the similar words in the Yearbook of International Law Commission^ 1966), Vol. II, p.219: "When a treaty
is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate
effects, good faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should
be adopted."
170
: Which states: "The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognise that it serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law..." See
supra note 45.
170: See supra note 130, para. 15.
172
: The EC appellant's submission in paras.9-10 referred to the ICJ and PCIJ Judgements in: the South
West Africa CrwesfSecond Phase), I.C.J. Reports 1966, p.4; the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company Limited(Second Phase), I.C.J. Reports 1970, p.4; the Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions Case, P.C.I.J.(1925) Series A, No.2, p.l; the S. S. "Wimbledon" Case, P.C.I.J.(1923) Series A,
No.l, p.l; and the Case Concerning the Northern Cameroon, I.C.J. Reports) 1963), p.4. The complaining
parties' appellee's submission, in para.364, also refers to the ICJ Judgement in the South West Africa
Cases. See supra note 132, pp.64-65, original note 66.
173
: See supra note 130, para. 133.
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bananas. Having taken into account all these considerations, the Appellate Body decided
that the United States has its standing in the Bananas case.
The Bananas case, to a certain extent, reflects the attitude of the Appellate Body
towards the decisions made by other international tribunals, particularly those made by
the ICJ and the PCIJ. The Appellate Body pays deference to these decisions, but it does
not mean that it is necessarily bound by them, particularly when the Appellate Body is
still able to find some reasoning from the WTO agreements. After rejecting the EC's
arguments, the Appellate Body succeeded in drawing the legal reasoning from the
chapeau of Article XXIII: 1 of GATT 1994173 and Article 3(7) of the DSU175 to uphold
the Panel's conclusion that the United States had a legal right to advance its claims in this
_ 176
case.
Despite the fact that the WTO panels and the Appellate Body have much freedom in
their selections of the decisions made by other tribunals, the ICJ is still the most
authoritative judicial body at the contemporary international level. Established according
to Article 92 of the UN Charter,177 the ICJ makes its decisions which may involve not
only Members of the United Nations,178 but also the non-Members of the United
Nations.179 In contrast, the World Trade Organisation is only a technical organisation180
which mainly deals with the trade affairs among its Members.181 The WTO dispute
settlement mechanism is only relevant to the Members.182 Therefore, with its
authoritative decisions and the coverage of affairs, the International Court of Justice will
continue to influence other international tribunals including WTO panels and the
173
: Which states: "If any Member should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
Agreement is being impeded..." See supra note 45.
175
: Which states: "Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action
under these procedures would be fruitful..." See supra note 45.
176
: The Appellate Body concluded in its report as the following: "Taken together, these reasons are
sufficient justification for the United States to have brought its claims against the EC banana import
regime under GATT 1994. This does not mean, though, that one or more of the factors we have noted in
this case would necessarily be dispositive in another case." The last sentence reflected the prudence of the
Appellate Body in its deliberations on this subtle issue. See supra note 132, para.138.
177
: Which states: "The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. .." See Basic Documents in International Law, supra note 15.
178
: Id, Article 93(1) states: "All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice."
179
: Id, Article 93(2) states: "A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."
180
: The legal status of the WTO has been defined in Article VIII:4 of the WTO Agreement, which states:
"The privileges and immunities to be accorded by a Member to the WTO, its officials, and the
representatives of its Members shall be similar to the privileges and immunities stipulated in the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies, approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 21 November 1947." See supra note 45.
181
: Id, Article 11:1 of the WTO Agreement states: "The WTO shall provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement."
182
: Id, Article 3(3) of the DSU states: "The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers
that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by
measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the
maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations ofMembers.
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Appellate Body. Except for the ICJ decisions, the decisions made by other international
tribunals have been, so far, rarely referred to. However, neither the WTO Agreement nor
its annexed agreements excludes such possibilities, hi other words, it is only a matter of
time that future WTO panels and the Appellate Body will use the decisions made by
other international tribunals than the ICJ to support their legal reasoning.
The WTO was not created in a vacuum(it emerged in the context of general
international law and other treaties), nor does its legal existence continue in a vacuum.183
The influence in the inter-relationship of WTO law and general international law is
mutual. On the one hand, international law has played its role in the formation and
development ofWTO law; on the other hand, the emergence ofWTO law has also altered
the general landscape of international law.
4.3.4. The contributions and implications ofWTO law to the development of
international law
The WTO Agreement has laid the basis for a highly complex international treaty
system which consists of some 20 multilateral trade agreements, with supplementary
"Understandings", "Protocols", "Ministerial Decisions", "Declarations" and more than
30,000 pages of "Schedules of Concessions" for trade in goods, and "Specific
Commitments" for trade in services. The legal complexity ofWTO law is increased by its
numerous references to other international agreements and general international law
rules, such as the Charter of the United Nations',184 international financial agreements
1 RS
such as the International Monetary Fund Agreement; international environmental
agreements such as the International Plant Protection Convention;186 international
"standards" promulgated by other "relevant international organisations open for
membership to all (WTO)Members";187 international services agreements on matters
including air transport and telecommunications;188 international agreements on
intellectual property rights,189 and the "customary rules of interpretations of public
international law"(Article 3 [2] of the DSU). The WTO legal system is, thus, to consist of
more "rules of law" than any other international treaty system.190 It also requires each
Member to "ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
183
: See Joost Pauwelyn, supra note 94, p.547.
184
: Article XVI:6 of the WTO Agreement states: "This Agreement shall be registered in accordance with
the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations." See supra note 45.
18:>
: Id, Article 111:5 of the WTO Agreement states: "With a view to achieving greater coherence in global
economic policy-making, the WTO shall co-operate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund
and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies."
186
: See supra note 115.
187
: Paragraph 3 ofAnnex A of the Agreement on the Application ofSanitary and Phytosanitaiy Measures
states: "International standards, guidelines and recommendations (are referred to)...(d)for matters not
covered by the above organisations, appropriate standards, guidelines and recommendations promulgated
by other relevant international organisations open for membership to all Members, as identified by the
Committee(on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures)." See supra note 45.
188
: Id, Annex on Air Transport Services and Annex on Telecommunications to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services.
189: See supra note 114.
190
: Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: How to Promote the International Rule ofLaw? Contributions by the WTO
Appellate Review Systemiincluded in Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation, edited by James
Cameron and Karen Campbell), Cameron May(1998), p.75.
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with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements",191 thereby integrating the
WTO rules into the domestic law ofMembers.
In terms of the contributions of WTO law to the development of international law,
several points can be drawn out from the writings in the previous parts. Firstly, the
decision-making mechanism provides an elaborate matrix of procedures to ensure that the
implementation of WTO rules will be carried on in a more predictable way. In general,
the WTO has followed the GATT practice of "consensus" in making the decisions of the
Ministerial Conference and the General Council. But the term "consensus" was not
defined in the GATT and the word "consensus" was not used. As professor John Jackson
pointed out: The practice of consensus voting developed partly because of the
uneasiness of governments about the loose wording of GATT decision-making powers,
particularly that in GATT Article XXV".192 In the WTO Agreement, however,
"consensus" is defined as the situation when the decision occurs and "no Member,
present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed
decision"(Article IX: 1). It should be noted that consensus is different from unanimity as
the former does not need to take into account the views of those absent. This is a more
efficient way. If consensus is not reached, a fall-back is the majority voting authority.
Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by a
majority of votes cast. Decisions to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement
including those multilateral trade agreements in Annex 1 and decisions to grant a waiver
to a WTO Member shall be taken by three-fourths of the Members.193 Amendments to the
provisions ofWTO agreements shall take effect for the Members that have accepted them
by two-thirds or three-fourths of the Members and thereafter on each other Member upon
acceptance by it.194 What is significant in Article X of the WTO Agreement is that it
authorises the Ministerial Conference to decide by a three-fourths majority of the
Members whether the Member which has not accepted the amendment within a specified
period should withdraw from the WTO or remain as a WTO Member. This gives the
Ministerial Conference extraordinary power to influence the WTO Members although it
seems unlikely that the Ministerial Conference will exercise this power quite often. With
regard to the voting system, Article IX: 1 of the WTO Agreement states: "...At meetings
of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, each Member of the WTO shall
have one vote."195 This is an advantage to many small countries, particularly those small
developing countries, as they can use their combined force to achieve the goals which
their individual power is unable to do so.
191
: See Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 45.
192
: John H. Jackson: The World Trade Organisation Constitution and Jurisprudence, The Royal Institute
of International Affairs(1998), p.46.
193
: A decision to grant a waiver in respect of any obligation subject to a transition period or a period for
staged implementation that the requesting Member has not performed by the end of the relevant period
shall be taken only by consensus. See note 4 of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 45.
194
: Amendments ofArticle IX, X of the WTO Agreement, Articles I and II of GATT 1994, Article 11:1 of
GATS, Article 4 of the Agreement on TRIPS shall take effect only upon acceptance by all Members.
195
: Article IV: 1 of the WTO Agreement states: "...The Ministerial Conference shall have the authority to
take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements... Article IV:2 states: .. .In
the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, its functions shall be conducted by the
General Council..." Decisions by the General Council when convened as the Dispute Settlement Body
shall be taken only in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. See supra note 45.
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The second contribution is the appellate jurisdiction which is contained in the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism. The transposition of the appellate function to the
international arena is a relatively novel development.196 There have been few examples of
international tribunals exercising an appellate jurisdiction over international judicial
bodies,197 and thus there is no guidance in international law on such matters as the scope
of the appellate function, the nature of appellate procedures and the role of appellate
judges. The practice in this field is particularly contributory to the development of
international law. Furthermore, the fact that the Appellate Body has no remand authority
implies that each appealed dispute has to be dealt with carefully. The practice of the
appellate review makes the WTO dispute settlement mechanism quite unique and
significant in the development of international jurisdiction.
Thirdly, the compensation mechanism in the WTO dispute settlement system looks
quite unique, ifwe compare it with that of other international organisations. In view of its
whole structure, the compensation mechanism in the WTO dispute settlement works as a
"cross-retaliation" process, making the compensation available to the suffered party even
from outside the field where its benefits have been impaired or nullified, or where the
attainment of any objective of the "covered agreements" has been impeded. The specific
provisions for compensation are included in Article 22 of the DSU. Although whether or
not this compensation mechanism has really benefited most developing country Members
still awaits some time to see,198 the consequential fact is that this reform has helped WTO
law to become more disciplined and authoritative. One possible effect is that such a
mechanism will scare some potential Members who dare to breach the trade rules. With
no doubt, this will bring significant impact upon the rule-orientation ofWTO law.
The global integration of States requires a more effective "international rule of law".
This can be achieved only by rendering international law more effective and by
interpreting and integrating "the national rule of law" and "the international rule of law"
in a mutually consistent manner. The unified WTO law and the requirement that
Members' national laws, regulations and administrative procedures should be in
conformity with WTO law have served as models for the "legalisation" and
"judicialisation" of international relations for the benefit of all members in an
international organisation. The practice of the Appellate Body, while interpreting WTO
law in the light of general international law principles and with due regard to the
jurisprudence of the ICJ, has enhanced legal security and consistency in the WTO legal
system. Its case law, though still very limited, has already visibly strengthened the
196
: The other example is the North American Free Trade Agreement. See Article 1904.13 and Annex
1904.13.
197
: The International Court of Justice has made a review rather than exercised an appellate function in
respect of certain international administrative tribunals. As professor Elihu Lauterpacht pointed out, in the
example of the UIN Administrative Tribunal, "Initially, there was no appeal from this tribunal, though it
was always possible, if the case aroused sufficient interest, for the General Assembly of the UN(or
comparable organ of the Specialised Agencies) upon their own initiative to request an advisory opinion
from the ICJ as to whether a specific question of jurisdiction or even of substance had been correctly dealt
with by the Tribunal. This course has never been pursued and, if it had been, it would not really have been
an appeal. It could not have been initiated by either the staff member or the UN Secretariat at their sole
options"(Original notes omitted). Elihu Lauterpacht: Aspects of the Administration ofInternational Justice,
Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited(1991), p.106.
198
: Upon the detailed discussion of the compensation mechanism within the WTO dispute settlement
system, see Part Four of Section Three. Chapter Five.
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"international rule of law , for instance by the regular adoption and implementation of its
dispute settlement findings to date, and by inducing other WTO bodies(such as the
Textiles Monitoring Body) and Member governments to apply international law more
strictly. While the emphasis on literal interpretations of the WTO texts in the panel and
Appellate Body reports so far is typical of the early jurisprudence for a new international
tribunal, these developments have shown that WTO law is already an important part of
international law.
WTO law has equally illustrated how important the "international law of
cooperation" has become in the modern world. Its focus on economic welfare is
particularly important to many developing countries. Since the World War Second, the
participants of interstate relations are no longer a small club of Western nations, but a
much larger number of nations representing different civilisations. Correspondingly, a
new dimension has been given to the concern of international relations with matters of
welfare. This is the public concern with international economic development. States,
despite all their differences of political ideology, have acknowledged it as their
indispensable task to enhance the welfare of their people. This change of views
determines the change of structure of international law. As professor Friedmann pointed
out, modern international law moves essentially on three different levels: "(a)The
international law of existence, i.e., the classical system of international law regulating
diplomatic interstate relations, orders the coexistence of States regardless of their social
and economic structure. (b)The universal international law of cooperation, i.e., the body
of legal rules regulating universal concerns, the range of which is constantly extending,
extends from matters of international security to questions of international
communication, health and welfare. (c)Close-knit regional groupings can proceed further
with the common regulation of their affairs because they are linked by a greater degree of
community of interests and values, and usually also of regional proximity, than mankind
at large. They can therefore act as pioneers in the transition from international to
community law."199 These changes have expanded the dimension of international law
both horizontally and vertically, bringing about a reflection of those fundamental issues
such as the allocation of power in this world, about democracy and accountability, and
most important of all, about the objective of international law.
Section Four Fairness, the Objective of International Law
4.4.1. Legitimacy and distributive justice: two components of fairness
The modern analysis on the origins of international law tends to go back to the social
contract theory which was first put forward in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Beginning with Hobbes' The Leviathan,200 social contract theory was progressively
refined by Locke's The Second Treatise of Civil Government,201 Rousseau s Social
199
: Wolfgang Friedmann: The Changing Structure of International Law, London: Stevens & Sons(1964),
p.367.
200
: Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan(l65l), reprinted in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes{edited by
W. Molesworth, 1841). Thomas Hobbes(1588-1679), English political philosopher and thinker.
201
: John Locke: Two Treatises of Government^ 1690)(edited by W. Carpenter, 1955). John Locke(1632-
1704), English philosopher.
131
Contract,202 and Kant's The Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals,203 The social
contract theory advocated that persons are by nature free, equal and autonomous beings,
restrictions on persons' liberty and autonomy can only be the consequence of their
agreement to empower a common authority. This is precisely how Grotius and
succeeding generations of international lawyers have described States in the global
system: free, equal and autonomous. As Locke observed, persons agree to empower a
common authority in order to ensure that common concerns for safety and peace can be
satisfied by their community collective protective measures.204 A State, on the same
reasoning, gives up its sovereignty in certain degree in order to secure its safety and to
promote its prosperity with common protective measures and institute institutional
processes.
The social contract theory only explains the legitimacy205 of international law, that
international law is based on the consent of sovereign States. International law, however,
should be more than legitimate. It should also ensure a distributive justice.206 In a global
community of some 200 sovereign States, the differences reflected in cultures, income,
political inclinations of the residents are larger than those of any individual State. It is
difficult, ifnot impossible, to apply a universal rule which can meet the basic demands of
all States. Thus, international law, more than any individual State's legal system, needs
an element of promotion of voluntary compliance because of the relative paucity of
modes of compulsion. In any community, however, whether national, local, or
international , the sense of community is buttressed by a high level of voluntary rule
compliance. If a rule can enjoy both a legitimacy as a right process and distributive
justice as a desired consequence, it will reinforce the perception of communitas on the
part of community members.
Legitimacy may coincide with distributive justice and thereby create a harmonious
framework for the objective of international law—fairness. Or it may not. The fairness
claim advanced from the perspective of legitimacy may clash with a fairness claim based
on distributive justice. They are two independent variables in the concept of fairness.
202
: Jean-Jacques Rousseau: On the Social Con/raet(1762)(translated and edited by D. Cress, 1983). Jean-
Jacques Rousseau(1712-1778), French social philosopher and writer.
203
: Immanuel Kant: The Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals( 1785)(translated by T. Abbott, 1873),
reprinted in The Essential Kant(edited by A. Zweig, 1970), pp.295-360. Immanuel Kant( 1724-1804),
German philosopher.
204
: Locke describes our natural condition—i.e. our State as free and equal beings—as the State of nature.
It is a State of perfect freedom, whereby we order our actions and dispose of our possessions as we see fit.
It is a State of equality, "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal" and creatures of the same
species are "equal one among another without subordination or subjection." See Locke, supra note 198,
p.l 18. The State of nature is only bound by the laws of nature, which proscribe each person from divesting
another of the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property. Id, p.l 19-120.
203
: For a different approach to this definition, see David Beetham: The Legitimation of Power( 1991).
There is a large and rapidly growing legal literature on legitimacy in the global literature. Recent examples
include: Martti Koskenniemi: From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument(\9%9)\ David Kennedy: International Legal Structures(1987); D. Georgiev: Politics or Rule of
Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law, European Journal of International Law, No.4,
1993.
~os
: For a good discussion of the difficulty encountered in any abstract attempt to define "justice" across
cultural barriers, see David Miller: Social Justice{\916), especially the discourse "On Three Types of
Justice".
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Then it comes to this. The notion of "fairness" encompasses two different and
potentially adversary components, legitimacy and distributive justice. These components
are indicators of law s, and especially fair law's, primary objective: to achieve a
negotiated balance between the need for order and the need for change. As Martti
Koskenniemi has observed, the international legal system "derives...both its intuitive
plausibility and vulnerability from the tension between such notions."207 What matters is
how this tension is managed discursively through what Koskenniemi calls "the social
conception" of the legal system. This "social conception" manifests itself in the
discursive pursuit of fairness.
4.4.2. Economic fairness: terms of development
The well documented gap between the rich and the poor in the contemporary
international community of States resembles, but far exceeds, that between the rich and
the poor persons in some developed countries. There is no globally agreed statistical
poverty level for the world's peoples, but the line separating developed countries from
the rest provides an approximate analogue. According to the recent survey of the World
Bank, up to 1999, there are still 64 countries grouped as low-income countries whose
gross national product(GNP) per capita is only $755 or less. In contrast, the GNP per
capita of these 23 high-income OECD members is $9266 or more. This figure is more
than twelve times of the former. Developing countries make up about eighty-five percent
of the world's population, but this population only generates about twenty-one percent of
the world's gross domestic product.208 Furthermore, if there are no substantial measures
to help some developing countries, especially the least-developed countries, to get rid of
the poverty and to catch up with the developed world, the gap between them will become
even wider in the future.209
In most developed countries, the gap between the rich and the poor is addressed
through extensive, if still inadequate, remedial programmes regulated by the local
governments, which are widely accepted by all classes as a necessary part of the social
compact. True, the rich everywhere remain much richer than the poor—in part as a by¬
product of deliberate incentives to foster excellence, innovative enterprise, and risk-
taking, but those more fortunate do not generally cavil at re-distributive and remedial
programmes, which range from graduated income tax to extensive social security and
healthcare system to avoid the most egregious consequences of poverty. In most
developed countries, elaborate systems of wealth-transfer seek to give an educational
head start to children from those deprived or broken families, provide educational
scholarship and loans, or free education, to those in need, supply basic healthcare for all,
and deploy subsidised buildings and social services to assist the neediest with the
requisites of shelter and food. Where the motivation to succeed has dimmed, most
207
: M. Koskenniemi: Theory: Implications for the Practitioner(mc\uded in Theory and International Law:
an Introduction, edited by P. Allot, T. Carty, M. Koskenniemi, 1991), p.7.
208
:These figures are from the World Bank Group/Data, classification economies,
cf. http://www.worldbank.org/external/dgprofile.asp?RMDK=l 10&SMDK=T&W=0
"09: The low-income countries lack the potential to further develop their economies. The value added from
agriculture in those countries is about twenty-five percent of GDP, compared with five percent of the world
average level. Foreign trade is only eight percent of GDP in those countries, compared with twenty-seven
of the world average level.
cf. http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/dgprofile.asp?RMDK=0&SMDK— l&W—0
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developed countries, at least, provide their citizens with programmes to rekindle and re-
socialise human functionality and aspiration.
As yet, the international community provides very little of those rudiments of
economic and social fairness for its most deprived. As professor Franck observed, this is
due to a number of factors.210 Among them, two factors are the most prominent. Firstly,
the magnitude of the global gap between the rich and the poor is far more daunting than
its counterpart in any developed country. Secondly, the number of rich persons, as a
proportion of total population, is far smaller in the international community than that in
developed countries. Internationally, therefore, even a radical redistribution from the rich
to the poor would have a quite limited remedial effect.
Except for the foregoing two, there are also many other factors which account for the
present tragic situations in many developing countries. The predatory exploitation of
natural resources during the colonial times and the lack of expertise after their
independence are the chief ones among them.211 Before the World Trade Organisation,
the legal framework of international trade defined by the GATT, which came into effect
in 1948, was seen as producing results which were either injurious or not beneficial to the
developing countries.212 Pressures for change in the rules governing international trade
led to the concerted efforts of developing countries, which brought about the first
convening of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD) in
Geneva in 1964.213
Motivated by this new international economic order after the first UNCTAD
conference, the GATT started a new mechanism, first introduced in 1971 and then made
permanent in 1979, the Generalised System of Preferences(GSP),214 to effect greater
distributive justice in the international trading system. Under the GSP, preferences may
be given to specified goods coming from developing countries "without according such
treatment to other contracting parties".215 This changed the previous international trade
disciplines required by the GATT most-favoured-nation treatment clause between the
developing and developed countries. The GSP is a more practical way to regulate
international trade since there is no equality if we implement the same rules between
those unequal trading partners. Meanwhile, the Lome Convention216 and the United
Nations Common Fund for Commondities217 similarly seek to inject equity into the
global commodities market. The Lome Convention, between the EEC and some African,
210
: See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford Clarendon Press(1995),
p.414.
211
: One example is that, up to 1999, the illiteracy rate of adult male and female in those low-income
countries is twenty-nine percent and forty-eight percent respectively.
cf. http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/dgprofile.asp?RMDK=108&SMDK=l&W=0
212
: For example, the GATT allowed an increase in agricultural and other commodity protectionism
requested by the developed countries, while the reduction of tariffs was concentrated on those industrial
products in which developed, not developing, countries had comparative advantage. See B. Gosovic:
UNCTAD: Conflict and Compromise, Leiden: Sijthoff(1971), p.12.
213: As for the successive UNCTADs, see supra note 32.
214
: See GATT Contracting Parties' Decision: Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity
and Fuller Participation ofDeveloping Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903128 November 1979).
215: Id.
216: See the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention ofLome{\5 December 1989), No. 29 ILM, p.783.
217
: See Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities(21 June 1980), 1992 UKTS 5(Cm.
1797).
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Caribbean, and Pacific(ACP) countries, seeks to palliate the effects of the fluctuations in
the international commodity market through a compensatory fund. Most of the those
ACP countries are the former colonies of some European powers. Before independence,
these countries depended heavily on the imports from and exports to their metropolitan
countries. When they were "sponsored" into the GATT after their independence, these
former metropolitan countries were required to provide most-favoured-nation treatment
to all other GATT contracting parties. This brought a lot of difficulties to these ACP
countries as their economic structures could not be changed overnight. The purpose of the
Lome Convention is to protect these ACP countries from too much turbulence simply
because of the change of trade mles. Although the GATT and the WTO recognised the
legality of the Lome Convention, how far those ACP countries have really benefited from
this convention remains debatable. The Common Fund for Commodities, implemented in
1991, is also intended to operate on the margins of the commodities marketplace. Unlike
the Lome Convention, the purpose of the fund is intended to be corrective, rather than
compensatory.218 While accepting the inevitability of market-driven price fluctuations,
the Fund aims to keep these fluctuations within certain parameters.219 This is helpful,
particularly, to those countries with only a single or a few products available for export.
These international remedial programmes have helped some developing countries in
avoiding the risks of price fluctuations while selling their products, but the earnings from
those commodities are far insufficient for the economic development of these countries.
Facing the rapid globalisation of world economy, many developing countries, especially
the least-developed countries, feel that they are still deprived of the benefits of the world
economic development. A common understanding, which is attracting more and more
people, is that if the international community could help the developing countries to
reform their economic structures, strengthen their economic facilities, and participate
more fully in the world economic activities, then the productive and consumptive
capacity of most developing countries are possible to rise gradually but significantly.
Everyone, including those of the developed countries, would ultimately benefit through
greater mutual trade and investment opportunities, thereby making the gap between
developing countries and developed countries easier to close by means of these re-
distributive and remedial initiatives. The help of the whole international community is
necessary in realising this huge task, but first of all, the organisation work by a
universally international institution, like the World Trade Organisation, is indispensable.
4.4.3. Combining legitimacy and distributive justice: from the GATT to theWTO
The implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ended the
laissez-faire situation of international trade,220 and created an economic order built on the
principles of equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all countries in matters of trade
218
: See R. T. Tait and G. N. Spear: The Common Fundfor Commodities, The George Washington Journal
of International Law and Economics, Vol. 16, 1982, pp.486-487.
219
: The Fund is primarily intended to help international commodities organisations(ICOs), comprising
both producer and consumer countries, to purchase buffer stocks when prices fall below the fairly widefand
sometimes flexible) margin established for that commodity by the ICOs. After prices rebound, ICOs are to
sell these stocks, helping to ensure that prices do not exceed the prescribed margin and generating the cash
necessary to repay their debt to the fund, with interest.
220
: See Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse: The Regulation of International Trade, second edition,
Routledge(1999), pp.20-21.
135
and economic relations. However, experience was to show that "no matter how valid the
principle of the most-favoured-nation may be in trade relations among equals, it is not an
acceptable and adequate concept for trade among countries with highly unequal
economic power".221 Although the Generalised System of Preferences consists of various
preference schemes favourable to developing countries, the preference-giving country has
the right to choose the countries entitled to preferential treatment and the products to be
covered. In addition, it may also set import target levels. Tariff preferences are granted
unilaterally and may be withdrawn or altered,222 giving the importer considerable
leverage, not immune to improprieties.223 The Lome Convention is implemented only
between the EEC and some African, Caribbean, Pacific countries which were principally
ex-colonies of the European donors. Its compensatory fund known as "STABEX" only
covers forty-eight agricultural products.224 Eligibility for STABEX funding is determined
by two criteria, both of which must be met.225 Meanwhile, the practice of the Common
Fund for Commodities also proved a failure because some developed countries claimed
that the price protection policy distorted the signals which a free market sent to producers
through fluctuating consumption, and that this in turn led to miscalculations by
producers.226
Regional and international aid programmes, commodity price stabilisation policies,
trade preferences, resource transfers and sharing, and the creation of equal or equitable
distribution of new resources: these are the new entitlements which mark a global
awareness that distributive justice as fairness is never off the agenda during the
development of international law. This awareness culminated in the provisions of the
WTO Agreement Preamble, which state: "there is need for positive efforts designed to
ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure
a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development"(Emphasis added).227
The creation of the World Trade Organisation brings about a more unified
international trade order. The WTO rules require that international trade should be based
on a non-discriminatory ground and each Member should ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
WTO agreements, toward which many developing countries have an ambivalent attitude.
Facing the aggressive unilateral actions of some developed countries, developing
countries can use the new dispute settlement mechanism to contend with these economic
221
: R. Prebisch: Preferential Treatment: A New Standard for International Economic Relations, Harvard
International Law Journal, Vol. XVIII(1977), p.l 13.
"2"
: See N. Kofele-Kale: The Principle ofPreferential Treatment in the Law ofGATT: Toward Achieving
the Objective ofan Equitable World Trading System, Vol. 18, 1988, Cal W Intl LJ, p.302.
"3
: See Robert E. Hudec: Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, Gower Publishing Company
Limited( 1987), p. 112.
224
: See European Report File: Commission Rejects Requests for STABEX Seminars in ACP Countries,
European International Service, 3 July 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library.
225
: A country is eligible for a transfer if a product represents at least 5 percent of its total export earnings
in the year preceding application. The export earnings of the product must also have dropped at least 4.5
percent from the average calculated over a six-year reference period. See Lome Convention IV, supra note
216, Articles 196(1), 197(3), 197(2).
226
: See Thomas M. Franck: Minimum Standards of Public Policy and Order Applicable to Collective
International Commodity Negotiations, Recueil des Cours, Vol.160, 1978-11, pp.403-430.
227
: See supra note 45.
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powers. The move towards a mandatory legitimacy in applying the unified rules to
disputes marks a potentially long step towards the infusion of genuine fairness into the
global trading system. Meanwhile, the unification of trade rules means that developing
countries will compete with developed countries on the same parameters. This is a big
challenge to many developing countries, as their economic strength is no match to that of
developed countries.
Considering the significant gap in terms of economic strength between developed
countries and developing countries, the negotiators of the WTO agreements continued to
keep the preferential treatment for developing country Members. For example, the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement permits to grant developing country Members,
upon request, the specified, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part from obligations
under this Agreement, taking into account their financial, trade and development
needs."228 The TRIPS Agreement permits developing country Members to delay for a
period of four years, and least-developed country Members for ten years, in the
application of the rules of TRIPS, while other countries "shall be obliged to apply the
provisions of this Agreement before the expiry of a general period of one year following
the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement."229 However, many other agreements
just give the general directions which encourage the WTO organs and developed country
Members to provide preferential treatment to developing country Members, but no
specific requirements are available.230 Thus, in combining the process legitimacy with the
distributive justice, the panels and the Appellate Body, under the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, will play a crucial role. Under the general guidance of the WTO Agreement
and the Dispute Settlement Understanding,231 together with the provisions of relevant
agreement(s), the panels and the Appellate Body will judge case by case how the
legitimacy and distributive justice can best be united without degrading the WTO rules.
Practice has shown that the reports deliberated by the WTO panels and the Appellate
Body have won respect from both the developed country Members and developing
country Members.
What moves the international community to agree to distributive formulas in which
fairness is a significant element? The factor of conscience is underrated by some cynics
and exploited by others; but it does play a role, particularly when appeal to it is based on
firm data and fundamental principles of legitimacy. Another factor is the closing
interdependence and the increasing awareness that poverty has become the major
obstacle in the development of world economy. A third factor is the growing shared
commitment of States to a democratic, open, and discursive process, not only within but
among States. "Just as the 1832 Reform Act empowered the emerging British
commercial class, so the empowerment of a new Third World majority in decision¬
making institutions and arenas can help refocus and redefine fairness discourse."232 In the
~28: Id, Agreement on the Application ofSanitaiy and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 10(3).
229
: Id, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Articles 65(1), 65(2) and
66(1).
230
: For example, General Agreement on Trade in Sei~vices, Article IV(Increasing Participation of
Developing Countries). See supra note 45.
231
: See WTO Agreement, Preamble; Dispute Settlement Understanding, Articles 3(12), 4(10), 8(10),
12(10), 12(11), 21(2), 21(7), 21(8). See supra note 45.
232: See Thomas M. Franck, supra note 210, p.437.
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context of the WTO, this, if well managed, will be best accomplished in dispute
settlement process.
'
Chapter Five The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Power-
Oriented or Rule-Oriented?
Section One From Power-Oriented to Rule-Oriented: A Historical Evolution
5.1.1. Power-orientation and rule-orientation: a political dichotomy
One of the major achievements of the Umguay Round negotiations is the
establishment of a rule-based dispute settlement mechanism under the legal framework of
the World Trade Organisation. Guided by the Understanding on Rides and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of DisputesifiQxeim&Qx as the Dispute Settlement
Understanding or DSU), the WTO dispute settlement mechanism deals with disputes
involving trade in goods, trade in services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights, and even the issues concerning the DSU itself.1
On the modern international law level, one may have recourse to various means for a
peaceful settlement if a dispute between States arises.2 Among these peaceful dispute
settlement means, the most frequently-invoked are, however, either those with a power-
orientation or those with a mle-orientation. This dichotomy perhaps puts the issue too
simple because most of the current international institutions and legal systems in practice
involve some mixture of both of them. Nevertheless, it is still a useful way to help us to
understand the nature of the policy issues of modem international organisations,
especially one with a comprehensive membership like the World Trade Organisation.
As professor John Jackson pointed out, this dichotomy, in a broad perspective, can be
explained as the followings: "one can roughly divide the various ways for the peaceful
settlement of international disputes into two types: settlement by negotiation and
agreement with reference(explicitly or implicitly) to relative power status of the disputing
parties; or settlement by negotiation or decision with reference to norms or rules to which
both parties have previously agreed."3 Obviously, in the former scenario, power(both
political and economic) plays a major role, while in the latter, the rule of law is the major
parameter in the dispute settlement.
The foregoing dichotomy in the international trade dispute settlement can also be
illustrated by the following example. Presumably, countries A and B have a trade dispute
regarding B's treatment of importation from A to B of TV sets. The first means
mentioned above would involve a negotiation between A and B by which the more
powerful of the two would have the advantage. Foreign aid, investment initiative,
1
: The agreements covered by the DSU include: WTO Agreement; Multilateral Trade Agreements
(including Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; General Agreement on Trade in Services',
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights); Dispute Settlement Understanding
and Plurilateral Trade Agreements(which apply only to the WTO Members who have accepted them). See
Appendix 1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, cf. The Legal Texts of the World Trade
Organisation: The Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations, Cambridge University
Press(1999).
2
: Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations states: "The parties to any dispute... shall, first of all,
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiiy, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. (Emphasis added). See
Basic Documents in International Law, edited by Ian Brownlie, fourth edition, Oxford University
Press(1995).
3: John H. Jackson: Restructuring the GATTSystem, Royal Institute of International Affairs(1990), p.51.
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diplomatic coercion, or retaliation measures on the other's key export goods by means of
import restrictions would all figure in the negotiation. A small country, especially a small
developing country, would hesitate to challenge a large one upon which its trade heavily
depends. Even an economic giant, like Japan, used to negotiate with its trading partners,
mainly the United States and the European Economic Community(now the European
Union), to resolve some of their subtle trade disputes.4 Implicit or explicit threats, for
example, to impose quantitative restrictions on some other products,5 would be a major
part of the technique employed. Domestic political influences would probably play a
greater part in the approach of the respective negotiators in this system, particular on the
negotiators for the more powerful party.6
On the other hand, the second suggested means—reference to agreed rules would see
the negotiators arguing about the application of those rules or the selection of rules, rather
than exercising the power of the disputing parties. For example, was country B obligated
under a treaty(bilateral or multilateral) to allow free entry of country A's TV sets in
question? During this negotiation process, it would be necessary for the disputing parties
to understand that an unsettled dispute would ultimately be resolved by impartial third-
party judgements based on the pre-agreed rules or customary rules and general principles
of law in the absence of agreed rules so that the disputing parties would be negotiating
with reference to their respective predictions as to the outcome of those judgements, and
not with reference to potential unilateral retaliation or actions exercising power of one or
n
more of the parties to the dispute
In both of the aforesaid means, negotiations and private settlement of disputes are the
dominant mechanism for resolving difference. The distinction between them is the
perceptions of the negotiators, or to be more precisely the disputing parties, as to what are
the "bargaining chips".8 Insofar as agreed rules for governing the economic relations
between the disputing parties exist, a system which predicates negotiations on the
4
: Before the Uruguay Round negotiations, one of the troublesome practices between Japan and the United
States upon their trade disputes was the arrangement outside the GATT surveillance. One of the reasons for
this phenomenon was that some of the key Japanese export products depended heavily on the US market.
For example, in 1987, the European Economic Community brought a complaint under GATT Article
XXIII:2 relating to certain aspects of a bilateral arrangement between Japan and the United States
concerning their trade of semiconductor products. See GATT BISD, 35th Supplement! 1987), p.l 16.
5
: For example, in the GATT early years, the trade of textiles and clothing were not subject to the
surveillance of the GATT. Many developing countries, mainly the exporters of textiles and clothing, often
faced the threats of restrictions from some developed countries. In 1974, the Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Textiles(X\\c Multifibre Arrangement, or MFA) was signed, between the major
exporters and importers of textiles and clothing, to govern most of world's trade in textiles and clothing.
The MFA enabled developed countries to negotiate quotas on imports of textiles and clothing mainly from
developing countries and economies in transition. The Arrangement's safeguard procedures permitted the
introduction of restraints on textiles and clothing imports when these imports were causing market
disruption, subject to a number of strict conditions. All unilateral restrictions and bilaterally-agreed quotas
were subject to the multilateral surveillance. Since 1 January 1995, the MFA has been replaced by the
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing which provides inter alia for the winding down of the MFA
trade restrictions over a ten-year period. See supra note 1.
6
: The ups and downs of the negotiations for China's resumption of its GATT contracting party position
and the entry of the WTO between China and the United States can be regarded as one such example.
: See John H. Jackson: The World Trading System, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press(1989), p.86.
: Id, this term is first used by professor John Jackson to refer to all those elements which can be invoked
to enhance the negotiation power.
140
implementation of those rules would seem for a number of reasons to be preferred.
Firstly, the
^ pre-agreed rules themselves are the outcome of compromise of all
participants. An international agreement reflects such a basic understanding that a
peaceful international community can only be established on the consent of its
participants that certain rules must be obeyed by all. Secondly, the risk of being isolated
and retaliated by the injured parties always scares those who attempt a breach of the
agreed rules. Thirdly, the disputing parties believe that if their negotiations reach an
impasse, the dispute settlement mechanism which takes over for the disputing parties will
be designed to apply the rules fairly or to interpret them precisely.
Power-oriented or rule-oriented, the choice depends not only on the wills of the
disputing parties, but on the balance of interests of all concerned parties. If the
international trade order is based on a well-balanced system of interests of all
participants, the rules which govern international trade will more possibly meet voluntary
compliance, and the trade disputes are more ready to be resolved on the agreed rules. If
no such system exists, then the parties to a dispute are left basically to rely upon their
respective "power positions", tempted(it is hoped) by the good will and good faith of the
more powerful party(cognisant ofhis long-range interests).
5.1.2. Rule-orientation: a rational option
In the current international relationships, there are very few cases which may go to
the very extreme of either power-orientation or rule-orientation.10 Almost all diplomacy^
and indeed all governments, involves a mixture of these techniques. To a large degree,
the history of civilisation may be described as a gradual evolution from a power-oriented
approach, in the state of nature, towards a rule-oriented approach, during which exists a
perpetual problem of proportion of these two approaches. In the present Western world,
from where modern science and democracy originate, power continues to play a major
role in the domestic affairs, particularly political power of voter acceptance, but also to a
lesser degree of economic power such as that of labour unions or large corporations.
However, the governments ofmost democratic countries have passed far along the scale
towards a rule-oriented approach, and generally have an elaborate legal system involving
court procedures and a monopoly of force, through the police and the military, to ensure
that rules will be followed.11 The history of England over the last thousand years will
9
: The negotiation history from the GATT to the WTO tells us that, in an international community,
conflicts of interests are unavoidable. The realistic option is that each participant needs to sacrifice its
interests to a certain degree if a multilateral agreement is to be reached.
10
: See Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse: Perspectives on dispute settlementin The Regulation of
International Trade, second edition), Routledge(1999), pp.54-58.
11
: The development from the European Economic Community(EEC) to the European Union(EU) gives us
another mode of an evolving political structure and legal system. The European Union law has touched
almost all aspects of peoples' lives within its member States. In most cases, the European Union law
prevails over its domestic counterparts. As for the political structure, the European Council of Ministers
based in Brussels represents the governments of the current 15 EU members, while the European
Parliament based in Strasbourg represents the citizens of the EU members, who elect directly the
representatives of the European Parliament. The European Court of Justice based in Luxembourg deals
with not only the lawsuits under the Treaty in the first instance, but also the appeals from the Court ofFirst
Instance in areas such as competition law, staff cases and injudicial review cases.
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support this evolutionary hypothesis from power-orientation to rule-onentation. Even in
most newly independent States, one can find that power is fairly divided among the
governing bodies according to an elaborated legal system.13 Few States, today, can
exercise their authority upon the raw power.
The rule-oriented tendency does not rest on the domestic level alone. Many
international institutions, political and economic, also develop in this way and the pace is
speeded up after the World War II. Although international law rules may be somewhat
less effective than their domestic counterparts, at least as for those nations with stable
legal systems and a generally effective central government, it is not always the case that
domestic laws are implemented more efficiently. It is practical for the policy advisers, the
statesmen and practitioners to evaluate accurately the real impact of the international
rules, recognising that some of the rules do have considerable effect and influence on real
government and business decisions.14 With the growing transnational economic
interdependence upon each other, it is generally accepted that no State could exist and
develop without relying on the other in one way or another. No State could dominate the
world either politically or economically. Therefore, the best way to regulate international
relations rests upon the well-elaborated and generally-accepted laws and rules.
The making of international law rules is usually realised by two means: one is to
expand the regulated dimension of those existing international institutions; the other is to
establish new international institutions by agreements to deal with these new issues
concerning international relations. The example of the former category is the United
Nations, which, under the mandate of Articles 55 and 56 ofUN Charter, has extended its
regulation from the diplomatic area to the economic and cultural areas through its
specialised agencies like UNESCO, WHO and IMO. The United Nations has also played
an important role in promoting the global economic development in a rule-oriented way
through its programmes and commissions like UNCTAD and UNCITRAL. The later
category example is the World Trade Organisation, which, despite its short history, has
already become the most important institution in regulating international trade relations.
These developments have changed the characteristics of modem international relations
from the political confrontation to economic cooperation, thereby making the global
governance through international institutions like the UN and WTO proceed to the more
diversified areas.15
12 :The interminable debate in the United Kingdom between the Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans is a recent
example. According to professor Julio Faundez, the Eurosceptics oppose deepening the process of
European integration because they do not want to surrender control of key political decisions, mainly the
monetary policy, to a federal type of organisation or to a group of un-elected officials of the European
Union. See Julio Faundez: Legal Reform in Developing and Transition Countries: Making Haste Slowly(in
Governance, Development and Globalisation edited by Julio Faundez et al), Blackstone Press Limited
(2000), pp.37-38.
13
: Despite the fact that wars are still prevalent in some newly independent countries, few of them adopted
the form of a totalitarian government.
14
: International law originates from the agreements of sovereign States. Just as professor Louis Henkin
states: "Every nation derives some benefits from international law and international agreements. Law keeps
international society running, contributes to order and stability, provides a basis and a framework for
common enterprise and mutual intercourse." Louis Henkin: How Nations Behave, New York Council on
Foreign Relations, Inc.( 1979),pp.29-87.
13
: As for the discussion of global governance, see Part One of Section Two, Chapter Three.
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From an economic(perhaps political in some way) perspective, the demands for rule-
orientation are not coming out of the willingness of the statesmen or the law-makers, but
from the practical needs of the citizens. Economic affairs tend to(at least in peace time)
affect the common people more directly than it may be the case for political and military
affairs. Particularly, as the world becomes more economically interdependent, more and
more private citizens have found that their jobs, their businesses, and their quality of life
are being affected, if not controlled, by forces from outside their country's boundaries.16
Hence, they are more than ever concerned about the economic policies pursued by their
government on their behalf. Meanwhile, the relationships in regulating peoples' political
and economic lives have become increasingly complex—to the point of being
incomprehensible to even the most brilliant human mind. As a result, citizens assert
themselves, at least within a democracy, and require their representatives and government
officials to respond to their needs and their perceived complaints. The consequence of
this is the increasing participation by the citizens in their governmental decision-making,
more parliamentary or congressional participation in the process of international
economic policy-making, thus restricting the degree of power and discretion which the
executive possesses.17
This development makes international negotiations and bargaining increasingly
difficult.18 However, if the citizens are going to make their demands be heard and have
their influence be felt, a "power-oriented" negotiation process(often requiring secrecy)
becomes more difficult if not impossible. As a result, the only appropriate way to turn
seems to be towards a rule-oriented system, whereby the various layers of citizens,
parliaments, executives and international organisations will all have their inputs, arriving
tortuously to a rule, which however, when established, will enable business and other
decentralised decision-makers to rely upon the stability and predictability of
governmental activity in relation to the rule.
Parallel to this evolution is the change of the approach in the dispute settlement
within the GATT. The expansion ofmembership partly accounts for this change, but the
perception of the participants for a more democratic and "transparent" dispute settlement
system is surely the legal basis for this change.
5.1.3. GATT dispute settlement mechanism: a practice evolving towards rule-
orientation
Originally, the GATT was intended to be placed in the institutional setting of the
proposed International Trade Organisation(ITO),19 and the draft of the ITO Charter
16
: This has become ever more obvious since the establishment of the World Trade Organisation, as the
WTO Agreement requires the WTO Members "shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." The entry of the
WTO seems, to many developing countries, as a double-edge sword. On the one hand, developing countries
can benefit from exporting their products on a tax-reduced and barrier-removed bases, but on the other
hand, in many areas, developing countries will compete with developed countries on the same parameter,
although they are granted some years of delay in the implementation ofWTO rules.
17: The frequent veto by the US Congress on the executive bills can be deemed as one of such examples.
18: This can be supported by the fact of the time-consuming Uruguay Round negotiations and the too many
expectations for a new round of global trade negotiations.
19
: The Bretton Woods conference, held in 1944, was devoted to monetary and banking issues, and it
established the Charters of the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank (International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development), but it did not take up the problems of trade as such because this
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called for a rigorous dispute settlement mechanism which contemplated the effective use
of arbitration(not always mandatory, however), and even the appeal to the International
Court of Justice(ICJ) in some circumstances.20 Clair Wilcox, vice-chairman of the US
delegation to the Havana Conference in 1948,21 noted that the possibility of suspending
trade concessions under this mechanism was "regarded as a method of restoring a balance
of benefits and obligations that, for any reason, may have been disturbed. It is nowhere
described as a penalty to be imposed on members who violate their obligations or as a
sanction to ensure that these obligations will be obeyed. But even though it is not so
regarded, it will operate in fact as a sanction and a penalty."22 He further noted the
procedure for obtaining an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the law involved in a
dispute, and said: "A basis is thus provided for the development of a body of international
23law to govern trade relationships."
While the ITO Charter would have established a rather elaborate dispute settlement
mechanism, GATT 1947, because of its provisional status, had only a few paragraphs
devoted to this subject. One can argue that there are a number of "dispute settlement"
procedures distributed throughout GATT 1947(raising the question of what we mean by
that phrase),24 but the central and formal procedures are clearly those found in Articles
XXII and XXIII. The first objective of these two Articles is simply to establish the right
for a contracting party25 to consult with any other contracting party on matters related to
the GATT—a right that does not impose a major obligation, but this is nevertheless
useful.
While Article XXII provides for consultation as a prerequisite to invoke the GATT
dispute settlement mechanism,26 Article XXIII is the core provision for the dispute
conference was held under the jurisdiction of ministries of finance, while trade was under the competence
of different ministries. Initiated by the United States, together with its allies, particularly the United
Kingdom, a draft of Charter of the proposed International Trade Organisation(ITO) was published in 1946,
and a preparatory committee was formed at the same year. Ironically, the ITO did not come into existence
eventually, mainly because of the veto from the US Congress.
20
: See the Charter of the International Trade Organisation, Chapter VIII, Articles 92-97, UN, Final Act
and Related Documents, UN Conference on Trade and Employment, held at Havana, Cuba, 21 November
1947—24 March 1948; Interim Commission for the International Trade Organisation, Lake Success, NY,
April 1948, UN Doc. E/Conf. 2/78.
21
: It is the principal meeting for the preparation of the International Trade Organisation(ITO), which was
held in Geneva from April to November 1947, and was followed by a meeting to complete the ITO Charter
in Havana, Cuba in 1948.
22
: Clair Wilcox: A Charterfor World Trade, New York: Macmillan(1949), p. 159.
23: Id, p. 160.
24
: See John H. Jackson: World Trade and the Law ofGATT, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill(1969), pp. 164-
166.
25
: As GATT 1947, from the perspective of international law, is only a provisional agreement, not an
organisation, therefore, the participants of the GATT are only contracting parties, not members. Article
XXXII: 1 of GATT 1947 states: "The contracting parties to this Agreement shall be understood to mean
those governments which are applying the provisions of this Agreement under Articles XXVI or XXXIII or
pursuant to the Protocol ofProvisional Application." See supra note 1.
26
: Article XXII: 1 states: "Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another
contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement." Article XXII:2
further states: "The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any
contracting party or parties in respect of any matter in which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory
solution through consultation under paragraph 1." See supra note 1.
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settlement in the GATT legal system. Three features can be drawn from these two
articles: (a)They are usually invoked on the grounds of "nullification or impairment" of
benefits expected under the multilateral agreements, and do not depend on actual breach
of legal obligation. (b)They establish the power for the CONTRACTING PARTIES28
not only to investigate and recommend actions, but to give a ruling on the matter. (c)They
give the CONTRACTING PARTIES the power in appropriately serious cases to
authorise a contracting party or parties to suspend its(or their) GATT obligations to the
other contracting party or parties.29 Each of these features has important interpretations
and implications, and although Article XXIII of GATT 1947 does not say much about
them, the procedures followed to implement these principles did evolve over more than
four decades ofpractice into a rather elaborate process.
During the first decade of the GATT history, the key factor to invoke the GATT
dispute settlement mechanism was almost always the claim of "nullification or
impairment", an unfortunately ambiguous phrase, and one that might connote a "power"
or "negotiation"-oriented approach. It was neither sufficient nor necessary to find a
"breach of obligation" under this language, although later practice made doing so
important. A ruling for an early case in the GATT history defined the "nullification or
impairment" phrase as "including actions by a contracting party that harmed the trade of
another," which "could not reasonably have been anticipated" by the other "at the time it
negotiated for a concession."30 But the concept of "reasonable anticipation" is still not
clearly stated.
The first major reform in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism occurred in
1955,31 when the original diplomatic-negotiated dispute settlement procedure was
replaced by a working party or a panel.32 The three or five experts would be specifically
27
: According to Article XXIII: 1, the bases on which a contracting party may be able to raise a complaint
are either the nullification or impairment of its benefits under GATT 1947, or the impediment to its
attainment of any objective of GATT 1947. See supra note 1.
28
: In the GATT practice, the term "CONTRACTING PARTIES" is referred to the joint action of the
contracting parties, while the term "Contracting Parties" is referred to the GATT. Article XXV: 1of GATT
1947 states: ".. .Wherever reference is made in this Agreement to the contracting parties acting jointly they
are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES." See supra note 1.
29
: See John H. Jackson: The World Trade Organisation Constitution and Jurisprudence, the Royal
Institute of International Affairs(1998), p.66.
30
: The concept "reasonably anticipation"(originally as "reasonably expectation") first appeared in the
dispute Chile-Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate(The report of the working party was adopted on
3 April 1950. See GATT BISD, 2nd Supplement[1950], p.188), in the context of determining
"nullification" or "impairment" under GATT Article XXIII. However, the working party did not indicate
the source or rationale of this concept. It is contained neither in the text of GATT 1947 nor in the
interpretative notes adopted by the parties.
31
: It is considered that this was largely because of the influence of the then Director-General, Eric
Wyndham White. See John H. Jackson, supra note 7, p.95.
32
: At the Seventh GATT Review Session(1955), the proposal to institutionalise the procedures of panels
was not adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES mainly because they preferred to preserve the existing
situation and not to establish judicial procedures which might put excessive strain on the GATT. This
consideration is even reflected in the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and SwveillanceQaeicvnaftzx as 1979 Understanding). Point 1 of the Annex(Entitled Agreed
Description of the Customaiy Practice of the GATT in the Field ofDispute Settlement[Article XXIII:2]) to
this Understanding states: "...Article XXIII:2 does not indicate whether disputes should be handled by a
working party or by a panel." The difference between a GATT working party and a panel is that the
citizens from the disputing parties cannot be members of the panel(Rule 11 of the 1979 Understanding),
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named and were to act in their own capacities and not as representatives of any
government.33 Although the composition of the working parties or panels was far from
satisfactory,34 this development, however, represented an important shift from primarily a
"negotiation" atmosphere ofmultilateral diplomacy to a more "arbitrational" or "judicial"
procedure, designed to arrive impartially at the truth of the facts and the best
interpretations of the law.35 The increasing use of the dispute settlement mechanism in
the late 1950s justified this tendency.
In 1962, an influential ruling pushed the GATT dispute settlement mechanism going
further in the direction towards rule-orientation. This happened in the case of Uruguay
against 15 industrialised countries' violations of their GATT obligations.36 The panel
grappled with the language of GATT Article XXIII, which defined "nullification or
impairment" as the basis of a complaint, but decided to push the GATT jurisprudence
beyond the language, and determined in its report that any "violation" of the GATT
obligations would be considered a "prima facie nullification or impairment" which
required the defending contracting party to carry the burden of proving that "nullification
or impairment" did not exist.37 This case, followed by many subsequent GATT panels,
reinforced a shift in the focus of GATT cases towards the treaty obligations of the GATT,
38that is in the direction of rule orientation.
During the Tokyo Round negotiations(1973-1979), some initiatives were adopted to
improve the GATT dispute settlement mechanism. The so-called Consultative Group of
while the members of a working party include those from the disputing parties(Point 6[ i ] of the Annex to
the 1979 Understanding). See GATT BISD, 26th Supplement! 1980), p.212; p.215; p.216.
33
: Rule 14 of the 1979 Understanding states: "Panel members would serve in their individual capacities
and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any organisation..." See GATT BISD,
26th Supplement! 1980), P-212.
j4
: Dispute settlement panel members in the GATT were mostly junior to middle-level trade diplomats, or
retired trade diplomats, expected to take advice from the technocrats/experts in the GATT Secretariat while
in drafting their legal rulings, In fact, it is the Secretariat, not the panels, that deliberated those rulings.
35
: Rule 16 of the 1979 Understanding states: "The function of panels is to assist the CONTRACTING
PARTIES in discharging their responsibilities under Article XXIII:2. Accordingly, a panel should make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and
the applicability of and conformity with the General Agreement and, if so requested by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, make such other findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2..." See GATT BISD,
26th Supplement! 1980), p.213.
36
: See Pierre Pescatore: WTO/GATTDispute Settlement Digest, Transnational Publishers Inc.(1997), p.98.
J?
: The "prima facie" concept was also applied in situations involving quotas or domestic subsidies on
products subject to agreed upon tariff limitations(for example, tariffs bound under Article II of GATT
1947, "Schedules ofConcessions"). See John H. Jackson, supra note 24, p.182.
38
: The development of this jurisprudence culminated in Point 5 of the Annex(Entitled Agreed Description
of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field ofDispute Settlement[Article XXIII:2]) to the 1979
Understanding, which states: "In practice, contracting parties have had recourse to Article XXIII only
when in their view a benefit accruing to them under the General Agreement was being nullified or
impaired. In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under the General Agreement,
the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. A prima facie case
of nullification or impairment would ipso facto require consideration of whether the circumstances are
serious enough to justify the authorisation of suspension of concessions or obligations, if the contracting
party bringing the complaint so requests. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of
the rules has an adverse impact on other contracting parties, and in such cases, it is up to the contracting
parties against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charges..." See GATT BISD 26th
Supplement! 1980), p.216.
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Eighteen was given this task, among others.39 However, partly because of the strong
objection of the European Communities to any changes in the existing dispute settlement
mechanism, this effort did not get very far. The result was a document officially entitled
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance^hereinafter as the 1979 Understanding), which was adopted by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES at their Thirty-fifth Session in Geneva in November 1979.
This Understanding, which was for the first time a separate document apart from GATT
Articles XXII and XXIII, provided a comparatively detailed procedure for the dispute
settlement. It reinforced the concept of the "prima facie nullification or impairment"
and permitted the use of non-government persons for panels while stating a preference
for government persons.41
In the 1980s, as the dispute settlement mechanism was becoming more legally precise
and juridical in nature, there developed the idea that there are generally two types of
cases in the GATT: the violations cases, which are based on the prima facie concept, and
certain non-violation cases, but nevertheless alleging "nullification or impairment". In
fact, the non-violation cases were relatively few in the history of the GATT. Some
scholars estimated that there were only between three to eight cases of this type out of
several hundreds in totality.4" Nevertheless, some of these non-violation cases were quite
influential.43
A 1988 panel report strengthened more the prima facie concept. The case(sometimes
called the "super-fund" case) was a complaint by the European Communities, Mexico
and Canada against the United States for the effects of the US 1986 legislation which
taxed imported petroleum products.44 Since the tax on the imported products was
admittedly higher than that for domestic products, the United States did not deny that the
national treatment obligation contained in GATT Article III45 had been violated. But it
then prepared to prove that the small tax had not caused nullification or impairment on
the exporters, by using trade flow statistics to show that no negative effects on the flow of
imported petroleum products occurred because of the tax. The panel, however, refused to
39: The Consultative Group of Eighteen, composed of high-level representatives with responsibilities in the
formulation of their countries' trade policies, was established on a provisional basis in 1975 to help
GATT's contracting parties carry out some of their major responsibilities more effectively. See GATT
Decision of the Council of 11 July 1975, GATTActivities, Geneva(1979), pp.53-55.
40
: Which is provided in the AnnexfEntitled Agreed Description ofthe Customary Practice of the GATT in
the Field of Dispute Settlement[Article XXIII:2]) to the 1979 Understanding. See GATT BISD, 26th
Supplement! 1980), pp.215-218.
41
: Rule 11 of the 1979 Understanding states: "...The members of a panel would preferably be
governmental..." Rule 13 states: "In order to facilitate the constitution of panels, the Director-General
should maintain an informal indicative list of governmental and non-governmental persons qualified in the
fields of trade relations, economic development, and other matters covered by the General Agreement, and
who could be available for serving on panels..." See GATT BISD, 26th Supplement(1980), p.212.
42: See Jackson, Davey and Sykes: Legal Problems ofInternational Economic Relation, third edition, West
Publishing Co.(1995), p.362.
43
: For example, United States—European Communities Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers ofOilseeds and RelatedAnimal-Feed Protein. See Pierre Pescatore, supra note 36, p. 108.
44: See Pierre Pescatore, supra note 3 6, pp. 114-116.
45: Article 111:2 of GATT 1947 states: "The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or
other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products..." See supra note 1.
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examine this proof. It noted that: "there was no case in the history of the GATT in which
a contracting party had successfully rebutted the presumption that a measure infringing
obligations causes nullification and impairment." It then also noted that: "although the
CONTRACTING PARTIES had not explicitly decided whether the presumption.. .could
be rebutted, the presumption had in practice operated as an irrefutable presumption." The
panel said that GATT Article 111:2, first sentence "obliges the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to establish certain competitive conditions for imported products in relation to
domestic products. Unlike some other provisions in the General Agreement, it does not
refer to trade effects.. .A change in the competitive relationship contrary to that provision
must consequently be regarded ipso facto as a nullification or impairment of benefits
accruing under the General Agreement." Therefore, the panel concluded: "The
circumstance that the tax differential was so small that its trade effects were minimal or
nil, as was alleged by the United States, was no rebuttal of this presumption, which came
close in practice to an irrefutable presumption. In any case, the impact of a measure
inconsistent with the General Agreement is not relevant for a determination of
impairment. The basic rationale of GATT Article 111:2, like the rationale of Article XI, is
to protect expectations not of export volumes, but of the competitive relationship between
imported and domestic products. Unlike some other provisions in the General
Agreement, GATT Article 111:2 does not refer to trade effects. A change in the
competitive relationship contrary to that provision must consequently be regarded in that
respect as. an impairment ofbenefits in the sense of GATT Article XXIII."46
When one reflects on this evolving history of the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism, some generalisations seem both apparent and quite remarkable. With very
meagre treaty language as a start, plus divergent alternative views about the policy goals
of the system, the GATT, like so many other human institutions, to some extent took on a
life of its own. Regarding both the dispute procedures(a shift from working parties to
panels), and the substantive focus of the system(a shift from general ambiguous ideas
about "nullification or impairment" to more analytical or "legalistic" approaches to the
interpretation of rules of treaty obligation), the GATT dispute settlement mechanism
moved in the direction to a more rule-oriented goal. The super-fund case may be a high-
water in this regard, since it arguably turns the treaty language "on its head": by stating
that a "prima facie case" cannot be rebutted, it makes the presumption that "nullification
or impairment" derives ipso facto from a violation, thus almost discarding the
"nullification or impairment" concept in favour of a focus on whether or not a "violation"
or "breach" of obligation exists. The GATT jurisprudence was therefore, through the
gradual case-by-case development of the dispute settlement mechanism, brought almost
in full circle at the time when the World Trade Organisation was established.47
46
: In the view of the author, the panel has gone a little farther on this point, because neither the 1979
Understanding nor its Annex explicitly states that "the presumption that a measure infringing obligations
causes nullification and impairment cannot be rebutted." This deliberation can be deemed as a high-water
of the GATT approach to the rule-orientation.
47
: Article I of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation{hereinafter as the
WTO Agreement) states: "The World Trade Organisation(hereinafter referred to as "the WTO") is
established." Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement states: "Except as otherwise provided under this
Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures
and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies
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Section Two The Rationale for a Rule-Orientation and the Pragmatism in Reality
5.2.1. The legal analysis of and the rationale for a rule-orientation
The approaches which the WTO Members48 adopt in dealing with trade disputes are
essential to a good functioning of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This requires
a close correlation and an optimal balance between a rule-oriented approach and a
pragmatic approach —between the multilateral legal order and Members' national trade
interests. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism has both the juridical and pragmatic
features. On the one hand, the Dispute Settlement Understanding50 contains detailed rule-
oriented provisions inspired by the basic WTO principles and, on the other hand, flexible
procedures concerning developing country and least-developed country Members reflect
a recognition of the current political reality.51
The phrase "rule-orientation" is used here to contrast with phrases such as "rule of
law", and "rule-based system". Rule-orientation implies a less rigid adherence to the
"rules" and connotes some fluidity in the rule approaches,52 which seems to accord with
the current reality(especially when it needs to accommodate some bargaining or
negotiation between the developing and developed country Members). Phrases that
emphasise too much the strict application of rules sometimes scare the policy-makers,
especially those from developing and the least-developed countries which have fewer
"bargaining chips" in hand, although, in reality, the different phrases may amount to the
same thing. Any legal system must contain some inherent ambiguities of its rules which
may accommodate the constant changes of practical needs of human society. The focal
point is that the procedures of rule application, which often centre on a dispute settlement
established in the framework of GATT 1947." This reflects the continuity from the GATT to the WTO in
the approach of rule-orientation. See supra note 1.
48
: Explanatory note (a) of GATT 1994 states: "The reference to 'contracting party' in the provisions of
GATT 1994 shall be deemed to read 'Member'. The references to 'less-developed contracting party' and
'developed contracting party' shall be deemed to read 'developing country Member' and 'developed
country Member'. The reference to 'Executive Secretary' shall be deemed to read 'Director-General of the
WTO'." See supra note 1.
49
: In the Article The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution(Ra.rvard International Law Journal, Vol.40,
1999, No.2, pp.333-377), professor Joel P. Trachtman put forward a formula of rales versus standards, in
which he defines that "a law is a 'rale' to the extent that it is specified in advance of the conduct to which it
is applied", while "a standard establishes general guidance to both the person governed and the person
charged with applying the law but does not, in advance, specify in detail the conduct required or
proscribed". These references can be used to explain correspondingly the approaches which the WTO
takes: rale-oriented approach and pragmatic approach. However, the pragmatic approach discussed in this
article has a broader dimension than that of the standard concept, which includes, in the WTO agreements,
not only the general guidance to encourage developing and least-developed country Members to participate
more in the global economy, but also the delays granted to them in their implementations of the WTO
agreements.
50: Which is Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement.
51
: The Articles of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which concern developing country and the least-
developed country Members, are Article 3(12), Article 4(10), Article8(10), Article 12(10), Article 12(11),
Article 21(2), Article 21(7), Article 21(8), Article 27(2). See supra note 1.
52
: Although the developing and developed country Members will eventually implement WTO rales on the
same parameters, many of the multilateral agreements grant some years of delay for developing and least-
developed country Members in their implementations of these rales. This, in the words of professor
Thomas M. Franck, is a combination of legitimacy and distributive justice. See Thomas M. Franck:
Fairness in International Law and Institution, Oxford: Clarendon Press(1995).
149
mechanism, should be designed so as to promote as much as possible the stability and
predictability of the rules and laws.53 For this purpose, the dispute settlement mechanism
must be both legitimate and reasonably efficient.54
For a long time before the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT had been blamed
for its inefficiency and lack of transparency in dealing with international trade disputes.55
There were neither explicit procedures for the disputing parties to abide by, nor assumed
procedures to implement the adopted recommendations and rulings.56 The frequent
blocking of panel reports by the losing party was its fatal weakness.57 This situation,
however, has been changed fundamentally with the establishment of the World Trade
Organisation and its new dispute settlement mechanism under the auspices of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. Article 23(1) of the DSU states: "When Members seek the
redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under
the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures
of this Understanding." The Dispute Settlement Understanding, for the first time,
provides a set of procedures for both parties to a dispute to proceed with clear rights and
obligations. The time-frame ensures the efficiency and predictability of a dispute
settlement. The standing Appellate Body is the place where the issues of law and
interpretations will be examined if any party to a dispute decides to appeal the panel
33
: According to Trachtman, rules are generally thought to provide greater predictability. There are two
moments at which to consider predictability. The first moment refers to the persons subject to the law to be
able to plan and conform their conducts with law ex ante. The second moment in which predictability is
important is ex post, after the relevant conducts have taken place. The predictability can reduce the cost of
rule implementation. But Trachtman further states that some degree of unpredictability may enhance the
ability of the disputing parties to bargain to a lower-cost solution. Thus, simple predictability is not the only
measure of a legal norm. One must also be concerned with the ability of the legal norm to provide
satisfactory outcomes. In economic terms, one must be concerned with the allocative efficiency of the
outcome. Joel P. Trachtman: The Domain ofWTO Dispute Resolution, see supra note 49, p.352.
54: See John H. Jackson, supra note 29, p.61.
55
: In order to strengthen the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the Punta del Este Declaration, which
marked the start of the Umguay Round negotiations, states: "In order to ensure prompt and effective
resolution of disputes to the benefits of all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and
strengthen the rules and procedures of the dispute settlement process, while recognising the contribution
that would be made by more effective and enforceable GATT rules and disciplines. Negotiations shall
include the development of adequate arrangements for overseeing and monitoring of the procedures that
would facilitate compliance with adopted recommendations." See GATTActivities( 1986), Geneva, p.23.
56
: The only reference to the implementation of recommendations or given rulings in the 1979
Understanding is Rule 22, which states: "The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall keep under surveillance
any matter on which they have made recommendations or given rulings. If the CONTRACTING
PARTIES' recommendations are not implemented within a reasonable period of time, the contracting party
bringing the case may ask the CONTRACTING PARTIES to make suitable efforts with a view to finding
an appropriate solution." See GATT BISD, 26th Supplement 1980), p.214.
57
: Point 6(i) of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding states: "...Since the tendency is to strive for
consensus, there is generally some measure of negotiation and compromise in the formulation of the
Working Party's report. The Council adopts the report. The reports of working parties are advisory
opinions on the basis of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES may take a final decision."(Emphasis
added). See GATT BISD, 26th Supplement 1980), p.217. In the GATT practice, the adoption of a panel
report needs the positive consensus, i.e. consensus of all members of the General Council, including the
losing party.
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report. The most obvious change of the new dispute settlement mechanism compared
with its predecessor in the GATT, perhaps, is the impossibility for either party to a
dispute to block the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report.59 This is a giant step in
the shift from power-orientation towards rule-orientation, although there is still much to
be improved for the new dispute settlement mechanism.60 As for the relationship between
Articles XXII, XXIII of GATT 1947 and the DSU, Article 3(1) of this Understanding
states: Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes
heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and
procedures as further elaborated and modified herein." The DSU, in other words, is the
expanded provisions of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII for dealing with trade disputes
among WTO Members. The history from the GATT to the WTO has demonstrated a fact:
that is, the more international trade develops, the more people wish to have a stable and
predictable legal system.
The increasing use of the new dispute settlement mechanism since the establishment
of the World Trade Organisation has shown that WTO Members have been determined to
constrain their power influence and accord their support in developing the rule-
orientation.
5.2.2. Pragmatism in developing the rule-orientation
As of this writing, there are altogether 144 WTO Members(excluding the European
Communities),61 together with dozens of countries and separate customs territories62
58: Article 17(6) of the DSU states: "An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the panel." See supra note 1.
59
: Contrary to the practice of the GATT, Article 16(4) of the DSU states that "Within 60 days after the
date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a
party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not
to adopt the report..." Again, Article 17(14) of the DSU stipulates that "An Appellate Body report shall be
adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by
consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to the
Members..."(Original footnotes omitted)(Emphases added). See supra note 1.
60
: Upon the need to improve the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, see J.C. Thomas and David
Palmeter: The Need for Due Process in WTO Proceedings, Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol.31, 1997, No.l,
pp.45-57; Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha: World Trade Dispute Settlement and the Exhaustion of Local
Remedies Rule, Journal of World Trade, Vol.30, 1996, No.4, pp.105-130; Nick Covelli: Public
International Law and Third Party Participation in WTO Panel Proceedings, Journal of World Trade,
Vol.33, 1999, No.2, pp.125-139; Jonathan I. Charney: Third Party Dispute Settlement and International
Law, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law(1997-98), Vol.36, pp.65-89; Edwini Kessie: Enhancing
Security and Predictability for Private Business Operators under the Dispute Settlement System of the
WTO, Journal of World Trade, Vol.34, 2000, No.6, pp. 1-17; Panel discussion moderated by Petros C.
Mavroidis and others: Is the WTO Dispute SettlementMechanism Responsive to the Needs of the Traders?
Would a System ofDirect Action by Private Parties Yield Better Results? Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol.32,
1998, No.2, pp.147-165; David Palmeter: The WTO Appellate Body Needs Remand Authority, Journal of




: According to Article XII: 1 of the WTO Agreement, "Any State or separate customs territory possessing
full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided in this
Agreement and Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed
between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements annexed thereto." Therefore, the WTO Members include not only the sovereign States, but the
separate customs territories like Hong Kong, Macao etc. See supra note 1.
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waiting for their WTO membership. In such a universal institution with its Members of
so diversified political and economic backgrounds, ranging from the richest to the poorest
in the economic sense, and from almost the biggest to the smallest in the geographic
sense, it is almost impossible to demand all WTO Members to apply a dispute settlement
mechanism on the same parameter without leaving any flexibility. The drafters of the
WTO Agreement understood that, if a dispute settlement mechanism is administered in a
rigid manner, or if it is proved impervious to change, this legal system will meet the
resistance from some of the Members, and then gradually lose its influence upon them in
making their trade policies. The task for the drafters is to find an optimal balance between
a strictly juridical pursuit of the basic GATT/WTO principles and a pragmatic
recognition of the political and economic realities.
Pragmatism in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism manifests itself in many
different ways. In a broad sense, it can operate generally to influence WTO Members in
their approaches to different trade policies and the latest developments in international
trade relations, especially in the absence of universally accepted norms. More
specifically, pragmatism can find a basis in, and be derived from, those legal provisions
of the WTO Agreement, the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. As a result of the pragmatic and realistic approach of those drafters, a
number of particular procedures have been built into the Agreements and the
Understanding. Their purpose is to give added flexibility and to mitigate any undue
rigidity in the application of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, so as to make the
implementation of the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its covered agreements
more feasible and more practicable in terms of trade policies. For instance, the second
paragraph of the WTO Agreement Preamble states as one of the reasons for establishing
the WTO is the recognition that "there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, especially the least developed among them,63 secure a share in the
growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development." The specific provisions concerning developing countries in the DSU can
be found in the following. For example, if a complaint based on any of the covered
agreements is brought by a developing country Member against a developed country
Member, the complaining party shall have the right to invoke, as an alternative, either the
relevant provisions of the DSU, or the corresponding provisions of the GATT Decision of
5 April 196664 (DSU Article 3[12]). To the extent that there is a difference between the
rules and procedures of the DSU and the corresponding rules and procedures of that
Decision, the latter shall prevail(DSU Article 3[12]). In the consultation stages, WTO
Members should give their special attention to the particular problems and interests of
63
: The WTO recognises as least-developed countries(LDGs) those countries which have been designated
as such by the United Nations. There are currently 48 least-developed countries on the UN list, 29 ofwhich
to date have become WTO Members.(Note added).
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm
64
: This Decision is referred to in paragraphs 41-47 of the Report of the Committee on Trade and
Development. As the preamble states, this Decision is based on the recognising of the GATT contracting
parties that the impairment of trade benefits "can cause severe damage to the trade and economic
development of the least-developed contracting parties". Thus, the contracting parties affirm their resolve
to solve such problems "while taking fully into account the need for safeguarding both the present and
potential trade of the least-developed contracting parties" affected by such problems. See GATT BISD,
14th Supplement/1966), pp. 18-20.
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developing country Members(DSU Article 4[10]). When a dispute is between a
developing country Member and a developed country Member, the panel shall, if the
developing country Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a developing
country Member(DSU Article 8[ 10]). In terms of panel procedures, the time for a
developing country Member to prepare its complaint or argument may be extended if
necessary(DSU Article 12 [ 10]). Where one or more of the parties is a developing country
Member, the panel report shall explicitly indicate the form in which account has been
taken of relevant provisions on a differential and more favourable treatment for
developing country Members that form part of the "covered agreement", which have
been raised by the developing country Member in the course of the dispute settlement
procedures(DSU Article 12[ 11 ]). As for the implementation, the Dispute Settlement
Body(DSB) 5 may consider what action may be appropriate for a developing country
Member to take and what impact of an action may have upon the developing country
Member concerned(DSU Article 21 [7], [8]). Although the above provisions are hortatory
in nature, and it is difficult to asses that, to what extent, these special treatments have
benefited developing country Members in practice, they have indicated that, in the
formulation of rule-orientation, WTO Members have begun to take a pragmatic approach
towards the issues of development. Meanwhile, these provisions have provided the
guidelines for the panelists and Appellate Body members in dealing with the disputes
concerning developing country Members.
To get a balance between the rule-orientation and pragmatism has been and,, perhaps
will be, the optimal choice for the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism as the
current globalisation of world economy cannot narrow the gap between the developing
and developed countries in the feasible future. The rich are becoming richer, and the poor
are becoming poorer. This situation has brought the difficulties for any human institution
to establish a universally acceptable international trade order. On the one hand, there has
to be the necessary degree of pragmatism and flexibility to enable those difficult and
often crucial issues to be dealt with efficiently and realistically. The DSU has offered
some possibilities for a legally controlled pragmatism, and throughout the history from
the GATT to the WTO, contracting parties/country Members have responded
constructively and positively to these international economic and political situations,
without having undue regard to legal technicalities. This has been an important source of
its strength. While on the other hand, however, the dispute settlement mechanism must
not be, through the tolerance of deviations, so weakened as to deprive it of its major
functioning as a legal system. If so, it would be harmful to international trade relations.
From the economic viewpoint, the goal of a temporary deviation, to a certain extent, of
the developing country Members from the WTO rules is to enhance their economic
development, then to give them a further help to integrate into the global economy, and in
the long-term, to propel the WTO dispute settlement mechanism developing in a more
rule-oriented direction.
65
: Article IV:3 of the WTO Agreement states: "The General Council shall convene as appropriate to
discharge the responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding..." Thus, the Dispute Settlement Body is de facto the WTO General Council in another
chapeau. See supra note 1.
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5.2.3. A new international trade order with the rule-orientation concept
The WTO legal system reveals the fundamental nature of law in achieving economic
objectives. This system, after decades of evolution and refinement based on the original
GATT, has expanded the body of rules covering not only the trade of goods, but the
trade of services and those trade-related intellectual property rights, which are embodied
in GATT 1994,66 GATS and TRIPS. In the sense that a legal order follows the expression
of a generalised political will in any society to achieve an ideal existence for its members,
the WTO law and rules represent the will of all its Members upon the international trade
system, which is a subset of the international society, to achieve an ideal global economy.
This process is replete with confrontation and compromise, negotiations and mediations,
making those highly complex inter-State issues concerning the real world economic
development be simplified to schedules of concessions.67 This contracting-making
process is marked by pragmatic deals using the language of self-interest. That
notwithstanding, one is still able to observe in the last fifty years of the GATT, and now
the WTO, the progressive attainment of a systemic legal ideal.
When the International Trade Organisation(ITO) became stillborn because of the US
Congress's refusal to ratify the 1947 Havana Charter, the GATT maintained a focus on
the removal of tariff barriers, in large part motivated by a desire to avoid the destructive
consequences of trade protectionism. There was a generation of historians, economists,
trade specialists, diplomats and sundry experts who believed, with a passion, that national
protectionism caused war.68 They built the GATT with a "never again" zeal which helped
to sustain the organisation when it was small and often neglected by powerful political
entities. The detailed, laborious work of negotiating concessions always had the support
of declared ideals albeit often couched in the sparse, disciplined language of classic
economics.
The GATT's history and the first few years' practice of the WTO have demonstrated
that economic interdependence, globalisation and more open participatory democracies
are contemporary tenors which demand a critical evaluation of the World Trade
Organisation. The WTO is a new institution and is still in its development. It should cope
with the current trend of globalisation, under which, it will, through its law-making and
practice, play an important role in developing a new international trade order. The
progressive reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade has greatly increased
international trade volume, promoted global economic interdependence, and most
importantly, increased the capacity of WTO Members to exchange goods and services
across their national borders so that the concept of the "global market" is now actual.69
66
: GATT 1994 consists of: (a)GATT 1947; (b)the provisions of the legal instruments that have entered
into force under GATT 1947 before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, (c)six
Understandings; (d)the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994. Therefore, the coverage of GATT 1994 is
bigger than that ofGATT 1947. See supra note 1.
67
: The results of the Uruguay Round negotiations are embodied in a "document" of some 26,000 pages.
Most of these pages are detailed schedules of tariffs, service trade and other concessions.
68: In the view of the drafters of GATT 1947, one of the reasons leading to the World War II is the global
trade protectionism which made the economy ofmany countries collapse in the pre-war years. See Michael
J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, supra note 10, pp.20-21.
69
: In the Article Towards a True Transitional Iaw(Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol.29, 1995, No.3, pp.83-
90), professor Alberto Tita described that: "From international investment to international trade, from
international business to international indebtedness, the international community has seen the rise of a
network of relations such as to configure, both in terms of quantity and quality, a truly global market."
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The pressure upon the WTO as an international institution to accommodate traditional
notions of sovereignty, and at the same time, to respond to the real world fact of
globalisation and increased economic interdependence, is reflected in the conflicts among
its Members which, eventually, find their way to resort to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.
The new dispute settlement mechanism is now serving as the basis to ensure the
implementation of the WTO Agreement and its covered agreements. After reviewing its
first few years practice, one can readily see its attractiveness: compulsory jurisdiction,70
clear procedural steps towards resolution, a swift procedural timetable,71 fact finding and
adjudication combined in a panel process,72 the chance to appeal on a point of law or the
legal interpretations of the panel report to the newly created Appellate Body,73 and the
availability ofmeaningful and significant compensation and suspension of concession.74
No other juridical order in an international institution so far can compete with that of the
WTO on these terms.
Looking back on the first few years' practice of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, one can draw the following conclusions. Firstly, there is a dramatic increase
in the number of cases coming before the new dispute settlement mechanism. This is a
very important trend since the good functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism in a
new institution is founded on the confidence put to it by its members. The cases under the
new dispute settlement mechanism are mainly brought by those major economic powers,
particularly the United States and the European Communities, against each other. But
notably, there is also a greater participation by developing countries, both against other
developing countries and against developed countries. Secondly, as a result of the more
binding and automatic process elaborated by the DSU, there is a strong incentive for the
disputing parties to negotiate mutually acceptable solutions within the WTO dispute
70
: Article 2 of the DSU states: "The Dispute Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these
mles and procedures and, except as otherwise provided in a covered agreement, the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements. Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to
establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of
rulings and recommendations, and authorise suspension of concessions and other obligations under the
covered agreements..." See supra note 1.
71
: See Appendix 3(Working Procedures) and Appendix 4(Expert Review Groups) of the DSU. See supra
note 1. See also Working proceduresfor appellate review, cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_3
72
: Article 11 of the DSU states that "...a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before
it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with
the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements..." See supra note 1.
73 Article 16(4) of the DSU states that "...If a party has notified its decision to appeal, the report by the
panel shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after completion of the appeal..." Article 17(6)
of the DSU states that "An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel." See supra note 1.
74: Article 3(7) of the DSU states that".. .In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of
the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are
found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements. The provision of
compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and
as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a covered
agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to the Member invoking the dispute
settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-a-vis the other Member, subject to authorisation
by the DSB of such measures." See supra note 1.
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settlement mechanism.75 In fact, the first trade dispute after the new dispute settlement
mechanism was set up was settled between Singapore and Malaysia without invoking the
panel process.76 This tendency bodes well for a multilateral trading system, as the
primary objective of a dispute settlement mechanism is to prompt the resolution of
disputes. Thirdly, it is clear that WTO Members are showing a strong inclination to use
the new dispute settlement mechanism rather than the alternatives of resorting to
unilateral measures or bilateral arrangements outside the multilateral trade rules. Even in
some politically sensitive cases, like EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products{Hormones)77 and United States—The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
/Icf(Helms-Burton Act),78 albeit that this Act itself is arguable, parties on both sides used
the rules and procedures of the DSU to resolve their dispute. Last but not least, the
developing country Members are taking their obligations seriously, and are actively
seeking to enforce the rights and obligations vis-a-vis others under the WTO jurisdiction.
This tendency is very positive for the new global trade order.
The combination of equal commitments to the agreed trade rules together with some
flexibility in the implementation of these rules is the key to success for the WTO in
building a respected and credible dispute settlement mechanism, which has helped to
establish a new international trade order. What is clear is that WTO Member
governments now have their choices: they can either use diplomatic means to deal with
disputes in a mutually acceptable manner, or they can choose the more judicial route by
bringing their disputes to the panels and, ultimately, to the Appellate Body. As is the case
in all litigation, complaints are sometimes brought for the purpose of obtaining a leverage
to achieve the negotiated objectives. This is particularly beneficial to some small
developing countries, as without the rules and procedures of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism and the extensive obligations stipulated in the covered agreements, they
would not have the necessary bargaining power face-to-face the developed countries. The
active participation of the developing countries in the new dispute settlement mechanism
73
: This is in conformity with the objectives of the DSU. Article 3(7) of the DSU states that "...The aim of
the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually
acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be
preferred..." See supra note 1.
76: See WTO Focus Newsletter, No.3, p. 15.
77
: See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat TVor/McA(Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body
(distributed on 16 January 1998), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R.
78
: See United States—The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity /lc/(complained by the European
Communities on 3 October 1996), WT/DS398. A panel was established on 20 November 1996. It
suspended work on 25 April 1997 at the request of the EC. The Helms-Burton Act or the "Cuba Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996" contains provisions under which any individuals or companies that
"trafficked" in property confiscated by the Cuba government on or after 1 January 1959 can be sued for
damages in US courts and provisions regarding the denial of entry to the United States of foreign nationals
"trafficking" in such property. See WTO Focus Newsletter, No. 11, p.7. At the EU-US summit on 18 May
1998, the parties resolved their dispute through negotiations. The parties agreed on (l)the establishment of
the Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation, which would promote the more effective attainment
of shared goals through economic and political cooperation; and (2)a package relating to the Act, by which
the United States would limit the impact of certain provisions on European companies and citizens. In
return, the European Union agreed to freeze any further action in the WTO on the alleged US violation of
the organisation's rules through the implementation of this Act. See Stefaan Smis and Kim Van der Borght:
The EU-US Compromise on the Helms-Burton and D'Amato Acts, The American Journal of International
Law, Vol.93, 1999, p.231.
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is a good omen signalling that more and more Member countries are determined to ensure
their compliance with the WTO rules and to work within the WTO legal system. Mr.
Renato Ruggiero, the former WTO Director-General, summarised the significance of this
rule-orientation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as the following: "The
attention that the WTO dispute settlement system now receives from the world at large is
evidence of its importance and relevance, and this can only increase as trade issues
intersect more frequently with other public concerns. Everyone recognises, at the dawn of
the third millennium, that rule of law must become the main pillar of an improved
management of our globalising world."79 True as it is, the WTO dispute settlement body,
through constant practice and improvement since its inception, has already developed
into a unique international tribunal, where the rule of law is becoming the legal basis of
the jurisdiction.
Section Three Rule-Orientation Under the WTO Jurisdiction
5.3.1, The uniqueness of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism
There is a widespread assumption that in a successful legal system, disputes80 should
be avoided, or at least resolved quickly and peacefully. Different international institutions
have their different dispute settlement mechanisms. Some of them settle disputes through
judicial means, while others fulfil this through quasi-judicial means or arbitration. Each
has its own procedures in resolving the disputes. Since it was established, the World
Trade Organisation has drawn a lot of academic study on its legal system, its impact upon
the international trade order, and its relationships with developing countries. However,
what fascinates scholars most is still the uniqueness of its dispute settlement mechanism.
In the World Trade Organisation, there is no formal judicial body like the International
Court of Justice(ICJ) of the United Nations, but the trade disputes can be settled swiftly,
and the recommendations and rulings made by panels or the Appellate Body(after they
are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body) are binding on both parties to the dispute.81
Although the WTO is only a newly-established institution, its dispute settlement
mechanism has already won the support from both the developed and developing country
Members. To sum up, there are at least four aspects which distinguish the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism from its counterparts of other international institutions.
The first different aspect is the premise on which a dispute can be brought to the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body(DSB), which is the permanent body to deal with trade
disputes between WTO Members. The procedures for the settlement of disputes arising
79
: Excerpts from Mr. Renato Ruggiero's parting statement to the WTO General Council on 14 April,
1999. See WTO Focus Newsletter, No.40, p.3.
80: John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, both from Cambridge, have given us a clear definition about disputes.
They define that the term "dispute" is used to "signify a specific disagreement relating to a question of
rights or interests in which the parties proceed by way of claims, counter-claims, denials and so on . A
dispute is different from a conflict which is "a general state of hostility between the parties . Conflicts may
still exist even after disputes have been resolved. See John Collier and Vaughan Lowe: The Settlement of
Disputes in International Law, Oxford University Press(1999), p.l.
81
: In view of the characteristics and nature of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the author of this thesis
defines the DSB as a "quasi-judicial" body.
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under the GATT,82 and now under the WTO83 that has replaced it, are remarkable for
their departure from the general principle that disputes resolved by formal mechanism
should be settled on the basis of what is an essentially retrospective analysis of the rights
and obligations of the parties at the time that the dispute arose. Different from this tenet,
the GATT/WTO system proceeds by an analysis of whether benefits(rather than rights)
that the parties expected to derive from the substantive rules of GATT 1947(now the
WTO agreements including GATT 1994) have been nullified or impaired, or the
achievement of any objective of the relevant agreement is being impeded, and then to an
essentially prospective analysis of what measures might produce a workable solution to
the dispute for the future. A more obvious difference is the non-violation complaints in
the WTO dispute settlement procedures. Article XXIII(l) of GATT 1994 states: "If any
contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any
objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of...(b)the application by
another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions
of this Agreement.. .the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment
of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or
parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall
give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it."84 The non¬
violation complaints originated from GATT 1947, but now it has been practically
applicable to all other WTO agreements. Article 26(1) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding states: "...Where and to the extent that such party considers and a panel
or the Appellate Body determines that a case concerns a measure that does not conflict
with the provisions of a covered agreement to which the provisions of paragraph 1 (b) of
Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable, the procedures in this Understanding shall
apply..."85 This wide regulated dimension reflects a fact that the World Trade
Organisation applies the dispute settlement mechanism not only to deal with those claims
of violation of trade rules, but to maintain a proper balance between the rights and
obligations of its Members.86
Connected with the foregoing analysis is the right to a bring a complaint to the
Dispute Settlement Body. This is the second distinctive aspect of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. International institutions, like the United Nations, tend to require
an agreement between the disputing parties on the terms of dispute settlement before their
82
: A useful overview of the development of the GATT and the WTO dispute settlement system can be
found in John H. Jackson: Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, Journal of International
Economic Law, No.l, 1998, p.329.
83
: See John H. Jackson: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, second edition, MIT,
Cambridge, Massachusetts(1997); John H. Jackson, W. J. Davey and A. O. Sykes: Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations, third edition, St Paul, Minnesota(1995); A. Qureshi: The World Trade
Organisation, Manchester University Press(1996).
84
: See supra note 1.
85
: Id, see Articles 22, 26 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Upon the detailed analysis of non¬
violation provisions and cases, see the third part in this section.
: Article 3(3) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states: "The prompt settlement of situations in
which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered
agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the effective
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of
Members." See supra note 1.
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judicial bodies initiate the dispute settlement procedures. This is the heritage from
arbitration. Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations states: "The parties to any
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
or other peaceful means of their own choice."87 The Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations further states: "...In seeking such a
settlement the parties shall agree upon such peaceful means as may be appropriate to the
circumstances and nature of the dispute. The parties to a dispute have the duty, in the
event of failure to reach a solution by any one of the above peaceful means, to continue to
seek a settlement of the dispute by other peaceful means agreed upon by them."88 While
the Dispute Settlement Understanding only requires a WTO Member to "exercise its
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful" before it brings
a case to the DSB(Article 3[7]). In other words, the invocation of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism is not necessarily based on the agreement of the disputing parties.
In view of the lenient wording in the UN Charter and other international agreements, to
bring a case for settlement in the WTO seems almost an automatic action.89 Furthermore,
each stage of the dispute settlement in the WTO, from the establishment of the panel to
the implementation of rulings and recommendations, is clearly timed, making this
proceeding more practicable and predictable.90
Then comes the third distinctive aspect of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism,
which is the appealing process carried out in the Appellate Body. In the strict sense, the
Appellate Body is not a judicial body. At most, it may be regarded as a quasi-judicial
body. So the persons who are serving the Appellate Body are not "judges", but
"members". The seven members, unlike the judges of the ICJ who are elected by the
General Assembly and the Security Council,91 are appointed by the Dispute Settlement
Body,92 and their term is much shorter(four years) compared with that of the ICJ
judges(nine years). Again, unlike the judges of the ICJ who are bound, unless they are on
leave or prevented from attending by illness or other serious reasons, to hold themselves
permanently at the discharge of the Court,93 the Appellate Body members are not
87: See supra note 2.
88: Id.
89
: Although Article XXII of GATT 1994 and Article 4 of the DSU require a WTO Member to hold
consultations first with any other Member concerned if a dispute arises, this, however, will not prevent the
requesting Member from bringing the case to the further stages of dispute settlement procedures. If the
requested Member does not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request, or does not enter
into consultations within a period of no more than 30 days, or a period otherwise mutually agreed, after the
date of receipt of the request, then the requesting Member may proceed directly to request the
establishment of a panel. If the consultations fail to settle a dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt
of the request for consultations, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. The
complaining party may request a panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider
that consultations have failed to settle the dispute. In cases of urgency, the consultation period is only 20
days. Id.
90
: See Articles 12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
91
: See Article 4(1) of the Statute ofthe International Court ofJustice. See supra note 2.
92
: See Article 17(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
93: See Article 23(3) of the Statute ofthe International Court ofJustice. See supra note 2.
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required to reside at Geneva. They are only required "to be available at all times and on
short notice" and "to stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant
activities of the WTO".94 As a general rule, the Appellate Body proceedings will not
exceed 60 days(in exceptional situations 90 days).95 Compared with that of the ICJ where
a case may drag on several years before settlement, this proceeding is quite short.
However, all these above factors will not reduce the binding effect of the decisions made
by the Appellate Body. Article 17(14) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states:
"An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by
the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate
Body report within 30 days following its circulation to the Members."96 It can be
expected that no winning party will join the consensus to block the adoption of the
Appellate Body report. In light of the enforcement under the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism,97 the Appellate Body report may bring much impact upon the governments
of the disputing parties in their policy-making. Compared with this, the decision made by
the ICJ cannot be regarded as so "straightforward". Article 94(2) of the Charter of the
United Nations provides that "If a party to a case fails to perform the obligations
incumbent upon it under a judgement rendered by the Court, the other party may have
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgement."98
The fourth distinctive aspect of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is its
potential impact upon the developing country Members. Seldom can so many provisions
particularly made for developing country Members be found in any other dispute
settlement mechanisms as they are in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Of the
total 27 articles of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, seven articles contain
provisions according special and preferential treatment to the developing country
Members.99 Among them, Article 24 accords particular considerations to the least-
developed country Members when they participate in the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. Although most of these provisions are procedural rather than substantial,
they reflect a fact that the issue of developing countries is among the fundamental ones in
the WTO. The other significance of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, from the
developing countries' perspective, is its adjudicative nature. It is generally believed that
the rule-based adjudicative method of dispute settlement in the WTO is more beneficial
to developing countries than a negotiation-based and non-adjudicative one. In the view of
professor John Jackson, "power positions" and "bargaining chips" play a great role in the
negotiation-based dispute settlement process. Hence, they may not be of great interest to
weaker developing country Members with lesser trade leverage.100 Emphasis on
negotiations is likely to lead some countries to use their relative political and economic
strength to take advantage of this process at the expense of weaker countries, a situation
94
: See Article 17(3) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
95: Id, see Article 17(5).
96
: Id.
97: Upon the detailed analysis of enforcement under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, see the fourth
part in this section.
98: See supra note 2.
99: They are Article 3(12), Article 4(10), Article 8(10), Article 12(10),(11), Article 21(2),(7),(8), Article 24,
and Article 27(2). See supra note 1.
100
: JohnH. Jackson: The World Trading System, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts(1989), pp.85-86.
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fundamentally incompatible with a system that places much importance on the law of
rules. Rules tend to treat everyone in the same fashion. This is probably why smaller
countries often support a legalistic system, as they perceive they will be treated more
fairly under such a system.
The list of the distinctive features of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can not
be exhaustive. Nevertheless, the above mentioned four aspects are the most prominent
ones. The WTO is a new institution. Its dispute settlement mechanism has made only a
short history of no more than one decade and, still needs practice and improvement.
However, the dispute settlement mechanism has already attracted both the developed and
developing country Members. This is a positive tendency. The following study, starting
from the inherent cohesion between GATT Articles XXII, XXIII and the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, will further the review of how the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism operates from the developing country perspective.
5.3.2. The inherent cohesion between GATT Articles XXII, XXIII and the Dispute
Settlement Understanding
As part of the "single package"101 accomplished during the Uruguay Round
negotiations, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is an indispensable instrument to the
legal frame of the World Trade Organisation.102 GATT 1947 was originally designed to
be set in the Charter of the International Trade Organisation(ITO), which would have
provided detailed procedures for the dispute settlement.103 Because of the failure of the
ITO, Article XXII and Article XXIII of GATT 1947 had been used as the backbone of
the GATT dispute settlement mechanism in the evolution from the power-orientation
towards the rule-orientation for almost four decades until they were incorporated into the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Meanwhile, the GATT jurisprudence developed
through all these years' panel deliberations. With only a few new additional elements, the
DSU is just like the crystallised work of these four decades' practice within the GATT
jurisdiction. Therefore, it is only natural that there still remains some inherent cohesion
between Articles XXII, XXIII ofGATT 1947 and the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Article 3(1) of the DSU reflects such a cohesion, which states: "WTO Members affirm
their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied under
101
: Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement states: "The agreements and associated legal instruments included
in Annexes 1, 2 and 3(hereinafter referred to as 'Multilateral Trade Agreements') are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members." Article XII: 1 states: "Any State or separate customs territory
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on
terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto."(Emphasis added). See supra note 1. Therefore, upon the
accession to the WTO, a State or a separate customs territory must accept the WTO Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements as a "single package".
102
: According to Article 1 of the DSU, the rules and procedures of this Understanding apply to the
disputes brought pursuant to the consultations and dispute settlement provisions of the WTO Agreement, the
Multilateral Trade Agreements, Plurilateral Trade Agreements(which apply to those Members who have
accepted them) and the DSU taken in isolation or in combination with any other agreement. See supra note
1.
103
: See the detailed descriptions in the first paragraph ofPart Three, Section one of this Chapter.
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Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and procedures as further
elaborated and modified herein."104
Article XXII: 1 of GATT 1947 stipulates consultation as the precondition to start a
dispute settlement process, which states that "each contracting party shall accord
sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation
regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting party with respect
to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement." However, GATT Articles
provide no further detailed procedures for the parties to a dispute for their
consultations.105 Under such circumstances, paragraphs 1 to 9 of DSU Article 4 not only
specify the obligations for WTO Members to seek consultations as the first step towards a
settlement for their trade disputes, but also provide explicit time frames during the
consultation stage.106 In order to make the consultations more efficient, paragraphs 7 and
8 ofDSU Article 4 set 60 days since the receipt of the request for consultations, and 20
days in urgent cases, as the time limits for consultation. This is more promptly, compared
• • 107with that stipulated in the 1979 Understanding.
When a WTO Member other than the consulting Members considers that it has
substantial trade interests in the consultations being held pursuant to Article XXII: 1 of
GATT 1994, GATS Article XXII:1,108 or the corresponding provisions in other covered
agreements,109 such Member may notify the consulting Members and the DSB, within 10
days after the request for consultations is circulated among the WTO Members, of its
desire to join in the consultations. If the request to join in the consultations is not
accepted, the requesting Member is free to start another consultation process under
104
: See supra note 1.
105
: Article XXII:2 of GATT 1947 provides the opportunity for the CONTRACTING PARTIES, at the
request of either party, to consult with any party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been
possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1 of the same Article. Again,
there are no detailed procedures for this kind of consultation.
106
: For example, a WTO Member receiving a request for consultation is required to meet two deadlines:
(a)It must respond to the request within 10 days of the receipt of such request; and(b)in that response, it
must agree to consult within 30 days after receiving such request, or within a time frame mutually agreed.
If the receiving Member does not respond within 10 days, or if it fails to start the consultation within 30
days after receiving such request or a period otherwise agreed, the Member requesting consultation may
proceed immediately to request the DSB to establish a panel.
107
: Rule 4 of the 1979 Understanding only demands the contracting parties "to respond to requests for
consultations promptly and to attempt to conclude consultations expeditiously, with a view to reaching
mutually satisfactory conclusions", but gives no time limits. See GATT BISD, 26th Supplement! 1980),
p.211.
108
: This is the enlarged scope for consultations under the WTO jurisdiction, as GATT 1947 only regulated
trade in goods. See supra note 1.
109
: The corresponding consultation provisions in the covered agreements are Agreement on Agriculture
(Article 19); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitaiy Measures(Article 11[1]);
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing(Article 8[4]); Agreement on Technical Barriers to 7/vu7e(Article
14[1]); Agreement of Trade-Related Investment Measures)Article 8); Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of GATT 7994(Article 17 [2]); Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT
1994(Article 19 [2]); Agreement on Preshipment Inspection!^Article 7); Agreement on Rules of
Origin{Axi\c\t 7); Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures^Article 6); Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measnres)Article 30); Agreement on Safeguards(Article 14); Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights(Article 64.1); and any corresponding consultation provisions in
Plurilateral Trade Agreements as determined by the compete bodies of each Agreement and as notified to
the DSB. See supra note 1.
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GATT Article XXII. 1 and Article 4 of the DSU. Therefore, if a third party wishes to
protect its own interests in a dispute settlement in progress, it can either request to join in
the consultations of other Members, or start a new one with these disputing Members.
This has never been so clearly stated either in GATT 1947 or in the 1979 Understanding.
Article XXIII of GATT 1947 is the foundation of the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism. Almost all the disputes start from the complaints of "nullification or
impairment of benefits or the impediment of attaining any objective under the General
Agreement, which are usually caused by "(a)the failure of another contracting party to
carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or(b)the application by another
contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement, or(c)the existence of any other situation."110 These three scenarios are often
described as the "violation" cases, "non-violation" cases, and other "situation" cases.
However, the concept of "nullification or impairment" is not well defined in Article
XXIII of GATT 1947. The 1979 Understanding, for the first time, codifies it as "in cases
where there is an infringement of the obligation assumed under the General Agreement,
the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case ofnullification or impairment."111
The Dispute Settlement Understanding uses the similar words as those of the 1979
Understanding. The only difference between them is that, under the WTO jurisdiction,
the concept of "nullification or impairment" applies not only to the "General
Agreement", but to any one of the "covered agreements".112 This is because the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism has a much wider regulating dimension than its
predecessor did.
While examining the three factors which bring about "nullification or impairment"
illustrated in GATT Article XXIII: 1, we may find that the first factor is easy to define.
Besides some exceptional measures like restrictions to safeguard the balance ofpayments
or for security reasons which are permissible under the WTO agreements, a failure to
carry out one's obligations under the General Agreement or any other covered agreement
is ipso facto a violation of rules and law under the GATT/WTO legal system. Under such
a complaint, the respondent Member must show that the violation does not exist,
otherwise it will lose the case. As for the second factor, however, the situation is a little
complicated since the application of a measure may not conflict with the provisions of the
General Agreement or other covered agreements, but still causes "nullification or
impairment" of others' benefits or impedes the attainment of any objective under a
relevant agreement. This may also lead to much argument between the disputing parties.
After the practice of panel deliberations under the GATT jurisprudence, the Dispute
Settlement Understanding has distinguished these two kinds of situations as "violation"
113and "non-violation" cases.
110
: Article XXIIL1 of GATT 1947. See supra note 1. Since GATT 1947 has been incorporated into GATT
1994, the application of the concept "nullification and impairment" is not limited to GATT 1947, but to all
WTO agreements. See supra note 66.
111
: 1979 Understanding, Rule 5. See GATT BISD, 26th Supplement! 1980), p.216.
112: Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 3(8). See supra note 1.
113
: The Dispute Settlement Understanding, as a whole, applies both to violation cases and non-violation
cases. Article 26(1) of the DSU, however, is a special provision which applies to non-violation cases. See
supra note 1. As for the burden of proof in the "violation" and "non-violation cases, see Part Four of this
Chapter.
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In view of the broad scope of application of violation complaints, as well as the
possible invocation of non-violation complaints, there is hardly any need for additional
"situation" complaints pursuant to Article XXIII: 1(c) of GATT 1947. The subsequent
non-invocation of this vague and outdated dispute settlement clause in the GATT practice
seems to vindicate this predicament. Because of the lack of predictable and justifiable
standards for interpreting the concept of "situation" and for adjusting the rights and
obligations under the WTO law on the basis of such a vague provision, we can anticipate
that the WTO Members will continue not to invoke GATT Article XXIII: 1(c) and not to
use this inadequate legal basis for their dispute settlement purposes.114
To draw up the Dispute Settlement Understanding is only a meaningful way to clarify
the existing provisions of GATT Articles XXII, XXIII, and to codify the decades'
practice of GATT dispute settlement. It is not designated to revise fundamentally the
previous practice. Thus, the DSU has not settled those issues which puzzled the disputing
parties even before the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Furthermore, new practice has also brought about new problems which equally merit our
attention and need our intelligence to solve them.
5.3.3. Non-violation complaint: a "panacea" or a "Pandora's box"?
Under general international law, a violation by one State of its obligation established
under international law in favour of another State or a community of States engages the
international responsibility of the defaulting State for its "internationally wrongful act"
and gives rise to "secondary" obligations and rights to legal remedies designed to ensure
the fulfilment of the breached "primary" obligations and corresponding rights and to wipe
out the consequences of the wrongful act.115 Today, one can regard State responsibility as
a general principle of international law, a concomitant of substantive rules and of the
supposition that acts and omissions may be categorised as illegal by reference to the rules
establishing rights and duties. Shortly, the law of responsibility is concerned with the
incidence and consequences of a State's illegal acts, and particularly the payment of
compensation for the loss caused. In the context of the WTO jurisdiction, the dispute
settlement mechanism has been so structured as to deal with a Member's complaint of the
nullification or impairment of its benefits, or the impediment of its attainment of any
objective under the WTO agreements, which is caused by another WTO Member's
failure to carry out its obligations. If the complained Member refuses to withdraw the
measures concerned, the WTO implementation mechanism will either authorise the
complaining Member to suspend its own concessions towards that complained Member
or help it to get a compensation.116
114
: Some scholars even suggest abolishing the "situation" complaints in the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System—International Law,
International Organisations andDispute Settlement, Kluwer Law International! 1997), p.176.
: Article 1 of the Articles on the Origin ofState Responsibility states: "Every internationally wrongful
act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." Article 3 further states: "There is an
internationally wrongful act of a State when: (a)conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable
to the State under international law; and (b)that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation
of the State." As for the existence of a breach of an international obligation, Article 16 states: "There is a
breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is
required of it by that obligation." See supra note 2.
: See Article 22(Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. See supra note 1.
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While the concept of a violation complaint and the legal obligations of the violating
contracting party had well been defined in the GATT practice, the notion of a non¬
violation complaint and the legal obligations of the violating contracting party(and now
the WTO Member) therein was and is still controversial in the State practice and legal
doctrine.
After tariff reduction, through the first GATT negotiations, was achieved, the GATT
drafters were considering how to preserve the negotiation results and prevent any
backsliding. One of the measures established is to make the tariff concessions binding on
all GATT contracting parties through Article II. Furthermore, all the contracting parties
are required to keep their concessions under GATT Article I{General Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment) and Article Tll(National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulation). Any breach of one's obligation to keep the tariff concessions will be
considered as ipso facto violating the GATT rules and, consequently, settled through
Article XXIII: 1(a) of GATT 1947. However, as pointed out previously, the GATT rules
are part of the still-born ITO legal system, they are not designated to contain the
provisions for all sorts of disputes. Therefore, the GATT drafters put Article XXIII: 1(b)
as a general provision to cope with those disputes not arising out of the breach ofGATT
rules, which is the legal source of the non-violation complaints.117
In the half-century GATT history, the dispute settlement mechanism had oscillated
between two positions or tendencies—one that encouraged minimal use of non-violation
complaints and another that advocated more extensive use ofnon-violation complaints.118
The parties in a dispute had inconsistently but naturally swung between the two positions,
depending on which position served their purposes more at a particular time. The
ambiguity in concept has induced the GATT contracting parties and now the WTO
Members to invoke the non-violation nullification or impairment provision when they
face a situation in which another contracting party/Member country does not
"technically" breach any obligation under the GATT/WTO regime, but still should be
considered "responsible" for the action. Thus, to a complainant in this situation, the non¬
violation provision is a source of hope.119
In 1985, Nicaragua requested the establishment of a panel under Article XXIII of
GATT 1947 to review certain trade measures implemented by the United States, which
were alleged to have affected Nicaragua. The terms of reference made by these two
countries explicitly instructed the Panel not to examine or judge the validity of or
117
: It is not surprising that concerns remained in the minds of the GATT 1947 drafters that GATT
contracting parties might take actions to circumvent binding tariff reductions, whose integrity could not be
fully protected by the agreement's general obligations. The fear was that this would dilute "reciprocity"
between GATT contracting parties. In view of this potential risk, the drafters of GATT 1947 devised this
expansive and ambiguous yet convenient provision. This "non-violation" provision entitled a contracting
party—even in the absence of a breach of obligations by another contracting party—to argue that its
benefits had been nullified or impaired under GATT 1947.
118
: This tension seems to elucidate the reason why the GATT failed to develop an "extensive
jurisprudence" of non-violation nullification or impairment. For a historical background of the GATT legal
system, see two books written by Robert E. Hudec: The GATT Legal System and World Trade
Diplomacy(second edition), Salem, New Hampshire: Butterworth Legal Publishers! 1990), and Enforcing
International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System, Salem, New Hampshire:
Butterworth Legal Publishers) 1993).
119
: See Sung-joon Cho: GA TT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the Achilles' Heel
ofthe Dispute Settlement Process? Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.39, 1998, No.2, p.329.
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motivation for the invocation of GATT Article XXI:(b)(iii).120 In its complaint,
Nicaragua stressed that "whether the invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii) was justified or
not, in either case benefits accruing to Nicaragua under the General Agreement had been
seriously impaired or nullified as a result of the embargo. As recognised by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in the Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the
GATT in the Field ofDispute Settlement(Article XXIII:2),nx recourse to Article XXIII
was permitted if nullification or impairment resulted from measures taken by other
contracting parties whether or not these measures conflicted with the provisions of the
General Agreement."122 As for the relationships between Article XXI and Article XXIII,
Nicaragua further stated that "it had also been recognised both by the drafters of the
General Agreement and by the CONTRACTING PARTIES that an invocation of Article
XXI did not prevent recourse to Article XXIII."123
The Panel noted that the embargo had virtually eliminated all opportunities for trade
between these two countries and that it had consequently seriously upset the competitive
relationship between the embargoed products and other directly competitive products.
Under such circumstances, the Panel noted that Article XXIII:2 would give the
CONTRACTING PARTIES essentially two options if the embargo were found to have
nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Nicaragua under the General Agreement
independent of whether or not it was justified under Article XXI. They could either
(a)recommend that the United States withdraw the embargo(or, which would amount in
the present case to the same, that the United States offer compensation), or (b)authorise
Nicaragua to suspend the application of concessions and other obligations under the
General Agreement towards the United States.124
When the Panel drafted its recommendations in this case, it came across such a
dilemma: as for the first option, the Panel was not certain how effective its
recommendations would be to the United States. It is clear from the GATT drafting
history that in case of recommendations on measures not found to be inconsistent with
the General Agreement, the contracting parties "are under no specific and contractual
obligations to accept those recommendations".125 As for the second option, the Panel
120
: Under the title Security Exceptions, Article XXI:(b)(iii) states: "Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations." See supra note 1. This is the excuse of the United States for its embargo of trade between these
two countries.
121
: This is the Annex to the 1979 Understanding, see supra note 40.(Note added).




: Article XXIII:2 of GATT 1947 partly states: "If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the
contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in
paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a
mling on the matter, as appropriate.. .If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorise a contracting party or parties to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this
Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances..." See supra note 1.
: The report of the Sixth Committee during the Havana Conference notes with respect to the power of
the Executive Board to make recommendations to member States in any matter arising under Article
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observed that, under the embargo imposed by the United States, not only all imports from
Nicaragua into the United States were prohibited, but also exports from the United States
to Nicaragua were virtually eliminated. Under these circumstances, an authorisation to
Nicaragua to suspend its trade concessions to the United States is almost meaningless.
Therefore, the Panel concluded: "even if it were found that the embargo nullified or
impaired benefits accruing to Nicaragua independent of whether or not it was justified
under Article XXI, the CONTRACTING PARTIES could, in the circumstances of the
present case, take no decision under Article XXIII:2 that would re-establish the balance
of advantages which had accrued to Nicaragua under the General Agreement prior to the
embargo. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Panel decided not to propose a
ruling in this case on the basic question of whether actions under Article XXI could
nullify or impair GATT benefits of the adversely affected contracting party.
The presumed function of non-violation complaints is to prevent the circumvention of
GATT provisions and negotiated tariff concessions through GATT consistent trade
measures. It prevents a party from withdrawing a concession de facto instead of
withdrawing it de jure in exchange for compensation or equivalent withdraws of
concessions by affected parties. The Nicaragua case shows that the resolution of a non¬
violation case can not always avoid the loss of the affected party. This is particularly true
when a dispute occurs between a small country like Nicaragua and an economic power
like the United States.
The recent Fuji—Kodak dispute shows the continuance of the ambiguous concept of
non-violation complaint under the WTO jurisdiction.127 In this dispute, the United States
argued that a series of Japanese government measures deterred access for US colour
photographic materials to the Japanese market, nullified or impaired benefits accruing to
the United States under the WTO agreements. This case again raised the question of
whether a Member country could nullify or impair benefits of another without breaching
any trade obligations. Furthermore, even if the Panel in this case believed that U.S.
benefits were nullified or impaired without any violation by the Japanese government's
regulations, it would be difficult for the Panel to make such a finding when the non¬
violation provisions in GATT 1994 and the GATS128 themselves do not directly address
93:1(b) or (c) of the Havana Charter^which corresponds to Article XXIII: 1(b) and (c) of the General
Agreement): "It was agreed that subparagraph 2(e) of Article 94 does not empower the Executive Board or
the Conference to require a Member to suspend or withdraw a measure not in conflict with the Charter".
The 1950 Working Party of the first GATT non-violation case Australia Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate
took the same view as to the powers of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. See GATT BISD, 2nd
Supplement, p. 195. In their 1982 Ministerial Declaration, the CONTRACTING PARTIES stated that the
dispute settlement process could not "add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the General
Agreement". See GATT BISD, 26th Supplement1980), p. 16.
126: See supra note 122.
127: See Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Pope/fhereinafter as Fuji—Kodak),
Request for Consultations by the United States(20 June 1996), WT/DS44/1, G/L/87; Japan—Measures
Affecting Distribution Services, Request for Consultations by the United States(21 June 1996), WT/DS45/1,
S/L/22.
128
: Article XXIII of GATS uses the similar words as that of GATT Article XXIII: 1(b), which states: "If
any Member considers that any benefits it could reasonably have expected to accrue to it under a specific
commitment of another Member under Part III of this Agreement is being nullified or impaired as a result
of the application of any measure which does not conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, it may
have recourse to the DSU..." See supra note 1.
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this issue.129 As one scholar pointed out, "if the Japanese government argues that it has
the sovereign right to implement any domestic policy as long as it observes the
international obligations under international agreements like the WTO agreements, it is
debatable whether the Panel should or could rule against Tokyo."
This persistent ambiguity of the non-violation provisions will inevitably lead to heavy
burdens on future panels. Furthermore, the uncertainties surrounding the non-violation
provisions will be exacerbated when some countries try to take advantage of this
uncertainty by seeking to apply the non-violation concept to those newly emerging areas,
such as environment and competition policies, which the current WTO law cannot
effectively regulate. From the developing countries' perspective, the non-violation clause
may operate like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, developing country Members
can complain, under the non-violation clause, of the WTO-consistent measures
implemented by some developed country Members, particularly under the provisions of
GATT Article XX(General Exceptions) and Article XXl{Security Exceptions), which,
nevertheless, have already affected the exports of some developing country Members. On
the other hand, the ambiguity in concept of those non-violation provisions will engage
developing countries in many unexpected disputes This is a disadvantage to many
developing countries, both in economic and legal terms. If the complained measure is
found to be permitted under the WTO rules, albeit the harmful effect on the exports of a
developing country Member, the consequential result will fall back to the negotiations
between the disputing parties for the possible compensation, which will put many
developing countries in a disadvantageous position as the limited varieties of and heavy
dependence on their exports make them almost have no "bargaining chips" to negotiate.
This is again reminiscent of the significance of a rule-oriented trade system to many
developing countries. In order to prevent the adverse effects of the non-violation
nullification or impairment complaints and keep the WTO legal system still on a rule-
oriented track, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be reformed in such a way
as to restrict the invocation of non-violation provisions and delimit the non-violation
concept on a more precise basis. Two options are available at the moment.
One is to encourage the WTO panels and the Appellate Body to apply the "technical
agreements"131 while interpreting the GATT provisions. The recent Hormones case
indicates this tendency. The Appellate Body did not adhere to the GATT provisions only.
While giving the conclusions in its report, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding
that the EC measures at issue were inconsistent with the requirements of Article 5(1) of
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement.132 This method will help the panel and the
Appellate Body give their deliberations on a more exact basis and reduce the controversy
on the references of the panel or Appellate Body report between the disputing parties.
u9
: On 31 March 1998, the Fuji—Kodak Panel released its final report in which it rejected almost all the
arguments made by the United States, both violation(under Article 111:4 and Article X:1 of GATT 1994)
and non-violation(under Article XXIII: 1 [b] of GATT 1994) claims. See Japan—Measures Affecting
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Panel Report (distributed on 22 April 1998), WT/DS44.
130: See Sung-joon Cho, supra note 119, p.313.
131
: Within the WTO legal system, there are some agreements, such as Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Agreement on the Implementation ofArticle VII of the GATT 1994
{Valuation for Customs Purposes), designed to cope with those complicated technical problems. See supra
note 1.
13~: See ECMeasures ConcerningMeat andMeat Products)Hormones), see supra note 77, para.253(l).
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The other is to turn some non-violation nullification or impairment complaints into
violation ones, or as some scholars advocate to violationise them.133 Under the current
WTO regime, if a measure regulated by another Member country does not explicitly
commit a breach of obligation, the Member which feels deprived of its legitimate benefits
by this measure can easily bring a non-violation nullification or impairment complaint.134
However, even if a regulatory measure is on its face not inconsistent with general
obligations under the WTO agreements, it still could have some import-restrictive impact
on the exporters, thus violating the national treatment obligation in the form of a
disguised discrimination. In other words, many future complaints that may be raised
under the non-violation provision can be interpreted as violation complaints if a panel or
the Appellate Body fully exercises its interpretative power in the context of the general
obligations embodied in the WTO agreements.136
After we have clarified the legal sources for different sorts of complaints under the
WTO jurisdiction, an efficient enforcement mechanism is the last resort to ensure the
disputes to move on a rule-based and well-defined way. However, the practice of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism in these years has made us aware that there still exist
some confusing provisions and even loopholes in the Dispute Settlement Understanding
on this issue.
5.3.4. Enforcement under the WTO jurisdiction: compensation or retaliation?
In the GATT practice, the CONTRACTING PARTIES could authorise a contracting
party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of
its(their) GATT concessions or other obligations as a sort of "sanction", if they
considered that the circumstances were serious enough to justify such "sanction"(Article
XXIII:2 of GATT 1947). However, since there are no specific provisions in GATT 1947
as to what extent the suspension of concessions is permissible and how to evaluate the
damages caused by the complained contracting party or parties, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES would give their authorisation only as they "determined to be appropriate in
the circumstances"(Article XXIII:2 of GATT 1947). In contrast to this cursory provision,
the Dispute Settlement Understanding has at least three articles to ensure the
133: See Sung-joon Cho, supra note 119, pp.333-335.
134
: See Edwin Vermulst and Bart Driessen: An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System and its
Relationship with the Uruguay RoundAgreements, Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol.29, 1995, No.2, p.136.
135
: If the panelists could read more carefully Article 111:1 of GATT 1947, which requires the internal
taxes, charges, laws and regulations of contracting parties "should not be applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic production", there would have been fewer non-violation
cases in the GATT history.
136
: In the case United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline{hereinafter as
Gasoline), the Appellate Body concluded that even if the American baseline establishment rules fell within
the terms ofArticle XX(g) of the General Agreement, they failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau
of Article XX of the General Agreement and accordingly were not justified under Article XX of the
General Agreement. Report of the Appellate Bodyfdistributed on 29 April 1996), WT/DS2/AB/R, p.29.
This is a good example that WTO juridical bodies can exercise their interpretative power to violationise at
least some of the potential non-violation cases.
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implementations of the adopted panel or Appellate Body report,137 forming an almost
complete structure to achieve the negotiated results.
Among the aforesaid three articles, Article 22 of the DSU is of paramount
importance, which defines the purpose and preconditions for compensation and
suspension of concessions. Article 22(3) is the core provision of the whole article, which
deserves a close study, not only because of its importance but of its complexity. When a
WTO Member is authorised by the DSB to suspend its concessions or other obligations
towards another Member, it should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations
with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found
a violation or non-violation nullification or impairment caused by the complained
Member(Article 22[3][a]). If the complaining Member considers that it is not practicable
or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same
sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sector(s) under
the same agreement(Article 22[3][b]). If that Member considers that it is not practicable
or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations even with respect to other
sector(s) under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are serious enough, it
may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered
agreement(Article 22[3][c]). In view of this broad applicability of WTO law, that
Member is able to find that some sort of suspension of concessions or other obligations is
always practicable or effective under this enforcement mechanism.
Then, there are several questions which need to be clarified before a WTO Member
wishes to succeed in invoking Article 22 of the DSU to protect its trade interests. The
first question is the order of invoking these provisions contained in Article 22(3).
Although there is no clear statement in this Article that these provisions should be
invoked in a hierarchical way, one can still infer from the general jurisprudence that they
are. In fact, one of the early disputes arbitrated under the WTO jurisdiction European
Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas—Recourse
to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22(6) of the AS'f/(hereinafter
as Bananas) has already given us a sound reasoning about this issue. In their final
decisions, the arbitrators stated: "We believe that the basic rationale of these disciplines
and procedures(of Article 22[3] of the DSU) is to ensure that the suspension of
concessions or other obligations across sectors or across agreements(beyond those sectors
or agreements under which a panel or the Appellate has found violations) remains the
exception and does not become the rule. In our view, if Article 22(3) of the DSU is to be
given full effect, the authority of Arbitrators to review upon request whether the
principles and procedures of subparagraphs(b) or (c) of that Article have been followed
must imply the Arbitrators' competence to examine whether a request made under
subparagraph(a) should have been made—in full or in part—under subparagraphs(b) or
(c). If the Arbitrators were deprived of such an implied authority, the principles and
procedures of Article 22(3) of the DSU could easily be circumvented. If there were no
review whatsoever with respect to requests for authorisation to suspend concessions
made under subparagraph(a), Members might be tempted to always invoke that
subparagraph in order to escape multilateral surveillance of cross-sector suspension of
137
: They are Article 21 (Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings), Article 22
(Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions) and Article 23{Strengthening of the Multilateral
System). See supra note 1.
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concessions or other obligations, and the disciplines of the other subparagraphs ofArticle
22(3) of the DSU might fall into disuse altogether."138 The arbitrators are correct in this
analysis. IfArticle 22(3) of the DSU is used at a random way, it will bear a heavy burden
on both of the disputing parties and the dispute settlement body as well to clarify which
sector(of the same agreement) or agreement is most relevant to the compensation. This is
a prolonging and, in some instances, arbitrary process. Under this circumstance, the
author of this thesis is with such a view that the same reasoning should apply when a
WTO panel or the Appellate Body makes the recommendations and rulings in its report
to the DSB to authorise the suspension of concessions or other obligations to an applying
Member.
The second question concerning Article 22 of the DSU is the nature of the suspension
of concessions or other obligations in a non-violation nullification or impairment dispute.
Article 22(1) of the DSU states that "compensation and suspension of concessions or
other obligations are temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations
and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither
compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the
covered agreements..."139 The point here is that, when a non-violation nullification or
impairment complaint is raised, there is no obligation for the complained Member to
"conform with", but only an obligation to negotiate with the complaining Member for an
appropriate compensation to redress the "nullification or impairment". Since the benefits
of the complaining Member are nullified or impaired, or the attainment of any objective
of the WTO agreements is impeded, by the measures of the complained Member, which
might not be in conflict with the provisions of the WTO agreements, there are no
obligations upon the complained Member to withdraw these measures concerned. In
other words, if an appropriate compensation from the complained Member is not
available in a non-violation nullification or impairment dispute, the suspension of
concessions or other obligations towards it by the complaining Member is defacto a sort
of retaliation.140
138
: European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas—Recourse to
Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22(6) of the DS[/(hereinafter as Bananas),
Decision by the Arbitration(distributed on 9 April 1999), WT/DS27/ARB, para.3.7.
139
: We can find the similar words in Article 3(7) of the DSU, which states: "...The aim of the dispute
settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the
parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of
mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the
withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the
covered agreements. The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal
of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which
is inconsistent with a covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to the Member
invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or
other obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-a-vis the other Member,
subject to authorisation by the DSB of such measures'." See supra note 1.
140
: The nature of a suspension of concessions or other obligations in a violation nullification or
impairment dispute is a little complicated. Since the measures of the complained Member has breached its
general obligations under the WTO agreements, the author of this thesis takes the suspension of
concessions or other obligations in such circumstances as a sort of compensation. For example, when
someone has committed a criminal offence that caused personal injury , loss, or damage, and he has been
convicted for his offence or it was taken into account when sentencing for another offence, the court may
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Apart from these aforesaid conceptual questions, there is another "sequencing"
problem which may bring about disputes in the implementation of adopted reports or
arbitration awards. Article 22 of the DSU allows the complaining Member in a dispute to
suspend its concessions or other obligations when the complained Member has failed to
comply with the decisions of an adopted report or arbitration award. However, this article
is silent on two critical points: (a)who determines whether the complained party has
failed to comply; and (b)when the right to suspend (or retaliate) arises.
According to Cherise Valles and Brendan McGivern, these two issues were the
essential points in the dispute between the United States and the European Communities
over the implementation of the Bananas decision. The United States claimed that the EC
had failed to implement the Bananas rulings and recommendations, and therefore sought
WTO authorisation to suspend its concessions or other obligations towards the European
Communities and its member States. The EC argued strongly that the United States had
not followed the "sequencing" principle required by the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. In the view of the European Communities, a multilateral determination of
non-conformity had to precede any request to suspend concessions or obligations. Similar
arguments occurred in some later cases like the Canada-Australia dispute over salmon,
the US-Australia dispute over leather subsidies, and the two cases between Canada and
Brazil on aircraft subsidies.141
These arguments originate from the ambiguous wording of Article 21(5) of the DSU,
which states: "Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings
such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement procedures,
including wherever possible resort to the original panel. The panel shall circulate its
report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it. When the panel
considers that it cannot provide its report within this time frame, it shall inform the DSB
in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within
which it will submit its report."142 The point here is that the Dispute Settlement
Understanding does not say clearly whether the dispute settlement procedure mentioned
in Article 21(5) is a special one. In other words, it is not stated in the DSU whether the
preliminary procedures before the dispute is referred to the panel could be eliminated,
and how to deal with this panel report if the complained party, in the view of the
complaining party, fails again to comply with the recommendations and rulings after the
panel report is circulated. Thus, there will presumably be such arguments as whether the
consultation process, as stipulated in Article 4 of the DSU, should precede this dispute
settlement procedure, and whether the panel report concluded under this procedure could
be appealed. In order to avoid unnecessary prolongation of the dispute settlement
procedures, Article 21(5) should be precise on this point.
The other point concerning these arguments is whether the adoption of the panel
report under this dispute settlement procedure is the precondition for the complaining
Member to request from the DSB the suspension of concessions and other obligations.
make a compensation order requiring the offender to pay compensation to the person suffering the
loss(with interest, if need be). See Oxford Dictionary of Law, Oxford University Press(Fourth edition),
1997, p.90.
141
: See Cherise M. Valles and Brendan P. McGivern: The Right to Retaliate under the WTO Agreement—
The "Sequencing" Problem, Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol.34, 2000, No.2, p.63.
142: See supra note 1.
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Article 22(2) of the DSU only states: "If the Member concerned fails to bring the
measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or
otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of
time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so
requested, and no later than the expiration of the reasonable period of time, enter into
negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a
view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation
has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiration of the reasonable period of
time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request
authorisation from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements."143 If the answer to this
question of precedence is positive, which means that the complaining Member cannot
request suspension of concessions and other obligations during this dispute settlement
procedure and, even in another "reasonable period" after the adoption of the panel report
concluded under this procedure, then the complained Member could possibly make
successive minor changes to its implementing measures and start such a dispute
settlement procedure one after another. This could result in an endless loop of litigation.
In the view of the author of this thesis, the right for the complaining Member to
suspend(or retaliate) should start 20 days after the expiration of the reasonable period if
no satisfactory compensation has been agreed. If the dispute is referred to the panel
according to Article 21(5) of the DSU, this right should start after the Panel report is
adopted without the possibility of being appealed. In other words, this sort of review is
only limited to the panel(if possible the original panel) and can be invoked only once. If
the disputing parties still cannot agree on the compliance of the measures implemented
by the complained party with the recommendations and rulings of the adopted panel or
Appellate Body report, the complaining party can suspend its concessions or other
obligations towards the complained party according to its understanding of the panel or
Appellate Body report. In that case, the complained party may start a new dispute
settlement procedure if it considers that its benefits are nullified or impaired in this
suspension of concessions or obligations.
Article 22(4) of the DSU states that "the level of suspension of concessions or other
obligations authorised by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment." In other words, the level of suspension of concessions is counted in
quantity, not in consequence, of the nullification and impairment. This builds into the
WTO a considerable asymmetry of compensatory/suspensory activity among WTO
Members. As ofwriting, the top three countries in terms of import/export capacity are the
United States, Germany and Japan with the annual value of US$2040,1052,and 859
billions respectively.144 A small country, especially a small developing country will
notice that the mutually agreed compensation or the authorised suspension of concessions
or obligations is not likely to have much impact upon a large one. Although WTO
Members are permitted to withdraw from this organisation if it considers that it cannot
fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the WTO agreements,145 the practice of the
GATT and the WTO indicates that no one wishes to isolate itself from the global trade
143: Id-
144: cf. http://www.jfdaily.com.cn/epublish/gb/paper39/734/class.../hwz389457.ht
145: See Article XV of the WTO Agreement and Article XXIII:2 ofGATT 1994. See supra note 1.
173
community. This, again, suggests that it is important to recognise a treaty obligation to
perform and not just to compensate or endure suspension of concessions in maintaining
an orderly international trade relationship.
Under the WTO jurisdiction, the enforcement mechanism applies not only to the
implementations of the adopted panel or Appellate Body reports, but to the arbitration
awards. Article 25(4) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states that "Article
21 {Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings) and
22(Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions) of this Understanding shall apply
mutatis mutandis to arbitration awards."(Notes added).146 Therefore, before we move on
to study the nature of the WTO panels and Appellate Body, it is a meaningful way to
review first the WTO arbitration procedures.
5.3.5. Arbitration: to be or not to be?
International commercial arbitration plays an important role in resolving a multitude
of international trade disputes involving States and State entities. Notwithstanding the
confidentiality accorded to many arbitration awards,147 there is still substantial evidence
that arbitration has in general experienced sustained growth and popularity and that States
and State enterprises have frequently been parties to such actions.148 Arbitration as a
method of settling disputes combines elements of both diplomatic and judicial
procedures. It depends for its success on a certain amount of good-will between the
parties in drawing up the compromis and constituting the tribunal, as well as actually
enforcing the award subsequently made. A large part depends upon negotiating
processes. On the other hand, arbitration is an adjudicative technique in that the award is
final and binding and the arbitrators are required to base their decision on law.149
The legal basis for the invocation of arbitration under the WTO jurisdiction is Article
25 of the DSU. As an alternative means contained in the dispute settlement mechanism,
arbitration can be used to facilitate the solution of certain disputes which concern issues
"that are clearly defined by both parties"(Article 25[1] of the DSU). Following this
language, an arbitration under the WTO jurisdiction is usually raised upon these
following factors. Firstly, the issues brought for arbitration are normally those simple
ones in terms of the fact finding and the standard of review. One of the early disputes
resorting to the WTO arbitration mechanism, the Bananas dispute, involves the request of
the United States to the Dispute Settlement Body to authorise suspension of the
application to the European Communities and its member States ofUS tariff concessions
and related obligations under GATT 1994, covering trade in an amount of US$520
146: See supra note 1.
147
: Most arbitration awards are confidential and not systematically published(with the exception of the
Iran-U.S. Claims tribunal decisions). Some parties, however, consent to such publication or, in many cases,
consent is given on the condition that the parties' identities are extracted.
148
: Gerhard Wegen and Thomas Welch in their article The Role of International Commercial Arbitration,
in Particular of the International Chamber ofCommerce, in Dispute Settlement in International Economic
Law(contained in the book Adjudication of International Trade Disputes in International and National
Economic Law, edited by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Gunther Jaenicke, University Press Fribourg
Switzerland, 1992) compared the number of arbitration in 1977(205 arbitration cases) and in 1989(309
arbitration cases) administered by the International Chamber ofCommerce(ICC). See p.385, note 2.
149: See the definition of arbitration in the Yearbook ofthe ILC, 1953, Vol. II, p.202.
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million. Prior to this arbitration process, the WTO Appellate Body in the same dispute
had already concluded that the European Communities has not succeeded in rebutting
the presumption that its^breaches of GATT 1994 have nullified or impaired the benefits
of the United States . Thus, there was not much contending upon those facts as
whether the European Communities regime for the importation, sale and distribution of
bananas had breached its obligations under GATT 1994 and whether the United States
had suffered from this breach. Secondly, recourse to arbitration should be subject to a
mutual agreement between the disputing parties which shall agree on the procedures to be
followed, the choice of arbitrators, the location of arbitration and the time limits(Article
25[2] of the DSU). If there is no such agreement, any one of the contending parties may
start a formal dispute settlement process.152 Thirdly, like the panelists and the Appellate
Body members, arbitrators act in their individual capacity, not as government
representatives. They should be neutral to the case at hand. Arbitrators may be nationals
of the disputing parties.
The advantages of the arbitration are easily to be discerned. Promptness is the first
one among them. Compared with that of a formal dispute settlement process,153 the time
frame for an arbitration is generally shorter. This is because the arbitration procedures are
normally decided by the disputing parties beforehand in order to make the arbitration
proceed more expeditiously.154 One can presume that it is the common wish that a dispute
should be settled the sooner the better. As for a special arbitration under the WTO
jurisdiction concerning the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations, or the
principles and procedures set forth in Article 22(3)(order of the suspension of
concessions or other obligations), the time limit is only 60 days.155
150
: The arbitrators decided in their decisions that the level of nullification or impairment suffered by the
United States was US$191.4 million per year. Accordingly, the arbitrators decided that the suspension by
the United States of the application to the European Communities and its member States of tariff
concessions and related obligations under GATT 1994 covering trade in a maximum amount of US$191.4
million per year would be consistent with Article 22.4 of the DSU. See supra note 138, para.8.1.
151
: See European Communities—Regimefor the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, Report of
the Appellate Body(distributed on 9 September 1997), WT/DS27/AB/R, para.255(x).
152
: Here, the author of this thesis uses the concept "formal dispute settlement process" to refer to a
complete dispute settlement process, from consultations to panel examination or even appellate review.
153: According to Article 20 of the DSU, the period from the date of establishment of the panel by the DSB
until the date the DSB considers the panel or appellate report for adoption shall as a general rule not exceed
nine months where the panel report is not appealed or 12 months where the report is appealed. Since this is
only a general rule. The fact in real situations is that the time for deliberating the panel or Appellate Body
report is frequently extended because of the complications of the issues.
154
: This conclusion is based on the fact that arbitration under the WTO jurisdiction is usually limited in
"issues that are clearly defined by both parties"(Article 25[1] of the DSU). In reality, arbitration is seldom
speedier than litigation. According to Gary B. Bom, outside of some specialised contexts, disputes often
require between 18 and 36 months to reach a final award, with only limited possibilities for earlier
summary dispositions. Procedural mishaps, challenges to arbitrators, and litigation over jurisdictional
issues in national courts can delay even these fairly stately timetables, as can crowded diaries of busy
arbitrators and counsels. See Gary B. Bom: Planning for International Dispute Resolution, Journal of
International Arbitration, Vol.17, 2000, No.3, pp.66-67.
155: Article 22(6) states: "...if the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims
that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining
party has requested authorisation to suspend concessions or other obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or
(c), the matter shall be referred to arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original panel, if
members are available, or by an arbitrator appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed within
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The second advantage is the flexibility in an arbitration process. Here, the principles
of the Modal Law on International Commercial Arbitration(hereinafiter as Modal Law)
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law(UNCITRAL), in
the view of the author of this thesis, are relevant in the case of the absence of relevant
provisions in Article 25 of the DSU.156 Simple process means time-saving, money-
saving157 and even face-saving. In some cases, the arbitrators are the original
panelists(Article 22[6] of the DSU). They are more familiar with the issues in dispute
than others. Therefore, they are in a better position to conciliate the disputing parties to
accept the decisions of the arbitration award. More importantly, since the procedures for
arbitration under the WTO jurisdiction are usually simple, this can save time to reduce
the damage which might have occurred during a formal dispute settlement process. This
is very important in some circumstances because some commercial opportunities may
never come again.
The third advantage is the expertise of the arbitrators. WTO agreements consist of
different portions which cover different areas of international trade. Some of them, like
sanitary and phytosanitary, customs valuation, are very "technical", which are
understandable only to a handful of people who are specialised in those areas. To select
those experts for one particular arbitration is an expedient way to settle the trade dispute.
Although the Appellate Body members are selected from the persons of recognised
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter
of the covered agreements generally(Article 17[3] of the DSU), they may not have a good
command of one particular area. Furthermore, the Appellate Body division works in
rotation, which means that the disputing parties cannot choose the Appellate Body
members. On this point, the selection of arbitrators is similar to the practice to select
panelists.
Last but not least, the arbitration award is final and binding on both parties to a
dispute.158 It cannot be, like a panel report, appealed. If either of the parties to this
proceeding refuses to implement the arbitration award, it will face the same punishment
as to the complained party when it refuses to implement the adopted panel or Appellate
Body report, that is, recommended by the DSB, either to withdraw its actions or to
compensate the suffered party, or to meet the suspension of concessions by the suffered
party under the authorisation of the DSB. This is a quite unique feature compared to the
implementation mechanism designed for the arbitration awards issued by other
international commercial arbitration tribunals. In the international commercial arbitration
sphere, the enforcement of an arbitration award is always a subtle issue, which, to a
60 days after the date of expiration of the reasonable period of time... "(Original note omitted). See supra
note 1.
156
: Adopted by UNCITRAL on 21 June 1985.
137: Gary B. Bom views this issue in a different way. He thinks that international commercial arbitration is
seldom cheap. The parties are required(subject to later allocation of arbitration costs by the tribunal) to pay
the fees of the arbitrator(s) and, usually, an arbitration institution. The parties will also have to pay the
logistical expenses of renting hearing rooms, travel to the arbitration sites, lodging, and the like. See Gary
B. Bom, supra note 154, p.66. In the view of the author of this thesis, not all of these situations will occur
in a WTO arbitration process since there are not such possibilities for the disputing parties to choose the
site other than Geneva for their arbitration and, the costs for arbitration under the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism are unlikely as high as those charged in most international commercial arbitration tribunals.
1,8: Article 25(3) of the DSU states: ".. .The parties to the proceeding shall agree to abide by the arbitration
award..See supra note 1.
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certain extent, reduces the application of arbitration. This issue was partly resolved when
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1958(lhe New York Convention) was made, under which each participant
agrees to recognise written agreements to arbitrate, to recognise and enforce foreign(or
international) arbitration awards, and to limit the circumstances under which awards may
be challenged. Nevertheless, the enforcement of an arbitration award in a non-
participant of the New York Convention is still subject to either the local law which the
arbitration award is relied upon, or the bilateral agreement. In contrast, the WTO legal
system provides the arbitration under its jurisdiction a "pro-enforcement" regime.
Since there are no similar provisions concerning arbitration in GATT 1947, the
Dispute Settlement Understanding provides only some guidelines which the arbitrators
need to elucidate and develop in each specific case. In the Bananas arbitration, the
arbitrators first needed to define the scope of the discretion granted under Article 22(3) of
the DSU to a WTO Member seeking the authorisation to suspend its concessions or other
obligations and, then to distinguish it from the scope of the authority of arbitrators to
review, pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 ofArticle 22 of the DSU, the choice made by that
Member. Article 22(7) of the DSU authorise the arbitrators to examine claims concerning
the principles and procedures in suspending concessions or other obligations set forth in
Article 22(3) of the DSU in its entirety, whereas Article 22(6) of the DSU seems to limit
the competence of arbitrators in such examination to cases where a request for
authorisation to suspend concessions or other obligations is made under subparagraphs
(b) or (c) ofArticle 22(3) of the DSU.160
The other concern from those who may put their dispute for arbitration is the
collegiality of the arbitration awards. Similar to the selection of panelists, but different
from the formulation of an Appellate Body division, arbitrators, in most cases,161 are
selected by the parties to the proceeding or appointed by the Director-General randomly.
Whether or not the precedent arbitration awards will be respected by the later arbitrators
is still not clear as, so far, there is not much such practice recorded. In the Bananas
arbitration, one of the US arguments is, as a time base for the EC to allocate MFN tariff
159
: Article III of the (New York Convention) states: "Each Contracting State shall recognise arbitral awards
as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of
arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of
domestic arbitral awards." cf. http/www.adr.org./rules/international/990819ae.html
160: The arbitrators believe that there is no contradiction between Article22(6), (7) and Article 22(3) of the
DSU, and that these provisions can be read together in a harmonious way. Their reasoning for these
conclusions is that if a panel or the Appellate Body report contains findings of WTO-inconsistencies only
with respect to one and the same sector in the meaning of Article 22.3(f) of the DSU, there is little need for
a multilateral review of the choice with respect to goods or services or intellectual property rights, as the
case may be, which a WTO Member has selected for the suspension of concessions subject to the
authorisation of the Dispute Settlement Body. However, if a WTO Member decides to seek authorisation to
suspend concessions under another sector, or under another agreement, outside the scope of the sectors or
agreements to which a panel's findings relate, paragraphs(b)-(d) of Article 22(3) of the DSU provide for a
certain degree of discipline such as the requirement to state reasons why that Member considers the
suspension of concessions within the same sector(s) as that where violations ofWTO law were found as not
practicable or effective. See supra note 138, para.3.6.
161
: In some exceptional circumstances, arbitration may be carried out by the original panel, ifmembers are
available. See Article 22(6) of the DSU. See supra note 1.
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quota to shares to substantial suppliers, whether the 1994-1996 period is "restricted" or
"unrepresentative" for purposes of Article XIII of GATT 1994.162 As a first step, the
arbitrators cited the panel deliberations in the disputes European Communities—Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas,163 EEC—Restrictions on Imports
of Apples from Chile,164 Japan—Restriction on Imports of Certain Agricultural
Products. Then, the arbitrators concluded that "while Members have a degree of
discretion in choosing a previous representative period, it is clear in this case that the
period 1994-1996 is not a 'representative period'". The arbitrators even referred to the
Appellate Body findings in the Bananas case that the Lome waiver did not justify EC's
inconsistencies with Article XIII of GATT 1994.166 Since the decisions made by the
arbitrators cannot be appealed, the demand for qualified arbitrators and the greatest
degree of clarity and collegiality of the arbitration awards should be high.167
In view of the promptness, expertise and flexibility, arbitration should attract WTO
Members to deal with their disputes in some circumstances, especially when the disputed
issues are more "technical" than legal, and both parties wish to solve their dispute in a
friendly way. However, since there are only limited provisions in the DSU which are
designated for arbitration, WTO Members will possibly meet some "technical problems"
as mentioned before in their future arbitration. Among those feasible problems, one is
concerning the applicable law for the arbitrators to rely upon. One of the major features
of international commercial arbitration is that the parties to a dispute are free to choose
the applicable substantive law.168 If they have failed to do so, either because that point
has been forgotten to be considered by them when negotiating the contract or because no
agreement could be reached, the arbitrators, it is felt, ought to apply that particular
national substantive law which, with some certainty, could have been expected by the
disputing parties. Different rules exist as to which law should be applied by the
arbitrators if the parties have not chosen it in their contract. The Modal Law provides that
162
: Article XIII:2(d) of GATT 1994 provides that if a Member decides to allocate a tariff quota, it may
seek agreement on the allocation of shares in the quota with those Members having a substantial interest in
supplying the product concerned. In the absence of such an agreement, the Member "shall allot to Members
having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such
Members during a previous representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the products,
due account being taken of any specialfactors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the
product".(Emphasis added). See supra note 1.
153
: European Communities—Regimefor the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, Report of the
Panel, WT/DS27/R/ECU; WT/DS27/R/GTM; WT/DS27/R/HND; WT/DS27/R/MEX; WT/DS27/R/USA,
para.7.68.
164
: EEC—Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, Report of the Panel(adopted on 10 November
1980), GATT BISD, 27th Supplement(1981), p.98.
163
: Japan—Restrictions on Imports ofCertain Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel(adopted on 22
March 1988), GATT BISD, 35th Supplement) 1989), paras.5.1.3.7.
166
: The Appellate Body stated: "In view of the truly exceptional nature of waivers from the non¬
discrimination obligations under Article XIII, it is all the more difficult to accept the proposition that a
waiver that does not explicitly refer to Article XIII would nevertheless waive the obligations of that Article.
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES had intended to waive the obligations of the European Communities
under Article XIII in the Lome Waiver, they would have said so explicitly." See supra note 151, para. 187.
167
: It seemed that the arbitrators in the Bananas arbitration were aware of this demanding. They stated in
their decisions that "given that our own decisions cannot be appealed, we considered it imperative to
achieve the greatest degree of clarity possible with a view to avoiding future disagreements between
parties." See supra note 138, para.2.12.
168: See Article 28(1), first sentence ofModal Law.
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that law should govern the contract and consequently be applied by the arbitrator, which
is indicated by the conflict of law rules which he considers applicable.169 According to
Article 11:2 of the WTO Agreement, the WTO agreements are binding on all Members. In
the absence of otherwise choice, the task leaving for the arbitrators is to seek the legal
basis for their decision from the relevant WTO agreement(s). If the disputing parties are
incidentally both participants of another international agreement, which conflicts with the
WTO agreements, then Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is
available for the resolution of such a conflict. Article 30(3) states: "When all the parties
to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not
terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to
the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty". Article 30(4)
further states: "When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the
earlier one: (a)as between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in
paragraph 3; (b)as between a State Party to both treaties and a State Party to only one of
the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and
obligations"170 Thus, when a conflict of law arises, the arbitrators need to clarify not only
the WTO agreements, but also those non-WTO agreements, of which the disputing
parties are both participants.
The other "technical problem" which will puzzle those who wish to settle their
disputes through arbitration is the procedures. Although Article 25 of the DSU has
already provided some provisions on this issue, the aforesaid cases have demonstrated
that they are still insufficient. At present, two options are available in practice. One is to
enlarge Article 25 of the DSU to specify the arbitration procedures under the WTO
jurisdiction. Presumably, it may draw some provisions from the existing international
arbitration law. The other is the reference in Article 25 of the DSU to the invocation of
Modal Law. Considering the complexities of the amendment mechanism in the WTO
regime, one could imagine that neither of these two options will be easily adopted. In the
view of the author of this thesis, WTO Members should be careful in choosing whether
they will put their disputes to the panelists or arbitrators, especially at the moment, as
there are not sufficient provisions regulating the arbitration process. In contrast to the
sparse language about arbitration, the detailed provisions on the panel examination and
appellate review in the DSU indicate that these procedures seem more attractive and
manageable.
Section Four The Function and Vocation of theWTO Panel Process
5.4.1. The legacies from and improvements upon the GATT panel process
While referring to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, one cannot begin to
appreciate the way in which WTO panels approach their tasks without analysing the role
of panels in the operation of the GATT system. The GATT dispute settlement mechanism
was concerned with two main objectives. One is to ensure that the commercial bargains
struck in successive rounds of trade negotiations were not upset by the actions of
6
: See Article 28(2) ofModal Law.
170: See supra note 2.
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individual contracting parties.171 The other is to ensure contracting parties' observance of
the general obligations that governed their regulation of trade.172 Thus, GATT 1947 not
only incorporated the results of the seven rounds of trade negotiations, but set out an
array of rules which were designed to protect the integrity of the concessions that had
been negotiated, and to protect the trading interests of the contracting parties generally.
It warrants noting that GATT 1947 neither used the word "panel" nor prescribed
procedures to govern panel proceedings.173 Rather, the initial practice of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES was either to have the Director-General issue a ruling on the
question put to him, or to refer the matter to a working party comprising of the disputants
and other interested parties. The use ofpanels in place ofworking parties only emerged at
the Seventh Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES(1955), when Norway advanced a
claim of nullification or impairment against the Federal Republic of Germany.
Notwithstanding the disputants' concurrence on the establishment of a "working party",
the Director-General noted that it had been agreed to establish a "panel to hear the
various complaints that might be referred to it by the CONTRACTING PARTIES".174
One important feature of the GATT panel process was that the parties to the dispute
played a decisive role in the whole process. This reflected GATT's diplomatic and
negotiated characteristics. The disputants made agreements on the choice of panelists,
and on the terms of reference for the panels. This, to a certain extent, resembles the
conciliation in terms of the procedures of dispute settlement and the finality of the panel
report. Since the CONTRACTING PARTIES made decisions by consensus, the losing
party had within its means, subject to institutional pressure of course, the power to block
the adoption of a panel report. Thus, GATT panels normally would be mindful of the fact
that their reports would become the subject of scrutiny, not only by disinterested
contracting parties but by the parties to the dispute and third parties who had participated
in this proceeding. "The desire to maximise the report's prospects for acceptance could
171
: The first paragraph of GATT Article XXVIII(te) states: "The contracting parties recognise that
customs duties often constitute serious obstacles to trade; thus negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually
advantageous basis, directed to the substantial reduction of the general level of tariffs and other charges on
imports and exports and in particular to the reduction of such high tariffs as discourage the importation
even of minimum quantities, and concluded with due regard to the objectives of this Agreement and the
varying needs of individual contracting parties, are of great importance to the expansion of international
trade. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may therefore sponsor such negotiations from time to time." See
supra note 1. Before the Uruguay Round negotiations, the other seven rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations under the GATT auspices are Geneva(1947), Annecy(1949), Torquay(1950), Geneva(1956),
Dillion( 1960-61), Kennedy) 1962-67), Tokyo) 1973-79). See JohnH. Jackson, supra note 29, pp.15-22.
172
: For example, the Working Party on the Brazilian Internal Taxes dispute found that Article 111:2 of
GATT 1947 applied "whether or not the contracting party in question had undertaken commitments in
respect of the goods concerned." See GATT BISD, 2nd Supplement) 1949), p. 181. Thus, benefits under
Article III and other Articles accrued regardless of whether there is a negotiated expectation of market
access.
173
: Even Article XXIII:2 of GATT 1947 only states that a dispute "may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so
referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they
consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate." See supra note 1.
174
: See Robert Hudec: The GATTLegal System and World Trade Diplomacy, see supra note 118.
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be expected to motivate a panel and, if so, would seem to restrain the panel from being
overly assertive in the hope of avoiding an adverse reaction from the losing party."175
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism adopts the basic form of the GATT panel
process, but goes much further along the rule-oriented direction. The terms of reference
for a WTO panel are clearly stated in Article 7(1) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. Although the parties to the dispute may agree otherwise within 20 days
from the establishment of the panel,177 this is only a secondary choice and based on a
mutual agreement. Following the procedure for selection of panelists in GATT
practice, the WTO Secretariat maintains an indicative list of persons, from which
panelists may be chosen(Article 8[4] of the DSU). This list consists of those well-
qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including persons who
have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or a
contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee of
any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or
published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official
of a Member(Article 8[1] of the DSU). Therefore, the nature of this list is prescriptive. In
other words, the demand for a panelist is very high. If the disputing parties can not agree
on the nominations of panelists, either party may request the General-Director for help.
This has happened on occasion. In the case Argentina—Measures Affecting Textiles and
Clothing, for example, the panel was established and the terms of reference were agreed
upon on 16 October 1997, but the parties to the dispute were unable to agree on the
choice of panelists. On 9 December, the European Communities requested the Director-
General to determine the composition of the panel, which he did on 18 December.179 As a
general rule, citizens ofWTO Members whose governments180 are parties to the dispute
or interested third parties may not serve on a panel concerned with this dispute, unless the
parties to the dispute agree otherwise(Article 8[3] of the DSU).
One of the new elements in the Dispute Settlement Understanding is Article 8(10),
which states: "When a dispute is between a developing country Member and a developed
country Member the panel shall, if the developing country Member so requests, include
at least one panelist from a developing country Member." This, in the view of the author
of this thesis, is more nominal than substantial, since "panelists shall serve in their
175
: Christopher Thomas: Litigation Process under the GATT Dispute Settlement System—Lessons for the
World Trade Organisation? Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol.30, 1996, No.2, p.57.
176
: Which states: "To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in(name of the covered agreements]
cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB byfname of party)in document...and to
make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided
for in that/those agreements]." See supra note 1.
177
: This does not mean that the modifications made by the parties to the dispute are under no scrutiny. If
other than standard terms of reference are agreed upon, any other WTO Member may raise any point
relating thereto in the DSB(Article 7[3] of the DSU). See supra note 1.
178
: The 1979 Understanding stipulates in Rule 13 that the Director-General should maintain an informal
indicative list of governmental and non-governmental persons qualified in the fields of trade relations,
economic development, and other matters covered by the General Agreement, and who could be available
for serving on panels. See supra note 32, p.212.
179
: See Constitution of the Panel Establishment at the Request of the European Communities, Note by the
Secretariat, WT/DS77/4, 7 January 1998.
180
: In the case where custom unions or common markets are parties to a dispute, this rule applies to
citizens of all member countries of the custom unions or common markets. See note 6 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. See supra note 1.
181
individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any
organisation. Members shall therefore not give them instructions nor seek to influence
them as individuals with regard to matters before a panel."(Article 8[9] of the DSU).
With a developing country background, the panelist may have a better understanding of
the economic levels and national policies of many developing country Members and,
hopefully, have more familiarity in the application of those special and preferential
provisions contained in the WTO agreements. But the relative lack of experience in the
WTO litigation makes it clear that it is not an easy job for the lawyers from developing
countries to acquire a better understanding of WTO agreements and the dispute
settlement mechanism. Even during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, the representatives ofmany developing countries were not as active as those
from the developed countries. They just followed the negotiated results of other
contracting parties under the most-favoured-nation clause. Thus, there are not so many
qualified persons in the developing country Members, who have acquired such expertise
as to serve on a panel.
— 1 o 1
The WTO panel process, compared with that under the GATT jurisdiction, seems
more expeditious and predictable. Article 12 of the DSU, together with the Working
Procedures in Appendix 3, has set a timetable for each phase of the panel proceedings,
from the submissions of complaints and rebuttals by the disputing parties to the fact-
examining of the panel. The general period for a panel process is no more than six
months, and three months in cases of urgency(Article 12[8] of the DSU). These periods
may be extended under some circumstances, but in no case should the period, from the
establishment of the panel to the circulation of the panel report to other WTO Members,
exceed nine months(Article 12[9] of the DSU).182 In light of the complexity of some
disputing issues, the panels in some cases are really pressed for time. Meanwhile the
concept of "urgency cases" in Article 12(8) of the DSU still needs to be clarified. If the
panels or the Appellate Body cannot delimit the invocation of this provision, the potential
abuse of this provision is feasible.
The most significant feature of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, however, is
that it is no longer possible for either party to the dispute to block the panel report or the
Appellate Body report for adoption by the DSB. According to Article 16(4) of the DSU,
the panel report "shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally
notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt
the report".(Emphasis added).183 Again, Article 17(14) of the DSU stipulates that "an
Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the
parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt it..."(Emphasis
181
: The CONTRACTING PARTIES never established precise deadlines for the different phases of the
dispute settlement process. In most cases, the proceedings of the panels were completed within a period of
time, extending from three to nine months. See Point 6(ix) of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding. See
supra note 32.
18~: As a buffer, Article 12(12) of the DSU permits a panel to suspend its work at any time at the request of
the complaining party for a period not to exceed 12 months. In the event of such a suspension, the time for
the panel process shall be extended by the amount of time that the panel work was suspended. However, if
the work of the panel has been suspended for more than 12 months, the authority for establishment of the
panel shall lapse. See supra note 1.
183
: See supra note 1.
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added). The significance lies in the shift of the meaning "consensus". "Consensus" in
the GATT is a practice used to decide the establishment of a panel or to adopt the panel
report. This is a positive consensus. A defending party which wished to block the
establishment of a panel or the adoption of the panel report could easily abuse this power
by defeating the consensus. In contrast to that, the practice of "consensus" is used in the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism in a reverse way, which is used by the DSB only
when to decide not to establish a panel or to adopt the panel/Appellate Body report. This
is a "negative consensus. It is presumable that no winning party will join the blocking
of a panel or Appellate Body report. Under these circumstances, the adoption of the panel
or Appellate Body report is almost automatic. Since WTO panelists are not concerned
about the blocking by the losing party of the adoption of their reports, they can give their
deliberations in a more impartial and rule-oriented way. This bodes well for a new
institution like the WTO.
The formal function of panels is to assist the Dispute Settlement Body in discharging
its responsibilities under the DSU and the WTO agreements. Given the near automaticity
of the WTO process for adopting reports, however, it is more realistic to say that it is the
panels, together with the Appellate Body, which effectively discharge the responsibilities
of the DSB. While panels control the dispute settlement process within the confines of
the rules set out in the DSU and become capable ofworking in a more independent way,
they may come across some other puzzling questions such as how to collect and assess
the evidence necessary for the deliberations of panel reports and, how to distribute the
burden ofproof and establish a standard of review in the panel examination. These issues,
in their nature, are as equally important as the independence of the panels.
5.4.2. Evidence-presenting and expert-supporting
With the WTO disputes becoming rather "technical" and complicated, evidence
presented by both parties to the dispute and expert review sought by the panel are
becoming more and more crucial in the deliberations of a panel report. Two factors are
likely assumed to account for this tendency. Firstly, as the appellate review is only
"limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed
by the panel"(Article 17[6] of the DSU), the panel examination, in fact, becomes the only
process in which the disputing parties may present evidence to support their claims or
defences. Secondly, the technicality and complexity of some disputing issues often make
the panelist even with a "universal" mind necessary to seek advice from the persons
outside the panel, especially those who are specialised in those particular areas.
Although Article 12(2) of the DSU states that panel procedures should provide
"sufficient flexibility" so as to ensure high-quality panel reports, the whole text of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding contains no specific rules concerning the production,
admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence. Paragraph 4 of Appendix 3(Working
Procedures) to the DSU specifies only that, before the first substantive meeting of the
panel with the parties to the dispute, the parties shall transmit to the panel written
submissions in which they present the "facts of the case" and their arguments. If the party
which has brought the complaint fails to present the pertinent evidence, the panel shall
ask it to do so. Subsequently, the party against which the complaint has been brought
shall be asked to present its point of view(Paragraph 5 of Appendix 3). Then, at the
184: Id.
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second substantive meeting of the panel, the party complained against shall have the right
to take the floor first to be followed by the complaining party. The parties to the dispute
shall submit, prior to that meeting, written rebuttals to the panel(Paragraph 7 ofAppendix
3). One can infer from these provisions that, within the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, a claim cannot be refused by the panel simply under the excuse of
insufficient evidence presented by the parties to the dispute.
Since most WTO disputes have dealt with the "measures" of Member governments,
the text of the measures at issues generally has been the factual basis for the proceedings.
Accordingly, panel proceedings have tended to emphasise legal arguments—the trade
consequences of the "measure" at issue—rather than disputes over points of fact. In the
case Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Panel took note of the statement by
Japan that the Panel of the previous GATT case Japan—Customs Duties, Taxes and
Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages erred in concluding that
shochu was "essentially" a Japanese product.185 The Panel accepted the evidence
submitted by Japan according to which a shochu-like product was produced in various
countries outside Japan. The Panel noted, however, that Japanese import duties on shochu
were set at 17.9 percent. At any rate what is at stake, in the Panel's view, is the market
share of the domestic shochu market in Japan that was occupied by Japanese-made
shochu. The high import duties on foreign-produced shochu resulted in a significant share
of the Japanese shochu market held by Japanese shochu producers. Consequently, in the
Panel's view, the combination of customs duties and internal taxation in Japan has the
following impact: on the one hand, it makes it difficult for foreign-produced shochu to
penetrate the Japanese market and, on the other hand, it does not guarantee equality of
competitive conditions between shochu and the rest of "white" and "brown" spirits.186
As the disputes under the WTO jurisdiction become more and more technical and
complex, the factual component in the panel deliberations is increasing concomitantly.
One such example is the dispute concerning the claim of anti-dumping. Since the
determination of whether the domestic industry has been injured by the imports is a
matter for the national authorities, the Anti-dumping Agreement only permits the WTO
panel to review the fairness and objectivity of these determinations(Article 17.6[i]).
Article 3(1) of the Anti-dumping Agreement also provides that "A determination of injury
for purposes ofArticle VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve
an objective examination of both (a)the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of
the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b)the
consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products."187 But
whether the foregoing two points for consideration are positive enough is still debatable.
In the view of the author of this thesis, what should be "examined" "positively" in many
anti-dumping claims upon the exports from developing countries to developed countries
is the comparative advantages in production between them. Some complainants tend to
overlook an important fact that the production cost, including labour force and raw
materials in many developing countries, is much cheaper than that of the developed
185
: Japan—Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages,
Panel Report(adopted on 10 November 1987), GATT BISD, 34th Supplement(1988), para.5.11.
186
: Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel(adopted as modified by the Appellate Body
on 4 October 1996), WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, para.6.35.
187: See supra note 1.
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countries. Furthermore, different statistical methods will make different conclusions in
the evaluation of production cost. In this context, developing countries face a heavier
burden in presenting evidence to rebut the dumping claims for their exports.
The other example is the complaint concerning the sanitary and phytosanitary
measures. Article 5(2) of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement states: "In the
assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific evidence;
relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing
methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence ofpest- or disease-free areas;
relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine treatment."188 The huge
difference in respect of science and technology levels between developing and developed
countries will bring about disputes on the methods as how to assess the risks to human,
animal or plant life or health. Even the United States and the European Communities
have different views on some of those issues. The Hormones dispute is just one of such
examples.
It is clear that there is now significant room for factual disputes in the WTO dispute
settlement process. In this regard, Article 13(1) of the DSU makes clear the right of
panels "to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body it deems
appropriate". It goes on to state that "A WTO Member should respond promptly and fully
to any request by a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and
appropriate." David Palmeter and Petros Mavroidis compared this requirement with the
normal practice of international tribunals in collecting evidence, and stated that "the
responding parties in the WTO proceedings have an affirmative obligation to co-operate
in providing evidence to panels".189 Meanwhile, Article 13(2) of the DSU, as an addition,
permits that panels may seek information from "any relevant source". All these can be
viewed that there are, in practice, no legal obstacles to the WTO panels in their evidence-
findings.
Information and evidence developed after the challenged action has occurred
normally will not be considered by the panel. In the case ECMeasures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products^Hormones), the Panel rejected the evidence that was not used in
making the determination upon the challenged action. The Panel then gave the reasoning
for this rejection: "According to the terms of reference given to us as a dispute settlement
panel, we have no mandate to re-examine the risk assessment referred to by the European
Communities in light of this 'new evidence', nor to make our own risk assessment."190
This prohibition is effective in holding back the abuse of trade-restricting measures by
some WTO Members without sound scientific grounds. Nevertheless, this prohibition
should be distinguished from the practice of the panel to collect additional evidence after
the first substantive meeting. In the case Argentina—Certain Measures Affecting Imports
ofFootwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, the Panel stated: "We note that the rules
of procedures of panels do not prohibit the practice of submitting additional evidence
after the first hearing of the Panel. Until the WTO Members agree on different and more
specific rules on this regard, our main concern is to ensure that 'due process' is respected
188: Id.
189
: David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis: Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation,
Practice and Procedure, Kluwer Law International 1999), p.76.
190
: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat FWHCte(Hormones), Report of the Panel(adopted as
modified by the Appellate Body on 13 February 1998), WT/DS26/R/USA, WT/DS48/R/Can,
para.8.115(USA) and 8.118(Canada).
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and that all parties to a dispute are given all the opportunities to defend their position to
the fullest extent possible".191
In addition to authorising WTO panels to seek information from "any relevant
source", Article 13(2) of the DSU also authorises them "to consult experts to obtain their
opinion on certain aspects of the matter". With respect to a factual issue concerning
scientific or other technical matters raised by a party to the dispute, a panel may "request
an advisory report in writing from an expert review group". Appendix 4 of the DSU sets
out rules for establishing an expert review group, and the procedures that such groups
should follow. Expert review groups are under the panel's authority. Their terms of
reference and working procedures shall be decided by the panel, and they shall report to
the panel(Paragraph 1 ofAppendix 4).
Considering the lack of relevant expertise in most developing country Members, the
draftsmen of the Dispute Settlement Understanding made a particular provision which
may benefit the developing country Members. Article 27(2) of the DSU states: "While
the Secretariat assists Members in respect of dispute settlement at their request, there may
also be a need to provide additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute
settlement to developing country Members. To this end, the Secretariat shall make
available a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical co-operation service to any
developing country Member which so requests. This expert shall assist the developing
country Member in a manner ensuring the continued impartiality of the Secretariat."
From the above wording, it can be inferred that Article 27(2) is not intended to be used
by developing countries to acquaint themselves with the WTO system of dispute
settlement. Instead, this article offers a limited sort of technical cooperation to WTO
developing and least developed country Members, once a complaint has been filed, which
means that no advice may be given on strategies or procedures that such a Member may
192follow in bringing a dispute. Thus, in terms ofWTO legal assistance on this respect,
there is still a lot ofwork to do.
The title ofAppendix 4{Expert Review Group) seems to indicate that the expert work
is normally carried out in the form of a group. But the Panel in Hormones dispute goes in
a different way. Instead of consulting with the expert group, the Panel seeks advice from
1 QT
the experts individually. This practice was affirmed by the Appellate Body, which
stated: "once the panel has decided to request the opinion of individual scientific experts,
there is no legal obstacle to the panel drawing up, in consultation with the parties to the
dispute, ad hoc rules for those particular proceedings."194
In the context of Appendix 4 of the DSU, paragraph 6 states: "The expert review
group shall submit a draft report to the parties to the dispute with a view to obtaining
191
: Argentina—Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items,
complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS56, at 97-98, para.6.55. See also paras.6.63-
6.64 of the same Panel Report where a claim of non-admissibility of evidence(because it had been
submitted after the consultations) was rejected.
192
: The author of this thesis takes this view from one of the examiners, Mary E. Footer. In the first review
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding which was held in the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999,
many developing country Members expressed their concern about the shortage of resources to participate in
the dispute settlement system, cf. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_/min99_e/english
193
: See supra note 191, paras.87, 88, and 89. The Panel also proceeded under Article 11 of the Sanitary
and Phytosanitaiy Agreement which also provides for the use of experts. See supra note 1.
194
: ECMeasures ConcerningMeat andMeat TVodwc/ifHormones), see supra note 77, para. 148.
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their comments, and taking them into account, as appropriate, in the final report, which
shall also be issued to the parties to the dispute when it is submitted to the panel. The
final report of the expert review group shall be advisory only." This gives each party the
opportunity to correct misconceptions or omissions and minimises the likelihood of a
subsequent appeal. Even if the expert review report adopted by the panel were
unreasonable and unacceptable, the parties to the dispute would still have the opportunity
to appeal the panel report. But this is only one side of the issue. The other side of this
issue is how to distribute the burden of proof, which is as equally important as the
evidence itself. This is because, in a litigation regardless of being domestic or
international, any party which bears the burden of proof will lose the case if it fails to
present sufficient evidence to support either its claim or its defence.
5.4,3. Burden of proof and standard of review
The burden of proof has been called "the law's response to ignorance".195 It
"compensates for many uncertainties of litigation, allowing the judicial system to reach
determinate outcomes in the absence of relevant information".196 As the dispute
proceedings, first in the GATT, and now in the WTO, are growing more complex and
more judicial, the necessity of fact-proving has become an increasingly important factor
of the panel process. Gone are the days when panels were able to adjudicate on a "cluster
of undisputed facts" yielded, without great effort, after two sets of submissions and oral
hearings. The current panels are often flooded with evidence, not only so in disputes
under these new, rather technical, WTO agreements such as the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement or the Agreement on Customs Valuation, but also under those
more conventional GATT provisions, for example, when a non-violation dispute arises.
International litigation procedures tend to be free from technical and detailed rules on
evidence-presenting and evidence-collecting known in municipal law.197 International
tribunals have frequently enjoyed the privilege of deciding for themselves what is
admissible as evidence and of evaluating the probative value of each piece of material
evidence submitted.198 They will also determine which party carries the burden of proof.
The WTO dispute settlement system forms no exception in that respect.
The issue of burden of proof is not directly addressed in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, except for Article 3(8) which is a statement of prior GATT practice, as
195: David Palmeter and Petros Maroidis, see supra note 190, p.81.
196: Id.
197
: In his Article Evidence, Proofand Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement, Joost Pauwelyn compares
the difference in the concept of "burden of proof' in common law and civil law. According to Pauwelyn,
the phrase of "burden ofproof' in common law countries has a two-tier meaning, which includes (a)in the
event that the evidence submitted by the parties is incomplete or with the evidence in equipoise, the party
with the burden of proof loses. The "benefit of the doubt" plays in favour of the opposing party; (b)a duty
resting on the proponent of a claim to present a prima facie case, i.e., to adduce enough evidence in order to
convince the court that there is a case to answer. While in civil law countries, the notion of "burden of
proof' simply refers to a duty of the parties to the dispute to prove their allegations{actori incumbit
probatio). See Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.1, 1998, pp.229-230.
198
: See, for example, the following statement of the International Court of Justice(ICJ) in the case Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits, Judgement of 27 Junel986, ICJ Report at 40,
para.60(1986): "(The Court,) within the limits of its Statute and Rules,...has freedom in estimating the
value of the various elements of evidence, though it is clear that general principles of judicial procedure
necessarily govern the determination of what can be regarded as proved".
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developed in numerous panel rulings: "In cases where there is an infringement of the
obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to
constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a
presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to
that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the
complaint has been brought to rebut the charge."199 Normally this provision can be
understood in a two-tier way. Firstly, the fact of the breach of WTO obligations is
sufficient enough for a claimant to raise a complaint.200 Then, it is the responsibility of
the respondent to provide evidence and argument to rebut this complaint.201
In the case United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre
Underwear, the parties to the dispute had divergent views on the question of burden of
proof. The United States essentially argued that it was not its duty to re-establish the
consistency of its restriction measures with the relevant rules of the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (hereinafter as the ATC), since it had already established that in the
March Statement.202 Costa Rica, on the other hand, insisted that in accordance with
Article 6(2)203 and 6(4)204 of the ATC, it was incumbent upon the United States to
199: See supra note 1.
200
: The rule that it is up to the complaining party to prove the breach of WTO obligations it alleges was
first explicitly confirmed in the panel report of the case Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. When
addressing the claim under GATT Article 111:2, first sentence, the Panel noted that: "...complainants have
the burden ofproof to showfirst, that products are like and second, that foreign products are taxed in excess
of domestic ones."(Emphasis added). When turning to the claim under GATT Article 111:2, second
sentence, the Panel made clear that: "...the complainants have the burden ofproof to show first, that the
products concerned are directly competitive or substitutable and second, that foreign products are taxed in
such a way so as to afford protection to domestic production."(Emphasis added). See Japan—Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 186, para.6.14 and para.6.28.
201
: In the case United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the Panel found
that a US gasoline regulation violated GATT Article 111:4 by treating imported gasoline less favourable
than domestic gasoline. The Panel then addressed the defences invoked by the United States under GATT
Article XX(b), (d) and (g): "The Panel noted that as the party invoking an exception(/« casu Article XX[b])
the United States bore the burden of proof in demonstrating that the inconsistent measures came within its
scope. The Panel observed that the United States therefore had to establish the following elements..." The
Appellate Body in the same case elaborated on the burden of proof with respect to the general
introduction(or "chapeau") to GATT Article XX, which rests on the party invoking an exception under
Article XX, as follows: "The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified as being within
one of the exceptions set out in the individual paragraph of Article XX does not, in its application,
constitute abuse of such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the exception. That is, of
necessity, a heavier task than that involved in showing that an exception, such as Article XX(g),
encompasses the measure at issue". See United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2, para.6.20. Report of the Appellate Body, see supra note 136,
pp.22-23.
202
: Which is the Annex of the Panel Report. See Unites States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and
Man-made Fibre Underwear, Report of the Panel(adopted as modified by the Appellate Body on 10
February 1997), WT/DS24/R, pp.93-106.
2<b
: Which states: "Safeguard action may be taken under this Article when, on the basis of a determination
by a Member, it is demonstrated that a particular product is being imported into its territory in such
increased quantities as to cause serious damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing
like and/or directly competitive products. Serious damage or actual threat thereof must demonstrably be
caused by such increased quantities in total imports of that product and not by such other factors as
technological changes or changes in consumer preference."(Original footnote omitted). See supra note 1.
"°4
: Which states: "...The Member or Members to whom serious damage, or actual threat thereof...is
attributed shall be determined on the basis of a sharp and substantial increase in imports, actual or
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establish to the Panel s satisfaction that the conditions required before imposing a
restriction had in fact been met. The Panel recalled in this context that one of the central
elements of the ATC was the prohibition, in principle, for WTO Members to have
recourse to any new restrictions beyond those notified under Article 2(4) of the ATC.205
In the view of the Panel, Article 6(2) of the ATC is an exception to the rule of Article
2(4) of the ATC. It is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior
GATT practice, that the party which invokes an exception in order to justify its action
carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception.
Consequently, the Panel decided that it was up to the United States to demonstrate that it
had fulfilled the requirements contained in Article 6(2) and 6(4) of the ATC in the March
Statement which, as the parties to the dispute had previously agreed, constituted the
scope of the matter properly before the Panel.206
WTO panels, despite the stipulations of Article 3(8) of the DSU, are not confined to
the evidence presented by both parties. A panel may seek information "from any
individual or body which it deems appropriate"(Article 13[1] of the DSU). In this regard,
they follow the practice of courts in the civil law system, as do most international
tribunals. In the case Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
the panel was faced with the question of whether the governmental measures under
Indonesia's National Car Programme constituted "specific subsidies" within the meaning
of Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures(fiQXQ\na.i\Qx as the SCM Agreement).207 The complaining parties, the European
Communities and the United States, claimed that they were and the responding party,
Indonesia, did not deny it. However, this was not enough for the panel to make its
deliberations. Under such circumstances, the panel applied Article 6(8) of the SCM
Agreement, which states: "In the absence of circumstances referred to in paragraph 7,208
the existence of serious prejudice should be determined on the basis of the information
submitted to or obtained by the panel..." The panel then concluded: "In light of the views
of the parties, and given that nothing in the record would compel a different conclusion,
we find that the measures in question are specific subsidies within the meaning of
Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement."209
imminent, from such a Member or Members individually, and on the basis of the level of imports as
compared with imports from other sources, market share, and import and domestic prices at a comparable
stage of commercial transaction; none of these factors, either alone or combined with other factors, can
necessarily give decisive guidance..."(Original footnote omitted). See supra note 1.
205
: Which reads as follows: "...No new restrictions in terms of products or Members shall be introduced
except under the provisions of this Agreement or relevant GATT 1994 provisions..."(Original footnote
omitted)(Emphasis added). See supra note 1.
206
: See supra note 202, para.7.16.
207
: Article 1(1) provides an illustrative list of subsidies which are under the regulation of this Agreement.
In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in Article 1(1), is specific to an enterprise or industry or
group of enterprises or industries(referred to in this Agreement as "certain enterprises") within the
jurisdiction of the granting authority, Article 2(1) provides three general principles for this determination.
See supra note 1.
208: Paragraph 7 ofArticle 6 of the SCMAgreement illustrates several situations in which serious prejudice
can be deemed as exceptional, but it is the responsibility of the party to which these situations occur to
provide the proof.(Note added). See supra note 1.
209
: Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting Automobile Industry, Report of the Panel(distributed on 23
July 1998), WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, p.212.(Emphasis added).
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The fact that questions on burden ofproof have attracted full attention in recent WTO
disputes is a positive development. An objective distribution of burden of proof, together
with sufficient evidence presented by both the complainant and the defendant, is surely
helpful to the panel in its deliberations, but this is not the end of the vocation of the WTO
panel process. Connected with and, in fact, as equally important as the burden of proof is
the approach taken by the panel when it reviews the measures imposed by the Member
governments concerned.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding contains no explicit provisions upon the issue
of standard of review. Article 11 simply exhorts panels to "make an objective assessment
of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements".210 The sparse
language may lead to disagreements when a panel is examining the domestic law of a
Member as interpreted by domestic authorities and tribunals to determine whether the
law, or the actions of those authorities and tribunals(including fact-finding), or both are in
compliance with the provisions of the covered agreements. To pose a concrete example:
Suppose that a Member government applies certain domestic product standards, perhaps
for reasons of domestic environment policy, in a manner that causes some foreign
exporters to argue that the government action is inconsistent with certain WTO norms,
such as rules in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Suppose also, however,
that a national government agency(or court) determines that the government action is not
inconsistent with WTO rules, and another Member decides to challenge that
determination in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding. It would seem clear that WTO
agreements do not permit a Member government's determination always to
prevail(otherwise the WTO rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective). But
should the WTO panel approach the issues involved(including factual determinations) de
novo, without any deference to the Member government? This standard-of-review
question, in the view of Steven Croley and John Jackson, has become something of a
touchstone regarding the relationship of "sovereignty" concepts to the GATT/WTO rule
system. "In many ways this relationship reflects a central problem for the future of the
international trading system—how to reconcile competing views about the allocation of
power between national governments and international institutions on matters of vital
concern to governments, as well as the domestic constituencies of some of those
governments."211
Within the WTO agreements, only the Antidumping Agreement addresses explicitly
the issue of standard of review.212 A certain degree of deference to the findings offact
made by domestic authorities in antidumping matters is provided in Article 17(6)(i) of
210
: See supra note 1.
211
: Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson: WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard ofReview, and Deference
to National Governments, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.90, 1996, p.194.
212: According to Steven Croley and John Jackson, the desire of some of the Umguay Round negotiators to
deal explicitly with this subject(standard of review) was influenced by their reaction(or that of their
constituencies) to some GATT panel cases, especially antidumping cases, in which observers felt that the
panels had overreached their authority and been too intrusive in disagreeing with national government
authorities. As a compromise with those opponents, the only success of these proponents is to put standard
of review in the Antidumping Agreement. This, in the view ofCroley and Jackson, is based on the Chevron
doctrine developed by the US Supreme Court and the degree of deference accorded to certain US domestic
authorities with investigative powers without fully thinking through the ramifications thereof at the
international level. Id, pp. 195-206.
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that Agreement, which states: "in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall
determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether
their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the
facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel
might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned."213 But
in what circumstances the evaluation can be deemed as "unbiased" and "objective"? This
Agreement does not say about that. It is at the discretion of the panel. Then, Article
17(6)(ii) further states: "the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where
the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in
conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible
interpretations."214 This subsection seems to establish a two-step process for the panel
examination. First of all, the panel must consider whether the provision of the Agreement
in question admits of more than one interpretation. If not, the panel must vindicate the
provision's only permissible interpretation. If, on the other hand, the panel determines
that the provision indeed admits ofmore than one interpretation, the panel shall proceed
to the second step of the analysis and consider whether the national interpretation is
within the set of "permissible" interpretations. If so, the panel must defer to the
interpretation given the provision by the national government.
Article 17(6) is not the only provision bearing on the standard of review. Also
relevant are two Ministerial Decisions which were taken at the end of the Uruguay Round
negotiations in 1994. Decision on Review of Article 17.6 of the Agreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 states:
"The standard of review in paragraph 6 of Article 17 of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be reviewed after a period of three
years with a view to considering the question of whether it is capable of general
application."215 Declaration on Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 or
Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures states: "Ministers
recognise, with respect to dispute settlement pursuant to the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, the need for the consistent resolution of disputes arising
from antidumping and countervailing duty measures."216 As both of these passages
suggest, the antidumping provisions were not uncontroversial, for the Ministerial
Decisions seem both to limit the application of those provisions, and to raise questions
about how they fit into the overall jurisprudence of the WTO. The true significance of
Article 17(6) of the Antidumping Agreement to the WTO dispute settlement procedures
still needs to await more future panel decisions.
In other WTO agreements, however, there are no similar stipulations as that in the
Antidumping Agreement. In the case United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
and Man-made Fibre Underwear, one of the arguments between the United States and
213: See supra note 1.
214: Id.
215: See supra note 1.
216: Id.
191
Costa Rica is the standard of review applied by the Panel. The United States advocated a
standard of review similar to that applied in the Fir Felt Hat case,217 in which the
Working Party, while examining a US escape clause measure in light of the requirements
of Article XIX of GATT 1947, afforded to the US authorities considerable discretion by
concluding that the United States was not called upon to prove conclusively that the
degree of injury caused or threatened in that case should be regarded as serious. Costa
Rica argued in favour of a five-step procedure whereby the Panel would certify whether
the administrative authorities of the importing country, when imposing the restriction,
had: (a)compiled with the procedural rules of the ATC; (b)properly established the facts;
(c)made an objective and impartial evaluation of the facts in light of the rules of the ATC;
(d)properly exercised its discretion in the interpretation of the rules; and (e)compiled with
the rules in general, while also having compiled with the other four requirements
mentioned above.218
The Panel adopted neither of these arguments. In the view of the Panel, a policy of
total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an "objective
assessment" as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. A review by the Panel is not a
substitute for the proceedings conducted by national authorities. Rather, the Panel's
function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national authorities.
The Panel drew particular attention to the fact that a series of prior panel reports in the
antidumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context had made it clear that it was not
the role of panels to engage in a de novo review.219 The Panel considered that the same
was true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon,
as in the context of cases dealing with antidumping and/or subsidies/countervailing
duties, to review the consistency of a determination by the national investigating
authorities imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal
instruments, in this case the ATC. Under these circumstances, the Panel stated that its
task was "to examine the consistency of the US action with the international obligations
of the United States, and not the consistency of the US action with the US domestic
statute implementing the international obligations of the United States."220
In light of the fact that an appeal shall be limited to the "issues of law covered in the
panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel"(Article 17[6] of the DSU),
the standard of review during the panel process is essential to deliberating a qualified
panel report. The Dispute Settlement Understanding is flawed in this respect. Considering
the comprehensive governance of the DSU and the complicated amendment
~17
: See Report on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Document CP/206, adopted on 22 October 1951
(CP.6/SR.19), version published by the Secretariat in November 1951, preface made by the Director-
General E WyndhamWhite.
218: See supra note 202, para.7.7.
~19
: See the panel reports on Korea—Antidumping Duties on Imports ofPolyacetal Resins from the United
States, adopted on 27 April 1993, GATT BISD, 40th Supplement 1994), p.205; United States—Imposition
ofAntidumping Duties on Imports ofFresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, adopted on 27 April
1994, GATT BISD, 41st Supplement) 1994); United States—Initiation of a Countervailing Duty
Investigation into Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, adopted on 3 June 1987, GATT BISD, 34th
Supplement) 1988), p.194.
220
: See supra note 202, para.7.12.
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procedures, we might reasonably predict that there is no feasibility to amend the DSU
in near future. One option, at the moment, to compensate the insufficient stipulations in
the DSU is to make a particular statement in a specific multilateral agreement like Article
17(6) of the Antidumping Agreement. The significance of doing so lies not only in the
release of the burden of panel work, but in the rule-orientation of deliberations in a panel
report.
5.4.4. The need for a due process to draft a panel report
J. C. Thomas and David Palmeter have started a very good discussion of the need for
"due process" in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. They raised in their
discussions some essential questions concerning the issues such as: does a complaining
party have an opportunity to make its case fully in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding?
Does a respondent have a full opportunity to meet the case which has been brought
against it? Do both parties to a dispute have the opportunity to put the necessary evidence
before the panel? When evidence is adduced by one party, does the other party have the
opportunity to adequately test it?222 All these questions are fundamental to building a
rule-orientation for the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
However, it is a pity that they missed, at least, one important issue, which is the due
process to draft a panel report.
Article 15 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which is obviously the legacy of
the 1979 Understanding, has set up an interim review process for a panel to draft its
report. This set-up, however, seems contradictory to the rule-orientation spirit of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. According to Article 15(1), a WTO panel, after
considering the submissions of complaints and rebuttals, shall first issue the
descriptive(factual and argument) sections of its draft report to both parties to the dispute
for their comments. Following the expiration of the set period of time for receipt of their
comments, the panel shall issue an interim report to the parties, including both the
descriptive sections and the panel's findings and conclusions. Within a period of time set
by the panel, a party may submit a written request for the panel to review precise aspects
of the interim report prior to the circulation of the final report to other WTO Members. At
the request of any party, the panel shall hold a further meeting with the parties on the
issues identified in the written comments(Article 15 [2] of the DSU).
The stipulations of the WTO interim review process are similar to those contained in
the North American Free Trade Agreement. When a dispute is submitted to the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission, a panel, after the failure of consultation, good offices, mediation
and conciliation, will proceed in a judicial way. The panel will first render an Initial
221
: Under the WTO amendment mechanism, a decision to amend the provisions, except Articles I and II of
GATT 1994, of the Multilateral Agreements in Annex 1A shall be taken by consensus among WTO
Members. If consensus is not reached, the Ministerial Conference shall decide by a two-third majority of all
Members whether to submit the proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance. Such a proposed
amendment shall take effect for the Members that have accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the
Members and thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it. While the decision to approve
amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall be made only by consensus and these
amendments shall take effect for all Members upon approval by the Ministerial Conference. See Article X
of the WTO Agreement. See supra note 1.
222
: J. C. Thomas and David Palmeter: The Need for Due Process in the WTO Proceedings, Journal of
World Trade, Vol.31, 1997, No.l, pp.45-57.
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Report setting out its findings of fact, its determination as to whether the measure at issue
is inconsistent with the NAFTA Treaty or nullifies or impairs benefits which the
complaining Party or Parties could reasonably have expected to accrue under the Treaty,
and the panel's recommendations for the resolution of the dispute. It then receives the
comments of the Parties, in the lights of which it may hold further hearings and
reconsider its report. It then presents its Final Report to the Free Trade Commission.223
The NAFTA is a regional trade agreement. Its dispute settlement system is established on
the negotiations and compromise among three neighbouring countries, Canada, the
United States and Mexico. While the WTO is a global organisation which consists of
more than 140 Members. The large membership makes it very difficult to coordinate the
different interests in its legal system. Although the interim review report and the final
resolution are only limited to the disputing parties in the particular case, the consequential
impact is beyond that. Therefore, the only practicable way in such a "universal"
organisation is to have the dispute settled on a uniform, rule-based process.
The WTO interim review process reflects the diplomatic-negotiation-based panel
practice of the GATT. Before the new dispute settlement mechanism was set up, it was a
common practice to get the consent of the parties to the dispute before the panel report
was adopted. In order to avoid blocking by the losing party, the GATT panels used to
conciliate the approaches of the disputing parties as close as possible. The situation in the
WTO, in this regard, has changed dramatically from that as it was in the GATT. The
WTO has designed an appellate review to continue the dispute settlement process if
either of the parties to the dispute considers that the panel report is incomplete, partial, or
even prejudiced. There are no legal obstacles, except some procedural requirements, for a
WTO Member to appeal the panel report. Article 16(4) of the DSU states: "Within 60
days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be
adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its
decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report."(Original
footnote omitted).224 Thus, the right for the parties to the dispute to appeal could be lost
only if they exercise their right after the 60-day period.225
According to David Palmeter, the term "due process" means fundamental fairness—
particularly procedural fairness,226 and he is probably right. A "due process" in drafting a
panel report, in the view of the author of this thesis and in a narrow sense, is an
"independent process" for a panel to draft its report. A panel may exercise its right to
seek information from any relevant sources when it scrutinises the evidence before it. The
parties to the dispute may provide some additional information during the drafting
process, but the decision of whether or not to accept this information shall be in the
hands of the panelists. Neither is a panel obliged to, nor should it discuss with the parties
to the dispute about the deliberations of its report. Any different views to the panel report
may be contained in the arguments of the appeal, including those from both the appellant
and the appellee. In light of these aforesaid discussions, Article 15 of the DSU is
redundant in building a due panel report drafting process.
~
: See 1992 NAFTA Treaty, Articles 2016, 2017 and Annex 2004.
224
: See supra note 1.
: In the view of the author of this thesis, this is another flaw of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
because there is no such permit as to extend this period under some exceptional circumstances.
226
: J. C. Thomas and David Palmeter, see supra note 222, p.51.
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The first few years practice of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has
demonstrated that the interim review process cannot prevent the parties to the dispute
from appealing the panel decisions. The statistical figures made by Professor Norio
Komuro in his article Kodak—Fuji Film Dispute and the WTO Panel Ruling are in
support of this conclusion.227 Of the first 16 Panel Reports circulated by the end ofMarch
1998 under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, all but the Panel Report of the case
Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper{which was adopted
by the DSB on 22 April 1998) were appealed. In other words, all the first 15 disputes did
not end at the panel stage. While we hail the success of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, we are aware that there are still many aspects of it, like the panel report
drafting process, which need to be improved.
Cambridge University's James Crawford has noted that the development of law in
complex societies has seen a constantly increasing refinement, and that international law
has shared in this increasing refinement.228 Certainly this is true of the WTO law which is
still in a developing process with the input of our expertise and intelligence. At the
moment, it will be very interesting to watch the developments in the next round of
multilateral trade negotiations. With luck these developments will include the issue of a
due process for a panel to draft its report.
The WTO panels have already worked efficiently and judicially compared with those
of the GATT. The automatic establishment of a panel, the clearly-cut time frames and
more independent work of the panelists reflect such a fact that the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism has laid a fundamental foundation in the rule-orientation.
However, what distinguishes the WTO Dispute Settlement Body from other international
tribunals is its appellate review which is unique not only in its function, but also in its
jurisdiction.
Section Five Legal Significance of the WTO Appellate Review
5.5.1. The right of a WTO Member to bring a claim under the new dispute
settlement mechanism
International judicial settlement involves the reference of a dispute between States to
a permanent tribunal for a legally binding decision. It developed from arbitration, which
accounts for the close similarity between the two and, through the past century, has been
available in a number of courts of general or specialised jurisdiction.229 Example of the
court of general jurisdiction is the International Court of Justice(ICJ), while the European
Court of Human Rights is a particular type of court of specialised jurisdiction. Different
tribunals may define different procedures to start a dispute settlement process. In the case
of the ICJ, Article 34(1) of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice states: "Only
States may be parties in cases before the Court". Then, Article35(l), (2) further state
respectively: "The Court shall be open to the States Parties to the present Statute." "When
a State which is not a Member of the United Nations is a party to a case, the Court shall
227
: Norio Komuro: Kodak—Fuji Film Dispute and the WTO Panel Ruling, Journal of World Trade,
Vol.32, 1998, No.5, pp. 162-163.
228
: James Crawford: Democracy in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
229
: See J. G. Merrills: International Dispute Settlement, Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited(1991),
p. 109.
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fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court. This
provision shall not apply if such State is bearing a share of the expenses of the Court."230
Article 33 and Article 34 of the European Convention on Human i?z'g/zte(amended by
Protocol 11), on the other hand, provide respectively: "Any High Contracting Party may
refer to the Court an alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the protocols
thereto by another High Contracting Party". "The Court may receive applications from
any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the
Convention or the protocol thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder
• • ??231
in any way the effective exercise of this right."
In contrast, there are no specific provisions in either the Dispute Settlement
Understanding or other WTO agreements, which deal with the question of standing for a
Member to bring a claim under the WTO jurisdiction. The only provision touching this
issue is Article 3(7) of the DSU, which partly states: "Before bringing a case, a Member
shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be
fruitful."232 Nevertheless, the meaning of the word "fruitful" is not well-defined. The
author of this thesis has pointed out in the previous section that, in the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, a claim cannot be refused by the panel simply under the excuse
that the evidence is insufficiently presented by the parties to the dispute. But who has
the standing to bring a case under the WTO jurisdiction is another issue, which merits
clarifying here.
In the appellate review of the Bananas case, the European Communities argued that
the Panel infringed Article 3(2) of the DSU234 by finding that the United States had a
right to advance claims under GATT 1994. The European Communities asserted that, as
a general principle in any system of law, including international law, a claimant must
normally have a "legal right or interest" in the claim it was pursuing. According to the
European Communities, treaty law is a "method of contracting out of general
international law". Therefore, the WTO Agreement must contain a rejection of the
requirement of a legal interest or an acceptance of the notion of actio popularis in order
to conclude that the WTO dispute settlement system sets aside the requirement of a legal
interest. The absence of such an express rule in the DSU or in the other covered
agreements indicates that general international law must be applied. The European
Communities maintained that the reasoning advanced by the Panel that all parties to a
treaty had an interest in its observance was a general observation which was true for all
treaties.235
230




: See supra note 1.
233: See the second paragraph ofPart Two, Section Four of this Chapter.
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: Which states: "The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognise that it serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements."(Note added). See supra note 1.
235
: See supra note 151, paras. 15-16.
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The European Communities also argued that the provisions of Article 10(2) of the
DSU, allowing a WTO Member that "has a substantial interest in the matter before a
panel to participate as a third party, suggested a fortiori that a party to a dispute must
show a legal interest . The European Communities asserted that the United States had
no actual or potential trade interest justifying its claim, since its banana production was
minimal. According to the European Communities, the United States has never exported
bananas, and this situation is unlikely to change due to climatic and economic conditions
in the United States.236
The Appellate Body did not accept the argument of the European Communities, that
the need for a "legal interest" is implied in the DSU or in any other provisions of the
WTO Agreement. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that "neither Article 3(3) nor
3(7) of the DSU nor any other provisions of the DSU contains any explicit requirement
that a Member must have a 'legal interest' as a prerequisite for requesting a panel".237
The Appellate Body noted that under Article 4(11) of the DSU, a Member wishing to join
in multiple consultations must have "a substantial trade interest", and that under Article
10(2) of the DSU, a third party must have "a substantial interest" in the matter before a
panel. But neither of these provisions in the DSU nor anything else in the WTO
Agreement, in the view of the Appellate Body, provides a basis for asserting that parties
to the dispute have to meet any similar standing.238
The Appellate Body also invoked the chapeau of Article XXIII: 1 of GATT 1994,239
together with Article 3(7) of the DSU, to support its conclusions that a WTO Member
had broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another Member under
the DSU, and the language of Article XXIII: 1 of GATT 1994 and Article 3(7) of the
DSU suggested, furthermore, that a Member was expected to be largely self-regulating in
deciding whether any such action would be "fruitful". Therefore, the United States, in the
view of the Appellate Body, was justified in bringing its claims under GATT 1994 to this
case, since it was a producer of bananas, the potential export interest of the United States
could not be excluded. The internal market of the United States of bananas could be
affected by the EC bananas regime, particularly, by the effects of that regime on world
suppliers and world prices of bananas.240
The Appellate Body, in the view of the author of this thesis, is right in its
deliberation, but should have invoked more legal reasoning from the WTO agreements to
support its decision. At the moment, there are at least two factors which could have been
used to rebut the argument of the European Communities. According to Article XXII: 1 of
: Id, para. 17.
237
: European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, Report of the
Panel, WT//DS27/R/USA, para.7.49.
238
: The Appellate Body did not go too further on this point and emphasised in the same paragraph that it
did not believe that its statement was dispositive of whether, in this case, the United States had "standing"
to bring claims under the GATT 1994. This reflects the prudence of the Appellate Body on this issue.
239
: Which partly states: "If any Member should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
Agreement is being impeded..." See supra note 1. In the view of the Appellate Body, of special importance
for determining the issue of standing are the words "If any Member should consider..." See supra note 151,
para. 134.
240: See supra note 151, paras.135-136.
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GATT 1994 and Article 4(2) of the DSU,241 the only obligation incumbent upon the
WTO Member before it starts the litigation is to have a consultation with a relevant
Member country. If the consultation fails to reach an agreement, the complaining party
will have the right to request the DSB to establish a panel. This request can only be
blocked by a consensus ofWTO Members, including the requesting party. Furthermore,
any breach of its obligations by one WTO Member will upset the overall balance of
global trade which was struck during the Uruguay Round negotiations and, in a general
way, nullify and impair the interests of all WTO Members. Thus, the United States, after
a satisfactory agreement had not been reached with the European Communities, should
have its legal right to bring the case to the WTO dispute settlement procedures.
The Bananas case is the first one which involved the issue of standing for a Member
to bring a case under the WTO jurisdiction. The Appellate Body has emphasised in its
report that its conclusion "does not mean, though, that one or more factors we have noted
94?
in this case would necessarily be dispositive in another case." This reflects the
prudence of the Appellate Body in interpreting the WTO law. Thus, it is predictable that
similar arguments like that in the Bananas case may happen again in future. In order to
avoid further confusion, it is necessary to add a provision in the DSU to define clearly
that, under what circumstances, the general right of a Member to bring a case can be
denied. This addition, of course, shall concern the redefining of the objectives and legal
characteristics of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, including the appellate review.
5.5.2. The objectives and legal characteristics of the Appellate Body
In the modern international relation sphere, appellate review, in the context of dispute
settlement, is a unique characteristic which distinguishes the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism from the practice ofmany other international tribunals. The disputes in most
international tribunals are tried only once and the decisions made by the tribunals become
final and binding on the parties to the dispute thereafter. For example, Article 60 of the
ICJ Statute states: "The judgement is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as
to the meaning or scope of the judgement, the Court shall construe it upon the request of
any party".243 Article 296(1) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea contains the similar
wording, which states: "Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction
under this section shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the
dispute".244 In contrast, a decision made for the dispute under the WTO jurisdiction, even
after it has gone through the panel examination and appellate review, is still not final until
the report of the panel or the Appellate Body is adopted by the DSB. These legal
characteristics need to be appreciated together with the objectives of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, particularly those of the appellate review process.
Article 3(2) of the DSU partly states that "The dispute settlement system of the WTO
is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
241
: Article XXII: 1 of GATT 1994 states: "Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration
to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made
by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement". Article
4(2) of the DSU contains the similar wording. See supra note 1.
242: See supra note 151, para. 138.
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system..."(Emphasis added).245 Thus, to provide "security" and "predictability" are the
main objectives of the new dispute settlement mechanism and the appellate review as
well.
Security and credibility are the watchwords of a judicial international dispute
settlement mechanism. They are the first cornerstone of the whole WTO dispute
settlement mechanism including a well functioning Appellate Body. Although the WTO
Appellate Body, like any other international court or arbitration tribunal, is one that does
not—in reality, as it cannot—rely on "incarceration, injunctive relief, damages for harm
inflicted or police enforcement...jailhouse... bail-bondsmen...blue helmets...truncheon
or tear gas for the advancement of its objectives",246 a strict interpretation of the DSU will
provide that "an adopted dispute settlement report establishes an international law
obligation upon the Member in question to change its practice to make it consistent with
the rules of the WTO Agreement and its annexes".247 Thus, "moral and political force of
international legal obligation" and a precarious threat of retaliation will maintain order in
international trading relations.248 Without such a moral basis and enforcement
mechanism, international order, including the trade order blueprinted by the WTO, will
be easily evaded and disregarded.
The second objective is predictability, which is implied in not only the rules of the
WTO agreements but the results of the dispute settlement under the WTO jurisdiction. In
submitting the Working Procedure of the Appellate Body to the Chairman of the Dispute
Settlement Body, the Chairman of the Appellate Body observed that "it is also important
to ensure consistency and coherence in our decision-making, which is to the advantage of
every WTO Member and the overall multilateral trading system we all share".249 This
inclination can be clearly traced in the stipulations of the Working Procedures of the
Appellate Body, which partly states: "To ensure consistency and coherence in decision¬
making, and to draw on the individual and collective expertise of the Members, the
Members shall convene on a regular basis to discuss matters of policy, practice and
procedure"([4]{l} of Part I). "In accordance with the objectives set out in paragraph 1,
the division responsible for deciding each appeal shall exchange views with the other
Members before the division finalises the appellate report for circulation to the WTO
Members..."([4] {3} ofPart I).250 Collegiality, thus, becomes a major responsibility which
the Appellate Body members need to adhere to when they exercise their appellate review
power. Predictability, coherence and consistency, are the inherent values of a well-
functioning legal system. They also form the second cornerstone of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. They underline one of the most important elements of the shift
from the GATT to the WTO, that although the GATT was marked by accommodation
and adaptability, the legal structure of the WTO now demands consistency and
245
: See supra note 1.
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: Hippler Bello, Judith: The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, The American
Journal of International Law, Vol.90, 1996, pp.416-417.
247
: John H. Jackson: The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of
Legal Obligation, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.91, 1997, p.61.
248
: See Robert E. Hudec: Dispute Settlementin Completing the Uruguay Round edited by Jeffrey J.
Schott), Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990, p.180.
249
: Letter of Julio Lacarte-Muro, Chairman of the Appellate Body, to Celso Lafer, Chairman of the
Dispute Settlement Body, 7 Febmary 1996.
230: cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab3_e.htm
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predictability.251 A standing appellate review is one of the principal means for attaining
this objective.
With those foregoing objectives, the Appellate Body has functioned well since the
new dispute settlement mechanism was set up. Compared with other international
tribunals, the WTO Appellate Body contains many unique features, which may be
summarised as the following.
Firstly, the new dispute settlement mechanism appears to be the only international
dispute settlement regime252 where appellate review is introduced at a later stage so as to
reduce the risks of erroneous first-level decisions and enable the automatic adoption,
without "political filtering" and possibility of "blocking"(such as those under the GATT
consensus practice) of first and second level dispute settlement findings. Article 17(14) of
the DSU stipulates that an Appellate Body report "shall be adopted by the DSB and
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by
consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report". In rare situations will a winning party
join this consensus. This automaticity helps the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
move in a more rule-oriented and predictable way.
Secondly, according to Article 17(3) of the DSU, the Appellate Body "shall comprise
persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated experience in law, international trade
and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally". The Appellate Body
membership "shall be broadly representative of membership in the WTO". This bodes
well for the developing country Members since they are, at the moment, the "majorities"
in the WTO only in terms of membership, not in terms of trade volume. In contrast, the
wording of Article 9 of the ICJ Statute is not so clear, which states: "At every election,
the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually
possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation
of the main forms of civilisation and of the principal legal systems of the world should be
assumed." Among the first appointed seven Appellate Body members, three of them are
231
: See Weiss Friedl: WTO Dispute Settlement and the Economic Order of WTO Member States(in
Challenges to the New World Trade Organisation edited by Pitouvan Dijck and Gerrit Faber), The Hague:
Kluwer Law International! 1996), P-83.
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: According to James Cameron and Karen Campbell, there are general four among the various types of
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procedures(such as Articles 60 and 61 of the ICJ Statute, and Articles 40 and 41 of the Statute of the
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original dispute settlement panels to be reconvened to examine whether the panel findings had been
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force, seems to be the only precedent for the use of an international court as a means of appeal from
domestic courts, at the request of individuals, on points of international law. James Cameron and Karen
Campbell: Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation, Cameron May Ltd(1998), pp.86-88.
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from developing country Members,253 Although it will take some time to see what the
developing country Members can benefit from this composition, we can reasonably
expect that the Appellate Body is well placed to hear the complaints from the developing
country Members and, to review those special and preferential provisions designated for
the developing country Members.
Thirdly, similar to Article 168A of the European Community Treaty, which provides
for a right of appeal to the European Court of Justice(ECJ) "on points of law only" and
subject to the further limitation(set out in Article 113, Statute of the ECJ) that "the
subject matter of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance may not be changed
in the appeal", Article 17(6) of the DSU limits the scope of appeal to "issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel". The right of
appeal, under the WTO jurisdiction, is limited to parties to the dispute and does not
extend, as in the ECJ, even to the third parties of the panel examination process and other
Members and institutions which did not intervene in the first dispute settlement
proceedings.254 In the WTO, only panel reports may be appealed.(Article 17[4] of the
DSU). While in the ECJ, appeals may be lodged not only against final decisions of the
Court of First Instance but also against its decisions on interlocutory matters(e.g.,
disposing of substantive issues in part or disposing of a procedural issue). The Appellate
Body may "uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel"
without explicit power for remanding the case back to the panel(Article 17[13] of the
DSU). The ECJ, by contrast, "may itself give final judgement in the matter, where the
state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the Court of First Instance
for judgemenfi'(Article 54, Statute of the ECJ).
Finally, unlike the International Court of Justice(ICJ) and the European Court of
Justice(ECJ), the Appellate Body has no competence to give advisory opinions. The
Dispute Settlement Understanding explicitly affirms that "the provisions of this
Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative
interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the
WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade
Agreement"(Article 3[9] of the DSU). Appellate review relates to the exercise of quasi-
judicial powers of WTO panels and the Dispute Settlement Body. Yet, the Appellate
Body differs from a court in the true sense. An Appellate Body report can become legally
binding only upon the adoption by the DSB, which is also the core of the debate about the
Appellate Body's impartiality and independence.
The objectives determine the regulating dimension of an international institution and,
the legal characteristics of this international institution reflect the advantages and
disadvantages to some of its participants in terms of its function and jurisdiction. The
WTO is a new institution and, so is the Appellate Body. While the Appellate Body is
helping the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to move in a rule-oriented direction, the
tribunal itself needs reforming in a more judicial way.255
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: The first seven Appellate Body members are James Bacchus(United States), Christopher Beeby(New
Zealand), Claus-Dieter Ehlermann(Germany), Said El-Naggar(Egypt), Florentino P. Feliciano(Philippines),
Julio Lacarte-Muro(Uruguay), Mitsuo Matsushita(Japan). See WTO Focus, 1995, No.6, p.8.
254
: See the Statute of the European Court ofJustice, Article 49. The Dispute Settlement Understanding,
Article 17(4). See supra note 1.
255
: As for the suggestions of how to reform the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in a more judicial
way, see Part Two of Section Two, Chapter Six.
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5.5.3. The function of and jurisdiction by the Appellate Body
Set as a "buffer" and a "filter", the appellate review provides one more chance for the
parties to the dispute, particularly the one which deems the panel report as unfavourable
to it, to lodge their arguments. The Dispute Settlement Understanding does not establish
any preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Appellate Body. It simply
provides that appeals are "limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel"(Article 17[6] of the DSU). In other words, the
concept of an "appeal" is meant to speak for itself. This bears some analogy to the
stipulations of the domestic law. We know intuitively what an appellate body should do.
Although the right of appeal may be statutory, there is no need to have some statutory
explanation ofwhen an appeal court can overturn a decision of a lower court—it does so
when the lower court is wrong in law. In this respect, an appeal proper is distinguished
from judicial review. Just as a classic English administrative law textbook puts it: "On an
appeal, the question is 'right or wrong'? On a judicial review, the question is 'lawful or
unlawful'?"256
But is the domestic analogy appropriate for international tribunals, particularly in the
context of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism? Is the application of the WTO
Agreement and its covered agreements a matter on which panels ought to be granted
leeway, or is it a matter on which there is a single correct interpretation, adherence to
which must be insisted upon by the Appellate Body? One approach might be that the
function of the Appellate Body is to ensure the proper interpretation of the WTO
Agreement and other multilateral agreements. Otherwise, judicial decisions might be
governed by political rather than legal considerations and, the results of the Uruguay
Round negotiations will be reduced to disuse. In accordance with this view, there is no
room for flexibility in the application of the terms of those agreements by panels and,
should be no scope for the Appellate Body to develop any concept of standard of review.
An alternative view is that, in the interpretation of the WTO Agreement and other
multilateral agreements, there must be a recognition of the need for the WTO Members to
have some flexibility in the implementation of their obligations. Since such obligations
may have a wide range of potential applications, the Appellate Body should be allowed
some leeway in its deliberations before concluding that a panel has not correctly applied
the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement and its covered agreements. This is not an
argument that the panels are mediatory or compromissory in nature. It is a recognition
that interpretation involves choices and that, in the context of a developing system of law
like that of the WTO, there has to be some flexibility in the exercise of the appellate
function. Obviously, the important question is, how much?
The issue of the nature of the appellate function is particularly acute in relation to
appeals arising under the Antidumping Agreement where there is a specific standard of
review. Article 17(6)(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement states: "...Where the panel finds
that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the
Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations." The question here is
whether this is a rule for both panels and the Appellate Body. In other words, does Article
17(6)(ii) turn the function of the Appellate Body in the area of antidumping into a process
56
: H. W. Wade and C. F. Forsyth: Administrative Law(seventh edition), Oxford: Clarendon Press(1994),
p.38.
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of judicial review? If so, the concept of "issues of law covered in the panel report and
legal interpretations developed by the panel", which is the description of the Appellate
Body s jurisdiction provided in Article 17(6) of the DSU, has to be read in the light of
Article 17(6)(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement, if a dispute arises under that agreement.
Following this vein, there is an important preliminary issue for the Appellate Body to
determine about its jurisdiction when a matter comes before it under the Antidumping
Agreement.
How has the Appellate Body perceived its role so far? At the outset, it is clear that the
Appellate Body considers that it, rather than parties to the dispute, controls the
procedures of the dispute settlement, and the Appellate Body has been prepared to insist
that WTO Members should comply with those rules. During the appellate review
proceedings of the first appealed case, United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, the Appellate Body rejected the attempt by Venezuela and Brazil
to make arguments on a matter that had not been appealed.257
In the initial stage of its practice, the Appellate Body appeared to treat the
requirement of Article 17(12) of the DSU258 as a stipulation that it must set out in its
decision a formal legal conclusion on every issue raised.259 Thus, the Appellate Body, in
those earlier cases, was prepared to question a panel's interpretation, no matter whether
or not that interpretation has any effect on the actual outcome of the case. However, in a
later case, the Appellate Body changed its former approach and took the view that
nothing in Article 11 of the DSU or "in previous GATT practice requires a panel to
examine all legal claims made by the complaining party. Previous GATT 1947 and WTO
panels have frequently addressed only those issues that such panels considered necessary
for the resolution of the matter between the parties, and have declined to decide other
issues. Thus, if a panel found that a measure was inconsistent with a particular provision
of GATT 1947, it generally did not go on to examine whether the measure was also
inconsistent with other GATT provisions that, a complaining party may have argued,
were violated.260 In recent WTO practice, panels likewise have refrained from examining
257
: The issues raised by Venezuela and Brazil in their respective Appellees' Submissions are whether clear
air is an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g) of GATT 1994 and whether the
baseline establishment rules are consistent with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. United
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, see supra note 136, pp.10-12.
258
: Which states: "The Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with
paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding." See supra note 1.
259
: After the Gasoline case, the Beverages case can be deemed another such example. See Japan-Taxes on
Alcoholic leverages/hereinafter as Beverages), Report of the Appellate Bodyfdistributed on 4 October
1996), WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R.
260
: See, for example, EEC—Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain Products from Hong
Kong, adopted on 12 July 1983, GATT BISD, 30th Supplement! 1984), p.129, para.33; Canada—
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, adopted on 7 February 1984, GATT BISD, 30th
Supplement! 1984), p.140, para.5.16; United States—Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, adopted on 13
March 1984, GATT BISD, 31st Supplement! 1985), p.67, paras.4.5-4.6; United States—Manufacturing
Clause, adopted on 15/16 May 1984, GATT BISD, 31st Supplement/1985), p.74, para.40; Japan-
Measures on Imports ofLeather, adopted on 15/16 May 1984, GATT BISD, 31st Supplement(1985), p.94,
para.57; Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors, adopted on 4 May 1988, GATT BISD, 35th
Supplement(1989), p.l 16, para.122; Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products,
adopted on 22 March 1988, GATT BISD, 35th Supplement/1989), p.163, para.5.4.2; EEC—Regulations on
Imports ofParts and Components, adopted on 16 May 1990, GATT BISD, 37th Supplement/1991), p. 132,
paras.5.10, 5.22, and 5.27; Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by
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each and every claim made by the complaining party and have made findings only on
those claims that such panels concluded were necessary to resolve the particular
matter."261 Although a few GATT and WTO panels did make broader rulings, by
considering and deciding issues that were not absolutely necessary to dispose of the
particular dispute, there is nothing anywhere in the DSU that requires panels to do so.262
In view of the complexity and time pressure of the WTO disputes, we can predict that the
Appellate Body will continue to apply the same measure of "judicial economy" to itself
in future cases.
In its early years following the inception of the new dispute settlement mechanism,
the Appellate Body suggested that one of its important functions was to provide guidance
to panels. How well did the Appellate Body measure up in this regard? Here, we can refer
to the old adage that one must look at what a court does and not just what it says. The
statement made by the Appellate Body in the Gasoline case that "WTO Members have a
large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment(including
its relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and the environmental
legislation they enact and implement"263 is no doubt meant to be reassuring to those
Members concerned with environmental protection. But this does not mean that future
panelists and Appellate Body members have to follow the interpretations of the Appellate
Body in the Gasoline case. WTO law does not recognise the rule of precedent, neither are
there any changes on the existing WTO rules concerning environment issues. Therefore,
the dispute settlement bodies still need to take into account the particulars of each case in
future.
Over time the Appellate Body has to develop a clear view of its role—what it is
capable of doing and what it should not do. In the view of the author of this thesis, this
will entail articulating some concept of a "standard of review", perhaps something akin to
the European Court ofHuman Rights concept of a "margin of appreciation".264 There are
Provincial Marketing Agencies, adopted on 22 March 1988, GATT BISD, 35th Supplement! 1989), P-37,
para.5.6; and United States—Denial ofMost-Favoured-Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwearfrom
Brazil, adopted on 19 June 1992, GATT BISD, 39th Supplement! 1993), P-128, para.6.18.(Footnote
original).
261
: See, for example, Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, adopted on 20
March 1997, WT/DS22/R, para.293; and Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, as modified by the Appellate Body and adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/9,
para.6.43.(Footnote original) See United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India, Report of the Appellate Body(distributed on 25 April 1997), WT/DS33/AB/R,
p. 18.(Emphasis original).
262
: See, for example, EEC—Restrictions on Imports ofDesert Apples, Complaint by Chile, adopted on 22
June 1989, GATT BISD, 36th Supplement! 1990), P-91, para.12.20, where the panel explicitly stated that
given its finding that the EEC measures were in violation of Article XI: 1 of GATT 1947 and were not
justified by Article XI:2(c)(i) or (ii) of GATT 1947, no further examination of the administration of the
measures would normally be required. In that case, the panel nonetheless considered it "appropriate" to
examine the administration of the EEC measures in respect of Article XIII of GATT 1947 in view of the
questions of great practical interest raised by both parties.
263
: United States—Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, see supra note 136, p.29.
264
: This concept was first described as a technique "used to grant to governments a certain benefit of
thought in especially difficult situations". See C. Morrisson: The Developing European Law of Human
Rights, A. W. Sijthoff(1967), p.150. It has come to be seen as "a doctrine of deference in the exercise of
judicial review". See T. A. O'Donnell: The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the
Jurisprudence of the European Court ofHuman Rights, 4 Hum. Rts. 6.474(1982), p.495.
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two important reasons for this consideration. Firstly, panels and the Appellate Body will
be consistently called upon to interpret provisions of the WTO Agreement and its covered
agreements that are not surrounded with past practice or necessarily fit squarely within
traditionally GATT obligations of "most-favoured-nation" and "national" treatment.
Those new provisions, drafted in language that may be general rather specific, cannot be
given a textual, fixed-in-time meaning the first time when they are raised in a dispute
settlement. They need honing and refining over time. Secondly, the interpretative
process, particularly in the context of those provisions concerning developing countries,
is not an exact science. There must be some leeway for the Appellate Body to give their
interpretations so that it may function well not only in maintaining the international trade
order, but also in bringing more developing countries to participate in the global trading
under this order. Thus, the WTO Appellate Body which commenced in an area where
there is no history of appellate jurisdiction must be able to operate with more flexibility
than domestic appellate bodies that are able to draw on years, and even centuries, of
practice in the development of interpretative process.
5.5.4. The role of the Appellate Body in bringing developing countries into the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism
As stated in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, one of the objectives of the World
Trade Organisation is to "ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development". Under this general guidance, many of the
multilateral agreements contain relevant provisions with special and preferential
treatment for developing and the least-developed country Members.263 Correspondingly,
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, from the procedural aspect, also contains some
articles to ensure that these provisions are to be implemented properly. This is a clear
difference between the GATT and the WTO in the context of taking into account the
matters concerning development. However, to make these provisions is only one side of
the issue, the other side is how to incorporate these general provisions into the WTO
jurisprudence, which has not been envisioned by the draftsmen of the WTO agreements.
As the author of this thesis has pointed out in the previous chapter, WTO system, like any
other fair legal systems, must contain both the legitimacy and distributive justice.267 To
fulfil this two-tier task, the dispute settlement mechanism should be designed in such a
way: on the one hand, it needs to resolve the trade disputes according to the rules
negotiated in the Uruguay Round; on the other hand, it should also be capable of keeping
the delicate balance which was struck in the Uruguay Round negotiations between
developing and developed countries in the context of fulfilling theirWTO obligations.
265
: For example, Articles 15 and 16 of the Agreement on Agriculture-, Article 10 of the Agreement on the
Application ofSanitary and Phytosanitary Measures', Article 12 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade-, Article 4 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures', Article 15 of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994(Antidumping Agreement)-, Article 20 of the Agreement on
Implementation ofArticle VII ofGATT 1994\ Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures-, Article 9 of the Agreement on Safeguards; Article IV of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services-, Article 66 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See supra
note 1.
266
: See supra note 51.
267: See section Four ofChapter Four.
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The Appellate Body has already made some impressive decisions on this issue in a
few recent trade disputes. In the case United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
andMan-made Fibre Underwear, the appellant, Costa Rica, appealed that the Panel erred
in finding that the United States' restraint measure268 could have legal effect between the
date of publication of the notice of consultations(i.e. 21 April 1995) and the date of the
application of that measure(i.e. 23 June 1995).269 The restriction measure was
"introduced" by the United States on 23 June 1995 for a period of 12 months starting on
27 March 1995, i.e., starting on the day when the United States requested the concerned
Members for consultations under Article 6(7) of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing(ATC). By invoking Article 2(4) of the ATC, Costa Rica argued that new
restrictions might be imposed in the textiles sector only under either (a)the ATC, or
(b)the "relevant" provisions of GATT 1994. More specifically, a transitional safeguard
measure could be imposed only if it met the requirements of (a)Articles XI{General
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions)270 and XQl(Non-discriminatory Administration
of Quantitative Restrictions) of GATT 1994, or of (b)Article 6 of the ATC.271 Since,
Costa Rica argued, Article XIII:3(b)272 of GATT 1994 generally prohibited the
backdating of import quotas, a backdated transitional safeguard measure restricting
imports would be permissible only if it is expressly authorised by Article 6 of the ATC.273
The question here is whether the silence of Article 6 of the ATC on the issue of
backdating allows the United States setting the restraint period starting on March 27
which was the date when the United States requested concerned Members for
consultations, or as the Panel concluded, setting the restraint period starting on 21 April
which was the date of the publication of the information about the request for
268
: Before the establishment of the World Trade Organisation, the international trade of textiles and
clothing was regulated by the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles(ihc Multifibre
Arrangement or MFA), which permitted the importing countries invoking restraint measures on the
importation of textiles and clothing under certain circumstances. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
sets out a transition period of ten years, demanding the importing countries to integrate the textiles and
clothing sector into the WTO regime in three stages. See supra note 5. See also Establishment ofan Import
Limit for Certain Cotton and Man-made Fibre Textile Products Produced or Manufactured in Costa Rica,
60 Federal Register 32653, 23 June 1995.
269
: One of the Panel conclusions is that "the United States violated its obligations under Article 3(2) of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994(the 'General Agreement') and Article 6(10) of the ATC by
setting the start of the restraint period on the date of the request for consultations, rather than the
subsequent date ofpublication of information about the restraint." See supra note 202, para.7.69.
270
: Costa Rica, however, did not submit any arguments in respect of Article XI of GATT 1994.
271
: United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, Report of the
Appellate Body(distributed on 10 February 1997), WT/DS24/AB/R, p.6.
272
: Which states: "In the case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting party
applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product or products
which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity
or value. Any supplies of the product in question which were en route at the time at which public notice
was given shall not be excluded from entry; Provided that they may be counted so far as practicable,
against the quantity permitted to be imported in the period in question, and also, where necessary, against
the quantities permitted to be imported in the next following period or periods; and Provided further that if
any contracting party customarily exempts from such restrictions products entered for consumption or
withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during a period of thirty days after the day of such public
notice, such practice shall be considered full compliance with this subparagraph."(Noted added). See supra
note 1.
273
: See supra note 271, p. 6.
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consultation. The Appellate Body believed that the answer to this question was only to be
found within Article 6(10) itself—its text and context—considered in the light of the
objective and purpose ofArticle 6 and the ATC in general.
Under the express terms of Article 6(10) of the ATC, "If, however, after the
expiration of the period of 60 days from the date on which the request for consultations
was received, there has been no agreement between the Members, the Member which
proposed to take safeguard action may apply the restraint by date of import or date of
export, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, within 30 days following the 60-
day period for consultation, and at the same time refer the matter to the TMB..."274 the
Appellate Body believed that, in line with the spirit of these terms, the restraint measure
could be "applied" only "after the expiration of the period of 60 days" for consultations,
without success, and only within the "window" of 30 days immediately following the 60-
day period.275 Accordingly, the Appellate Body believed that, in the absence of an
express authorisation in Article 6(10) of the ATC to backdate the effectiveness of a
safeguard restraint measure, a presumption arose from the very text of Article 6(10) that
such a measure could be applied only prospectively.276
After the Appellate Body provided the deliberations to the text ofArticle 6(10) of the
ATC, it turned to its context, which included the whole of Article 6. Article 6(1) offers
some reflected light on the question of backdating a restraint, which reads in pertinent
part: "Members recognise that during the transition period it may be necessary to apply a
specific transitional safeguard mechanism^referred to in this Agreement as 'transitional
safeguard'). The transitional safeguard may be applied by any Member to products
covered by the Annex, except those integrated into GATT 1994 under the provisions of
Article 2...The transitional safeguard should be applied as sparingly as possible,
consistently with the provisions of this Article and the effective implementation of the
integration process under this Agreement.''''7'11 It appears to the Appellate Body that to
inject into Article 6(10) an authorisation for backdating the effectiveness of a restraint
measure will "loosen up the carefully negotiated language ofArticle 6(10), which reflects
an equally carefully drawn balance of rights and obligations ofMembers, by allowing the
importing Member an enhanced ability to restrict the entry into its territory of goods in
the exportation of which no unfair trade practice such as dumping or fraud or deception
as to origin, is alleged or proved". In the view of the Appellate Body, "retroactive
application of a restraint measure effectively enables the importing Member to exclude
more goods by enforcing the quota earlier rather later".278 Based on this reasoning, the
Appellate Body concluded that "the Panel erred in concluding 'if the importing country
publishes the proposed restraint period and restraint level after the request for
274: See supra note 1.
275
: Under Article 6(5) of the ATC, the maximum period of validity of a determination of "serious damage
or actual threat thereof', for purpose of application of an ATC-consistent restraint measure, is 90 days after
the date of initial notification of such damage. After the 90-day period, a new determination of "serious
damage or actual threat thereof' will have to be made if a new restraint measure is imposed. See supra note
1.
276
: See supra note 271, p. 14.
277
: See supra note 1 (Emphasis added).
278
: See supra note 271, p.15.
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consultations, it can later set the initial date of the restraint period as the date of the
279
publication of the proposed restraint'".
Developing countries, in general, were not particularly interested in the GATT
dispute settlement mechanism. Only a few developing countries participated in the GATT
trade system, few special and preferential provisions in the GATT legal documents were
made for those "less-developed contracting parties", and no strict procedures were
provided for the dispute settlement. All these account for the disinterest of many
developing countries to the GATT legal system. Therefore, the institutional reforms
within the WTO should presumably go a long way to address their concerns. However,
the institutional weakness of the GATT is only one(if the most visible) of the problems of
the old system. Such substantive anomalies as the Arrangement Regarding International
Trade in Textiles(the Multifibre Arrangement or MFA) had long been regarded as a
mockery of free trade, its abolition was a key demand of developing countries throughout
the Uruguay Round negotiations and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing(ATC) is the
resultant compromise. The question now is the extent to which in operation the
compromise can keep both sides happy. That is, on the one hand, the WTO needs to
establish the confidence among developing country Members to those new international
trade rules and encourage them to behave under the WTO legal framework; on the other
hand, it is also necessary to push the developed country Members to give up their
restrictive measures substantially and, to integrate those trade sectors like textiles and
clothing, which are of great importance to the developing countries, completely into the
regime of the WTO in near future. The Appellate Body in the case United States—
Restrictions on Imports ofCotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear has made a good start
on this endeavour. While interpreting the provisions of the ATC narrowly, the Appellate
Body put an end to the practice of backdating of the effectiveness of a restrictive measure
to the date of the importing Member's call for consultations.280 This, as some scholars
?R 1
have observed, means a small step for Costa Rica, but a giant step for developing
countries which had been fighting against the MFA for decades.
279: Id, p.21.
280
: Article 3(5)(i) of the MFA provided in part: "If, however, after a period of sixty days from the date on
which the request has been received by the participating exporting country or countries, there has been no
agreement either on the request for export restraint or on any alternative solution, the requesting
participating country may decline to accept imports for retention from the participating country or countries
referred to in paragraph 3 above of the textiles and textile products causing market disruption(as defined in
Annex A) at a levelfor the twelve-month period beginning on the day when the request was received by the
participating exporting country or countries not less than the level provided for in Annex B..."(Emphasis
added). Simply as a matter of comparative texts, it may be noted that, like Article 6(10) of the ATC, Article
XIX of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards do not contain any language expressly permitting
backdating of the effectiveness of a safeguard measure taken thereunder with respect to categories of goods
already integrated into GATT 1994. In contrast, it may also be noted that both Article 10(2) of the
Antidumping Agreement and Article 20(2) of the SCM Agreement expressly authorise, under certain
circumstances, the retroactive levying of antidumping and countervailing duties for the period when
provisional measures were in force.
281
: See Rambod Behboodi: Legal Reasoning and International Law of Trade—The First Steps of the
Appellate Body ofthe WTO, Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol.32, 1998, No.4, p.80.
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Section Six Developing Countries and the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
5.6.1. Statistical analysis: participation of developing country Members in the WTO
dispute settlement proceedings
During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, developing countries
had mixed feelings about the proposed new dispute settlement mechanism.282 A rule-
oriented multilateral dispute settlement mechanism represented an attractive and
transparent alternative to the previous unilateral measures and, the new legal system
would be assumed to effectively protect the contracting rights of developing country
Members. However, the WTO-sanctioned retaliation mechanism, as permitted in the
original proposal of the Dispute Settlement Understanding when a ruling is ignored, was
not credible for the developing country Members. After many revisions of the proposal, a
substantially strengthened dispute settlement mechanism was finally agreed in the middle
of the negotiations and, some observers have expressed satisfaction with its role in
resolving trade disputes between the WTO Members.283
One of the remarkable consequences of the establishment of this new dispute
settlement mechanism is the active participation of the developing country Members. The
following Table 2 will provide a statistical comparison of participation of developing
countries in the GATT and WTO dispute settlement mechanism as of the end of 2001.
From this table, it is evident that, out of the total 236 GATT disputes, developing
countries had initiated only 38 of them as complainants against developed countries and
other developing countries, i.e. about 16.10 percent of the totality. But the corresponding
percentage occurring in the WTO is already as high as 25.64 percent. In other words,
there is an increase of 9.54 percent. The other dramatic increase is the complaints raised
by developed country Members against developing country Members, which is 21.37
percent of the total 234 WTO disputes. This is an increase of 11.20 percent, compared
with the same scenario in the GATT.284 From the table it is also clear that there is a 11.55
percent increase in the disputes between developing country Members themselves.
Furthermore, one point which merits our notice is that the figure of the total WTO
disputes involving developing country Members within only seven years is already
higher than that with a forty-seven years' length ofGATT history.
Table 2: Level of participation of developing countries in the GATT and WTO dispute
settlement mechanism






Total complaints 236 234
282
: See J. Croome: Reshaping the World Trading System, Geneva: World Trade Organisation! 1995).
283
: See John H. Jackson: Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO
Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Prospects^in The WTO As An International Organisation edited by A.
O. Krueger), The University of Chicago Press(1998), pp. 161-180; A. W. Shoyer: The First Three Years of
WTO Dispute Settlement: Observations and Suggestions, Journal of International Economic Law, 1998,
Vol.1, pp.277-302.
284
: One factor accounting for the low participation level of developing countries in the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism is that most of the developing contracting parties were not the signatories of the
codes made during the Kennedy Round( 1962-67) and Tokyo Round( 1973-79) negotiations. Thus, most of
the GATT mles were not binding on developing contracting parties. In contrast, the WTO rules, under the
"single package" policy, are binding on all Members.
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Developing countries v. developing
countries
3 1.27 30 12.82
Total complaints by developing countries 38 16.10 60 25.64
Developed countries v. developing
countries
24 10.17 50 21.37
Note: Figures as of the end of2001.
Since a general picture of the participation of developing countries in the GATT and
WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been provided, the following tables are
designated to analyse the nature and trend of the current WTO disputes involving the
developing country Members. Table 3 is the summary of the complaints raised by the
developing country Members against the developed country Members, while Table 4 is
the summary of the complaints raised by some developing country Members against
other developing country Members. After the analysis of these disputes in which
developing country Members participated as complainants, Table 5 provides us another
picture of the complaints which were raised by the developed country Members against
the developing country Members. In order to show the different stage in which each of
the cases is currently involved, in the following three tables, the author of this thesis
chooses to use different handwritings to describe the cause of dispute. The cause of
dispute in bold indicates those cases where the panel or appellate review process has
been completed, while the cause of dispute in italics indicates those cases where
settlement has been notified or is apparent. Active panels are underlined. All others are in
pending consultations.
Table 3: Complaints raised by developing country Members against developed country
Members
Complaint Respondent Year Cause of the Dispute
Venezuela, Brazil United States 1995
Standards for reformulated
and conventional gasoline
India Poland 1995 Import Regimefor automobiles
Costa Rica United States 1995
Restrictions on imports of




v -U'4/ It! ill
1996
Measures affecting imports of
women andgirls' wool coats
India United States 1996
Measures affecting imports
ofwoven wool shirts and
blouses
Mexico United States 1996
Anti-dumping investigation
(fresh or chilled tomatoes)
India, Malaysia, Import prohibition of certain
285
: All the sources in tables 2, 3, 4, 5 are from the documents circulated by the WTO Secretariat. See
Overview ofthe State-of-Play ofWTO Disputes, cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispul_.htm
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of certain poultry products
Brazil Canada 1997
Measures affecting the
export of civilian aircraft
Colombia United States 1997
Safeguard measures against
imports ofbroom and corn
brooms
Korea United States 1997 Anti-dumping duties(CTVs)
Chile




Korea United States 1997 Anti-dumping duties(DRAMS)
Panama European Cornmunities 1997
Regime for the importation,
sale and distribution of bananas
Argentina United States 1997 Tariff rate quota(groundnuts)
India European Communities 1998 Import duties(rice)
India European Communities 1998
Anti-dumping investigation
(unbleached cotton fabrics)
India European Communities 1998
Anti-dumping duties(bed-
linen)
Brazil European Communities 1998
Special and differential
treatment(coffee)




Korea United States 1999 measures(steel)




Korea United States 2000 Safeguard Measuresdine pipe)
Anti-dumping and
countervailing
India United States 2000 measures on steel plate
Brazil European Communities 2000
Measures affecting soluble
coffee
Brazil United States 2000
Countervailing duties(carbon
steel products)
Brazil European Communities 2000
Anti-dumping duties(pipe
fittings)
Export credits and loan
Brazil Canada 2000 guarantees for regional aircraft
Brazil United States 2001 US Patents Code
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Peru European Communities 2001 Trade description of sardines
Note : Figures as of the end of 2001.
Out of these thirty complaints raised by the developing country Members, nine are
caused by the anti-dumping regime of some developed country Members, particularly
those of the United States and the European Communities. Together with the other two
countervailing disputes, they make up more than one third of the total disputes in this
group. This is a worrying tendency as the United States and the European Communities
are the two largest markets of exports for many developing countries. Before the
establishment of the World Trade Organisation, developed countries used to limit the
imports from developing countries with some non-tariffmeans like import licenses, tariff
quotas and voluntary export restraints. One typical example is the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement^MFA) which was made between some developing countries with bulks of
textile exports and those major developed countries. The MFA restricted the exports of
textile and clothing products from developing countries to those major developed
countries by the allocation of quotas. The other example is the Lome Convention between
the European Communities and those African, Caribbean and Pacific(ACP)
countries(most of which are the former colonies of the European metropolitan countries),
which provided more preferential treatment to these ACP countries than other developing
countries. With the elimination of these prejudicial non-tariff measures under the WTO
rules, some developed country Members are concerned about the surging of cheap
commodities from developing country Members into their domestic markets. They begin
to choose the means within the ambit of the WTO rules to limit the imports from
developing country Members. The anti-dumping measure becomes one of the efficient
TO/T
ways which many countries are glad to have recourse to. However, the investigation in
an anti-dumping dispute involves a very complicated process.287 To evaluate the impact
of the allegedly dumped imports in the domestic market, in most cases, is subjective
rather than objective. More often than not, the fact that the cost of production, including
labour force and raw materials, in most developing countries is much cheaper than that in
developed countries is overlooked by those countries raising the complaints.
Consequently, it is not easy to persuade the panel or the Appellate Body of the fact that
the dumping does not exist.
After we summarised these anti-dumping and countervailing disputes, we still have
got such an impression that all other disputes listed in Table 3 are more or less connected
with other restrictive measures implemented by the developed country Members on the
286
: Article 17(6)(i) of the Antidumping Agreement states: "in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the
panel shall determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their
evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the
evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion,
the evaluation shall not be overturned". See supra note 1. In the view of the author of this thesis, this
flexible standard of review in the examination of an anti-dumping dispute accounts for, in some extent, the
frequent use of anti-dumping measure by some countries.
287
: For example, Article 3(4) of the Antidumping Agreement states: "The examination of the impact of the
dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic
factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilisation of capacity; factors
affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on
cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investment. The list is not
exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance". See supra note 1.
212
imports from the developing country Members. For example, the Gasoline and Shrimp
disputes, both cases concern the different technical and product standards existing in
developing and developed countries. If we apply the WTO rules without taking into full
account the difference of the economic development existing between the developing and
developed country Members, then most developing country Members will surely be
placed in a disadvantageous position in the dispute settlement proceedings.
One of the disputes in the this group, which merits special attention, is European
Communities—Measures Affecting Different and Favourable Treatment of Coffee,288
This dispute arose from the complaint by Brazil in respect of the special and preferential
treatment under the EC's Generalised System of Preferences(GSP). Brazil stated that it
was aware that there was a proposed EC Council Regulation(COM[1998] 521 final)
which would unify all EC laws and regulations concerning the operation of the GSP
scheme for both agricultural and industrial products. Brazil contended that this special
treatment adversely affected the importation into the EC of soluble coffee originating in
Brazil. In this context, Brazil alleged that this special treatment was inconsistent with the
Enabling Clause, as well as with Article I ofGATT 1994. To the author's memory, this is
the first case raised by a developing country Member under the terms of the special and
preferential treatment in the WTO dispute settlement history. In the dispute settlement
proceedings, four other developing country Members, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Peru and
Columbia, expressed their wishes to join the consultations. Although this dispute is
resolved peacefully in the end, it raised another question as whether the WTO panel or
the Appellate Body should take the special and preferential treatment clause as one of the
standards of review when they are dealing with the disputes concerning developing
country Members, no matter under what excuses these complaints are raised.
Table 4: Complaints raised by developing country Members against other developing
country Members
Complaint Respondent Year Cause of the Dispute
Singapore Malaysia 1995
Prohibition of imports ofPolyethylene
and Polypropylene
Philippines Brazil 1995 Measures affecting desiccated coconut
Mexico Venezuela 1995 Anti-dumping investigation(OCTG)
India Turkey 1996
Restrictions on imports of textiles and
clothing products
Sri Lanka Brazil 1996
Countervailing duties on imports of desiccated
coconut and coconut milk powder
Mexico Guatemala 1997 Anti-dumping investigation(port-land cement)
Brazil Peru 1997 Countervailing duty investigation(buses)
Indonesia Argentina 1998 Safeguard measures on imports of footwear
Mexico Guatemala 1999 Anti-dumping measure(port-land cement)
Thailand Colombia 1999 Safeguard measure(plain polyester filaments)
288
: See WT/DS154/1, dated on 7 December 1998. Brazil previously brought a similar case against the US
system of GSP during the GATT period. See United States—Denial ofMost-Favoured-Nation Treatment
as to Non-rubberfootwearfrom Brazil(\992).
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Mexico Ecuador 1999 Provisional antidumping measure(cement)
Costa Rica
Trinidad and










Measures affecting imports from Honduras
and Colombia
Brazil Argentina 2000 Transitional safeguard measures (cotton fabrics)
Mexico Ecuador 2000 Anti-dumping measures(cement)
Honduras Nicaragua 2000
Measures affecting imports from Honduras
and Colombia
Thailand Egypt 2000 Import prohibition on canned tuna with soybean
oil
Argentina Chile 2000
Price band svstem and safeguard measures relating
to certain agricultural products
Brazil Turkey 2000 Antidumping duty on steel and iron pipe fittings
Turkey Egypt 2000 Anti-dumping measures on steel rebar





Price band system and safeguard measures
relating to certain agricultural products
Argentina Chile 2001 Provisional safeguard measure on mixed edible oil
Chile Peru 2001 Taxes on cigarettes
India Brazil 2001 Anti-dumping duties on jute bags
Colombia Chile 2001
Safeguard measures and modification of schedules
regarding sugar
Chile Mexico 2001 Measures affecting the import ofmatches
India Argentina 2001
Measures affecting the import ofpharmaceutical
products
Note: Figures as of the end of 2001.
Table 4 demonstrates a picture of diversified disputes between the developing country
Members. Anti-dumping and countervailing disputes are still the biggest portion of the
total thirty disputes. But after that, there are five disputes concerning safeguard measures,
six concerning measures affecting imports, three concerning import restriction measures,
two concerning different price systems, and one concerning different tax systems. One
fact accounting for this diversity is that these disputes are normally produced either
because of the indirect effects brought by the readjustment of domestic industrial policies
or because of the direct protection for those domestic infant industries. Since many
developing country Members are required to readjust their import and export regime,
making them operating in conformity with the WTO rules, there might emerge some
conflicts of interests in the course of these readjustments. These conflicts may lead to
trade disputes not only between developing and developed country Members, but
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between developing country Members themselves. More importantly, many developing
countries have come to realise that their industries, no matter how small and weak they
are, need to compete with those of other countries under the same rules. Although they
may benefit some years of delay in the implementation of these rules, they still lack
enough resources to strengthen their economies within these extended periods. Under
these circumstances, some countries have to resort to those emergency measures, like
anti-dumping or safeguard measures, to protect their domestic industries.289 While, in
general, we take a positive approach to the participation of developing country Members
in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, we shall not overlook those protective
elements inherent in these disputes, which cannot be forgiven at the excuse that these
complaints are brought by developing countryMembers.
Compared with others in this group, the first two disputes attracted more attention.
Malaysia—Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and Polypropylene290 is the first
dispute which arose between two developing country Members, Singapore and Malaysia,
and was brought to the WTO dispute settlement procedures. On 10 January 1995,
Singapore requested Malaysia to enter into consultation pursuant to Article XXIII: 1 of
GATT 1994 and Article 4(3) of the DSU regarding the prohibition of imports of
polyethylene and polypropylene instituted and maintained by Malaysia under its
Customs(Prohibition of Imports) Order 1994. The consultations failed to settle the
dispute within 60 days after the date of the receipt of the request for consultation.
Thereafter, Singapore requested the establishment of a Panel pursuant to Article XXIIL2
of GATT 1994 and Article 4(7), Article 6 of the DSU upon the standard terms of
reference provided in Article 7(1) of the DSU. This is also the first dispute which invoked
the formal WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This dispute was settled eventually upon
an agreement ofboth sides and with Singapore's withdrawal of the panel request.
The second dispute is Brazil—Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut(hereinafter as
the Coconut case), which went through the whole dispute settlement procedures.291 The
289
: For many developing countries, they prefer to use safeguard measures as the relevant WTO rules are
more flexible on this point than others. Article XIX:l(a) of GATT 1994 states: "If, as a result of unforeseen
development and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement,
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in
respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such
injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession". Article 2(1)
of the Safeguard Agreement states: "A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that
Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being imported into
its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or
directly competitive products". See supra note 1. Thus, compared with the anti-dumping dispute, it is much
easier for a respondent to support its actions in a safeguard measure dispute.
290
: See Malaysia—Prohibition ofImports ofPolyethylene and Polypropylene, WT/DS1, distributed on 19
July 1995.
291
: The application for initiation of the countervailing duty investigation was filed with the Brazilian
authorities on 17 January 1994. The investigation was initiated on 21 June 1994, provisional countervailing
duties were imposed on 23 March 1995, and definitive countervailing duties were imposed on 18 August
1995. The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation^the WTO Agreement) entered
into force for both parties to this dispute, Brazil and the Philippines, on 1 January 1995, that is, after the
application for, and the initiation of, the investigation and prior to the imposition of the provisional and
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Philippines claimed that the countervailing duty imposed by Brazil on the Philippine's
exports of desiccated coconut was inconsistent with the WTO rules. The fundamental
question in this case is one of the temporal application of one set of international legal
norms, or the successor set of norms, to a particular measure taken during the period of
co-existence of GATT 1947 and the Tokyo Round Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Code with the WTO Agreement. Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties contains a general principle of international law concerning the non-
retroactivity of treaties. It provides as follows: "Unless a different intention appears from
the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any
act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the
• ?Q?
entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party". In the Coconut case, Article
32(3) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures is the relevant
provision, which states: ".. .the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to investigations,
and reviews of existing measures, initiated pursuant to applications which have been
made on or after the date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement".
Absent a contrary intention, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures is not applicable to acts or facts which took place, or situations which ceased to
exist, before the date of its entry into force. Based on this reasoning, the Panel concluded
that the provisions of the agreements relied on by the claimant were inapplicable to the
dispute. This dispute was finally settled after the appellate review(appealed by both the
Philippines and Brazil) and the Appellate Body upheld the findings and legal
interpretations of the Panel.




Cause of the Dispute
United States Korea 1995
Measures concerning the testing and
inspection of agricultural products
United States Korea 1995
Measures concerning the shelf-life of
products









Laws, regulations andpractices in the
telecommunications sector
United States Turkey 1996 Taxation offoreign film revenues
Canada Brazil 1996 Export financing programme for aircraft
United States India 1996
Patent protection for pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products
United States,
definitive countervailing duties. See Brazil—Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS22/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body(distributed on 21 February 1997), p.l.
292
: See supra note 2.
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Certain measures affecting trade and








Certain measures affecting the
automotive industry
United States Argentina 1996
Certain measures affecting imports of
footwear, textiles, apparel and other items




|| '§ ' ' '
v
1997 Taxes on alcoholic beverages
European
Communities Argentina 1997 Measures affecting textiles and clothing
European
Communities India 1997
Patent protection for pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products
European










Quantitative restrictions on imports of
agricultural, textile and industrial
Communities India 1997 products
European
Communities Korea 1997 Safeguard measure(diary products)

















Measures affecting export of certain
commodities
European
Communities Argentina 1998 Safeguard measures(footwear)
Poland Thailand 1998 Anti-dumping duties(metal products)
United States Mexico 1998 Anti-dumping investigation(corn syrup)
European
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Communities Argentina 1998 Countervailing duties(wheat gluten)
European
Communities India 1998 Measures affecting the automotive sector
European
Communities India 1998 Import restrictions
European
Communities India 1998 Measures affecting custom duties
European
Communities Argentina 1998
Measures on the export of bovine hides
and the import of finished leather
European
Communities Argentina 1998 Anti-dumping measures(drill bits)
Czech Republic Hungary 1999 Safeguard measure(steel product)
United States,
Australia Korea 1999 Measures affecting imports of beef
United States Korea 1999
Measures affecting government
procurement
United States Argentina 1999 Measures affecting imports of footwear
United States Argentina 1999
Patent protection for pharmaceuticals
and test data protection for agricultural
chemicals
United States India 1999
Measures relating to trade and investment
in the motor vehicle sector
European
Communities Brazil 1999













Measures affecting trade and investment
in the motor vehicle sector
United States Argentina 2000
Certain measures on the protection
ofpatents and test data
United States Brazil 2000 Measures on minimum import prices
United States Romania 2000 Measures on minimum import prices
United States Brazil 2000 Measures affectingpatentprotection
United States Mexico 2000 Measures affecting trade in live swine
United States Mexico 2000
Measures affecting telecommunication
service
Note: Figures as of the end of 2001.
The fact that developing country Members are complained against by developed
country Members is a dramatic change in the context of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. In the GATT history, there is only a small portion of 24 complaints raised by
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developed contracting parties against developing contracting parties.294 This is mainly
due to the fact that many developing countries were not the signatories of the codes made
in the Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Therefore,
most of the GATT multilateral agreements were not relevant to them. In contrast, the
developing country Members in the WTO community could no longer keep themselves
away from those multilateral trade rules. Thus, those export/import-oriented developing
country Members, like Korea, India, Brazil and Mexico, tend to confront the challenges
on their foreign trade regime from the developed country Members. A more significant
feature is that, within such a short period of WTO history, the complaints raised by
developed country Members against developing country Members are even more than
those raised by developing country Members against developed country Members(50 vs.
30). This may be beyond the expectations of the Uruguay Round negotiators. Some
disputes, like India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, are quite influential as the recommendations and rulings of the panel and the
Appellate Body adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body will bring much impact upon
the domestic policy-making of some developing country Members.295 Out of the fifty
disputes listed in Table 5, about two thirds of them concern the measures affecting the
flow of imports or exports. This reflects a similar picture as described in the above
paragraphs in which the developing country Members act as the complainants.
In addition to the disputes listed in the foregoing tables, developing country Members
are also involved in some mixed disputes, i.e. they are acting as complaints together with
other developed country Member.296
While we applaud the active participation of developing country Members in the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, we should not overlook one important fact that the
number of developing country Members which have used the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism is still small in light of the fact that the majority of WTO Members are
developing countries. In this respect, the "active participation" is merely referred to a
small portion of countries. Only twenty-eight developing country Members have invoked
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism either as complainants or as respondents and, the
major users are still limited to those newly industrialised countries. While these countries
may have gained much experience and trained domestic personnel in the process of
294
: See Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila: Developing Countries and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol. 31, 1997, No.6, p.179.
295
: In the dispute India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, the
United States and the European Communities claimed respectively that the absence in India of (a)either
patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products or a system to permit the filing of
applications for patents on these products and (b)a system to grant exclusive marketing rights in such
products, violated the TRIPS Agreement Articles 27, 65, and 70. In 1999, India reached agreements with
the United States and the European Communities upon its enactment of relevant legislation to implement
the recommendations and rulings issued by the DSB. See Overview ofthe State-ofPlay ofWTO Disputes.
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispul_e.htm
296
: Id, for example, European Communities—Trade Description ofScallops{Canada, Peru, and Chile as
the complaints); European Communities—Duties on Imports of Grains(Canada, United States, Thailand,
and Uruguay as the complaints); European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution ofBananas{Ecuador, Guatemala, Elonduras, Mexico and the United States as the complaints);
Hungary- Export Subsidies in Respect of Agricultural .Pra</wc&(Argentina, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Thailand and the United States as the complaints); United States—Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of2000(Canada and Mexico as the complaints).
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dispute settlement, the majority of others seem still to isolate themselves from the new
dispute settlement mechanism. This may develop into a vicious cycle, i.e. the less these
countries use the new dispute settlement mechanism, the more they would probably
ignore it. This will lead to two consequent issues as whether the dispute settlement under
the WTO jurisdiction is compulsory or voluntary and, how the WTO could attract more
developing country Members to solve their disputes under its jurisdiction. Following this
vein, we may refer to the following two relevant questions: Whether does there exist any
legal obligations for Member governments to submit their disputes to the WTO dispute
settlement procedures? What is the impact of the dispute settlement within the WTO to
the domestic policy making?
5.6.2. Obligations of the Member governments to submit their disputes for
adjudication and the impact of the disputes settled within the WTO to
the domestic policy- making
As a general rule, it can be said that there is no specific legal obligations for any party
in a dispute to submit their dispute for adjudication. Although international economic
relations are generally based on agreements, the parties are still free to agree from the
very beginning on the methods of settlement which are applicable in case there should
arise a dispute between them.297 It is indeed a very typical feature of international
economic relations that the parties very often enter into an agreement beforehand, setting
up or referring to a certain dispute settlement mechanism in a way which obliges all
parties to make use of it. However, adherence to such agreements can only be secured to
the extent that legal enforcement is possible. More importantly, this is only the case when
private participants are subject to the jurisdiction of States.
In the context of the obligation of Member governments to submit their disputes for
adjudication, one point which needs to be clarified is that, even in the course of the WTO
dispute settlement proceedings, Member governments still have much freedom to choose
the ways to settle their disputes. For example, Article XXII ofGATT 1994 and Article 4
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding contain the provisions encouraging the
disputing parties to hold consultations between themselves before they request for the
establishment of a panel. The Director-General, at the request of any party to the dispute,
may offer good offices, conciliation or mediation with the view to assisting them to settle
the dispute. Even after the dispute has been referred to a panel, the disputing parties are
still permitted to choose the way they deem appropriate to settle their dispute.299
Freedom to choose the way for dispute settlement, however, does not mean the
freedom to evade the WTO rules. Article 4(1) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
states: "Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes
~97
: See Peter Behrens: Alternative Methods ofDispute Settlement in International Economic Relations
(included in Adjudication of International Trade Disputes in International and National Economic Law
edited by E.U. Petersmann and G. Jaenicke), University Press Fribourg Switzerland) 1992), pp.12-13.
298
: Article 5(3) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states: "Good offices, conciliation or mediation
may be requested at any time by any party to a dispute. They may begin at any time and be terminated at
any time. Once procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation are terminated, a complaining party
may then proceed with a request for the establishment of a panel". See supra note 1.
299
: Id. Article 12(7) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states: "...Where a settlement of the matter
among the parties to the dispute has been found, the report of the panel shall be confined to a brief
description of the case and to reporting that a solution has been reached".
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heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and
procedures as further elaborated and modified herein".300 In the light of the general
principle contained in Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, which states: "Each
Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements",301 the WTO
rules and the new dispute settlement mechanism should become the first choice for the
legal reasoning in a dispute settlement and, still exert much impact upon the policy¬
making of Member governments. A brief account of the following two cases may
vindicate the foregoing point.
The dispute European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas is the first such example to be analysed here. A panel was
established on 8 May 1996 to consider a complaint raised by Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico and the United States against the European Communities, concerning
the regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas established by an EC
Council Regulation(EEC No.404/93 of 13 February 1993) on the common organisation
of the market in bananas, and subsequent EC legislation, regulations and administrative
measures, including those reflecting the provisions of the Framework Agreement on
BananasifhQ BFA), which implemented, supplemented and amended that regime. Since
the circulation of the Appellate Body Report,302 there have been a lot of literature
published on the merits of the adjudication, but few articles or documents are available
on the appraisal of the impact of the recommendations and rulings on the national
governments concerned after the adjudication.
The problems existing in those African, Caribbean, and Pacific(ACP) countries,
which are brought by the WTO adjudication on the EC bananas regime, are
representative of a wider scenario for many developing countries. Just as over 30 years of
co-operation under various regimes have failed to improve the position of ACP exporters
of bananas, co-operation under the Lome Convention has not yielded the results which the
ACP countries wished for.303 The ACP countries, under the previous preferential
treatment of the Lome Convention, lacked the impetus to adjust their domestic economic
structures and promote the competitiveness of their exports. Only when the European
Communities began to reduce the preferential treatment, did these ACP countries realise
that their dependence on the bananas was so heavy that it was not easy for them to
diversify their exports. The WTO adjudication on the EC banana regime has indicated
that there will be more important limits on the ability of the EC to promote the trade of
the ACP countries, a point which has been recognised by the European Commission, in
both the Green Paper and its subsequent communication, in arguing that any new
convention must be more WTO-consistent than previous conventions.304
300




: See supra note 151.
303
: For example, whereas in 1975, the first Lome Convention, the ACP countries accounted for 7.6 percent
of total EC imports. By 1996, they accounted for only 3.8 percent of total EC imports. See P. Gakuna:
ACP-EU trade: past, present and future, The Courier, No.l67(January-February 1998), pp.16-17; and C.
Cosgrove: Has the Lome Convention failed ACP trade? Journal of International Affairs, No.48, 1994,
p.223.
304
: See, for example, the GATT discussions of previous Lome Conventions, GATT BISD, the 23rd
Supplement/1977), p.46; the 29th Supplement/1983), p.l 19; and the 35th Supplement/1989), p.321.
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On 1 March 2001, the European Communities reported to the DSB that on 29 January
2001, the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation(EC) No.216/2001
amending Regulation(EEC) No.404/93 on the common organisation of the market of
bananas. The modifications made in Council Regulation 216/2001 provide for three tariff
quotas open to all imports irrespective of their origin.305 According to the European
Communities, the tariff quotas are a transitional measure, leading ultimately to a tariff-
only regime no later than 1 January 2006.306 In the interim period, starting on 1 July
2001, the EC will implement an import regime based on tariff rate quotas, to be allocated
on the basis of historical licensing. On 22 June 2001, the EC notified an Understanding
on Bananas between the EC and the US, and an Understanding on Bananas between the
EC and Ecuador. Pursuant to these Understandings with the US and Ecuador, the EC has
made the following changes on its import regime: (a)effective from 1 January 2001, the
EC has implemented an import regime on the basis of historical licensing as set out in
annex to each of the Understandings; (b)effective as soon as possible thereafter, subject
to Council and European Parliament approval and to adoption of a GATT Article
XIII(with the title Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions)
waiver, the EC will implement an import regime on the basis of historical licensing as set
out in annex to each of the Understandings. In the view of the EC, the European
Commission will seek to obtain the implementation of such an import regime as soon as
possible.
Although the settlement of the Bananas dispute did not meet the complete satisfaction
of the complainants,307 it did make the Council of the European Union amend the EC
bananas import regime. Since the European Union carries out a uniform commercial
policy within its member countries, we can expect the recommendations and rulings of
the Bananas case will bring much impact upon the EU policy-making.
The dispute India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products is another example which reflects the impact of WTO adjudication upon the
domestic policy-making of Member governments. The Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights(TRlVS) is one of the new agreements negotiated
and concluded at the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The TRIPS
Agreement brings intellectual property within the world trading system for the first time
305
: To be specific, the three tariff quotas include: (l)a first tariff quota of 2,200,000 tonnes at a rate of
75/tonnes, bound under the WTO; (2)a second autonomous quota of 353,000 tonnes at a rate of 75/tonnes;
(3)a third autonomous quota of 850,000 at a rate of 300/tonnes. Imports from ACP countries will enter
duty-free. In view of contractual obligations towards these countries and the need to guarantee proper
conditions of competition, they will benefit from a tariff preference limited to a maximum of 300/tonnes.
See Overview ofthe State-of-Play ofWTO Disputes.
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu 1_e.htm
306
: Id. According to the EC, substantial progress has been achieved with respect to the implementing
measures necessary to manage the three tariff rate quotas on the basis of the First-come, First-served
method. On 3 May 2001, the EC reported to the DSB that intensive discussions with the U.S. and Ecuador,
as well as the other banana supplying countries, including the other complaints, have led to the common
identification of the means by which the long-standing dispute over the EC's banana import regime will be
resolved.
307
: Id. At the same DSB meeting on 3 May 2001, both the United States and Ecuador reported that the
Understandings did not constitute mutually satisfactory solutions within the meaning of Article 3(6) of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, and that, at the moment, it would be premature for them to take the item
to the DSB agenda.
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by imposing certain obligations on WTO Members in the area of trade-related intellectual
property rights. First the United State in 1996,308 then the European Communities in
1997,309 complained respectively to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body that: (a)India did
not comply with its obligations under Article 70(8) of the TRIPS Agreement to establish
"a means" that adequately preserved novelty and priority in respect of applications for
product patent in respect of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical inventions during
the transitional period provided for in Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement; (b)India did
not comply with its obligations under Article 70(9) of the TRIPS Agreement; (c)India
thereby nullified and impaired benefits accruing directly or indirectly to the United States
and the European Communities under the TRIPSAgreement.
Article 70(8) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that "Where a Member does not make
available as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement patent protection for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products commensurate with its obligations
under Article 27,310 that Member shall: (a)notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI,311
provide as from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement a means by which
applications for patents for such inventions can be filed; (b)apply to these applications, as
of the date of application of this Agreement, the criteria for patentability as laid down in
this Agreement as if those criteria were being applied on the date of filing in that Member
or, where priority is available and claimed, the priority date of the application; and
(c)provide patent protection in accordance with this Agreement as from the grant of the
patent and for the remainder of the patent term, counted from the filing date in
accordance with Article 33 of this Agreement,312 for those of these applications that meet
the criteria for protection referred to in subparagraph^)".313 Under the general
requirement of the foregoing provisions, the United States and the European
Communities contended that India did not provide such means for them to apply patents
for their pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products during the transitional period
of implementing the WTO rules. As Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement provides for
transitional periods for developing country Members: in general five years from the entry
into force of the WTO Agreement, i.e. till 1 January 2000, and an additional five years to
provide for product patent protection in areas of technology to which such protection
308
: See India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report of the
Appellate Body(distributed on 19 December 1997), WT/DS50/AB/R.
309
: See India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report of the
Panel, WT/DS79/R.
310
: Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement states: "Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4
ofArticle 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether
products are imported or locally produced".(Note added)(Original note omitted). See supra note 1.
311
: Id. Under the title Acquisition and Maintenance of Intellectual Property Rights and Related Inter
Partes Procedures, Part IV of the TRIPS Agreement contains only Article 62, which provides the general
principles governing the procedures of acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights within
the WTO legal system.(Note added). See supra note 1.
312: Id. Article 33 states: "The term ofprotection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of
twenty years counted from the filing date(It is understood that those Members which do not have a system
of original grant may provide that the term of protection shall be computed from the filing date in the
system of original grant)".(Note added).
313: See supra note 1.
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would otherwise have to be extended in its territory on 1 January 2000 under the general
transition ride. Hence, in the areas of technology, developing country Members which
meet these conditions are not required to provide patent protection until 1 January 2005.
However, these transitional provisions are not applicable to Article 70(8), which ensures
that, if product patent protection commensurate with Article 27 is not already available
for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical product inventions, a means must be in
place as of 1 January 1995 which allows for the entitlement to fde patent applications for
such inventions and the allocation of fding and priority dates to them so that the novelty
of the inventions in question and the priority of the applications claiming their protection
can be preserved for the purposes of determining their eligibility for protection by a
patent at the time that product patent protection will be available for these inventions, i.e.
at the latest after the expiration of the transitional period. Thus, in order to prevent the
loss of the novelty of an invention in this sense, fding and priority dates need to have a
sound legal basis if the provisions ofArticle 70(8) are to fulfil these purposes. Moreover,
a filing must entitle the applicant to claim priority, if available, on the basis of an earlier
filing in respect of the claimed invention over applications with subsequent fding or
priority dates. Without legally sound fding and priority dates, the mechanism to be
established on the basis ofArticle 70(8) will be rendered inoperable.
The recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB in these two disputes have
brought significant impact on the Indian government's policy-making.314 After the first
dispute was settled, both parties agreed that the period of implementation for the Indian
government was 15 months from the date of the adoption of the Appellate Body Report,
i.e. it expired on 16 April 1999. As for the second dispute with the European
Communities, India indicated at the DSB meeting of 21 October 1998, that it needed a
reasonable period of time to comply with the DSB recommendations and that it intended
to have bilateral consultations with the EC to agree on a mutually acceptable period of
time. At the DSB meeting on 25 November 1998, India read out a joint statement done
with the EC, in which it was agreed that the implementation period in this dispute would
correspond to the implementation period in the former dispute between India and the
United States. At the DSB meeting on 28 April 1999, India presented its final status
report on the implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings in its dispute with
the United States, which report also applied to the implementation in its dispute with the
European Communities. This report disclosed the enactment of the relevant domestic
legislation to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
The settlement of the dispute India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products has indicated that forcing developing countries to pay
the full cost of intellectual property rights would make certain products prohibitively
expensive in the developing world. The developing world, in turn, has far less ability to
invest large sums in the development of innovative industries of its own. Furthermore,
Many developing countries like India had no regime, or only limited regime, for the
protection of intellectual property rights before the TRIPS Agreement was enacted. This
314
: The Appellate Body in the first complaint raised by the United States recommended that the Dispute
Settlement Body request India to bring its legal regime for patent protection of pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products into conformity with India's obligations under Articles 70(8) and 70(9) of
the TRIPS Agreement. These recommendations had much impact on the conclusions made by the Panel in
the second complaint raised by the European Communities. See supra note 308, p.34, and supra note 309,
p.69.
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is the rationale behind the transition period designed for the developing country Members
in the TRIPS Agreement. When the transition period expires, the developing country
Members will be required to establish the same regime as that of the developed country
Members, concerning the protection of the trade-related intellectual property rights. It is
certainly no easy job for them to do so. Meanwhile, developing country Members may
have to pay more for some imports in the context of the protection of intellectual property
rights, and this will become, for many developing country Members, another
insurmountable barrier in the future international trade.
A principal theme in the study of WTO law is the greatly increased cost of
participation for some Members in the new multilateral trading system. Whereas prior to
1995, a GATT requirement that involved too high a domestic political cost could in effect
be resisted, that is no longer the case in the WTO.315 At least with regard to patents, the
TRIPS Agreement involves obligations that could well cost some citizens in the WTO
Members their lives. Even in the name of the future development of efficient research-
based industries, that is a political cost of the highest order.316 It is to be expected that
non-compliance will continue to be a prominent feature of the TRIPS Agreement in
particular.317 Indeed, how to deal with this continued tendency to resist the full rigours of
the WTO rules like the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement has been a major source of
contention in the WTO dispute settlement. In this regard, the only practicable solution is
to establish a fair dispute settlement mechanism.
315: See Sara Dillon: Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death ofDomestic Political Constituencies, Minnesota
Journal ofGlobal Trade, No.8:2, 1999, p. 197.
316
: See Sara Dillon: International Trade and Economic Law and the European Union, Hart
Publishing(2002), p.79.
317
: See John E. Giust: Noncompliance with TRIPS by Developed and Developing Countries: Is TRIPS
Working? Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, No.8, 1997, p.69; Keshia B. Haskins:
Special 301 in China and Mexico: A Policy Which Fails to Consider How Politics, Economics, and Culture
Affect Legal Change Under Civil Law System of Developing Countries, Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media and Environment Law Journal, No.9, 1999, p.1125.
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Chapter Six Towards a Complete Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Section One Relevant Issues to Be Clarified for a Complete Dispute Settlement
Mechanism
6.1.1. Representation of parties in theWTO dispute settlement proceedings
The issue of representation of parties did not catch wide attention until the incident
occurred during a recent panel procedure, where two WTO Members(the United States
and Mexico) successfully opposed the participation of some private attorneys who had
been appointed as its delegates by another WTO Member(St. Lucia).1 The rights and
wrongs on this Panel decision have been debated significantly by many scholars since
then.2 The present writings will mainly focus the research on the stipulations of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding on this particular issue, the impact of the Panel
decision on the developing country Members and, the recommendations on the possible
amendments to the DSU.
To start with this analysis, it is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding on this issue. Unfortunately, the DSU is silent on
which persons are to be recognised as being entitled to represent a WTO Member in the
dispute settlement proceedings. This silence, however, shall not prevent us from drawing
the jurisprudence for this issue from other relevant provisions, or even other international
agreements. Besides, the practice and documents of the GATT, the predecessor of the
WTO, are also a valuable source for us to understand the legality of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism.3
While we refer to those relevant international agreements and customary practice,
Article 3(2) of the DSU is an illuminating provision, which states: "The dispute
settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognise that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law..."4 Guided by this provision, we first invoke
the general principles regarding the representation of States in their relations with
international organisations, which are set out in the 1975 Vienna Convention on the
Representation of States in their Relations with International Organisations of a
1
: This incident happened during a Panel meeting on 10 September 1996 on the dispute European
Community—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas. See WTO Press Notice dated
19 September 1996. See also B. Bahree: Rules of the Game—WTO Slips on Denying Parties Outside Legal
Help, Wall Street Journal Europe, 17 September 1996.
2
: See U. Bourke: International Dispute Settlement: The WTO Route or Alternatives? paper delivered at the
conference on Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation held in Brussels on 14 June 1996. See
also Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha: Representation of Parties in World Trade Disputes, Journal of World
Trade, Vol. 31, 1997, No.2, pp. 83-96.
3
: Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement states: "Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the
Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary
practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the
framework of GATT 1947." See The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade
Negotiations, Cambridge University Press) 1999).
4: Id.
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Universal Character.5 Although this Convention has not yet entered into force, its Part
III{Delegations to Organs and to Conferences) particularly represents a reflection of
customary international law in this area. Article 43(Appointment of the members of the
delegation) states: "Subject to the provisions ofArticles 46 and 73, the sending State may
freely appoint the members of the delegation."6 In terms of the composition of the
delegation, Article 45 states: "In addition to the head of delegation, the delegation may
include other delegates, diplomatic staff, administrative and technical staff, and service
staff."7 Therefore, it is the consideration and freedom of choice of the sending State upon
who will represent it in an international organisation. The only exceptions are the limit on
the size of the delegation and the conditional appointment of delegates from the persons
who have the nationality of the host State. In the case of the WTO, this means that only
Switzerland would be entitled to oppose the appointment of its nationals in delegations to
a panel hearing in Geneva.
The rules contained in the 1975 Vienna Convention are in line with the stipulations of
the Rules ofProcedures for Sessions of the GATT Contracting Parties,8 Rules 5 and 6
provide that each contracting party shall be represented by an accredited representative,
and each representative may be accompanied by such alternate representatives and
advisers as he may require. No mention is made of any requirement that either the
alternates or the advisers must be full-time government employees. Furthermore, under
Rule 7, the credentials of the members of the delegation shall take the form of a
communication from or on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. One is therefore
compelled to conclude that neither the principles enshrined in the 1975 Vienna
Convention, nor the specific rules adopted under the GATT, contain any stipulation that
would warrant the decision of a panel that excludes duly accredited private practitioners
from its proceedings.
The Panel decision to expel private attorneys in the Banana case also contradicts the
objective of the WTO to bring developing country Members fully into its dispute
settlement mechanism. Article 27(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides
that "While the Secretariat assists Members in respect of dispute settlement at their
request, there may also be a need to provide additional legal advice and assistance in
respect of dispute settlement to developing country Members. To this end, the Secretariat
5: See The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 69, 1975, pp.730-759.
6
: Id. Article 46(Size of the delegation) states: "The size of the delegation shall not exceed what is
reasonable and normal, having regard, as the case may be, to the functions of the organ or the object of the
conference, as well as the needs of the particular delegation and the circumstances and conditions in the
host State". Article 73(Nationality of the members of the mission, the delegation or the observer
delegation) states: "(l)The head ofmission and members of the diplomatic staff of the mission, the head of
delegation, other delegates and members of the diplomatic staff of the delegation, the head of the observer
delegation, other observer delegates and members of the diplomatic staff of the observer delegation should
in principle be of the nationality of the sending State. (2)The head of the mission and members of the
diplomatic staff of the mission may not be appointed from among persons having the nationality of the host
State except with the consent of that State, which may be withdrawn at any time. (3)Where the head of the
delegation, any other delegate or any member of the diplomatic staff of the delegation or the head of the
observer delegation, any other observer delegate or any member of the diplomatic staff of the observer
delegation is appointed from among persons having the nationality of the host State, the consent of that
State shall be assumed if it has been notified of such appointment of a national of the host State and has
made no objection."
7: See supra note 5.
8
: See GATT BISD, 12th Supplement! 1964), pp. 10-16.
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shall make available a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical cooperation
services to any developing country Member which so requests. This expert shall assist the
developing country Member in a manner ensuring the continued impartiality of the
Secretariat."9 Without any opposite stipulations, we then deduce from the above
ambiguous wording that the legal assistance to a developing country Member may
continue, if necessary, in the whole course of the dispute settlement proceedings,
including the panel examination and appellate review. However, the fact in real situations
is that there is neither such possibility that the legal expert from the WTO technical
cooperation services is the government official of the requesting country, nor such
requirement in the DSU that the legal expert should be a national of the requesting
country. Ifwe follow the Panel decision of the Banana case in future situations, the legal
assistance provided by the WTO to the developing country Members will seem either
impossible or impracticable.
According to Ambassador Edwin Laurent of St. Lucia, the Panel decision to expel
private attorneys at the September 1996 meeting entrenches the disadvantage of small
countries in the WTO, which, unlike the larger and more powerful countries, cannot
afford to employ full-time specialised legal counsel on a permanent basis.10 Indeed, it
should not be difficult to conceive that the effective exercise of the right to be heard in a
legal proceeding is largely dependent upon the availability of international legal expertise
and advocacy skills which may not be available in the government staff of some
developing countries. If those developing country Members are deprived of the right to
seek legal assistance from outside their countries, or even outside their governments, then
the consequence will be like, as David Palmeter argues, that when the panels' doors are
closed, laymen from developing and smaller countries will be left to debate points of law
with U.S. and European Community legal specialists.11 Being aware of this reality, the
WTO, besides the provision of legal assistance, also conducts special training courses for
interested Members concerning these dispute settlement procedures and practices so as to
enable Members' experts to be better informed in this regard. However, these efforts can
only make limited achievement in narrowing the huge gap in terms of legal expertise
between the developed and developing country Members, at least, for the time being.
Under the Statute ofthe International Court ofJustice, no attempt is made to regulate
the manner by which the parties to a dispute shall be represented before the Court. Article
42 of the ICJ Statute states: "(l)The parties shall be represented by agents. (2)They may
have the assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court. (3)The agents, counsel, and
advocates of parties before the Court shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary
to the independent exercise of their duties."12 Presumably, the parties to a dispute have
the liberty to recruit both government officials and private practitioners in their
delegations by which they are represented before the Court. Even in cases where the
instrument referring the matters in dispute to an international adjudicatory procedure
contains provisions concerning the representation of parties, no limitations are imposed
as regards the representation of sovereign States and organs of international
9: See supra note 3.
10: See Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, supra note 2, p.94.
11
: David Palmeter: The Need for Due Process in WTO Proceedings, Journal of World Trade, Vol.31,
1997, No.l, p.53.
12
: See Basic Documents in International Law, fourth edition, edited by Ian Brownlie, Oxford University
Press(1995).
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organisations. For example, pursuant to the EC Treaty, parties to a dispute before the
European Court of Justice who are not member States or the institutions of the European
Communities must be represented by a member of the bar of any of the member States.
Flowever, member States themselves and the institutions can be represented by anyone,
whether a private practitioner or not, who has been appointed as an agent.13 On the other
hand, the various instruments concerning international commercial arbitration adopt an
even more liberal approach. Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the ICC Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration Rules, and
the recent World Intellectual Property Organisation(WIPO) Arbitration Rules, parties
may be represented by persons of their choice and, in addition, these persons may be
assisted by advisers.14
However, professor Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, in his article Representation ofParties
in World Trade Disputes, has cogently distinguished the representation of States in
political organs from the representation before international adjudicatory bodies. In the
former situation, the States participate in the decision-making, whether they are present
or not may affect the legal validity of the decision adopted by these organs.15 But in the
case of adjudication, as a rule, States do not participate as co-decision-makers. Thus, the
function of a State's participation in the legal proceedings of an international adjudicatory
body is of a different nature to that of their participation in the non-adjudicatory organ:
they do not participate in the adjudicatory body itself but rather appear before it.16
Therefore, in a third-party dispute settlement, the parties to a dispute tend to be concerned
over the impact of the judgement rather than the legality of the rules. Under this
circumstance, the legal expertise will play a vital role in the proceedings of a dispute
settlement.
Although the Banana case was conditionally resolved at the Doha Ministerial
17
Conference, there is no assurance that similar incidents like the Panel decision of the
Banana case will not reoccur, in light of the ambiguities of the DSU provisions in this
respect. Therefore, in order to avoid confusions in future disputes and clarify the relevant
13
: See EEC Statute, Article 17. See also Rules ofProcedure ofthe Court ofJustice, Article 38(8).
14
: See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: Article 4; ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration: Article 15.5;
London Court ofInternational Arbitration Rules: Article 9; WIPOArbitration Rules: Article 13.
15
: The WTO deviates from the traditional way by setting up two separate decision-making mechanisms.
Where the rules and procedures of the Dispute Settlement Understanding provide for the DSB to take a
decision, it shall do so by consensus(the body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on
a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken,
formally objects to the proposed decision). On the other hand, according to Article IX and Article X of the
WTO Agreement, only in the cases of amendment to Articles IX, X:2 of the WTO Agreement, Articles I and
II of GATT 1994, Article 11:1 of the GATS, Article 4 of the Agreement on TRIPS, is the acceptance of all
WTO Members necessary. In most other cases, if the consensus is not reached, the decisions and
amendments will be made by voting of either three-fourths or two-thirds majority, and take effect upon all
WTO Members. See supra note 3.
16
: See Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, supra note 2, p.88.
17
: At the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, the ministers ofWTO Members agreed to permit a waiver
requested by the European Communities from its obligations under Article 1:1 of GATT 1994 until 31
December 2007, to the extent necessary to permit the European Communities to provide preferential tariff
treatment for products originating in African, Caribbean and Pacific(ACP) countries as required by Article
36.3, Annex V and its Protocols of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, without being required to extend
the same preferential treatment to like products of any other Member.
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_acp_ec_agre_e.htm
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provisions, the WTO needs to amend the present Dispute Settlement Understanding. Two
proposed amendments are put forward here. The first amendment goes to Article 3(10). A
sentence should be inserted between the first and second sentences of the original
paragraph, which reads as "In the course of the dispute settlement procedures, the parties
to a dispute are free to seek assistance from their government officials, and legal experts
who are not necessarily limited to the nationals of the seeking country." The second
amendment applies to Article 27(2). The last sentence of the original paragraph should be
modified as "The expert may assist the developing country Member in the whole course
of the dispute settlement proceedings, including the panel examination and appellate
review."
After we have clarified the issue of representation of parties in the WTO dispute
settlement proceedings, a relevant issue comes to us, which equally merits our attention
for the sake of the efficiency of enhancement in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
This issue concerns the relationship of the admissibility of a claim under the WTO
jurisdiction and the exhaustion of local remedies.
6.1.2. The exception to the customary rule of exhaustion of local remedies
It is acknowledged generally that local remedies are relevant to the settlement of
certain international disputes concerning States and privates. As one scholar has pointed
out, the fact that the celebrated rule of "exhaustion of local remedies"(which means that
an international tribunal will not entertain a claim put forward on behalf of an alien on
account of alleged denial of justice unless the person in question has exhausted the legal
remedies available to him in the State concerned) is accepted as a customary rule of
international law needs no proof today, as its basic existence and validity have not been
1 8
questioned. Not only has this rule been affirmed in recent diplomatic practice,
particularly by developed countries against whom or in regard to whose nationals the rule
is most likely to be invoked in regard to the protection,19 and been assumed to exist as a
principle of customary or general international law in such conventions as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the European Convention on
Human Rights,20 but, in recent history, has it been frequently invoked in international
litigation both before the ICJ and other arbitration tribunals in circumstances in which
such international courts have conceded either explicitly or implicitly that the rule
exists.21
The exhaustion of local remedies rule did not catch much attention in the GATT
dispute settlement history until the days when the results of the Uruguay Round of
18





: See Article 41(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 11(3) of the
International Convention on the Elimination ofall Forms ofRacial Discrimination; and Article 26 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. See supra note 12.
21
: For example, the rule was invoked by the respondent State before the ICJ in the Interhandel case, where
the Court stated categorically that "the rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international
proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law". See ICJ
Reports^ 1959), p. 27. The rule was also accepted by the tribunals as a relevant rule of customary
international law in both the Finnish Ships Arbitration and the Ambatielos Claims. See United Nations
Reports ofInternational Arbitration Awards(UNRIAA)(1934), p. 1479; and UNRIAA(\956), p.83.
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Multilateral Trade Negotiations began to be implemented. The GATT legal system was
set up to regulate the international trade in the respect of goods. Disputes might arise
when a GATT contracting party did not keep up its scheduled concessions, imposed
measures which were inconsistent with GATT 1947, or applied the measures which,
notwithstanding, were consistent with GATT 1947, but still impaired or nullified the
benefits of other contracting parties, or impeded the attainment of benefits of other
contracting parties.22 The focus of debate in the GATT dispute settlement proceedings
was the treatment to goods, not to persons. Therefore, it is understandable that the Panel
in the case United States—Antidumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement
Clinker from Mexico(the Gray Portland Cement case) rejected the request to apply the
exhaustion of local remedies rule in the GATT dispute settlement procedures under
Article XXIII of GATT 1947. The Panel concerned also ruled that the exhaustion of local
remedies rule did not apply to the dispute settlement procedures governed by the 1979
Agreement of Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade(the Anti-Dumping Code) and seemed to vindicate the thesis that the exhaustion of
local remedies rule did not apply in the law of the GATT.23
This situation, however, has been changed dramatically since the World Trade
Organisation expanded its regulated dimension to such new areas like trade in services
and the protection of trade-related intellectual property rights. Article I:2(c) and (d) of the
General Agreement on Trade in Xerv/c&s(GATS) define the trade in services as the
supply of a service "by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence
in the territory of any other Member"; and "by a service supplier of one Member, through
presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member".24 Article
11:1 and Article XVII: 1 of the GATS require that the host State(or separate customary
territory) should offer national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment in relation
to its own service suppliers and among all the foreign service suppliers. Again, the first
sentence of Article 1(3) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights(TRIPS) states: "Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this
Agreement to the nationals of other Members".25 Similar words can also be found in
Article 3 and Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement where national treatment and most¬
favoured-nation treatment are required. Hence, the WTO legal system, different from that
of the GATT, regulates not only the treatment to goods, but also the treatment to private
persons and companies.
Ifwe read rigidly Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which states:
"The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognise that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
22: See GATT Article XXIII: 1. See supra note 3.
23: See GATT Document, ADP/82, p.72, para.5.9.
24: See supra note 3.
25
: Id. As for the definition of "nationals", the second sentence of Article 1(3) of the TRIPS states: "In
respect of the relevant intellectual property rights, the nationals of other Members shall be understood as
those natural or legal persons that would meet the criteria for eligibility for protection provided for in the
Paris Co«ve«rion( 1967), the Berne Conventional 1), the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Intellectual Circuits, were all Members of the WTO members of those
Conventions".
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interpretation of public international law..."(Emphasis added)26 we may tend to
conclude that the customary rule of exhaustion of local remedies is also applicable in the
WTO dispute settlement procedures, albeit there are no such relevant provisions in the
WTO agreements. As a matter of fact, there has been at least one scholar who argued for
the application of this rule in the WTO legal system.27 His arguments are nothing
inappropriate ifwe do not take into account the unique institutional characteristics of the
World Trade Organisation. But, after having acquired a full knowledge of the objectives
and composition of this organisation, we may tend to draw a different conclusion.
The argument for the exception of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to the
customary rule of exhaustion of local remedies is based on the analyses concerning both
the procedural and substantial aspects of the WTO legal system.
The initial considerations in respect of the procedural aspect derive from Article 3(3)
of the DSU, which states: "The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member
considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered
agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the
rights and obligations of Members".28 In other words, in a judicial or quasi-judicial
procedure concerning the settlement of a commercial dispute, the promptness of the
dispute settlement has the same value as the impartiality of the legal procedure itself.
Under the present WTO dispute settlement mechanism, a dispute may go through the
stages of consultation, panel examination and appellate review before it is finally
resolved. These stages will normally last up to 60 days,29 six months30 and 60 days31
respectively, which do not include the time necessary for the Dispute Settlement Body to
decide the establishment of a panel and to adopt the panel or Appellate Body report. Even
after the panel or Appellate Body report is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body and
has the effect of enforcement upon the complained Member to redress its inconsistent
measures, there still may be some "sequence" problems as to who and how to decide
whether the implementations of the complained Member have fully complied with the
recommendations and rulings of the panel or Appellate Body report, and when the
provision of compensation may be resorted to by the complaining Member if the
immediate withdrawal of the complained measures is not available. These sequence
problems which arose after the Appellate Body report of the Banana case was adopted
almost paralysed the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.32 If the exhaustion of local
remedies is required before a Member wishes to resort to the WTO dispute settlement
procedures, there will be two situations arising out of it. In the first situation, there may
be no breach of obligations at all under the WTO law until all local legal remedies
26: See supra note 3.
27
: For example, see Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha: World Trade Dispute Settlement and the Exhaustion of
Local Remedies Rule, Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol. 30, 1996, No. 4, pp.107-130.
28
: See supra note 3.
29: In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods, this period will be no more than
20 days.
30
: In cases of urgency, including those relating to perishable goods, this period will be no more than three
months. In other exceptional cases, this period may be extended to nine months to the maximum.
31
: In some cases, this period may be extended to 90 days to the maximum.
32
: For the details of the sequence problems of the Banana case, see Cherise M. Valles and Brendan P.
McGivern: The Right to Retaliate under the WTO Agreement—The "Sequence" Problems, Journal of
World Trade, Vol. 34, 2000, No.2, pp.63-84.
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available in the complained Member have been exhausted by the aliens who claim to
have been injured by the measures of the complained Member—the breach consisting in
the very failure to afford a remedy, provided it be an improper failure. In that case, no
question of any breach can arise until all such remedies have been exhausted. In the
second situation, the breach can be established(or at any rate alleged) independently of
the action of the local tribunals; but in that event, a bar to the admissibility of any
international claim in respect of the breach continues so long as any remedies afforded by
the local law in respect of it have not been exhausted.33 If we stick to such a viewpoint
that the exhaustion of local remedies rule is inherently contained in the WTO law and an
injured alien needs to exhaust all the local remedies of the host State(or separate customs
territory) available to him before he petitions his government to bring his claim to the
WTO, it will be highly unpredictable and inconceivable that the dispute could be resolved
promptly in accordance with the spirit of Article 3(3) of the DSU, taking into account the
varieties and complexities of the local legal system in the present 144 WTO Members.
Furthermore, it is likely to occur that some recalcitrant Members may use this rule as a
gimmick to circumvent the WTO dispute settlement procedures, by changing a little each
time on the treatment to foreign privates and companies after the decision of their local
tribunal is made, thus making the exhaustion of local remedies fall into an endless loop of
litigation. Such a prolonged process will undoubtedly make the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism more costly and unattractive. Meanwhile, it is important for us to note the
extreme difficulties encountered by many developing country Members if they are
required to invoke the local remedies of some developed country Members in terms of
the complicated legal system and high cost.
Compared with those procedural issues, the considerations derived from the
substantial aspects of the WTO law are even more significant. The development and
application of the exhaustion of local remedies rule have naturally been influenced by the
jurisprudential considerations which underlie them. These considerations concern the
practice of diplomatic protection in the customary international law, as well as this rule in
a narrower context. Therefore, it may be useful to first review the bases of the law
relating to diplomatic protection, before we embark on the analysis of the jurisprudential
underpinnings of this customary rule, in order to appreciate the special kind of emphasis
which has been inherent in the case of the exhaustion of local remedies rule.
According to professor C. F. Amerasinghe, the protection of aliens by their national
States in one form or another predates considerably the eighteenth century. Early in the
seventeenth century, Grotius, in his De Jure Belli ac Pacis( 1625), had written what
33
: Gerald Fitzmaurice in the book The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice raises
several other questions which merit our consideration in the application of the exhaustion of local remedies
rule: (l)Does the local remedies rule apply in every case in which a breach of international law or treaty is
alleged, and the local law of the defendant State in principle affords remediesfif its courts recognise the
existence of the breach) or could do so if invoked; or are there cases, or classes of cases, to which the rule
has no application, even if the local law could afford a remedy if resorted to? (2)In what cases does the rule
operate as a bar to admissibility and in what as a plea to the merits? (3)What constitutes a "remedy" for the
purposes of the application of the rule; must every actual or apparent remedy be invoked and, in general,
what is the kind of remedy non-resort to which will bring the objection into play? (4)Where does the
burden of proof lie of establishing, as the case may be (a)that local remedies existed, but have either (i)not
been resorted to at all, or (ii)have been resorted to, but have not been fully exhausted; (b)that although such
remedies existed, they were not of the kind to which the rule relates, or otherwise that non-resort to them is
no bar to the claim? Cambridge University Press(1993), p.687.
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appears to have foreshadowed the formulation of this practice. But it was not until the
time of Vattel that a clear attempt was made to explain the concept of diplomatic
protection in any terms. In 1758, Vattel, in his book Le droit des gens, not only asserted
the right of a State to protect its nationals, but seems to have implied that there was an
obligation resting upon the alien's national State to protect him. It is clear that Vattel
conceived the right of protection as inhering in the national State of the alien and did not
envisage the injury done to the alien as creating any right vesting in the alien at
international law to remedy against the host State. A consequence of this view was that
the injury done to the alien was regarded as being a violation of an obligation owed by
the host State to his national State. Formally, this explanation was the result of the theory
that the individual had no rights at international law.34 Although it is not clear what Vattel
meant by the duty to protect a national abroad which rested upon the national State of the
alien, the principle that the right infringed in cases where an alien suffers illegal injury at
the hands of a State is the right of the alien's national State and not the right of the alien
himself, apparently deriving as it does from the theory that States alone are subjects of
international law, has been recognised in several international judicial decisions.35
While the rationale for the exhaustion of local remedies rule should basically be the
same as for that of diplomatic protection in general, it would seem that there are some
jurisprudential considerations which enter into the implementation and application of the
exhaustion of local remedies rule, which result in certain crucial variations in the
importance attached to some of the underlying premises of diplomatic protection. In the
view ofprofessor Amerasinghe, the development of the exhaustion of local remedies rule
is based on, apart from the recognition of the respondent State's sovereignty in what is
basically an international dispute, the objective contemplated in the reliefof international
tribunals from being excessively burdened with litigation. On the other hand, the national
State of the injured alien may also have an interest in the relief from being unduly
burdened with international claims, but this is clearly secondary to that of having the
dispute in which its national is involved appropriately settled, if necessary, by resorting to
international litigation.36
After having reviewed the legal basis of the formulation and development of the
exhaustion of local remedies rule, we may find that the most substantial element inhering
in this customary rule is the recognition of the sovereignty of the host State. This,
however, is contradictory to the legal foundation and composition of the World Trade
Organisation. Article XII: 1 of the WTO Agreement defines the WTO membership as
34
: See supra note 18, pp.53-54 and footnote 2.
35
: For example, in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice(PCIJ) stated that "It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect
its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom
they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of
its subjects and resorting to a diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is
in reality asserting its own rights—its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law". Jurisdiction! 1924), PCIJ Series A, No.2, p.12. The International Court of Justice(ICJ)
has also affirmed this principle in several cases, either explicitly or implicitly. For example, in the
Reparations case, it said that the rule of diplomatic protection rests upon two bases: "The first is that the
defendant State has broken an obligation towards the national State in respect of its nationals. The second is
that only the party to whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach".
ICJ Reports^1949), p. 181.
36: See supra note 18, p.69.
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consisting of both "States" and "separate customary territories".37 This division leads to
such an assumption that the sovereignty is not necessarily the inherent quality of a
separate customary territory. The WTO only requires the separate customary territory to
possess full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other
matters provided for in the WTO Agreement and the multilateral trade agreements on
terms agreed between it and the WTO. If we insist that the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism should be no exception to the customary rules of international law in respect
of local remedies, then, the logical explanation to the fact that there is, so far, no such
practice in the WTO dispute settlement history is that WTO Members either have
impliedly waived the requirement that local remedies must be exhausted, or are estopped
from raising this requirement.38 Nevertheless, this waiver does not mean that all the
possibilities for an injured alien to get remedies from the host State(or separate customary
territory) have been excluded. He may still be able to choose to solve the dispute by
means of the local tribunals under the national law of the host State(or separate
customary territory).39 The point, however, is that this choice is optional, not compulsory.
The fact that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies has not been invoked in the
WTO dispute settlement procedures reflects a tendency that WTO Members wish to solve
their trade disputes in a practicable and efficient way. Hence, when we review the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism from a developing country perspective, it is only natural
for us to raise such a question: are the remedies contained in this mechanism sufficient to
relieve the loss of the suffered Member? then a further question is: do they really benefit
the developing country Members?
37: See supra note 3.
38
: Mr. John Dugard, special rapporteur of the Third Report on Diplomatic Protection(2002), provides the
exceptions to the general principle that local remedies must be exhausted, which includes: (a)the local
remedies: are obviously futile(option 1); offer no reasonable prospect of success(option 2); provide no
reasonable possibility of an effective remedy(option 3); (b)the respondent State has expressly or impliedly
waived the requirement that local remedies be exhausted or is estopped from raising this requirement;
(c)there is no voluntary link between the injured individual and the respondent State; (d)the internationally
wrongful act upon which the international claim is based was not committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the respondent State; (e)the respondent State is responsible for undue delay in providing a
local remedy; (f)the respondent State prevents the injured individual from gaining access to its institutions
which provide local remedies. See International Law Commission, Third Report on Diplomatic Protection,
pp.5-6, A/CN.4/523. In fact, there is at least one international treaty in which local remedies may be
excluded in some circumstances. Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement provides for
investors of one State Party themselves to initiate proceedings in respect of disputes concerning the
treatment of their investments by another State Party under the Treaty. Any dispute not resolved by
negotiation may be submitted to arbitration(Articles 1116-19). The investor may choose between
arbitration under ICSID or the ICSID Additional Facility or UNCITRAL Rules(Article 1120). The States
Parties have in NAFTA Article 1122 given their consent to each of these alternative forms of arbitration:
investors may give their consent to the arbitration when they initiate proceedings(Article 1121). If the
investor does opt for arbitration under the NAFTA treaty, it may not resort to other dispute settlement
procedures: in other words, recourse to local remedies is precluded. See John Collier and Vaughan Lowe:
The Settlement ofDisputes in International Law, Oxford University Press(1999), pp.113-114.
39: Although the WTO law has no direct effect in the domestic legal system of its Members, Article XVI:4
of the WTO Agreement requires each Member to "ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements". See supra note 3.
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Section Two Towards a Fair and Open Dispute Settlement Mechanism
6.2.1. Does theWTO remedy system benefit developing country Members?
When the WTO dispute settlement mechanism was set up, it received a wide
acclamation from both academics and politicians for its well-formulated procedures and
rule-oriented character. As professor John Jackson pointed out, the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, for the first time, established an overall unified dispute
settlement system for all portions of the negotiated agreements, and a legal text(rather
than just customary practice) to carry out those procedures for dispute settlement. These
new dispute settlement procedures include measures to avoid the "blocking" of a decision
which once frequently occurred under the GATT positive consensus decision-making
rules,40 and provide for the first time a new appellate review which will substitute for
some of the procedures that were vulnerable to blocking.41 The former WTO Director-
General Renato Ruggiero even regarded the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as "the
central pillar of the multilateral trading system" and "the WTO's most individual
contribution to the stability of the global economy".42
There is not a bit of exaggeration in these acclamatory remarks if we compare the
present WTO dispute settlement mechanism with the previous one under the GATT
system. Clearly-cut time limits for each stage of the dispute settlement proceedings, an
appellate review of the appealed panel report, the negative consensus adopted in making
decisions upon the establishment of the panel and the adoption of the panel or Appellate
Body report,43 all these reforms have guided the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
developing towards a more judicial objective. However, these developments have only
reflected one side of the issue. If we take a careful look at its other side, the remedy
system of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, particularly from the developing
country Members' perspective, we might have got a different view as to this widely-
acclaimed legal system.
Through the analysis of Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,44 we
may draw three expounding points. Firstly, the remedy methodology in the WTO is in a
sequential order, i.e. the impracticability of one way is the precondition to invoke the
next way in offering remedies. If the first sort of remedy can be used to cover the loss of
the complaining party, it is neither necessary nor reasonable to invoke the rest ones.
Secondly, by means of this remedy system, the complaining party can always find one
way or another to get its damages remedied after the measures of the complained party
40
: The positive consensus requires the agreement of all the parties present at the meeting in adopting a
decision. Thus, more often than less, a defeated party will object to the passage of a decision which is
unfavourable to it.
41
: See John H. Jackson: The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO: Significance & Challenges
(contained in the book The World Trade Organisation—The Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st
Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation, edited by Terence P. Stewart), American Bar Association
(1996), p. 10.
42: See the speech delivered by Renato Ruggiero on 17 April 1997.
cf. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/displ_e.htm
43
: The negative consensus requires the agreement of all parties present at the meeting in negating a
decision. It seems unlikely that a prevailing party will join the consensus to negate the decision which is
favourable to it.
44
: As for the detailed analysis of the remedy system in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, see Part
Four of Section Three, Chapter Five.
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have been found to be inconsistent with the requirements of the WTO agreements and
have impaired or nullified the benefits of the complaining party, or the measures have
been found to be consistent with the requirements of the WTO agreements, but the
nullification or impairment still exists.45 Thirdly, there are no clear definitions as to such
wording "not practicable or effective" and "serious enough". The considerations of these
circumstances merely depend on the presentations(oral and written) of the disputing
parties and the discretion of the panel or the Appellate Body. Together with the negative
consensus mechanism practised in adopting the panel or the Appellate Body report, the
WTO remedy system is really effective to scare those potential breachers of the
negotiated concessions and obligations.
Before the complaining party starts the retaliation process, the complained party may
choose to compensate the loss of the complaining party. A mutual agreement on the
solution of a dispute is clearly preferred. Article 22(2) of the DSU states: "If the Member
concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement
into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings
within the reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21,
such Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period
of time, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement
procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation..."46 As
compensation in the WTO is voluntary, it may include to entail the complained party
reducing tariffs on a product of export interest to the complaining party, or offering
concessions in either trade in services or the protection of intellectual property rights in
an equal value to the decided level ofnullification or impairment of benefits, or whatever
forms both parties may mutually agree.
Then the first question may arise as to what extent the developing country Members
can benefit from the WTO compensation mechanism. Under both common law and civil
law, compensation in terms of monetary damages always benefits the party who has
suffered a sustained injury or loss as a result of the actions of the defendant.47 Under the
WTO system, however, it is not possible for one WTO Member to offer "monetary
compensation" to another, following a settlement of the dispute. In some instances, the
offered compensation may not benefit the industry which has suffered damages as a
result of the implementation of WTO-inconsistent measures, or even WTO-consistent
measures, by the complained party. For example, when country A, which is presumably a
developed country Member, has a trade dispute with country B, which is incidentally a
developing country Member, over the protective measures of country A to its domestic
market for agricultural products. The rulings and recommendations of the Appellate Body
report require that country A should remove these WTO-inconsistent measures within a
reasonable period of time. However, because of the strong lobbies and being afraid of
losing the votes from farmers, the government of country A refuses to reduce the tariffs
on the imports of agricultural products from country B, but agrees to compensate country
B in one way or another. Provided the overall benefits accruing from the previous
reduction of tariffs are ensured, country A may choose either to reduce the tariffs in other
45: Id. Article XXIII: 1(b) of GATT 1994 is designated for those non-violation disputes.
46
: See supra note 3.
47
: See the definition of "compensation" in Oxford Dictionary of Law, Oxford University Press(1997),
pp.90-91.
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sectors of the same agreement, or to reduce the tariffs in the sectors of other agreements.
In regard to the first choice, country B may use the compensation to alleviate the loss of
the farmers concerned temporarily. But many developing countries have few choices of
agricultural products available for the replacement of tariff reduction. The temporary
compensation is not possible to help them to change the monotonous economic pattern.
Furthermore, the WTO compensation mechanism does not punish a recalcitrant for its
past wrongs, even if it could be established that the complained party flagrantly ignored
its obligations under the WTO agreements by implementing those inconsistent measures.
This is because compliance under WTO law is prospective in nature as opposed to being
retroactive.
As to the second choice, the reduction of tariffs in the sectors of other agreements is
irrelevant to the farmers of country B, and what is more significant is that there are
practically not many sectors as important as agriculture in this country. Nevertheless, in
view of the comprehensive interests of the mutual relationships, the government of
country B may have to accept this bitter offer from country A. Here, one more point
which merits our attention is that the reduction of tariffs in the sectors of other
agreements by country A does not benefit country B alone. In accordance with the
principle ofmost-favoured-nation treatment, a tariff reduction or an improvement in the
market access conditions in those sectors will have to be extended to all other WTO
Members. Thus, if country B should accept compensation in this way, it does not
necessarily mean that this would increase its market share in country A. It would depend
on, inter alia, its market position and the strength of its competitors.
The second question is connected with the methodology and effect of suspension of
concessions and obligations. As Article 22(3) of the DSU demonstrates, the suspension
methodology in the WTO remedy system is a "cross-retaliation". Therefore, the WTO
Members can always expect to seek some retaliation for their losses if compensation is
not available to them. But the question as how much the developing country Members
can really benefit from this mechanism remains to be debated. The consequent situations
which occurred after the decision of arbitrators was delivered in the Banana case have
vindicated our worrying on this issue to a certain extent. One of the complaining
parties,48 Ecuador, was authorised by the Dispute Settlement Body to impose retaliatory
measures in the form of punitive tariffs on certain products exported into its domestic
market by the complained party, the European Communities, after the failure by it to
comply with the recommendations of the DSB. While the authorisation was meant to
restore the balance of concessions struck between the parties during the Uruguay Round
negotiations by allowing the prevailing parties to suspend concessions equivalent to the
level of nullification and impairment of benefits, a critical question may arise: do these
authorisations benefit a small developing country Member like Ecuador? This is because
retaliation may not always be the preferred remedy of a complaining party, as its effect is
to raise barriers not only to the trade of the complained party but also to its own.
Furthermore, one may ask whether this objective may ever be achieved in a situation
where a great imbalance in terms of trade volume and economic power exists between the
48
: Apart from Ecuador, the complaining parties in the Banana case include Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico
and the United States. See European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas-Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador. WT/DS27/RW/ECU, Report of the Panel(distributed on 12
April 1999).
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complaining party which is seeking suspension of concessions and the complained party
which has failed to bring the WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with the
requirements of the WTO agreements. In such a case, and in situations where the
complaining party is highly dependent on the imports from the complained party, the
consequence of retaliation is likely to fall into such a dilemma that the suspension of
certain concessions or certain other obligations entails more harmful effects for the party
seeking suspension than for the other party. As one scholar once pointed out, for a
significant number of developing countries which rely on the imports from developed
countries, it might be counter-productive for them to impose retaliatory measures, as they
would increase the prices of capital goods and other relevant products and services that
they need for their own economic development.49
According to the data reflected in the arbitration award of the Banana case, Ecuador's
share of world merchandise trade is below 0.1 percent, whereas the EC's world
merchandise trade share is 20 percent. In terms ofworld trade in services, the EC's share
is 25 percent, while no data are available for Ecuador because its share would be so
small. The GDP at market prices in 1998 was US$ 20 billion for Ecuador and US$ 7,996
billion for the 15 EC member States. In 1998, the EC's GDP per capita was US$ 22,500,
whereas per capita income is US$ 1,600 in the case of Ecuador.50 While Ecuador may be
authorised by the DSB, as it previously suggested in its request for arbitration, to retaliate
against the European Communities by suspending certain obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which include the
protection of performers, producers of phonograms(sound recording) and broadcasting
organisations, geographical indications and industrial designs, it is doubtful whether the
retaliation would benefit Ecuador in the medium to long terms. Should Ecuador proceed
to retaliate in this way, it would probably scare off foreign investors and damage that
country's reputation, making the economic development of this country become even
more difficult. It is in that context that the arbitrators encouraged the parties to seek a
mutually satisfactory result as retaliation would not be to each party's benefit.51 Ecuador
appears to accept this reasoning and has indicated its willingness to delay the imposition
of retaliatory measures, albeit it has received the authorisation from the DSB, and
arranges to explore with the European Communities the possibility of reaching a
mutually satisfactory result.
49
: See Edwini Kessie: Enhancing Security and Predictability for Private Business Operators under the
Dispute Settlement System ofthe WTO, Journal ofWorld Trade, Vol. 34, 2000, No.6, p.8.
50
: See European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas-Recourse
to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22(6) of the DSU. WT/DS27/ARB/ECU
(distributed on 24 March 2000), para. 125.
51
: Id. The arbitrators state: "Given the difficulties and the specific circumstances of this case which
involves a developing country Member, it could be that Ecuador may find itself in a situation where it is
not realistic or possible for it to implement the suspension authorised by the DSB for the full amount of the
level of nullification and impairment estimated by us in all of the sectors and/or under all agreements
mentioned above combined. The present text of the DSU does not offer a solution for such an eventuality.
Article 22.8 of the DSU merely provides that the suspension of concessions or other obligations is
temporary and shall only be applied until the WTO-inconsistent measure in question has been removed, or
the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or
impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached. We trust that in this eventuality the
parties to this dispute will find a mutually satisfactory solution".
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After observing these dysfunctioning aspects of the WTO remedy system, a few
scholars begin to rethink the trade sanctions and their consequences.52 These intelligent
researches will help us to review the present WTO dispute settlement mechanism in a
more thorough way. Steve Charnovitz in his recent article Rethink WTO Trade Sanctions
also put forward some alternatives to reform the WTO remedy system, which include:
(a)giving WTO law direct effect in Members' domestic legal systems; (b)imposing
monetary fines on scofflaw governments(those governments treating WTO law with
contempt); (c)invoking membership sanctions within the WTO; (d)adopting the practice
of other international organisations like the ILO to catalyse a community response to the
heinous behaviour of a recalcitrant Member; (e)improving the interaction between the
WTO and domestic political processes.53 All these alternatives are relevant in reforming
the present WTO remedy system, but no individual one can be a perfect substitute. The
first alternative, if practicable, could be an efficient way to implement WTO agreements
and the panel or the Appellate Body decisions. But the author of this thesis does not think
that it could be achieved in a feasible future in light of the complexities of domestic legal
systems among the present 144 Members. To render WTO law direct effect within the
territories of Members will likely meet resistance on the pretext of sovereignty. As
Charnovitz himself pointed out: "courts have suggested that a country manifesting direct
effect would be at a disadvantage if its trading partners did not do so".54 Thus, WTO
Member governments will certainly not move towards direct effect unless this is a
unanimous choice. The last three alternatives may be practicable, but the question is: to
what extent? As it is previously emphasised, the World Trade Organisation is based on
agreements. All its functions and mandate derive from the authorisation of its Members.
Sometimes, the negotiators purposely choose the ambiguous words in order to avoid the
political confrontation. If they could have their intentions expressed clearly and meet no
opposition, they would have done so in their agreements. The vagueness of the remedy
system in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism reflects, to a certain extent, the
difficulties and compromise of the negotiators. Comparatively speaking, the second
alternative could be a practicable way to improve the present WTO remedy system. But
the disadvantage of this choice is, as in the situation of compensation, that the suffered
industry may not get the necessary remedies, particularly in terms of their market access
conditions in the complained party. A fine is a penalty for violating a law. It cannot be
used to achieve the long-term objectives.
52
: See Edward Alden: Gloom Descends over Former Supporters of the WTO's Procedure for Disputes,
Financial Times(London), 6 December 2000, at p.8(discussing unhappiness with WTO trade sanctions);
Jagdish Bhagwati: After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, International Legal Affairs, Vol.77, 2001,
pp.l5-28(explaining that large-scale retaliation through the WTO "makes ever more people hostile to the
WTO, which is seen as authorising bullying tactics"); Edwini Kessie, see supra note 49, pp.l-16(suggesting
that it might be advisable to abolish the remedy of retaliation); Brink Lindsey, Daniel T. Griswold, Mark A.
Groombridge, & Aaron Lukas: Seattle and Beyond: A WTO Agenda for the New Millennium, 4 November
1999, pp.29-31 (stating that the most serious problem with the WTO procedures is their reliance on trade
sanctions as the ultimate remedy), cf. http//www.cato.org Bruce Stokes: Something Is Missing Here, 19
May 2001,p.1514(urging Member governments to rethink the present WTO system of sanctions).
cf. http//www.tabd.org
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While the WTO remedy system is regarded by some developed country Members as
an effective way to restore the balance of concessions and obligations struck during the
Uruguay Round negotiations in the case that a certain Member fails to bring its WTO-
inconsistent measures into full conformity with the recommendations and rulings of a
panel or the Appellate Body, it may not seem the same story as to many developing
country Members. This is because an efficient trade system requires the conformity of the
conducts of the participants with the requirements of their negotiated agreements. This
reasoning is also in accordance with the spirit of Article 22(1) of the DSU, which partly
states: "neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is
preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity
with the covered agreements".55 However, considering the large membership and the
huge magnitude of trade rules, we can expect that disputes among WTO Members will
still be unavoidable. In this regard, an efficient dispute settlement institution seems not
only practicable, but indispensable, to guide the Member governments to conduct in
conformity with the WTO rules.
6.2.2. From quasi-judicial to judicial, the future of the WTO dispute settlement
institutions
The success of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has surpassed the
expectations of the Uruguay Round negotiators. Despite their quasi-judicial nature, the
WTO dispute settlement institutions have functioned very much like a court of
international trade. There is a compulsory jurisdiction; disputes are settled largely by
applying the rules of law; adopted panel or Appellate Body decisions are binding upon
the disputing parties; and sanctions may be imposed if the decisions are not observed by
the complained party. These jurisdictional features have vindicated that the increasing
number and importance of the disputes will necessitate expanding and upgrading the
current WTO's dispute settlement institutions. Panels and the Appellate Body should be
given their permanent status. The dispute settlement proceedings should be under the
public scrutiny and, the decisions of the panels and the Appellate Body should be
implemented in a more expeditious way. All these procedural reforms will eventually
expedite the creation of a new judicial body, the international court of trade.
The idea to set up an international court of trade is not new. According to the Havana
Charter which was part of the fruits achieved at the Bretton Woods Conference after the
Second World War, the proposed International Trade Organisation(ITO) should have
included a judicial body similar to the International Court of Justice, which was
designated to deal with the trade disputes among its members.56 With the failure of the
ITO, the dream to set up an international court of trade did not come true.
Then, the creation of the WTO, particularly the initial success of its dispute
settlement mechanism, has again brought the concerns to the fore about the judiciary of
this new institution. These concerns, so far, have not resulted in a unanimous viewpoint
upon the necessity to create a rule-based trade court within the World Trade
Organisation. For example, Thomas J. Schoenbaum in his article WTO Dispute
Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform stated: "Forcing disputes to a rule-based
55: See supra note 3.
56
: See John H. Jackson: The World Trade Organisation: Constitution and Jurisprudence, The Royal
Institute of International Affairs(1998), Chapter Two.
241
conclusion through adjudication may put undue strain upon the WTO system and lead to
unwise results. Even certain rule-based disputes are better settled through the negotiation
process".57 Schoenbaum used the dispute United States—Imposition of Import Duties on
Autos from Japan under Sections 301 and 304(hereinafter as the Auto case)58 to support
his argument. In the view of Schoenbaum, although the US measure to impose 100 per
cent tariffs on six models of cars imported from Japan was a blatant violation of GATT
rules, and a WTO panel certainly would have found in Japan's favour, such a result
would have caused a political furore in the United States.59 Schoenbaum's remarks
recalled our memory of the GATT negotiation-based dispute settlement practice, by
which the contracting parties chose to settle their disputes outside the purview of the
GATT rules, making the GATT dispute settlement mechanism almost being discarded. In
the view of the author of this thesis, should the WTO panel in the Auto case have found
in Japan's favour, the result would not have caused a political furore in the United States.
The WTO is founded on the multilateral agreements which bind each Member and, the
dispute settlement mechanism is based on the trust and confidence of the Members
including the United States. If the deliberations of the panel or the Appellate Body still
depend on the political will of a few Members, then the decisions made by the panel or
the Appellate Body cannot be expected to be fair and impartial. As a matter of fact, in
another dispute United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre
Underwear, the Appellate Body found in favour of Costa Rica, a small developing
country, and the United States accepted the Appellate Body's decisions.60 Therefore,
Schoenbaum's worries about the creation of a rule-based judiciary are groundless and
unnecessary.61
For a complete judiciary, the WTO dispute settlement institutions need to be
improved in the following three aspects: independence, publicity and enforcement.
Independence is referred to the final effect of the panel or Appellate Body decisions.
According to the practice under the current WTO dispute settlement mechanism, the
decisions made by a panel or the Appellate Body are not final until they are adopted by
the Dispute Settlement Body. Article 16(4) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
states: "Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the
report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies
the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
report..."62 Different from the practice of most courts of first instance in which the
decision of the court will have the binding effect if the disputing parties do not appeal
before the expiration date. In the case of the WTO, the panel report, if the disputing
parties do not appeal it, will have its binding effect only after it is adopted by the DSB.
57: International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, July, 1998, p.650.
58
: Since this dispute was settled mutually, it was not the subject of a WTO panel decision. For complete
analysis of this dispute, see Eleanor Robert Lewis and David J. Weiler: Will the Rubber Grip the Road? An
Analysis of the US-Japan Automotive Agreement, Law & Policy in International Business(1996), p.631.
79: See supra note 57.
60
: See United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear,
WT/DS24/AB/R(distributed on 10 February 1997).
61
: In the same article, Schoenbaum referred to another settled dispute European Communities—Regime
for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, arguing that it would have been better to have
negotiated a compromise solution. See supra note 57, p.651. In the view of the author of this thesis, this
argument could also be rebutted with the same reasoning.
62: See supra note 3(Original note omitted).
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Then, Article 17(14) of the DSU has the similar provisions, which states: "An Appellate
Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to
the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report
within 30 days following its circulation to the Members".63 Here, the crucial point is that
the Dispute Settlement Body is not a judicial body in its full sense. The DSB is, de facto,
the General Council of the WTO in its another capacity, which is composed of
representatives of all the Members(Article IV[2] and [3] of the WTO Agreement).
Although, under the negative consensus, the panel or Appellate Body report is due to be
adopted automatically, this procedural requirement reduces the independence of the
deliberations made by the panelists and the Appellate Body members. At the moment, as
a first step of the reform, the overload problem could be fixed by creating a permanent
roster of panel members, enlarging the Appellate Body, and giving the Appellate Body
members full-time status as judges of court, and expanding the DSB secretariat. The
creation of a permanent roster of panel members derives from the considerations of
collegiality of a judicial body. While the full-time status as judges of court for the
Appellate Body members may extricate them from affairs which might affect the
impartiality of their decisions. Although the DSU does not have the provisions like
Article 17(2) of the ICJ Statute, which stipulates that a judge cannot participate in
deciding a case if he has acted as agent, counsel or advocate, or as a member of a national
or international court, or of a commission of inquiry, in the case,64 the qualifications of an
Appellate Body member should be as high as that. When time becomes ripe, the panel
report(after the expiration date without being appealed) and the Appellate Body report
may become binding on the disputing parties without the necessity of being adopted by
the DSB. Meanwhile, the standing problem could be partly solved by incorporating into
the DSU the criteria under public international law, which must be fulfilled by a Member
to espouse a claim on behalf of one of its nationals.65
The second aspect concerning the procedural reform is the publicity of the WTO
dispute settlement proceedings. Although the WTO is a "universal" international
organisation,66 its dispute settlement mechanism is available only to its Members. The
non-Members and other governmental or non-governmental organisations have no direct
access to it. This is different from the practice of the ICJ.67 Article 5 of the WTO
63: Id(Original note omitted).
64
: See supra note 12. According to professor John Collier and professor Vaughan Lowe, Article 17 of the
Statute contains the obvious rule that no member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any
case. See John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, supra note 38, p. 129, note 21.
65
: From the developing country Members' perspective, the right to bring a claim to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism should be limited to the Member governments which may evaluate the overall
balance before they take the complaints of their nationals to the WTO. Take the example of the GATS, if
the private parties(service suppliers) are allowed to bring their claims to the WTO, then the host Members,
most ofwhich are developing country Members, will be involved in an endless loop of litigation. This will
scare away many developing country Members from participating in the GATS.
66
: As for the institutional characteristics of the WTO, see the first part of Section One, Chapter Three.
67
: Article 93(2) of the ICJ Statute states: "A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may
become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each
case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." Article 35(3) of the ICJ
Statute further states: "When a State which is not a Member of the United Nations is a party to a case, the
Court shall fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses of the Court. This
provision shall not apply if such State is bearing a share of the expenses of the Court." See supra note 12.
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Agreement requires the WTO to arrange "consultation" or "cooperation" with other
governmental or non-governmental organisations, but this does not provide the legal
foundations for the direct participation of these organisations in the WTO dispute
settlement proceedings. Although some of the multilateral agreements like the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Agreement,68 contain specific provisions for the cooperation with
other non-governmental organisations, whether or not these mentioned organisations
have the direct access to the WTO dispute settlement proceedings remains debatable. The
deliberations of the Appellate Body in the dispute United States—Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products^hereinafter as the Shrimp case) indicate that the
answer is negative.69 With the increasing of those technical disputes, the WTO panels and
the Appellate Body will face more and more disputes which want special knowledge for
judgement. Hence, it is necessary to design a mechanism which will enable those relevant
governmental and non-governmental organisations to have the access to the WTO dispute
settlement proceedings. As for the participation of those non-Member governments, the
author of this thesis prefers that the future international court of trade should exclude
such possibility. This is because the WTO is a "technical" organisation. Its dispute
settlement mechanism is only one of the means available between the Member and non-
Member governments to solve their trade disputes. The latter may either choose a
"universal" and open international organisation or act on a mutual agreement for the
dispute settlement.
One other issue concerning publicity is whether the WTO dispute settlement process
should be under the public scrutiny. Article 14(1) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding states: "Panel deliberations shall be confidential." Similar provisions can
also be found in Article 17, which is to regulate the appellate review proceedings.70 These
arrangements are obviously the legacy of the GATT negotiation-based dispute settlement
practice. In contrast, Article 46 of the ICJ Statute states: "The hearing in Court shall be
public, unless the Court shall decide otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the
71
public be not admitted." This is also the common practice of most tribunals, both
domestic and international.72 At least, there are two contributory points accounting for
68
: Article 12(2) of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement states: "The Committee(on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures) shall maintain close contact with the relevant international organisations in the
field of sanitary and phytosanitary protection, especially with the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the
International Office ofEpizootics, and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention, with
the objective of securing the best available scientific and technical advice for the administration of this
Agreement and in order to ensure that unnecessary duplication of effort is avoided". See supra note 3.
69
: The Appellate Body states: "It may be well to stress at the outset that access to the dispute settlement
process of the WTO is limited to Members of the WTO. This access is not available, under the WTO
Agreement and the covered agreements as they currently exist, to individuals or international organisations,
whether governmental or non-governmental. Only Members may become parties to a dispute of which a
panel may be seized, and only Members 'having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel' may
become third parties in the proceedings before that panel".(Original note omitted). United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R(distributed on 12 October 1998),
p.35.
70
: Article 17(10) of the DSU partly states: "The proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be
confidential..." See supra note 3.
71
: See supra note 12.
7~
: For example, Article 40(1), (2) of the European Convention ofHuman Rights provides respectively:
"Hearings shall be in public unless the Court in exceptional circumstances decides otherwise." "Documents
deposited with the Registrar shall be accessible to the public unless the President of the Court decides
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this arrangement. Firstly, public hearing will help the dispute settlement proceedings
progress on an impartial way. This is also one of the basic elements for a judicial body.
Secondly, through the dispute settlement, not only the disputing parties, but other
Members, will have a better understanding to the WTO rules. This will eventually reduce
the trade disputes among Members. The WTO dispute settlement procedures, in this
context, need to be more transparent when the dispute settlement institutions evolve on
the way from quasi-judicial to the judicial.
Then, the third aspect for consideration is the enforcement of the adopted panel or
Appellate Body decisions. In general, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is
efficient, compared with that of the GATT or even some other international tribunals. For
example, the dispute settlement process under the International Court of Justice, ifwe do
not take into account the nature of the cases, takes a much longer time. The
"automaticity" provisions of the DSU have eliminated the ability of some recalcitrant
defending parties to block the dispute settlement system at critical stages, such as panel
establishment or the adoption of panel or Appellate Body reports. The "cross-retaliation"
system ensures the winning party to find one way or another to get compensation if the
losing party fails to bring its measures in conformity with the WTO rules. Nevertheless,
as it was pointed out previously, the "sequence" problem still looks like Achilles' heel of
the whole enforcement system.73 Although early experience has told us that most WTO
Members are ready to accept the decisions made by the present dispute settlement
institutions, there is no such guarantee that this loophole will not be exploited. In this
respect, the future reform should focus on the strict construction of Article 21(5) and
Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,74 As the author of this thesis
suggested in the previous chapter, the right for the complaining party to suspend(or
otherwise." cf. http://www.ppu.org.uk/learn/texts/doc_enropean%20convention.htm Article 291(1) of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea states: "All the dispute settlement procedures specified in this Part shall
be open to States Parties." In some circumstances, the dispute settlement procedures shall be open to
entities other than States Parties.(Article 291 [2]). See supra note 12.
73
: See supra note 32.
74
: Cherise M. Valles and Brendan P. McGivern put forward three models for the construction of Article
21(5) and Article 22 of the DSU: (a)The Bananas model: the arbitrators first determined the WTO-
consistency of the implementing measures(the role of an Article 21 [5] panel) before assessing the level of
the suspension of concessions(the function of an Article 22 arbitration). The two principal difficulties with
this model are that it blurs the line between Article 21(5) and Article 22, which were intended by the DSU
to perform separate functions, and it compresses two major adjudicative functions into a single, limited
timeframe. (b)The Salmon model: the parties provided for "sequencing" on ad hoc basis. The complaining
party, Canada, made concurrent requests for the suspension of concessions under Article 22 and for the
establishment of a panel under Article 21(5). Canada and Australia then asked the Article 22 arbitrators to
suspend their deliberations on the level of suspension until after the Article 21(5) panel had ruled on the
WTO-consistency of Australia's implementing measures. This may well prove to be a model for future
cases, as it establishes a procedure to ensure that any request to suspend concessions is based on a prior
multilateral determination of inconsistency. It also preserves the right of the complaining party to receive
subsequent authorisation to suspend concessions by negative consensus. (c)The SCM model: in three
implementation disputes involving prohibited subsidies, the parties used a provision in the SCMAgreement
to extend any Article 22 retaliation deadlines that would otherwise apply. In each case, the complaining
party requested the establishment of an Article 21(5) panel on the basis of a bilateral agreement to extend
the Article 22 deadlines until after completion of the Article 21(5) process. This model is likely to serve as
a precedent for SCM implementation disputes in the future. See supra note 32. Each of the foregoing
models provides a practical solution in a specific case, but not applicable to all sorts of disputes,
particularly when the disputing parties cannot agree on the applicable procedure.
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retaliate) should start 20 days after the expiration of the reasonable period if no
satisfactory compensation has been agreed. If the dispute is referred to the panel
according to Article 21(5) of the DSU, this right should start after the Panel report is
adopted without the possibility of being appealed. In other words, this sort of review is
only limited to the panel(if possible the original panel) and can be invoked only once.75
This is because an efficient implementation system not only represents the rule-
orientation of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, but helps to strengthen the
Members' confidence in the future dispute settlement institutions.
In the context of a new international court of trade, some Members may express their
concern with the workload and procedural delays as the case of the ICJ, a concern not
although unjustified. We need only consider the South West Africa cases,76 or the
Barcelona Traction case,77 in which, in 1966 and 1970, the International Court of Justice
70
rejected the applications as inadmissible after six or eight years of proceedings.
Recently, procedural delays in the ICJ have been reduced and this may have played a role
in the renewed confidence placed in the Court. But progress can still be made. One other
concern which merits our notice is the cost of the proceedings in the new trade court.
Long proceedings cost more money. This might be a problem for some developing
country Members. In this respect, the future international court of trade may follow the
practice of the ICJ, to set up a fund financed by voluntary contributions from WTO
Members, with a view to providing financial assistance to poorer Members to participate
in the dispute settlement proceedings.
Gilbert Guillaume cogently pointed out in his article The Future of International
Judicial Institutions that "The role of international justice in our world must be neither
exaggerated nor underestimated. When the Permanent Court of Justice was set up, after
the First World War, the paramount idea was that the use of force would cease if
governments were compelled to go to courts instead of going to war. This notion is still
alive among the general public and with people especially 'concerned' about keeping the
peace.. .The problem of peace cannot be reduced to the settlement of disputes and even to
the settlement of certain kinds of disputes. Certainly the judiciary may make a very
valuable contribution to the maintenance of peace. But resort to the Court is not the
'miraculous' remedy which will wipe violence from the face of the Earth".79 The creation
of a new international court of trade does not mean the provision of a panacea to all trade
disputes. It is only the initial effort to strengthen the WTO rules and, to attract more
WTO Members to solve their disputes through legal means. This effort should be
buttressed by a solid political will of all WTO Members for a fair international trade
system.
75: See Part Four, Section Three ofChapter Five.
76:1. C. J. Reports, No.319, 1962 and, I. C. J. Reports, No.6, 1966.
77:1. C. J. Reports, No.3, 1970.
78
: Responding to the criticism, the ICJ revised its rules of procedure in 1972 and 1978, and the situation
has now changed. The most recent advisory opinions have taken from three to six months. It is true,
however, that when the Court is seized as a result of a special agreement between States, it generally
delivers its judgement within two or three years. On the other hand, when unilateral requests are submitted
to the Court, procedures may be more lengthy, due to objections relating to jurisdiction or admissibility
raised by the respondent State. See Gilbert Guillaume: The Future of International Judicial Institutions,





From the GATT to the World Trade Organisation, international regulation of trade
has progressed from a voluntary basis to an institutional basis. The post-war trade and
financial order was mainly designed to enable States to manage their domestic
economies, in a manner consistent with political and social stability and justice, without
the risk of setting off a protectionist race to the bottom. States obligated themselves not to
impose quotas or related import restrictions, the sort of means strongly associated with
the inter-war years. Meanwhile, they were not required to eliminate or reduce their import
tariffs. The legal structure of the GATT was created to facilitate such concessions and
make them binding. The two pillars which supported the GATT legal structure are the
most-favoured-nation treatment clause and the national treatment clause, which are
embedded in Articles I and III ofGATT 1947.
The World Trade Organisation has inherited these basic principles from the GATT in
regulating international trade. However, because of its birth defects, the GATT had some
significant limitations. The contractual character meant that the GATT could not
effectively make its participants keep their domestic policies consistent with the GATT
trade rules. The positive consensus process left panel decisions at risk of being blocked
by the losing party. The relative lack of discipline made GATT dispute settlement
proceedings less predictable and, in some cases, extraordinarily prolonged. In contrast,
the World Trade Organisation has its own legal personality, parallel to those international
institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The coexistence of
sovereign States and separate customs territories in the WTO indicates a broader type of
membership in this international institution. Compared with the GATT, the WTO has not
only strengthened the regulation of international trade, but established a new dispute
settlement mechanism to ensure that these principles are followed. Furthermore, the
WTO has expanded its regulation beyond trade in goods, to include services and trade-
related intellectual property rights. Therefore, the differences between the GATT and the
WTO are reflected in both their institutional structures and their regulatory remit.
The expansion of the institutional dimension and the increase of membership have
occurred concurrently with the evolution of dispute settlement from a negotiation-based
means to a rule-based means. Compared with the GATT dispute settlement mechanism
and many other international tribunals, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is unique
in many aspects. Although there is no formal judicial body like the International Court of
Justice, trade disputes can be settled swiftly, and the recommendations and rulings made
by panels or the Appellate Body(after they are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body)
are binding on both parties to the dispute. More significantly, developing countries have
changed their attitude from reluctance and scepticism to acceptance and cooperation.
They have begun to participate in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings despite the
fact that the participants are still limited to a small portion of them. This is a positive
trend for any international institution.
At this point in time, appraisals of the early experience of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism are almost uniformly optimistic and approving. The new mechanism has
established a unified dispute settlement system for all parts of the GATT/WTO rules,
including those which regulate the new subjects of services and intellectual property
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rights. It has clarified that all parts of the Uruguay Round legal texts, which are relevant
to the matter in issue, can be considered in a particular dispute case. It has reaffirmed and
clarified the right of a complaining Member to have a panel process initiated, preventing
blocking at that stage. It has established a unique appellate review procedure which has
substituted some of the former procedures of Council approval of a panel report. The
negative consensus has made it possible to avoid blocking the establishment of a panel
and the adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report. All these features have helped us
to understand why this new dispute settlement mechanism is playing a more and more
important role in the resolution of international trade disputes.
Positive as it is, the new dispute settlement mechanism is still not ideal in its impact
on many developing country Members. Specifically, there are several issues to be
clarified, which concern the relationships of developing country Members and the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism. The issue of the economic development in developing
countries and the establishment of the rule-orientation in international trade order was
intensely debated during the Uruguay Round negotiations, and is still controversial
among WTO Members. The general principle contained in Article 11:2 of the WTO
Agreement requires that all WTO agreements(except those plurilateral agreements)
should bind all WTO Members. In view of the current situations in many developing
countries, the WTO permits these countries some time to delay the implementation of
WTO agreements. By now, most of these extended periods have expired, which means
that developing country Members including these least developed countries shall be
bound by the WTO rules. But the economic situation in many of these countries has not
changed fundamentally.
As dispute settlement is vital to maintaining integrity ofWTO treaty system and to
protecting interests of weaker developing country Members, the dispute settlement
mechanism plays an important role to provide authoritative interpretation and application
of the WTO rules, to maintain a balance between rules of multilateral trade system and
sovereignty of States, and to ensure the integrated application ofWTO law and the rest of
international law. All these features have led to the combination of a pragmatic approach
and rule-orientation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
WTO dispute settlement mechanism has manifested its pragmatism in many different
ways. In a broad sense, it can operate generally to influence WTO Members in their
approach to trade policies and the latest developments in international trade relations,
especially in the absence of universally accepted norms. More specifically, pragmatism
can find a basis in, and be derived from, those legal provisions of the WTO agreements.
The purpose of this pragmatic approach is to give added flexibility and to mitigate any
undue rigidity in the application ofWTO law, so as to make the implementation ofWTO
agreements more feasible and practicable in terms of trade policies. But the WTO
consists of 144 Members and the membership is still on the increase. Too much
flexibility will destroy the balance of concessions struck in the Uruguay Round
negotiations, and too much rigidity will also make the new institution and its legal system
become irrelevant. Therefore, the task for the WTO dispute settlement bodies, including
the panels and the Appellate Body, is to find an optimal balance between a strictly
juridical pursuit of the basic GATT/WTO principles and a pragmatic recognition of the
political and economic realities in many developing country Members.
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In the context of the dispute settlement procedures, this thesis provides a critical
analysis of the impact of some specific issues upon the developing country Members. The
non-violation dispute settlement process is a unique feature in the WTO litigation system.
From the developing countries' perspective, this process may operate like a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, developing country Members can raise their complaints, under
the non-violation clause, of these WTO-consistent measures implemented by some
developed country Members, particularly under the provisions of GATT Article
XX(General Exceptions) and Article XXI{Security Exceptions), which, nevertheless,
have already affected the exports of some developing country Members. On the other
hand, the ambiguity in concept of those non-violation provisions will engage developing
countries in many unexpected disputes. This is a disadvantage to many developing
countries, both in economic and legal terms. If the complained measure is found to be
permitted under the WTO rules, albeit the harmful effect on the exports of a developing
country Member, the consequential result will fall back to the negotiations between the
disputing parties for the possible compensation, which will put many developing
countries in a disadvantageous position as the limited varieties of and heavy dependence
on their exports usually make them almost have no "bargaining chips" to negotiate. In
this respect, it is reminiscent of the significance of a rule-oriented trade system to many
developing countries.
With the WTO disputes becoming rather "technical" and complicated, evidence
presented by both parties to the dispute is becoming more and more important in the
deliberations of a panel report. Considering the lack of relevant expertise in most
developing country Members, the draftsmen of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
made a particular provision which provides: "While the Secretariat assists Members in
respect of dispute settlement at their request, there may also be a need to provide
additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute settlement to developing
country Members. To this end, the Secretariat shall make available a qualified legal
expert from the WTO technical co-operation service to any developing country Member
which so requests. This expert shall assist the developing country Member in a manner
ensuring the continued impartiality of the Secretariat"(Article 27[2] of the DSU). The
ambiguous wording in the above provision may lead to the difficulties to define the
nature of the legal assistance. As one scholar has pointed out, Article 27(2) offers only a
limited sort of technical cooperation to WTO developing and least developed country
Members, once a complaint has been filed, which means that no advice may be given on
strategies or procedures that such a Member may follow in bringing a dispute.1 Thus, in
terms ofWTO legal assistance in this respect, there is still a lot ofwork to do.
Connected with evidence-presenting is the standard of review. The Dispute Settlement
Understanding contains no explicit provisions upon this issue. Article 11 simply exhorts
panels to "make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements". The sparse language may lead to disagreement when a
1
: The author of this thesis takes this view from one of the examiners, Mary E. Footer. In the first review of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding which was held in the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999, many
developing country Members expressed their concern about the shortage of resources to participate in the
dispute settlement system, cf. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minst_/min99_e/english
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panel is examining the domestic law of a Member as interpreted by domestic authorities
and tribunals to determine whether the law, or the actions of those authorities and
tribunals(including fact-finding), or both are in compliance with the provisions of the
covered agreements. Within the current WTO legal frame, only the Antidumping
Agreement addresses explicitly the issue of standard of review. A certain degree of
deference to the findings of fact made by domestic authorities in antidumping matters is
provided in Article 17(6)(i) of that Agreement, which states: "in its assessment of the
facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities' establishment of the
facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of
the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the
panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned".
But in what circumstances the evaluation can be deemed as "unbiased" and "objective"?
this Agreement does not say about that. It is at the discretion of the panel. Since the
victims in those antidumping complaints are usually developing countries, whether the
domestic authorities could have a correct evaluation of those basic elements concerning
the price of the exported product is crucial to their objective judgement. The standard-of-
review issue, in the view of Steven Croley and John Jackson, has become something of a
touchstone regarding the relationship of "sovereignty" concepts to the GATT/WTO rule
system.2 In many ways this relationship reflects a central problem for the future of the
international trading system—how to reconcile competing views about the allocation of
power between national governments and international institutions on matters of vital
concern to governments, as well as the domestic constituencies of some of those
governments.
Arbitration, as an alternative means contained in the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, can be used to facilitate the solution of certain disputes which concern issues
"that are clearly defined by both parties"(Article 25[1] of the DSU). An arbitration under
the WTO jurisdiction is usually raised upon those issues concerning the fact finding and
the standard of review. Several advantages of arbitration can be easily discerned.
Promptness and flexibility are the most obvious ones among them. Simple process means
time-saving, money-saving, or even face-saving. In the context of the WTO dispute
settlement proceedings, arbitration, however, is not a suitable means for all sorts of
disputes and all kinds of Members. The apparent disadvantage is the lack of rules to
regulate the arbitration process. Article 25 of the DSU is the relevant provision, but is
insufficient. Since there are no clear provisions in the DSU to refer to the arbitration rules
outside the WTO legal system, the author of this thesis holds that WTO Members,
particularly the developing and least developed country Members, should be careful in
choosing whether they will put their disputes to the panelists or arbitrators. In contrast,
the detailed provisions governing the panel examination and appellate review in the DSU
indicate that these procedures seem more attractive and manageable.
Finally, there are two basic themes which need to be further clarified in future. The
first theme is how to incorporate developing country Members fully into the global
trading community through the dispute settlement process. The World Trade Organisation
is a new institution. The myriad of trade rules made during the Uruguay Round
2
: See Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson: WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and
Deference to National Governments, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.90, 1996, p. 194.
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negotiations is beyond the knowledge of any single intellect. Most developing country
Members still have not acquired a full understanding of the impact of these rules. In view
of the backward economic structures and the huge task to eliminate poverty in some
developing country Members, it is understandable to us that the implementation of WTO
rules in these countries have met some uncooperation, or even resistance. Some
developing countries fear that the current globalisation will marginalise their economy
and, eventually, widen the gap between them and developed countries. In this respect, the
WTO dispute settlement institutions, including the panels and the Appellate Body, may
reduce these fears to a certain extent by the peaceful resolution of trade disputes,
particularly those between developing and developed country Members. At this point, it
merits our review of the resolutions of two disputes United States—Restrictions on
Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear(hereinafter as US Underwear
Imports) and European Communities—Regimefor the Importation, Sale and Distribution
ofBananas{hereinafter as Bananas). In the former case, the Panel agreed that the United
States failed to prove both the underlying causality of its domestic industries and the
attribution of the damage to an individual Member's exports. In the appellate review
proceedings, Costa Rica succeeded in obtaining a ruling from the Appellate Body on a
few narrow points upon which it did not prevail with the Panel, i.e. the United States
could not impose a restraint between the time ofpublication of the notice of consultations
and the date of formal application of the measure.3 The resolution of the dispute US
Underwear Imports has strengthened the confidence of many developing country
Members that even a small country like Costa Rica can challenge the sole superpower,
the United States, in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. In the latter case, the
Appellate Body decided on one of the disputing points that WTO Members should be
allowed to have private counsel present during the Appellate Body hearings.4 The
Bananas case has helped developing country Members to become aware that the dispute
settlement in the WTO is not rigid in clarifying the WTO rules. The domestic situations
of some developing country Members should also be under the deliberations of the
dispute settlement institutions.
The second theme is how to define a "developing country Member". As noted in the
thesis, more than two-thirds of the WTO Members select themselves as "developing
country Members". Under this circumstance, it is not difficult to conceive that such an
ambiguous definition will bring about much confusion in applying those special and
preferential provisions contained in the WTO Agreement and its covered agreements for
developing country Members. Furthermore, the large number of applicable Members will
make it even more difficult for the WTO to distribute the limited legal assistance fund to
those which are really in need of help. Hence, it is necessary to redefine a developing
country Member in the WTO. Two practicable ways are available at the moment. One is
to regroup the developing country Members, applying different treatment to different
3
: United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R
(distributed on 10 February 1997), Report of the Appellate Body, pp. 11-17.
4
: The Appellate Body states: "representation by counsel of a government's own choice may well be a
matter of particular significance, especially for developing country Members, to enable them to participate
fully in dispute settlement proceedings." European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution ofBananas, WT/DS27/AB/R(distributed on 9 September 1997), Report of the Appellate Body,
paras.4-12.
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groups. The author in this thesis referred to the practice of the World Bank, i.e., to use the
Gross National Income(GNI) per capita as the criterion to classify the WTO Members
This is a persuasive and practicable method. The other method, following the way in
which some developed countries offer their GSP treatment to the exports of developing
countries, is to set a criterion for providing special and preferential treatment to a certain
group of developing country Members. Any Member which has reached this criterion will
"graduate" from this group.
To provide legal and financial assistance to developing country Members is not the
final objective of the World Trade Organisation and its dispute settlement mechanism.
The final objective is, as the WTO Agreement has declared, to raise standards of living,
ensure full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expand the production of and trade in goods and services under the
general guideline of optimal use and preserving of natural resources. The problem of
development is not domestic, but international in its nature. Whether the World Trade
Organisation and its dispute settlement mechanism have enhanced the international trade
can only be appraised against a broader perspective of whether the developing country
Members, particularly those least-developed country Members, have benefited from this
new institution and its legal system. The contribution of this thesis is not to make
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